good faith claim in New York

2025CPLR 3408 provides for mandatory settlement conferences in certain residential foreclosure actions and requires that "[b]oth the plaintiff and defendant shall negotiate in good faith to reach a mutually agreeable resolution, including a loan modification, if possible" (CPLR 3408 [f]; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers , 108 AD3d 9, 11 [2d Dept 2013]). " 'The purpose of the good faith requirement [in CPLR 3408] is to ensure that both plaintiff and defendant are prepared to participate in a meaningful effort at the settlement conference to reach resolution' " ( US Bank N.A. v Sarmiento , 121 AD

2025CPLR 3408 provides for mandatory settlement conferences in certain residential foreclosure actions and requires that "[b]oth the plaintiff and defendant shall negotiate in good faith to reach a mutually agreeable resolution, including a loan modification, if possible" (CPLR 3408 [f]; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers , 108 AD3d 9 , 11 [2d Dept 2013]). " 'The purpose of the good faith requirement [in CPLR 3408] is to ensure that both plaintiff and defendant are prepared to participate in a meaningful effort at the settlement conference to reach resolution' " ( US Bank N.A. v Sarmiento , 121 A

2015Penal Law § 155.15 (1) provides that, “[i]n any prosecution for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in good faith.” As noted in People v Green ( 5 NY3d 538, 542 [2005]), however, the Court of Appeals in People v Chesler ( 50 NY2d 203, 209-210 [1980]) “held that section 155.15 was unconstitutional insofar as it made a good-faith claim of right an affirmative defense because to do so impermissibly shifted the burden onto the defendant to disprove the element of intent.” Rather, “a goo

2015Penal Law § 155.15 (1) provides that, “[i]n any prosecution for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in good faith.” As noted in People v Green ( 5 NY3d 538, 542 [2005]), however, the Court of Appeals in People v Chesler ( 50 NY2d 203, 209-210 [1980]) “held that section 155.15 was unconstitutional insofar as it made a good-faith claim of right an affirmative defense because to do so impermissibly shifted the burden onto the defendant to disprove the element of intent.” Rather, “a goo

2015Penal Law § 155.15 (1) provides that, “[i]n any prosecution for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in good faith.” As noted in People v Green ( 5 NY3d 538, 542 [2005]), however, the Court of Appeals in People v Chesler ( 50 NY2d 203, 209-210 [1980]) “held that section 155.15 was unconstitutional insofar as it made a good-faith claim of right an affirmative defense because to do so impermissibly shifted the burden onto the defendant to disprove the element of intent.” Rather, “a goo

2015Penal Law § 155.15 (1) provides that, “[i]n any prosecution for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in good faith.” As noted in People v Green ( 5 NY3d 538, 542 [2005]), however, the Court of Appeals in People v Chesler ( 50 NY2d 203, 209-210 [1980]) “held that section 155.15 was unconstitutional insofar as it made a good-faith claim of right an affirmative defense because to do so impermissibly shifted the burden onto the defendant to disprove the element of intent.” Rather, “a goo

2015Penal Law § 155.15 (1) provides that, “[i]n any prosecution for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in good faith.” As noted in People v Green ( 5 NY3d 538, 542 [2005]), however, the Court of Appeals in People v Chesler ( 50 NY2d 203, 209-210 [1980]) “held that section 155.15 was unconstitutional insofar as it made a good-faith claim of right an affirmative defense because to do so impermissibly shifted the burden onto the defendant to disprove the element of intent.” Rather, “a goo

2015Penal Law § 155.15 (1) provides that, “[i]n any prosecution for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in good faith.” As noted in People v Green ( 5 NY3d 538, 542 [2005]), however, the Court of Appeals in People v Chesler ( 50 NY2d 203, 209-210 [1980]) “held that section 155.15 was unconstitutional insofar as it made a good-faith claim of right an affirmative defense because to do so impermissibly shifted the burden onto the defendant to disprove the element of intent.” Rather, “a goo

2025As a consequence, the implied covenant claim is duplicative and therefore palpably insufficient as a matter of law ( see Mill Fin., LLC v Gillett , 122 AD3d 98, 104-105 [1st Dept 2014] ["Where a good faith claim arises from the same facts and seeks the same damages as a breach of contract claim, it should be dismissed"]; MBIA Ins.

2024Thus, "[w]here a good faith claim arises from the same facts and seeks the same damages as a breach of contract claim, it should be dismissed" (Mill Fin., LLC v. Gillett, 122 A.D.3d 98, 104 [1st Dep't 2014].

2021In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v Contes , 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we conclude that there is a "valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences" that could lead a rational person to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt ( People v Delamota , 18 NY3d 107, 113 [2011]) that defendant did not act under a good faith claim of right ( see generally People v Kachadourian , 184 AD3d 1021, 1027 [3d Dept 2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1113 [2020]; People v Hurst , 113 AD3d 1119, 1120 [4th Dept 2014], lv denied 22 NY3d 1199 [2014], reconsideration

2015Penal Law § 155.15 (1) provides that, “[i]n any prosecution for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in good faith.” As noted in People v Green ( 5 NY3d 538, 542 [2005]), however, the Court of Appeals in People v Chesler ( 50 NY2d 203, 209-210 [1980]) “held that section 155.15 was unconstitutional insofar as it made a good-faith claim of right an affirmative defense because to do so impermissibly shifted the burden onto the defendant to disprove the element of intent.” Rather, “a goo

2025CPLR 3408 provides for mandatory settlement conferences in certain residential foreclosure actions and requires that "[b]oth the plaintiff and defendant shall negotiate in good faith to reach a mutually agreeable resolution, including a loan modification, if possible" (CPLR 3408 [f]; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers , 108 AD3d 9, 11 [2d Dept 2013]). " 'The purpose of the good faith requirement [in CPLR 3408] is to ensure that both plaintiff and defendant are prepared to participate in a meaningful effort at the settlement conference to reach resolution' " ( US Bank N.A. v Sarmiento , 121 AD

2025CPLR 3408 provides for mandatory settlement conferences in certain residential foreclosure actions and requires that "[b]oth the plaintiff and defendant shall negotiate in good faith to reach a mutually agreeable resolution, including a loan modification, if possible" (CPLR 3408 [f]; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers , 108 AD3d 9 , 11 [2d Dept 2013]). " 'The purpose of the good faith requirement [in CPLR 3408] is to ensure that both plaintiff and defendant are prepared to participate in a meaningful effort at the settlement conference to reach resolution' " ( US Bank N.A. v Sarmiento , 121 A

2021"Pursuant to CPLR 3408(f), the parties at a mandatory . . . settlement conference are required to negotiate in good faith to reach a mutually agreeable resolution" ( U.S. Bank N.A. v Smith , 123 AD3d 914 , 916; see CPLR 3408[f]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers , 108 AD3d 9, 11 ). "'The purpose of the good faith requirement [in CPLR 3408] is to ensure that both plaintiff and defendant are prepared to participate in a meaningful effort at the settlement conference to reach resolution'" ( U.S. Bank N.A. v Smith , 123 AD3d at 916, quoting US Bank N.A. v Sarmiento , 121 AD3d 187, 200 [internal quot

2021"Pursuant to CPLR 3408(f), the parties at a mandatory . . . settlement conference are required to negotiate in good faith to reach a mutually agreeable resolution" ( U.S. Bank N.A. v Smith , 123 AD3d 914 , 916; see CPLR 3408[f]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers , 108 AD3d 9, 11 ). "'The purpose of the good faith requirement [in CPLR 3408] is to ensure that both plaintiff and defendant are prepared to participate in a meaningful effort at the settlement conference to reach resolution'" ( U.S. Bank N.A. v Smith , 123 AD3d at 916, quoting US Bank N.A. v Sarmiento , 121 AD3d 187, 200 [internal quot

2019Although we agree with defendant that the court's reference to the good faith of the police officers in conducting its analysis was misplaced inasmuch as the Court of Appeals has declined to adopt the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule ( see Bigelow , 66 NY2d at 426-427 ; see also P.J.

2015The court is greatly indebted to Justice Barry Kamins for chronicling the following cases in which the Court of Appeals has applied a more stringent state standard: People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417 (1985) (declining to adopt a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule); People v Johnson, 66 NY2d 398 (1985) (adhering to the “bright line” two prong test of Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108 [1964] and Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410 [1969] in evaluating warrantless searches and seizures based on informant information in stead of adopting the Supreme Court’s “totality of the circumstances” test);

2015Here, however, the court instructed the jury that “defendant has the burden of proving that she took, withheld or obtained the property under a claim of right made in good faith by a preponderance of the evidence.” We conclude that the court committed a mode of proceedings error when it shifted the burden onto defendant to disprove the element of intent (see Green, 5 NY3d at 542 ), thereby requiring reversal of the judgment and a new trial even in the absence of preservation (see generally People v Becoats, 17 NY3d 643, 651 [2011], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 1970 [2012]; People v Patterson

2015Here, however, the court instructed the jury that “defendant has the burden of proving that she took, withheld or obtained the property under a claim of right made in good faith by a preponderance of the evidence.” We conclude that the court committed a mode of proceedings error when it shifted the burden onto defendant to disprove the element of intent (see Green, 5 NY3d at 542 ), thereby requiring reversal of the judgment and a new trial even in the absence of preservation (see generally People v Becoats, 17 NY3d 643, 651 [2011], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 1970 [2012]; People v Patterson

2015Here, however, the court instructed the jury that “defendant has the burden of proving that she took, withheld or obtained the property under a claim of right made in good faith by a preponderance of the evidence.” We conclude that the court committed a mode of proceedings error when it shifted the burden onto defendant to disprove the element of intent (see Green, 5 NY3d at 542 ), thereby requiring reversal of the judgment and a new trial even in the absence of preservation (see generally People v Becoats, 17 NY3d 643, 651 [2011], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 1970 [2012]; People v Patterson

2015Here, however, the court instructed the jury that “defendant has the burden of proving that she took, withheld or obtained the property under a claim of right made in good faith by a preponderance of the evidence.” We conclude that the court committed a mode of proceedings error when it shifted the burden onto defendant to disprove the element of intent (see Green, 5 NY3d at 542 ), thereby requiring reversal of the judgment and a new trial even in the absence of preservation (see generally People v Becoats, 17 NY3d 643, 651 [2011], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 1970 [2012]; People v Patterson

2012As Colonial correctly contends, transfers made in violation of a court order are void insofar as property is transferred to an entity that has notice of the order, with no or inadequate consideration, and the court may direct that the recipients of such transfers convey the property pursuant to the escrow order (see Skiff-Murray v Murray, 17 AD3d 807, 808-809 [2005]; Catalano v Catalano, 158 AD2d 570, 572 [1990], order amended 176 AD2d 278 [1991]).

2012As Colonial correctly contends, transfers made in violation of a court order are void insofar as property is transferred to an entity that has notice of the order, with no or inadequate consideration, and the court may direct that the recipients of such transfers convey the property pursuant to the escrow order (see Skiff-Murray v Murray, 17 AD3d 807, 808-809 [2005]; Catalano v Catalano, 158 AD2d 570, 572 [1990], order amended 176 AD2d 278 [1991]).

2012As Colonial correctly contends, transfers made in violation of a court order are void insofar as property is transferred to an entity that has notice of the order, with no or inadequate consideration, and the court may direct that the recipients of such transfers convey the property pursuant to the escrow order (see Skiff-Murray v Murray, 17 AD3d 807, 808-809 [2005]; Catalano v Catalano, 158 AD2d 570, 572 [1990], order amended 176 AD2d 278 [1991]).

2012As Colonial correctly contends, transfers made in violation of a court order are void insofar as property is transferred to an entity that has notice of the order, with no or inadequate consideration, and the court may direct that the recipients of such transfers convey the property pursuant to the escrow order (see Skiff-Murray v Murray, 17 AD3d 807, 808-809 [2005]; Catalano v Catalano, 158 AD2d 570, 572 [1990], order amended 176 AD2d 278 [1991]).

2023A good faith claim, however, is not duplicative of a breach of contract claim where the complaint alleges conduct that is separate from the conduct constituting the alleged breach of contract and such conduct deprived the other party of the benefit of its bargain ( see Credit Agricole Corporate v BDC Fin., LLC , 135 AD3d 561, 561 [1st Dept 2016]).

2023A good faith claim, however, is not duplicative of a breach of contract claim where the complaint alleges conduct that is separate from the conduct constituting the alleged breach of contract and such conduct deprived the other party of the benefit of its bargain ( see Credit Agricole Corporate v BDC Fin., LLC , 135 AD3d 561, 561 [1st Dept 2016]).

2021Consequently, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction ( see People v McCoy , 188 AD3d 1262, 1262 [2d Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 1058 [2021]; see generally People v Bleakley , 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).

2015A good faith claim of right negates larcenous intent, and the People have the burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Zona, 14 NY3d 488, 492-493 [2010]; People v Green, 5 NY3d 538, 542 [2005]). *1076 In analyzing the legal sufficiency of a conviction, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the People and “determine whether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial and as a matter of law satisfy the proof and burde

2014Where a good faith claim arises from the same facts and seeks the same damages as a breach of contract claim, it should be dismissed (Amcan Holdings, Inc. v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 70 AD3d 423, 426 [1st Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 704 [2010]).

2010(See Amcan Holdings, Inc. v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 70 AD3d 423, 426 [1st Dept 2010] [dismissing a good faith and fair dealing claim because it arose from the same facts as the breach of contract claim].) Claims for breach of good faith and fair dealing are not duplicative when claims are not directed at all of the defendants and where claims are not predicated on contractual terms that form the basis of the breach of contract claim.

2021Defendant contends that, during the trial, the court erred in not giving an expanded charge on the justification defense in the context of a robbery to explain that a person, i.e., the victim, may not use force to recover property allegedly owned by him under a good-faith claim of right ( see generally People v Reid , 69 NY2d 469, 475 [1987]).

2007This Court has explicitly held that a good-faith claim of right is not a defense to robbery (see People v Banks, 55 AD2d 795, 795-796 [1976]), which holding has been cited with approval by the Court of Appeals (see People v Reid, 69 NY2d 469 [1987]).

2015Corp., 87 AD2d 514, 515 [1st Dept 1982].) Compliance with the good faith requirement of CPLR 3408 “must be based on the totality of the circumstances.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Van Dyke, 101 AD3d 638, 638-639 [1st Dept 2012].) The issue of whether a party failed to negotiate in good faith should be determined by considering whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the party’s conduct did not constitute a meaningful effort at reaching a resolution.

2014The Appellate Division has also made clear that a lender’s refusal to make an offer with the exact terms and conditions as desired by a borrower does not constitute a violation of the good faith requirement (Lucido, 114 AD3d 714 , 715; Van Dyke, 101 AD3d 638 ).

2019Video , 68 NY2d at 305 ), the court also concluded more broadly that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule did not justify its application in this case.

1987Video, supra, at 305), and it has also rejected the application of the good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement (see, United States v Leon, 468 US 897 ) in such cases (see, People v Bigelow, supra, at 427; see also, People v P. J.

2015The court is greatly indebted to Justice Barry Kamins for chronicling the following cases in which the Court of Appeals has applied a more stringent state standard: People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417 (1985) (declining to adopt a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule); People v Johnson, 66 NY2d 398 (1985) (adhering to the “bright line” two prong test of Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108 [1964] and Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410 [1969] in evaluating warrantless searches and seizures based on informant information in stead of adopting the Supreme Court’s “totality of the circumstances” test);

1985(People v Jennings, 54 NY2d 518 [1981]; People v Zimmerman, 101 AD2d 294, 297 [2d Dept 1984] [“the good-faith exception * * * has not * * * been recognized by the Supreme Court * * * and * * * has been rejected by the courts of this State”]; cf. People v Young, 55 NY2d 419 [1982].) Most authoritatively, People v Gokey (supra) suppressed as illegally seized under the State Constitution evidence which the 4th Amendment would not have excluded.

2014However, the standard to apply in determining what constitutes a lack of good faith pursuant to CPLR 3408 (f) is a matter of first impression in this Court (cf. IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. v Yano-Horoski, 78 AD3d 895, 896 [2010] [the plaintiff did not challenge “bad faith” determination on appeal, but only contested the sanction of cancellation of the debt]).

2012Although not directly on point, because they do not explicitly address the good faith requirement of CPLR 3408 (f), the opinions in IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v Yano-Horoski ( 26 Misc 3d 717 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2009], revd as to sanction 78 AD3d 895 [2d Dept 2010]) are informative.