45 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1916–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Leongreen2 sentences2026"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, including the attenuation-of-taint exception, see Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237-43 , 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016), the independent-source exception, see Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-41 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988), the inevitable- discovery exception, see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 441- 48, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), and the good-faith exception, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-25 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L. 2026"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, including the attenuation-of-taint exception, see Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237-43 , 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016), the independent-source exception, see Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-41 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988), the inevitable- discovery exception, see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 441- 48, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), and the good-faith exception, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-25 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L. | 4 | 22 |
Straughn v. Stategreen2 sentences2015United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).’ Tolbert v. State, 718 So.2d 731, 734 (Ala.Crim.App.1997). “ ‘In Leon , the United States Supreme Court recognized four circumstances in which the good-faith exception was inapplicable: (1) when the magistrate or judge relies on information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) when the magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role and fails to act in a neutral and detached manner; (3) when the warrant is based on an affidavit 2009“In Leon , the United States Supreme Court recognized four circumstances in which the good-faith exception was inapplicable: (1) when the magistrate or judge relies on information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) when the magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role and fails to act in a neutral and detached manner; (3) when the warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking [in] indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) when the warrant is | 3 | 3 |
Ball v. Stategreen2 sentences2009It is ‘ “disingenuous, after having gone to [a district judge] with the paltry showing seen here, to suggest, as the [State] suggests, that at bottom it was the [district judge] who made the error and the search and seizure are insulated because the officer’s reliance on that error was objectively reasonable.’” Ball v. State, 868 So.2d 474, 475 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (Cobb, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 438 (3d Cir.2002)).” Ex parte Green, 15 So.3d at 496-97 . 2009It is `"disingenuous, after having gone to [a district judge] with the paltry showing seen here, to suggest, as the [State] suggests, that at bottom it was the [district judge] who made the error and the search and seizure are insulated because the officer's reliance on that error was objectively reasonable."' Ball v. State, 868 So.2d 474, 475 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (Cobb, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 438 (3d Cir.2002))." Ex parte Green, 15 So.3d at 496-497 . | 3 | 3 |
United States v. David Scott Zimmermangreen2 sentences2009It is ‘ “disingenuous, after having gone to [a district judge] with the paltry showing seen here, to suggest, as the [State] suggests, that at bottom it was the [district judge] who made the error and the search and seizure are insulated because the officer’s reliance on that error was objectively reasonable.’” Ball v. State, 868 So.2d 474, 475 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (Cobb, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 438 (3d Cir.2002)).” Ex parte Green, 15 So.3d at 496-97 . 2009It is `"disingenuous, after having gone to [a district judge] with the paltry showing seen here, to suggest, as the [State] suggests, that at bottom it was the [district judge] who made the error and the search and seizure are insulated because the officer's reliance on that error was objectively reasonable."' Ball v. State, 868 So.2d 474, 475 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (Cobb, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 438 (3d Cir.2002))." Ex parte Green, 15 So.3d at 496-497 . | 3 | 3 |
Rivers v. Stategreen2 sentences2015This Court has'adopted the good-faith exception and has explained: “ ‘The good faith exception provides that when officers acting in good faith, that is, in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral, detached magistrate, conduct a search and the warrant is found to be invalid, the evidence need not be excluded.’ Rivers v. State, 695 So.2d 260, 262 (Ala.Crim.App.1997). . 2015“The good faith exception provides that when officers acting in good faith, that is, in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral, detached magistrate, conduct a search and the warrant is found to be invalid, the evidence need not be excluded.” Rivers v. State, 695 So.2d 260, 262 (Ala.Crim.App.1997). | 2 | 7 |
Ex Parte Parkergreen2 sentences2009See also Ex parte Parker, 858 So.2d 941 (Ala.2003) (reversing trial court’s denial of motion to suppress and declining to apply the good-faith exception when the affidavit supporting the search warrant was based on information the affiant knew was false); Ex parte Turner, 792 So.2d 1141 (Ala.2000) (rejecting application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule because, at the time the warrant was issued, anticipatory searches were not authorized by statute or court rule); Ex parte Lemus, 802 So.2d 1073 (Ala.2001) (relying on Ex parte Turner and rejecting application of the good-fai 2009See also Ex parte Parker, 858 So.2d 941 (Ala.2003)(reversing trial court's denial of a motion to suppress and declining to apply the good-faith exception when the affidavit supporting the search warrant was based on information the affiant knew to be false); Ex parte Turner, 792 So.2d 1141 (Ala.2000) (rejecting application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule because, at the time the warrant was issued, anticipatory searches were not authorized by statute or court rule); Ex *1183 parte Lemus, 802 So.2d 1073 (Ala.2001) (relying on Ex parte Turner and rejecting application of the | 2 | 2 |
Webb Business Promotions, Inc. v. American Electronics & Entertainment Corp.green2 sentences2005Promotions, Inc. v. American Elecs. & Entertainment Corp., 617 N.W.2d 67, 73 (Minn.2000)). 2001The focus of the good faith inquiry is on the offer of the accord, and not on the actions of the parties in performing the underlying contract." 617 N.W.2d at 73 (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Burgin v. Stategreen2 sentences2010A prosecutor’s decision to call such a witness is subject to a good-faith standard, and it is ‘always open for the defendant to argue that the probative value of the evidence offered to impeach the witness is clearly outweighed by the prejudicial impact it might have on the jury, [pursuant to Rule 403, Ala.R.Evid.j, because the jury would have difficulty confining use of the evidence to impeachment.’ United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d [1191,] 1193 [(7th cir.1984)].” 747 So.2d at 919 . 2002A prosecutor’s decision to call such a witness is subject to a good-faith standard, and it is ‘always open for the defendant to argue that the probative value of the evidence offered to impeach the witness is clearly outweighed by the prejudicial impact it might have on the jury, [pursuant to Rule 403, Ala. R.Evid.], because the jury would have difficulty confining use of the evidence to impeachment.’ United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d at 1193 .” Burgin, 747 So.2d at 918-19 (emphasis added). | 1 | 3 |
Illinois v. Krullgreen2 sentences2026Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), extended the good-faith exception to searches conducted in reasonable reliance on subsequently invalidated statutes. 2026Id., at 349-350 ('legislators, like judicial officers, are not the focus of the rule'). | 1 | 2 |
Massachusetts v. Sheppardgreen2 sentences1986The State inappropriately argues the good faith exception to the warrant requirement established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984). 1986The State inappropriately argues the good faith exception to the warrant requirement established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Dracy Lamont McKneely Andrew Ellis, and Alandis Bennett, Also Known as Torjano Akinesgreen1 sentence2015Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that exclusion of the evidence is not generally justified.” (footnote omitted)); and United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1454 (10th Cir.1993) (“A corollary to the presumption in favor of good faith reliance upon warrants is that ‘police officers should be entitled to rely upon the probable-cause determination of a neutral magistrate when defending an attack on them good faith for either seeking or executing a warrant’ particularly where, ‘with the benefit of hindsight and thoughtful reflection, reviewing judges still cannot agr | 1 | 1 |
Tolbert v. Stategreen1 sentence2015United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).’ Tolbert v. State, 718 So.2d 731, 734 (Ala.Crim.App.1997). “ ‘In Leon , the United States Supreme Court recognized four circumstances in which the good-faith exception was inapplicable: (1) when the magistrate or judge relies on information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) when the magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role and fails to act in a neutral and detached manner; (3) when the warrant is based on an affidavit | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Scott P. Butlergreen1 sentence2015Initially, I respectfully disagree with the special writing concurring in the result where it states that Leon provides that the standard of review applicable in Bolden’s case is whether “ ‘ “thoughtful and competent judges [can disagree] as to the existence of probable cause” ’ ” (quoting United States v. Butler, 763 F.2d 11, 14 (1st Cir.1985)) and where, as here, disagreement does exist, the trial court’s finding of probable cause is not error and does not warrant reversal. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Terry Jon Martingreen1 sentence2015Accordingly, the good faith exception is applicable here.”); United States v. Martin, 833 F.2d 752, 756 (8th Cir.1987) (“When judges can look at the same affidavit and come to differing conclusions, a police officer’s reliance on that affidavit must, therefore, be reasonable.”); United States v. Tate, 795 F.2d 1487, 1491 (9th Cir.1986) (“Similarly, in this case the evidence in the affidavit was sufficient to create disagreement among the judges. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 473667green1 sentence2015Accordingly, the good faith exception is applicable here.”); United States v. Martin, 833 F.2d 752, 756 (8th Cir.1987) (“When judges can look at the same affidavit and come to differing conclusions, a police officer’s reliance on that affidavit must, therefore, be reasonable.”); United States v. Tate, 795 F.2d 1487, 1491 (9th Cir.1986) (“Similarly, in this case the evidence in the affidavit was sufficient to create disagreement among the judges. | 1 | 1 |
Bailey v. Stategreen2 sentences2015“In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), a case relied on by the circuit court, the United States Supreme Court recognized four circumstances in which the good-faith exception was inapplicable: (1) when the magistrate or judge relies on information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) when the magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role and fails to act in a neutral and detached manner; (3) when the warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking an indicia of prob 2015“In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), a case relied on by the circuit court, the United States Supreme Court recognized four circumstances in which the good-faith exception was inapplicable: (1) when the magistrate or judge relies on information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) when the magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role and fails to act in a neutral and detached manner; (3) when the warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking an indicia of prob | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Chanthasouxatgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Kevin C. Reillygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tanner v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Zemunskigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nicoletta v. Rochester Eye & Human Parts Bank, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rahman v. Mayo Clinicgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Green
green
2 sentences2012The Court then holds that “[t]he application of and rationale for the good-faith exception are particularly inappropriate where, as here, the officer is executing a search warrant that depends on his own affidavit.” 15 So.3d at 496-97 . 2009However, in Ex parte Green, 15 So.3d 489 (Ala.2008), and cases cited therein—cases relied on by the dissent— the appellate courts declined to apply the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule because the affidavits used to obtain the search warrants failed to contain sufficient information to allow a determination that the facts alleged in the affidavit were current rather than remote. | 3 | 2009–2012 |
Nelms v. State
green
2 sentences2009The affiant’s testimony reveals nothing about when any of the relevant activities took place, thus ‘render[ing] official belief in [the existence of probable cause] entirely unreasonable.’ Nelms, 568 So.2d at 388 .” Ex parte Green, 15 So.3d at 497 . 2009The affiant's testimony reveals nothing about when any of the relevant activities took place, thus `render[ing] official belief in [the existence of probable cause] entirely unreasonable.' Nelms, 568 So.2d at 388 ." Ex parte Green, 15 So.3d at 497 . | 3 | 2008–2009 |
Ex Parte Turner
green
2 sentences2009See also Ex parte Parker, 858 So.2d 941 (Ala.2003) (reversing trial court’s denial of motion to suppress and declining to apply the good-faith exception when the affidavit supporting the search warrant was based on information the affiant knew was false); Ex parte Turner, 792 So.2d 1141 (Ala.2000) (rejecting application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule because, at the time the warrant was issued, anticipatory searches were not authorized by statute or court rule); Ex parte Lemus, 802 So.2d 1073 (Ala.2001) (relying on Ex parte Turner and rejecting application of the good-fai 2009See also Ex parte Parker, 858 So.2d 941 (Ala.2003)(reversing trial court's denial of a motion to suppress and declining to apply the good-faith exception when the affidavit supporting the search warrant was based on information the affiant knew to be false); Ex parte Turner, 792 So.2d 1141 (Ala.2000) (rejecting application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule because, at the time the warrant was issued, anticipatory searches were not authorized by statute or court rule); Ex *1183 parte Lemus, 802 So.2d 1073 (Ala.2001) (relying on Ex parte Turner and rejecting application of the | 3 | 2001–2009 |
United States v. Clinton Webster
green
2 sentences2002A prosecutor’s decision to call such a witness is subject to a good-faith standard, and it is ‘always open for the defendant to argue that the probative value of the evidence offered to impeach the witness is clearly outweighed by the prejudicial impact it might have on the jury, [pursuant to Rule 403, Ala. R.Evid.], because the jury would have difficulty confining use of the evidence to impeachment.’ United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d at 1193 .” Burgin, 747 So.2d at 918-19 (emphasis added). 2000A prosecutor's decision to call such a witness is subject to a good-faith standard, and it is `always open for the defendant to argue that the probative value of the evidence offered to impeach the witness is clearly outweighed by the prejudicial impact it might have on the jury, [pursuant to Rule 403, Ala.R.Evid.], because the jury would have difficulty confining use of the evidence to impeachment.' United States v. Webster , 734 F.2d at 1193 )." 747 So.2d at 918 -19 . | 3 | 1999–2002 |
Ames v. Pardue
green
2 sentences2017Our supreme court has explained: " Ames [ v. Pardue , 389 So.2d 927 (Ala. 1980),] is part of a line of cases that discuss the application of the good faith standard to the mortgagee's power of sale. 1997Ames, supra , is part of a line of cases that discuss the application of the good faith standard to the mortgagee's power of sale. | 2 | 1997–2017 |
Ex Parte Lemus
green
2 sentences2009See also Ex parte Parker, 858 So.2d 941 (Ala.2003) (reversing trial court’s denial of motion to suppress and declining to apply the good-faith exception when the affidavit supporting the search warrant was based on information the affiant knew was false); Ex parte Turner, 792 So.2d 1141 (Ala.2000) (rejecting application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule because, at the time the warrant was issued, anticipatory searches were not authorized by statute or court rule); Ex parte Lemus, 802 So.2d 1073 (Ala.2001) (relying on Ex parte Turner and rejecting application of the good-fai 2009See also Ex parte Parker, 858 So.2d 941 (Ala.2003)(reversing trial court's denial of a motion to suppress and declining to apply the good-faith exception when the affidavit supporting the search warrant was based on information the affiant knew to be false); Ex parte Turner, 792 So.2d 1141 (Ala.2000) (rejecting application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule because, at the time the warrant was issued, anticipatory searches were not authorized by statute or court rule); Ex *1183 parte Lemus, 802 So.2d 1073 (Ala.2001) (relying on Ex parte Turner and rejecting application of the | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Nix v. Williams
green
2 sentences2026"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, including the attenuation-of-taint exception, see Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237-43 , 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016), the independent-source exception, see Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-41 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988), the inevitable- discovery exception, see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 441- 48, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), and the good-faith exception, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-25 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L. 2026"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, including the attenuation-of-taint exception, see Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237-43 , 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016), the independent-source exception, see Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-41 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988), the inevitable- discovery exception, see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 441- 48, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), and the good-faith exception, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-25 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Murray v. United States
green
2 sentences2026"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, including the attenuation-of-taint exception, see Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237-43 , 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016), the independent-source exception, see Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-41 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988), the inevitable- discovery exception, see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 441- 48, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), and the good-faith exception, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-25 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L. 2026"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, including the attenuation-of-taint exception, see Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237-43 , 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016), the independent-source exception, see Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-41 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988), the inevitable- discovery exception, see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 441- 48, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), and the good-faith exception, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-25 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Arizona v. Evans
green
2 sentences2026In Arizona v. Evans, supra, the Court applied the good- faith exception in a case where the police reasonably relied on erroneous information concerning an arrest warrant in a database maintained by judicial employees. 2026Id., at 14 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Utah v. Strieff
green
1 sentence2026"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, including the attenuation-of-taint exception, see Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237-43 , 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016), the independent-source exception, see Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-41 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988), the inevitable- discovery exception, see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 441- 48, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), and the good-faith exception, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-25 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Utah v. Strieff
green
2 sentences2026"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, including the attenuation-of-taint exception, see Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237-43 , 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016), the independent-source exception, see Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-41 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988), the inevitable- discovery exception, see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 441- 48, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), and the good-faith exception, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-25 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L. 2026"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, including the attenuation-of-taint exception, see Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237-43 , 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016), the independent-source exception, see Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-41 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988), the inevitable- discovery exception, see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 441- 48, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), and the good-faith exception, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-25 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Illinois v. Gates
green
2 sentences2015As previously stated, “Probable cause must be determined by an analysis of ‘the totality of the circumstances.’ Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). 2015As previously stated, “Probable cause must be determined by an analysis of ‘the totality of the circumstances.’ Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
United States v. Ellis
green
1 sentence2012In United States v. Ellis, 971 F.2d 701 (11th Cir.1992), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explained: “The ‘manifest purpose’ of the ‘particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment’ is ‘to prevent general searches.’ Leon, 468 U.S. at 963 , 104 S.Ct. at 3447 (Stevens, J., concurring). ‘By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches t | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Maryland v. Garrison
green
2 sentences2012In United States v. Ellis, 971 F.2d 701 (11th Cir.1992), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explained: “The ‘manifest purpose’ of the ‘particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment’ is ‘to prevent general searches.’ Leon, 468 U.S. at 963 , 104 S.Ct. at 3447 (Stevens, J., concurring). ‘By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches t 2012In United States v. Ellis, 971 F.2d 701 (11th Cir.1992), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explained: “The ‘manifest purpose’ of the ‘particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment’ is ‘to prevent general searches.’ Leon, 468 U.S. at 963 , 104 S.Ct. at 3447 (Stevens, J., concurring). ‘By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches t | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| United States v. Sonia Luz Lopez-Valdez green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| United States of America,plaintiff-Appellee v. Armando Lopez-Soto green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| cluster 100 green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Tye green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Lyon v. United States green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| National Kidney Patients Association v. Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Helton v. United States green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Garrett v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Pazos v. State green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Wright green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Brown green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Pavco Industries, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Mobile green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Government Street Lumber Co. v. AmSouth Bank, NA green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Pargoud v. United States green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Bradley v. Fisher green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| cluster 373418 green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Harry Needelman v. United States green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Layton v. Campbell green | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.