good faith exception in Tennessee

2026Tenn. Nov. 15, 2024), and that the good faith exception in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), should not be used to salvage this otherwise invalid search.

2026The court noted that even if a search warrant is invalid, evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant may still be admissible under the good-faith exception established in Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

2019See State v. Keith , 978 S.W.2d 861 , 871 (Tenn. 1998) (Birch, J., dissenting) (noting that Tennessee had not yet adopted the good-faith exception of Leon ); State v. Carter , 16 S.W.3d 762 , 768 n.8 (Tenn. 2000) (expressing reticence about incorporating a good-faith exception into Tennessee's jurisprudence and instead deciding the admissibility of a confession on Fourth Amendment grounds).

2016See State v. Carter, 16 S.W.3d 762 , 768 n.8 (Tenn. 2000) (declining to address the issue until it was “squarely presented”). 20 The State urges us to adopt the good-faith exception articulated in Davis21 and points out, correctly, that courts in several other jurisdictions have adopted this good-faith exception 20 We note that the General Assembly enacted a statute in 2011 entitled “Exclusionary Rule Reform Act.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-108 (2012).

2023The trial court found that the incorrect name in the affidavit was a “clerical mistake,” and denied the motion to suppress stating that Petitioner’s name was incorrect in one spot, but correct in “four or five other spots” and that “should not invalidate a lawfully, legally issued warrant or affidavit.” The trial court relied on State v. Davidson, in which the Tennessee Supreme Court: -3- adopt[ed] a good-faith exception for the admission of evidence when a law enforcement officer has reasonably and in good faith conducted a search within the scope of a warrant the officer believes to be valid

2023Additionally, prior to the suppression hearing, our supreme court carved out a good- faith exception to the warrant requirement in State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156 (Tenn. 2016), holding that “[w]hen an officer has complied with constitutional requirements to obtain a warrant, but in good faith failed to comply with the state statutory and rule affidavit requirements, societal interests are not advanced when the exclusionary rule applies to exclude evidence obtained from the search warrant.” Id. at 186 .

2019In Davis , the Supreme Court expanded the good-faith exception and held that evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule. 564 U.S. at 241 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 .

2019In Davis , the Supreme Court expanded the good-faith exception and held that evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule. 564 U.S. at 241 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 .

2019This Court granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal and adopted the good-faith exception to the state exclusionary rule as described in Davis , explaining that this adoption was a logical extension because "we have already recognized and applied other doctrines that are in effect exceptions to the exclusionary rule." Reynolds , 504 S.W.3d at 313 (citing State v. Carter , 160 S.W.3d 526 , 532-33 (Tenn. 2005) ; State v. Huddleston , 924 S.W.2d 666 , 674-75 (Tenn. 1996) ).

2017Again, the Court was careful to define the narrowness of the exception by holding that “we note that Rule 41(g), a procedural rule promulgated by this Court, does not divest this Court of its authority to decide whether a good-faith exception, or any other exception, should be adopted.” Id. (citing State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283, 314-15 , (Tenn. 2016)).

2026In McElrath, our high court adopted the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule set out in Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147-48 (2009), to wit, “when police mistakes are the result of negligence . . . rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements,” the exclusionary rule should not be applied. 569 S.W.3d at 578 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2020Tennessee has also adopted the good-faith exception “‘when police mistakes are the result of negligence . . . rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements.’” State v. McElrath, 569 S.W.3d 565, 578 (Tenn. 2019) (quoting Herring v. U.S., 555 U.S. 135, 147-48 (2009)).

2019In State v. Daniel , we applied a good-faith exception to the technical requirement that the officer executing a search warrant leave a copy of the warrant with the person being searched "given the specific facts of this case in which the Defendant was aware of the blood draw and the fact that no property of the Defendant was seized as a result of the warrant which could later be returned." 552 S.W.3d 832 , 841 (Tenn. 2018). 5.

2018More recently, in State v. Daniel , 552 S.W.3d 832 (Tenn. 2018), this Court summarized our application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for cases involving an "inadvertent," "clerical," or "technical" violation of Rule 41 that did not result in any prejudice to a defendant.

2020See State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156 , 185- 86 (Tenn. 2016); see also State v. Daniel, 552 S.W.3d 832, 841 (Tenn. 2018); State v. Lowe, 552 S.W.3d 842, 859 (Tenn. 2018).

2019Ingram , 331 S.W.3d at 755 (citation omitted); see United States v. Diehl , 276 F.3d 32 , 41-42 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that when the State seeks to introduce evidence based on a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the State carries the burden to demonstrate that the conduct at issue meets the standards of good faith); see, e.g. , Lowe , 552 S.W.3d at 859 (recognizing that the State bears the burden of proving that an error resulting in a warrant being in technical violation of procedural rules or statutes was made in good faith and resulted in no prejudice to the defendant).

2026Nevertheless, we hold that the evidence recovered from the Defendant’s residence was admissible pursuant to the good faith exception recognized by the Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. McElrath, 569 S.W.3d 565, 578 (Tenn. 2019), regardless of whether the affidavit established probable cause.

2026In McElrath, our high court adopted the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule set out in Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147-48 (2009), to wit, “when police mistakes are the result of negligence . . . rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements,” the exclusionary rule should not be applied. 569 S.W.3d at 578 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2020In Jackson, the pro se plaintiff filed a medical malpractice claim for injuries she allegedly sustained from a minimally invasive surgery, but did not attach a certificate of good faith to her complaint. 383 S.W.3d. at 499.

2020In Jackson, the pro se plaintiff filed a medical malpractice claim for injuries she allegedly sustained from a minimally invasive surgery, but did not attach a certificate of good faith to her complaint. 383 S.W.3d. at 499.

2019Ingram , 331 S.W.3d at 755 (citation omitted); see United States v. Diehl , 276 F.3d 32 , 41-42 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that when the State seeks to introduce evidence based on a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the State carries the burden to demonstrate that the conduct at issue meets the standards of good faith); see, e.g. , Lowe , 552 S.W.3d at 859 (recognizing that the State bears the burden of proving that an error resulting in a warrant being in technical violation of procedural rules or statutes was made in good faith and resulted in no prejudice to the defendant).

2018See, e.g. , United States v. Diehl , 276 F.3d 32 , 41-42 (1st Cir. 2002) (recognizing that, where the state is defending a motion to suppress on the basis of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, it is the state's burden to demonstrate that the conduct at issue meets the standards of good faith).

2016See, e.g., State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 59 (Conn. 1990); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 667 (Idaho 1992); State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1068 (N.M. 1993).

2016See, e.g., State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150 , 579 A.2d 58, 59 (1990); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660, 667 (1992); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431 , 863 P.2d 1052, 1068 (1993).

2016In McClintock v. State, 480 S.W.3d 734, 742 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015), the court declined to 3 The Court notes that “[t]he State urges us to adopt the good-faith exception articulated in Davis and points out, correctly, that courts in several other jurisdictions have adopted [the Davis] good-faith exception and it has been applied to prevent the exclusion of evidence obtained from warrantless blood draws conducted prior to McNeely.” (Footnotes omitted).

2016In McClintock v. State, 480 S.W.3d 734, 742 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015), the court declined to 3 The Court notes that “[t]he State urges us to adopt the good-faith exception articulated in Davis and points out, correctly, that courts in several other jurisdictions have adopted [the Davis] good-faith exception and it has been applied to prevent the exclusion of evidence obtained from warrantless blood draws conducted prior to McNeely.” (Footnotes omitted).

2016See, e.g., State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 59 (Conn. 1990); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 667 (Idaho 1992); State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1068 (N.M. 1993).

2016See, e.g., State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150 , 579 A.2d 58, 59 (1990); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660, 667 (1992); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431 , 863 P.2d 1052, 1068 (1993).

2016See, e.g., State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 59 (Conn. 1990); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 667 (Idaho 1992); State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1068 (N.M. 1993).

2016See, e.g., State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150 , 579 A.2d 58, 59 (1990); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660, 667 (1992); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431 , 863 P.2d 1052, 1068 (1993).

2016In Brown v. State, 767 S.E.2d 299, 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014), the Georgia Court of Appeals did not apply a good-faith exception, relying on the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga. 1992), which recognized that the court has the power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the United States Constitution.

2016In Brown v. State, 330 Ga.App. 488 , 767 S.E.2d 299, 302 (2014), the Georgia Court of Appeals did not apply a good-faith exception, relying on the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1992), which recognized that the court has the power to impo.se higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the United States Constitution.

2016In Brown v. State, 767 S.E.2d 299, 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014), the Georgia Court of Appeals did not apply a good-faith exception, relying on the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga. 1992), which recognized that the court has the power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the United States Constitution.

2016In Brown v. State, 330 Ga.App. 488 , 767 S.E.2d 299, 302 (2014), the Georgia Court of Appeals did not apply a good-faith exception, relying on the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1992), which recognized that the court has the power to impo.se higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the United States Constitution.

2014State v. Carter, 16 S.W.3d 762 , 768 n.8 (Tenn. 2000) (“Moreover, this Court has yet to adopt the exception, and we decline to address its validity under the Tennessee Constitution until the issue is squarely presented.”); State v. Bearden, 326 S.W.3d 184, 188 (Tenn. Crim.

2014See State v. Moats, 403 S.W.3d 170 , 187 n.8 (Tenn. 2013) (citing State v. Carter, 16 S.W.3d 762 , 768 n.8 (Tenn. 2000)); State v. Bearden, 326 S.W.3d 184, 188 (Tenn. Crim.

2014See also Myers, 382 S.W.3d at 309 (holding that plaintiffs must strictly comply with 29-26-121(a)(1) because “[w]ithout the notice required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121[a][1], the defendants were not apprised that Mr. Myers continued to assert a claim against them and that a suit would be filed and -7- were therefore deprived of the notice required by Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29 - 26-122(c) (mandating dismissal with prejudice when a plaintiff has failed to offer proof of a good faith claim prior to bringing defendants into litigation). *

2013See also Myers, 382 S.W.3d at 309 (holding that plaintiffs must strictly comply with 29-26-121(a)(1) because “[wjithout the notice required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121[a][l], the defendants were not apprised that Mr. Myers continued to assert a claim against them and that a suit would be filed and were therefore deprived of the notice required by Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122 (c) (mandating dismissal with prejudice when a plaintiff has failed to offer proof of a good faith claim prior to bringing defendants into litigation).

2000In Lane v. John Deere Co., 767 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. 1989), the Court stated, “The good faith requirement [in the UCC’s acceleration of a debt provision] . . . imposes ‘an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms and technicalities of the law.’” Id. at 140 (citations omitted).

2000In Lane v. John Deere Co., 767 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. 1989), the Court stated, “The good faith requirement [in the UCC’s acceleration of a debt provision] . . . imposes ‘an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms and technicalities of the law.’” Id. at 140 (citations omitted).

2019Notably, however, this Court left open other applications of the good-faith exception, stating, "We adopt only the Davis good-faith exception, which 'represents a small fragment of federal good-faith jurisprudence.' " Id. (quoting State v. Lindquist , 869 N.W.2d 863 , 876 (Minn. 2015) ).

2017The good-faith exception does not “permit law enforcement officers to ‘extend the law to areas in which no precedent exits or the law is unsettled.’” Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d at 313 (quoting Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d at 876-77 ).

2016As Chief Justice John Marshall so eloquently stated in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803), “The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.

2016As Chief Justice John Marshall so, eloquently stated in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 , 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), “The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.

2016Third, the Court’s decision treats Ms. Reynolds differently than the defendants in McNeely and Aviles v. State, 443 S.W.3d 291 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014).

2016See Aviles v. State, 443 S.W.3d 291 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014).