good faith exception in District of Columbia

2026The trial court also found that the electronic data recovered from the cell phone should not be suppressed based on the good-faith exception established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

2026One exception to this general exclusionary rule is the good-faith doctrine, created in Leon, 468 U.S. at 897 .

2025The vestigial view that the Supreme Court once expressed but has since put to rest is that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation, (W.G.) Davis, 564 U.S. at 237-38 , an outdated notion that we too squarely reject. 39 regulations subject to some general congressional oversight and notice-and- comment rulemaking, and stressing those peculiar facets as bringing this case within the good faith exception. 11 When pressed at oral argument about whether the good faith exception applies when an officer on the street violates the Fourth Amendment so long as there is room f

2021Further, it was well-established under pre-Carpenter case law that the third-party doctrine applies to credit card (…continued) Leyva’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, but there is no remedy for her because of the good-faith exception.”); see also Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 249-50 (2011) (holding that where the police conducted a search of Davis’s vehicle pursuant to then-binding precedent that was later overruled, the exclusionary rule did not bar admission of the fruits of the search). 13 records.

2017See, e.g., id. at 239-40, 131 S.Ct. 2419 (holding that the good-faith exception applies “when the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding judicial precedent”); Herring, 555 U.S. at 136 , 129 S.Ct. 695 (holding that the good-faith exception applied to evidence obtained in a search incident to arrest where the officer “reasonably believe[d] there [wajs an outstanding arrest warrant” for the defendant, but where “that belief turn[ed] out to be wrong because of a negligent bookkeeping error by another police employee”).' The Supreme Court has not, however, recognized

2017See, e.g., id. at 239-40, 131 S.Ct. 2419 (holding that the good-faith exception applies “when the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding judicial precedent”); Herring, 555 U.S. at 136 , 129 S.Ct. 695 (holding that the good-faith exception applied to evidence obtained in a search incident to arrest where the officer “reasonably believe[d] there [wajs an outstanding arrest warrant” for the defendant, but where “that belief turn[ed] out to be wrong because of a negligent bookkeeping error by another police employee”).' The Supreme Court has not, however, recognized

2014In such cases, applying the good faith exception "would defeat the purpose of the exclusionary rule, for it would remove the incentive for police to make certain that they properly understand the law that they are entrusted to enforce and obey.” Id. at 817 (citing United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.2000)); accord United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir.2003).

2014In such cases, applying the good faith exception ―would defeat the purpose of the exclusionary rule, for it would remove the incentive for police to make certain that they properly understand the law that they are entrusted to enforce and obey.‖ Id. at 817 (citing United States v. Lopez-Soto, 105 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000)); accord United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003). 17 appellant‘s motion to suppress and judgment of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with our decision.

2014See Leon, supra, at 920-22 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ; United States v. Edelen, 529 A.2d 774, 785-86 (D.C.1987) (explaining that the "good faith exception” prevents exclusion where an officer's conduct is “objectively reasonable,” such as conducting a search in reasonable reliance on a properly issued search warrant later found to be unsupported by probable cause or otherwise defective).

2010In United States v. Edelen, 529 A.2d 774 (D.C.1987), a case before Herring that applied Leon and Krull, this court stressed an essential predicate for finding the objectively reasonable reliance by a police officer that justifies the good-faith exception.

2025See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914, 922 (1984) (citation omitted) (judicial warrant authorized search); (W.G.) Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011) (binding appellate precedent authorized search); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 360 (1987) (legislation authorized search).

2010In this latest iteration of the good-faith exception in Herring, the Court rejected its earlier characterization of the exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio as an inherent Fourth Amendment right. 28 Instead, the Court emphasized that the rule “applies only where it ‘results in appreciable deterrence’ ” of police misconduct, 29 meaning that “the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs,” principally the cost of “letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free” 30 Summarizing the Court’s latter-day exclusionary rule jurisprudence, the Chief Justice explained in Herring: [I]n Krull we

2021See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 919–26 (1984) (holding that “the extreme sanction of exclusion is inappropriate” where government agents relied on an objectively reasonable understanding that a search was lawful); Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 720 (D.C. 2017) (explaining that the good-faith exception “applies when the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding judicial precedent”) (internal quotation marks omitted).6 6 See, also, e.g., United States v. Castro-Aguirre, 983 F.3d 927 , 935 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that defendants were not entitled to s

2020The government has not cited to us any court decision applying “the good faith exception in a situation remotely like the present one,” Jones, 168 A.3d at 720 , where the police gave no credited explanation for the extended seizure and delayed search. 23 magistrate judge to whom he ultimately submitted the warrant application implicitly approve the preceding delay by issuing the warrant.

1994D.C.Code § 14-102 (1989); 1 Jefferson v. United States, 558 A.2d 298, 301 (D.C.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1032 , 110 S.Ct. 748 , 107 L.Ed.2d 765 (1990); Scott v. United States, 412 A.2d 364, 367-68 (D.C.1980); Davis v. United States, 370 A.2d 1337, 1339 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 853 , 98 S.Ct. 168 , 54 L.Ed.2d 123 (1977).

1983Scott v. United States, 412 A.2d 364 (D.C.1980); D.C.Code § 14-102 (1981). 9 Furthermore, this court had held that immediately after the prosecution has impeached its own witness with the prior statement, the court must give a cautionary instruction advising the jury that the prior statement is admissible only for impeachment; failure to do so has constituted error.

2025Both the Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantee defendants ‘“a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,”’ Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 10 We acknowledge appellee filed a sur-reply brief which further emphasized its previous arguments related to whether defense counsel’s performance was deficient, specifically as to the application of the good-faith exception had a motion been filed.

2025What differentiates CSOSA from all of the third-party actors that the good faith exception has been applied to is that CSOSA, at its core, “is a law enforcement agency.” In re W.M., 851 A.2d at 455.

2025Our dissenting colleague cites to several supposed counterexamples: (1) a Fifth Circuit case that predates the Supreme Court’s initial adoption of a good faith exception in Leon, and so that case says nothing about how to best interpret those precedents, United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); (2) a Second Circuit case that offers no opinion at all about the good faith exception’s application, and merely remanded for the trial court to reconsider that issue in light of Herring, so it is likewise no counterpoint, United States v. Julius, 610 F.3d 60, 65-68 (2d Cir. 20

2025Our dissenting colleague cites to several supposed counterexamples: (1) a Fifth Circuit case that predates the Supreme Court’s initial adoption of a good faith exception in Leon, and so that case says nothing about how to best interpret those precedents, United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); (2) a Second Circuit case that offers no opinion at all about the good faith exception’s application, and merely remanded for the trial court to reconsider that issue in light of Herring, so it is likewise no counterpoint, United States v. Julius, 610 F.3d 60, 65-68 (2d Cir. 20

2025The federal courts of appeals are in accord that the more sweeping reading of Herring and (W.G.) Davis, applying the good faith exception to constitutional violations that were fairly debatable, “cannot be the law.” United States v. Sheehan, 70 F.4th 36, 55 (1st Cir. 2023); id. at 54-55 (“We do not read Herring to require an additional or individualized assessment of the deliberateness and culpability of police conduct. . . .

2025The federal courts of appeals are in accord that the more sweeping reading of Herring and (W.G.) Davis, applying the good faith exception to constitutional violations that were fairly debatable, “cannot be the law.” United States v. Sheehan, 70 F.4th 36, 55 (1st Cir. 2023); id. at 54-55 (“We do not read Herring to require an additional or individualized assessment of the deliberateness and culpability of police conduct. . . .

2025United States v. De Leon-Reyna, 930 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 1991) (relying on Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 ).

2025Our dissenting colleague cites to several supposed counterexamples: (1) a Fifth Circuit case that predates the Supreme Court’s initial adoption of a good faith exception in Leon, and so that case says nothing about how to best interpret those precedents, United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); (2) a Second Circuit case that offers no opinion at all about the good faith exception’s application, and merely remanded for the trial court to reconsider that issue in light of Herring, so it is likewise no counterpoint, United States v. Julius, 610 F.3d 60, 65-68 (2d Cir. 20

2025Our dissenting colleague cites to several supposed counterexamples: (1) a Fifth Circuit case that predates the Supreme Court’s initial adoption of a good faith exception in Leon, and so that case says nothing about how to best interpret those precedents, United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); (2) a Second Circuit case that offers no opinion at all about the good faith exception’s application, and merely remanded for the trial court to reconsider that issue in light of Herring, so it is likewise no counterpoint, United States v. Julius, 610 F.3d 60, 65-68 (2d Cir. 20

2025Our dissenting colleague cites to several supposed counterexamples: (1) a Fifth Circuit case that predates the Supreme Court’s initial adoption of a good faith exception in Leon, and so that case says nothing about how to best interpret those precedents, United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); (2) a Second Circuit case that offers no opinion at all about the good faith exception’s application, and merely remanded for the trial court to reconsider that issue in light of Herring, so it is likewise no counterpoint, United States v. Julius, 610 F.3d 60, 65-68 (2d Cir. 20

2025Our dissenting colleague cites to several supposed counterexamples: (1) a Fifth Circuit case that predates the Supreme Court’s initial adoption of a good faith exception in Leon, and so that case says nothing about how to best interpret those precedents, United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); (2) a Second Circuit case that offers no opinion at all about the good faith exception’s application, and merely remanded for the trial court to reconsider that issue in light of Herring, so it is likewise no counterpoint, United States v. Julius, 610 F.3d 60, 65-68 (2d Cir. 20

2024See In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190, 191 (D.C. 1990) (en banc) (“We now reaffirm that in virtually all cases of misappropriation, disbarment will be the only appropriate sanction unless it appears that the misconduct resulted from nothing more than simple negligence.”); see also In re Gray, 224 A.3d 1222 , 1233 (D.C. 2020) (per curiam) (rejecting an attorney’s good-faith defense and disbarring him for reckless misappropriation of client funds).

2021See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 , 430 n.9 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that while a credit card user “may not pause to consider that he is also ‘conveying’ to his credit card company the date and time of his purchase or the store’s street address . . . he would hardly be able to use that as an excuse to claim an expectation of privacy if those pieces of information appear in the credit card company’s resulting records of the transaction”) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 ; United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053 , 1077–78 (6th Cir. 1993) (

2021See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 919–26 (1984) (holding that “the extreme sanction of exclusion is inappropriate” where government agents relied on an objectively reasonable understanding that a search was lawful); Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 720 (D.C. 2017) (explaining that the good-faith exception “applies when the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding judicial precedent”) (internal quotation marks omitted).6 6 See, also, e.g., United States v. Castro-Aguirre, 983 F.3d 927 , 935 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that defendants were not entitled to s

2021See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 919–26 (1984) (holding that “the extreme sanction of exclusion is inappropriate” where government agents relied on an objectively reasonable understanding that a search was lawful); Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 720 (D.C. 2017) (explaining that the good-faith exception “applies when the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding judicial precedent”) (internal quotation marks omitted).6 6 See, also, e.g., United States v. Castro-Aguirre, 983 F.3d 927 , 935 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that defendants were not entitled to s

2021See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 919–26 (1984) (holding that “the extreme sanction of exclusion is inappropriate” where government agents relied on an objectively reasonable understanding that a search was lawful); Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 720 (D.C. 2017) (explaining that the good-faith exception “applies when the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding judicial precedent”) (internal quotation marks omitted).6 6 See, also, e.g., United States v. Castro-Aguirre, 983 F.3d 927 , 935 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that defendants were not entitled to s

2021See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 , 430 n.9 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that while a credit card user “may not pause to consider that he is also ‘conveying’ to his credit card company the date and time of his purchase or the store’s street address . . . he would hardly be able to use that as an excuse to claim an expectation of privacy if those pieces of information appear in the credit card company’s resulting records of the transaction”) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 ; United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053 , 1077–78 (6th Cir. 1993) (

2020See, e.g., Griffith, 867 F.3d at 1278-79 (declining to apply the good faith exception to evidence seized pursuant to a “bare bones” affidavit); Underwood, 725 F.3d at 1085 (equating a “bare bones” affidavit with an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable” (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 )); United States v. Craig, 861 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1988) (referring to the third Leon exception as the “bare bones affidavit exception”).

2020See, e.g., Griffith, 867 F.3d at 1278-79 (declining to apply the good faith exception to evidence seized pursuant to a “bare bones” affidavit); Underwood, 725 F.3d at 1085 (equating a “bare bones” affidavit with an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable” (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 )); United States v. Craig, 861 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1988) (referring to the third Leon exception as the “bare bones affidavit exception”).

2020Specifically, the good faith exception is inapplicable where (1) the magistrate who issued the warrant “was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for [the affiant’s] reckless disregard of the truth”; (2) the issuing magistrate “wholly abandoned his [neutral and detached] judicial role”; (3) the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant was “so lacking in indicia of probable 36 cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; or (4) the warrant was “so facially deficient — i.e., in failing to par

2020Specifically, the good faith exception is inapplicable where (1) the magistrate who issued the warrant “was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for [the affiant’s] reckless disregard of the truth”; (2) the issuing magistrate “wholly abandoned his [neutral and detached] judicial role”; (3) the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant was “so lacking in indicia of probable 36 cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; or (4) the warrant was “so facially deficient — i.e., in failing to par