good faith exception in North Carolina

2026The Supreme Court left the implementation of a “good faith exception” to the legislature: “If a good faith exception is to be applied to this public policy, let it be done by the legislature, the body politic responsible for the formation and expression of matters of public policy.” Id. at 724 , 370 S.E.2d at 562 .

2026The Supreme Court left the implementation of a “good faith exception” to the legislature: “If a good faith exception is to be applied to this public policy, let it be done by the legislature, the body politic responsible for the formation and expression of matters of public policy.” Id. at 724 , 370 S.E.2d at 562 .

2026Thus, we adopt the Supreme Court's reasoning in Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , to hold that there is a good faith exception to any exclusionary rule arising from Article I, Section 20 of our state constitution equivalent to the federal good faith exception to the exclusionary rule arising out of the Fourth Amendment.

2026Thus, we adopt the Supreme Court's reasoning in Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , to hold that there is a good faith exception to any exclusionary rule arising from Article I, Section 20 of our state constitution equivalent to the federal good faith exception to the exclusionary rule arising out of the Fourth Amendment.

2025The good faith exception allows “evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause” to “be use[d] in the prosecution’s case in chief.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 900 , 104 S. Ct. at 3409 ; accord State v. Welch, 316 N.C. 578, 588 , 342 S.E.2d 789, 794 (1986).

2025The good faith exception allows “evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause” to “be use[d] in the prosecution’s case in chief.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 900 , 104 S. Ct. at 3409 ; accord State v. Welch, 316 N.C. 578, 588 , 342 S.E.2d 789, 794 (1986).

2017More recently, the Court held that the good faith exception applies “when the police conduct a search in compliance with binding precedent that is later overruled.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011).

2017The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies in instances where “suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct . . . and . . . would come at a high cost to both the truth and the public safety.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 232 .

2020See id. at 718 , 370 S.E.2d at 559 (“North Carolina was among a handful of states that adopted an exclusionary rule by statute rather than by judicial creation.”). 2 We note that the exclusionary rule itself (and by extension the good faith exception to that rule) is not a rule mandated by the Fourth Amendment but rather is a judicially established “rule [to] effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364, 373 (1987). -7- STATE V.

2020See id. at 718 , 370 S.E.2d at 559 (“North Carolina was among a handful of states that adopted an exclusionary rule by statute rather than by judicial creation.”). 2 We note that the exclusionary rule itself (and by extension the good faith exception to that rule) is not a rule mandated by the Fourth Amendment but rather is a judicially established “rule [to] effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364, 373 (1987). -7- STATE V.

2020See id. at 718 , 370 S.E.2d at 559 (“North Carolina was among a handful of states that adopted an exclusionary rule by statute rather than by judicial creation.”). 2 We note that the exclusionary rule itself (and by extension the good faith exception to that rule) is not a rule mandated by the Fourth Amendment but rather is a judicially established “rule [to] effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364, 373 (1987). 7 STATE V.

2020See id. at 718 , 370 S.E.2d at 559 (“North Carolina was among a handful of states that adopted an exclusionary rule by statute rather than by judicial creation.”). 2 We note that the exclusionary rule itself (and by extension the good faith exception to that rule) is not a rule mandated by the Fourth Amendment but rather is a judicially established “rule [to] effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364, 373 (1987). -7- STATE V.

2014Thus, it is possible that evidence not excluded by the federal constitution might be excluded by the North Carolina Constitution.” (Citation and quotation marks omitted.) Footnote seven goes on to provide, “Compare Carter, 322 N.C. at 722-24 , 370 S.E.2d at 561-62 (refusing to allow a good-faith exception to the North Carolina Constitution with respect to non-testimonial identification orders), with State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491, 506-08 , 417 S.E.2d 502, 510-11 (1992) (rejecting the notion that Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution provides more protection than the Fourth Am

2014Thus, it is possible that evidence not excluded by the federal constitution might be excluded by the North Carolina Constitution.” (Citation and quotation marks omitted.) Footnote seven goes on to provide, “Compare Carter, 322 N.C. at 722-24 , 370 S.E.2d at 561-62 (refusing to allow a good-faith exception to the North Carolina Constitution with respect to non-testimonial identification orders), with State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491, 506-08 , 417 S.E.2d 502, 510-11 (1992) (rejecting the notion that Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution provides more protection than the Fourth Am

2004Tate, 315 N.C. at 720 , 340 S.E.2d at 747 .

2004Tate, 315 N.C. at 720 , 340 S.E.2d at 747 .

2026Still, even if “the trial court’s reasoning for denying [a] motion to suppress was incorrect, we are not required on this basis alone to determine that the ruling was erroneous.” State v. Austin, 320 N.C. 276, 290 , 357 S.E.2d 641, 650 (1987) (citing State v. Gardner, 316 N.C. 605 , 342 S.E.2d 872 (1986)).

2026Still, even if “the trial court’s reasoning for denying [a] motion to suppress was incorrect, we are not required on this basis alone to determine that the ruling was erroneous.” State v. Austin, 320 N.C. 276, 290 , 357 S.E.2d 641, 650 (1987) (citing State v. Gardner, 316 N.C. 605 , 342 S.E.2d 872 (1986)).

2025See Herring, 555 U.S. at 142 , 129 S. Ct. at 701 (“We (perhaps confusingly) called this objectively reasonable reliance ‘good faith.’ ”).

2025See Herring, 555 U.S. at 142 , 129 S. Ct. at 701 (“We (perhaps confusingly) called this objectively reasonable reliance ‘good faith.’ ”).

2025See id.; cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 , 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997) (“Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is.”).12 Thus, it would have been legally impossible for the General Assembly to legislatively enact a good faith exception to any state constitutional exclusionary rule.

2025See id.; cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 , 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997) (“Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is.”).12 Thus, it would have been legally impossible for the General Assembly to legislatively enact a good faith exception to any state constitutional exclusionary rule.

2025Analysis A. Standard of Review When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, our “scope of review . . . is ‘strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge’s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge’s ultimate conclusions of law.’ ” State v. Bone, 354 N.C. 1, 7 , 550 S.E.2d 482, 486 (2001) (quoting State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134 , 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982)). “[T]he trial court’s conclusions of law are fully reviewable” de novo, and “this

2025Analysis A. Standard of Review When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, our “scope of review . . . is ‘strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge’s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge’s ultimate conclusions of law.’ ” State v. Bone, 354 N.C. 1, 7 , 550 S.E.2d 482, 486 (2001) (quoting State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134 , 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982)). “[T]he trial court’s conclusions of law are fully reviewable” de novo, and “this

2025See Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C.

2025The Supreme Court adopted the good faith exception because “where the officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable, . . . [e]xcluding the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 919–20, 104 S. Ct. at 3419 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 , 539–40, 96 S. Ct. 3037 , 3073–74 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)).

2025The Supreme Court adopted the good faith exception because “where the officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable, . . . [e]xcluding the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 919–20, 104 S. Ct. at 3419 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 , 539–40, 96 S. Ct. 3037 , 3073–74 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)).

2025See State v. Romano, 369 N.C. 678, 693 (2017) (“The State also argues that . . . the good faith exception and the inevitable discovery and independent source - 14 - STATE V.

2025App. at 112–13, 846 S.E.2d at 304 (Dillon, J., concurring in part & concurring in the result in part) (stating that “Carter . . . did not hold that the absence of a good faith exception under state law . . . was a constitutional matter” but rather was “a matter of public policy within the purview of our General Assembly’s lawmaking authority”), with, e.g., State v. Smith, 124 N.C.

2025App. 565, 576 , 478 S.E.2d 237, 244 (1996) (“[U]nder North Carolina’s Constitution, no good faith exception exists which might ‘save’ the fruits of a search made pursuant to an invalidated warrant.” (citing Carter, 322 N.C. at 724 , 370 S.E.2d at 562 )).

2025Analysis A. Standard of Review When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, our “scope of review . . . is ‘strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge’s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge’s ultimate conclusions of law.’ ” State v. Bone, 354 N.C. 1, 7 , 550 S.E.2d 482, 486 (2001) (quoting State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134 , 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982)). “[T]he trial court’s conclusions of law are fully reviewable” de novo, and “this

2025Analysis A. Standard of Review When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, our “scope of review . . . is ‘strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge’s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge’s ultimate conclusions of law.’ ” State v. Bone, 354 N.C. 1, 7 , 550 S.E.2d 482, 486 (2001) (quoting State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134 , 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982)). “[T]he trial court’s conclusions of law are fully reviewable” de novo, and “this

2025See State v. Alexander, 233 N.C.

2019See Spratt , 265 N.C. at 526 -27 , 144 S.E.2d at 571 .

2019See Spratt , 265 N.C. at 526 -27 , 144 S.E.2d at 571 .

2019As explained by the court in Powell when finding that the IRS fulfilled its obligations under FOIA, the good faith presumption afforded to such declarations cannot be rebutted “by purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents.” Id. {31} “It is not the function of this Court to consider and rule on imagined controversies.” Sbella v. Moon, 125 N.C.

2019App. 607, 610 , 481 S.E.2d 363, 365 (1997).