good faith exception in Arkansas

2007Then, in Moya v. State, 335 Ark. 193 , 981 S.W.2d 521 (1998), this court decided to follow the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ approach for applying the good-faith exception.

2007Then, in Moya v. State, 335 Ark. 193 , 981 S.W.2d 521 (1998), this court decided to follow the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ approach for applying the good-faith exception.

2005McFarland v. State, 284 Ark. 533 , 684 S.W.2d 233 (1985), is the case often cited for the Arkansas Supreme Court’s adoption of Leon and the good-faith exception.

2005McFarland v. State, 284 Ark. 533 , 684 S.W.2d 233 (1985), is the case often cited for the Arkansas Supreme Court’s adoption of Leon and the good-faith exception.

2005After McFarland, it appeared that the good-faith exception would truly be an “exception” in Arkansas, as the supreme court refused to apply it to salvage unconstitutional searches in Stewart v. State, 289 Ark. 272 , 711 S.W.2d 787 (1986), and Herrington v. State, 287 Ark. 228 , 697 S.W.2d 899 (1985).

2005After McFarland, it appeared that the good-faith exception would truly be an “exception” in Arkansas, as the supreme court refused to apply it to salvage unconstitutional searches in Stewart v. State, 289 Ark. 272 , 711 S.W.2d 787 (1986), and Herrington v. State, 287 Ark. 228 , 697 S.W.2d 899 (1985).

2006However, Mrs. Blevins notes that it was the State’s burden to establish applicability of the good-faith exception, see Hoay v. State, 348 Ark. 80 , 71 S.W.3d 573 (2002), and argues that the State failed to meet its burden.

2006However, Mrs. Blevins notes that it was the State’s burden to establish applicability of the good-faith exception, see Hoay v. State, 348 Ark. 80 , 71 S.W.3d 573 (2002), and argues that the State failed to meet its burden.

1985The primary issue in this case involves the application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), and adopted by this court in McFarland & Soest v. State, 284 Ark. 533 , 684 S.W.2d 233 (1985); Lincoln v. State, 285 Ark. 107 , 685 S.W.2d 166 (1985); Toland v. State, 285 Ark. 415 , 688 S.W.2d 718 and State v. Anderson, 286 Ark. 58 , 688 S.W.2d 947 (1985).

1985The primary issue in this case involves the application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), and adopted by this court in McFarland & Soest v. State, 284 Ark. 533 , 684 S.W.2d 233 (1985); Lincoln v. State, 285 Ark. 107 , 685 S.W.2d 166 (1985); Toland v. State, 285 Ark. 415 , 688 S.W.2d 718 and State v. Anderson, 286 Ark. 58 , 688 S.W.2d 947 (1985).

1994Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128 , 664 S.W.2d 463 (1983), we summarized some previous cases recognizing the tort of bad faith and described it as follows: [A] liability insurance company can be held accountable in tort for failure to settle a claim within the policy limits. . . . [A] claim based on the tort of bad faith must include affirmative misconduct by the insurance company, without a good faith defense, and that the misconduct must be dishonest, malicious, or oppressive in an attempt to avoid its liability under an insurance policy.

1994Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128 , 664 S.W.2d 463 (1983), we summarized some previous cases recognizing the tort of bad faith and described it as follows: [A] liability insurance company can be held accountable in tort for failure to settle a claim within the policy limits. . . . [A] claim based on the tort of bad faith must include affirmative misconduct by the insurance company, without a good faith defense, and that the misconduct must be dishonest, malicious, or oppressive in an attempt to avoid its liability under an insurance policy.

1984IV In Bowen v. Danna, 276 Ark. 528 , 637 S.W.2d 560 (1982), we found that the good faith requirement for acceleration, found in Ark.Stat.Ann. § 85-1-208 ( Add. 1961 ), does not apply to clauses which permit the acceleration of a debt upon the default of a specific condition which is in the exclusive control of the debtor.

1984IV In Bowen v. Danna, 276 Ark. 528 , 637 S.W.2d 560 (1982), we found that the good faith requirement for acceleration, found in Ark.Stat.Ann. § 85-1-208 ( Add. 1961 ), does not apply to clauses which permit the acceleration of a debt upon the default of a specific condition which is in the exclusive control of the debtor.

2025Menne v. State, 2012 Ark. 37 , 386 S.W.3d 451 . 17 Because there was a lack of probable cause in the affidavit for search warrant and the trial court relied on good faith, we must focus on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

2025Menne v. State, 2012 Ark. 37 , 386 S.W.3d 451 . 17 Because there was a lack of probable cause in the affidavit for search warrant and the trial court relied on good faith, we must focus on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

2023App. 69 , 571 S.W.3d 47 . 5 challenged the circuit court’s determination that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, I must concur with the majority’s conclusion that Erby’s conviction should be affirmed.

2023However, because Erby has not challenged the circuit court’s determination that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, I must concur with the majority’s conclusion that Erby’s conviction should be affirmed. 13 2019 Ark.

2009Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), provides the test for determining whether a warrant alleged to have such defects falls outside the Leon good-faith exception.

2009Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), provides the test for determining whether a warrant alleged to have such defects falls outside the Leon good-faith exception.

2004App. 153 , 79 S.W.3d 406 (2002), this court held that although there was no justification for a nighttime search, the search was permissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

2004In determining whether the good-faith exception is applicable, this court must decide whether it “was objectively reasonable for a ‘well-trained police officer’ to conclude that the nighttime search was supported by probable cause.” Crain, 78 Ark.

2005After McFarland, it appeared that the good-faith exception would truly be an “exception” in Arkansas, as the supreme court refused to apply it to salvage unconstitutional searches in Stewart v. State, 289 Ark. 272 , 711 S.W.2d 787 (1986), and Herrington v. State, 287 Ark. 228 , 697 S.W.2d 899 (1985).

2005After McFarland, it appeared that the good-faith exception would truly be an “exception” in Arkansas, as the supreme court refused to apply it to salvage unconstitutional searches in Stewart v. State, 289 Ark. 272 , 711 S.W.2d 787 (1986), and Herrington v. State, 287 Ark. 228 , 697 S.W.2d 899 (1985).

2005See Moore v. State, 297 Ark. 296 , 761 S.W.2d 894 (1988); Watson v. State, 291 Ark. 358 , 724 S.W.2d 478 (1987); Chrobak v. State, 75 Ark.

2004App. 281 , 58 S.W.3d 387 (2001), the court of appeals affirmed the denial of Chrobak’s motion to suppress on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in a case involving Chrobak’s transmittal of pornographic images of children from his home computer.

1982Supplemental Opinion on Rehearing Seay v. Davis, 246 Ark. 627 , 438 S. W.2d 479 (1969).

1982"The note in this case falls within the intent of the code, its language being that in the event of default the note may be accelerated `at the option of the holder.'" However, in a supplemental opinion, Seay v. Davis, 246 Ark. 627 , 438 S.W.2d 479 (1969), we modified our opinion: *563 In a petition for rehearing the appellants insist that the Code applies only when the contract permits the creditor to accelerate the maturity "at will," or words to that effect, whereas here there is also a condition in the contract that the debtors must be in default.

1982In the original opinion of Seay v. Davis, 246 Ark. 201 , 438 S.W.2d 479 (1969), we applied the good faith requirement to an acceleration clause in a note and mortgage even though there was default in a specific condition.

1982In the original opinion of Seay v. Davis, 246 Ark. 201 , 438 S.W.2d 479 (1969), we applied the good faith requirement to an acceleration clause in a note and mortgage even though there was default in a specific condition.

2025However, the warrant did not specify items to be seized or even limit the search to photographic evidence, which was all the officer alleged was on the cell phone when obtaining the warrant, but instead broadly allowed a search of 1 The circuit court stated after the suppression hearing that it would adopt the reasoning of the circuit court in the second trial until it was informed by defense counsel that the circuit court in the second trial granted the motion to suppress, finding the affidavit and subsequent warrant “so lacking in probable cause so as to render belief in its existence entire

2020Townsend v. State, 68 Ark.