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33 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1950–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Leongreen2 sentences2023“The exclusionary rule . . . does not apply automatically, as even a search pursuant to an invalid search warrant may be found to be reasonable under the good-faith exception.” Id. (citing White v. State, 842 So. 2d 565, 571 (Miss. 2003); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 922- 23 (1984)). 2018The court went on to note that, even if the search warrant was invalid, the good-faith exception set forth by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897 , 926, 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) -which provided that "[i]n the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause"-would apply, and the evidence would be admissible. | 7 | 11 |
White v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Id. at 544 (¶21) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing White v. State, 842 So. 2d 565 , 10 570-72 (¶¶14-21) (Miss. 2003)). 2023“The exclusionary rule . . . does not apply automatically, as even a search pursuant to an invalid search warrant may be found to be reasonable under the good-faith exception.” Id. (citing White v. State, 842 So. 2d 565, 571 (Miss. 2003); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 922- 23 (1984)). | 5 | 8 |
United States v. Bobby Russellgreen2 sentences2018White v. State, 842 So. 2d 565, 571 (Miss. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Russell, 960 F.2d 421, 423 (5th Cir.1992)) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922–23). ¶36. 2018White v. State , 842 So.2d 565 , 571 (Miss. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Russell , 960 F.2d 421 , 423 (5th Cir.1992) ) (citing Leon , 468 U.S. at 922 -23 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ). ¶ 36. | 4 | 4 |
Sedric Sutton v. State of Mississippigreen2 sentences2026In any event, even if probable cause for issuing the search warrant arguably did not exist in this case, we point out that “[t]he exclusionary rule . . . does not apply automatically, as even a search pursuant to an invalid search warrant may be found to be reasonable under the good-faith exception.” Sutton, 238 So. 3d at 1159 (¶35). ¶24. 2023“The exclusionary rule . . . does not apply automatically, as even a search pursuant to an invalid search warrant may be found to be reasonable under the good-faith exception.” Id. (citing White v. State, 842 So. 2d 565, 571 (Miss. 2003); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 922- 23 (1984)). | 1 | 2 |
Hotboxxx, LLC v. City of Gulfport, Mississippigreen1 sentence2023“In Mississippi, standing depends on whether the plaintiff asserts a colorable interest in the subject-matter of the litigation or experiences an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant, or as otherwise provided by law.” Hotboxxx LLC v. City of Gulfport, 154 So. 3d 21, 27 (¶20) (Miss. 2015) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Eaddy v. Stategreen2 sentences2022In Eaddy v. State, 63 So. 3d 1209 (Miss. 2011), our Supreme Court stated that it had “no duty to address . . . the good-faith exception” because “the State’s brief [did] not address [the] Court’s precedent on that exception.” Id. at 1214-15 (¶¶21-22). 2022In Eaddy v. State, 63 So. 3d 1209 (Miss. 2011), our Supreme Court stated that it had “no duty to address . . . the good-faith exception” because “the State’s brief [did] not address [the] Court’s precedent on that exception.” Id. at 1214-15 (¶¶21-22). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tompkinsgreen1 sentence2022Article 3, Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution protects the entirety of 17 See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 612-13 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566 , 578 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999); State v. Tompkins, 723 N.W.2d 344, 347-49 (Neb. 2006); State v. Hicks, 147 P.3d 1076, 1089 (Kan. 2006). 18 See Eaddy, 63 So. 3d at 1215 (¶24) (stating that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in “White does not sanction the good-faith exception where the officer is mistaken about the suspect’s general right to be free | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Paulo Laragreen1 sentence2022Article 3, Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution protects the entirety of 17 See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 612-13 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566 , 578 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999); State v. Tompkins, 723 N.W.2d 344, 347-49 (Neb. 2006); State v. Hicks, 147 P.3d 1076, 1089 (Kan. 2006). 18 See Eaddy, 63 So. 3d at 1215 (¶24) (stating that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in “White does not sanction the good-faith exception where the officer is mistaken about the suspect’s general right to be free | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Wuriegreen1 sentence2022Article 3, Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution protects the entirety of 17 See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 612-13 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566 , 578 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999); State v. Tompkins, 723 N.W.2d 344, 347-49 (Neb. 2006); State v. Hicks, 147 P.3d 1076, 1089 (Kan. 2006). 18 See Eaddy, 63 So. 3d at 1215 (¶24) (stating that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in “White does not sanction the good-faith exception where the officer is mistaken about the suspect’s general right to be free | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hicksgreen1 sentence2022Article 3, Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution protects the entirety of 17 See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 612-13 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566 , 578 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999); State v. Tompkins, 723 N.W.2d 344, 347-49 (Neb. 2006); State v. Hicks, 147 P.3d 1076, 1089 (Kan. 2006). 18 See Eaddy, 63 So. 3d at 1215 (¶24) (stating that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in “White does not sanction the good-faith exception where the officer is mistaken about the suspect’s general right to be free | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Holmesgreen1 sentence2015In re Estate of Holmes, 961 So.2d 674, 682 (¶ 25) (Miss.2007). | 1 | 1 |
Pugh v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The State alternatively argues in its supplemental brief that “this Court may rely on the inevitable-discovery doetrine[.]” The inevitable-discovery doctrine states that “results of an unreasonable search will be admissible if it can be shown that this evidence would have ultimately been discovered by constitutionally permissible means.” Pugh v. State, 101 So.3d 682, 689 (¶29) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)). 2015The State alternatively argues in its supplemental brief that “this Court may rely on the inevitable-discovery doctrine[.]” The inevitable-discovery doctrine states that “results of an unreasonable search will be admissible if it can be shown that this evidence would have ultimately been discovered by constitutionally permissible means.” Pugh v. State, 101 So. 3d 682, 689 (¶29) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Magee v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Under the good-faith exception, the State may admit “evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be invalid.” Magee v. State, 73 So.3d 1183, 1189 (¶ 21) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-21 , 104 S.Ct. 3430 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)). 2015Under the good-faith exception, the State may admit “evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be invalid.” Magee v. State, 73 So. 3d 1183, 1189 (¶21) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Leongreen1 sentence2011Typically, the “mere existence of a warrant ... suffices to prove that an officer conducted a search in good faith and justifies application of the good faith exception.” United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 308 (3d Cir.2001) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ); see also United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 560-61 (3d. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Alex Hodgegreen1 sentence2011Typically, the “mere existence of a warrant ... suffices to prove that an officer conducted a search in good faith and justifies application of the good faith exception.” United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 308 (3d Cir.2001) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ); see also United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 560-61 (3d. | 1 | 1 |
| Gibson v. Manuelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Jones v. Preuit & Mauldingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Clinton Webster
green
2 sentences2016Webster, 734 F.2d at 1193 . 9 We recognize that although Pustay’s case was tried in 2007, the relevant Mississippi authority on impeachment of testimony is Carothers, 152 So. 3d 277 . 2016Webster, 734 F.2d at 1193 . . | 2 | 2014–2016 |
Winningham v. Winningham
green
2 sentences2015Id. 2014Id. | 2 | 2014–2015 |
Herring v. United States
green
2 sentences2010I begin with a brief discussion of Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 , 129 S.Ct. 695 , 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009), in which the United States Supreme Court applied the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in the context of negligent record-keeping by the police. 2010I begin with a brief discussion of Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 , 129 S.Ct. 695 , 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009), in which the United States Supreme Court applied the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in the context of negligent record-keeping by the police. | 2 | 2007–2010 |
United States v. Donald G. Ford (97-6097/6270) Sandra Hutchins Ford (97-6271)
green
1 sentence2022Article 3, Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution protects the entirety of 17 See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 612-13 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566 , 578 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999); State v. Tompkins, 723 N.W.2d 344, 347-49 (Neb. 2006); State v. Hicks, 147 P.3d 1076, 1089 (Kan. 2006). 18 See Eaddy, 63 So. 3d at 1215 (¶24) (stating that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in “White does not sanction the good-faith exception where the officer is mistaken about the suspect’s general right to be free | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Arnett v. State
green
1 sentence2022Arnett, 532 So. 2d at 1010 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Terrell v. State
green
1 sentence2018"The standard of review regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence is abuse of discretion." Terrell v. State , 952 So.2d 998 , 1005 (¶ 31) (Miss. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Eckman v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.
green
1 sentence2018Id. at 1053-54 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Anthony Carothers v. State of Mississippi
green
1 sentence2016Webster, 734 F.2d at 1193 . 9 We recognize that although Pustay’s case was tried in 2007, the relevant Mississippi authority on impeachment of testimony is Carothers, 152 So. 3d 277 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Nix v. Williams
green
2 sentences2015The State alternatively argues in its supplemental brief that “this Court may rely on the inevitable-discovery doetrine[.]” The inevitable-discovery doctrine states that “results of an unreasonable search will be admissible if it can be shown that this evidence would have ultimately been discovered by constitutionally permissible means.” Pugh v. State, 101 So.3d 682, 689 (¶29) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)). 2015The State alternatively argues in its supplemental brief that “this Court may rely on the inevitable-discovery doetrine[.]” The inevitable-discovery doctrine states that “results of an unreasonable search will be admissible if it can be shown that this evidence would have ultimately been discovered by constitutionally permissible means.” Pugh v. State, 101 So.3d 682, 689 (¶29) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Massachusetts v. Sheppard
green
2 sentences2011Instead, “the sole issue ... is whether the officerf ] reasonably believed that the search [he] conducted was authorized by a valid warrant.” Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 988 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 ; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 (emphasizing “the officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable”); Russell, 960 F.2d at 423 (testing for lack of indicia of probable cause, not lack of probable cause, in determining whether exclusionary rule applies). ¶ 24. 2011Instead, “the sole issue ... is whether the officerf ] reasonably believed that the search [he] conducted was authorized by a valid warrant.” Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 988 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 ; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 (emphasizing “the officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable”); Russell, 960 F.2d at 423 (testing for lack of indicia of probable cause, not lack of probable cause, in determining whether exclusionary rule applies). ¶ 24. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Krauter v. Krauter
green
2 sentences2010Marriage § 53 and Krauter v. Krauter, 79 Okla. 30 , 190 P. 1088 (1920), for this specific proposition. 2010Marriage § 53 and Krauter v. Krauter, 79 Okla. 30 , 190 P. 1088 (1920), for this specific proposition. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Werner v. Werner
green
2 sentences2010As basis for this statement, the majority finds that the Chrismond decision cited as a "leading case" Werner v. Werner, 59 Kan. 399 , 53 P. 127 (1898), which does not mention a good-faith requirement. 2010As basis for this statement, the majority finds that the Chrismond decision cited as a "leading case" Werner v. Werner, 59 Kan. 399 , 53 P. 127 (1898), which does not mention a good-faith requirement. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Arizona v. Evans
green
2 sentences2009In any event, the United States Supreme Court discussed the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 , 115 S.Ct. 1185 , 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995). 2009In any event, the United States Supreme Court discussed the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 , 115 S.Ct. 1185 , 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
In Re Foreclosure of Sutton Investments, Inc.
green
2 sentences1995Id., 266 S.E.2d at 690 . 1995Id., 266 S.E.2d at 690 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
James E. Duncan, Cross-Appellee v. Mr. & Mrs. Harold Peck, Cross-Appellants, Highland Coal & Chemical Corporation
green
2 sentences1992A good-faith defense is a common-law concept based on a subjective test determinable by a review of the facts. 844 F.2d at 1263-67 ; but see Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir.1988). . 1992A good-faith defense is a common-law concept based on a subjective test determinable by a review of the facts. 844 F.2d at 1263-67 ; but see Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir.1988). . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Grisham v. Hinton green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Hallahan v. Haltom Corp. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Henager v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Barksdale v. Learnard green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.