good faith exception in Delaware

2026What matters for the exclusionary rule is simply that a constitutional violation occurred. 88 For example, in Dorsey, the Supreme Court refused to adopt the good faith exception for Delaware’s state exclusionary rule because the Delaware Constitution requires probable cause to be present in a warrant. 761 A.2d at 820 . 16 unconstitutional warrant, the Superior Court of Delaware has done so multiple times.89 The Superior Court has applied the independent source doctrine to evidence obtained under both general90 and overbroad warrants,91 with these cases often sharing similar facts to those at i

2023State v. Dorsey, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000). 125 Id. at 897 . 126 Id. 38 of warrants without probable cause, or based upon defective warrants, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would directly clash with those rights of citizens as developed in our Commonwealth over the past 200 years.”127 In rejecting the Fourth Amendment’s Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, the Delaware Supreme Court, in Dorsey v. State, recognized that the Delaware Constitution embodies the common law principle “that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper re

2021In order for a determination or other action to be in “good faith” for purposes of this Agreement, the Person or Persons making such determination or taking or declining to take such other action must believe that the determination or other action is in the best interests of the Partnership.221 As our case law makes clear, the use of the unmodified verb “believe” in the definition of “good faith” in Section 7.9(b) means that the good faith standard in the LP Agreement is subjective and not objective.222 Section 7.10(b), which appears in a section of the LP Agreement entitled “Other Matters Con

2021In order for a determination or other action to be in “good faith” for purposes of this Agreement, the Person or Persons making such determination or taking or declining to take such other action must believe that the determination or other action is in the best interests of the Partnership.221 As our case law makes clear, the use of the unmodified verb “believe” in the definition of “good faith” in Section 7.9(b) means that the good faith standard in the LP Agreement is subjective and not objective.222 Section 7.10(b), which appears in a section of the LP Agreement entitled “Other Matters Con

2016Id. at 866 . 32 Wheeler v. State, 135 A.3d 282, 298 (Del. 2016). 33 Id. at 298 n.71 (stating that the Delaware Constitution provides additional protections in determining whether a seizure has occurred, that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply in Delaware, and by requiring more than probable cause for the issuance of a night time search warrant). 12 authority that provides for any additional protection under the Delaware Constitution in areas outside those articulated in Wheeler.34 Moreover, the Court has been unable to find any historical evidence of a divergence

2016Id. at 866 . 32 Wheeler v. State, 135 A.3d 282, 298 (Del. 2016). 33 Id. at 298 n.71 (stating that the Delaware Constitution provides additional protections in determining whether a seizure has occurred, that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply in Delaware, and by requiring more than probable cause for the issuance of a night time search warrant). 12 authority that provides for any additional protection under the Delaware Constitution in areas outside those articulated in Wheeler.34 Moreover, the Court has been unable to find any historical evidence of a divergence

1952A similar approach was taken in Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del.Ch. 127 , 32 A.2d 148 ; see also Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass Co., 19 Del.Ch. 326 , 167 A. 831 .

1952A similar approach was taken in Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del.Ch. 127 , 32 A.2d 148 ; see also Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass Co., 19 Del.Ch. 326 , 167 A. 831 .

2016Id. at 866 . 32 Wheeler v. State, 135 A.3d 282, 298 (Del. 2016). 33 Id. at 298 n.71 (stating that the Delaware Constitution provides additional protections in determining whether a seizure has occurred, that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply in Delaware, and by requiring more than probable cause for the issuance of a night time search warrant). 12 authority that provides for any additional protection under the Delaware Constitution in areas outside those articulated in Wheeler.34 Moreover, the Court has been unable to find any historical evidence of a divergence

2016Id. at 866 . 32 Wheeler v. State, 135 A.3d 282, 298 (Del. 2016). 33 Id. at 298 n.71 (stating that the Delaware Constitution provides additional protections in determining whether a seizure has occurred, that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply in Delaware, and by requiring more than probable cause for the issuance of a night time search warrant). 12 authority that provides for any additional protection under the Delaware Constitution in areas outside those articulated in Wheeler.34 Moreover, the Court has been unable to find any historical evidence of a divergence

2021See 3 LaFave, supra note 65, § 5.1(h) n.377. 92 866 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1988). 93 Id. at 1075 . 94 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 34 to suppress.

2000It should, therefore, be adopted in Delaware. . 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984). .

2020Jan. 29, 2002) (“Although the statute provides for a good faith defense to a statutory claim for production of books and records . . . this does not appear to be the proper standard to apply in response to a contractual claim to inspect books and records.” (citation omitted)); Bond Purchase, 746 A.2d at 850–64 (applying the Delaware LP Act’s proper purpose requirement and good faith defense to the statutory books and records right, but not to the contractual books and records right); In re Paine Webber, 698 A.2d at 392 (“[P]laintiffs are not required to demonstrate a proper purpose to enforce

2016See, e.g., Arbor Place, 2002 WL 205681 , at *4 n. 9 ("Although the statute provides for a good faith defense to a statutory claim for production of books and records, this does not appear to be the proper standard to apply in response to a contractual claim to inspect books and records.” (citation omitted)); Bond Purchase, 746 A.2d at 850-64 (applying the Delaware LP Act’s proper purpose requirement and good faith defense to the statutory books and records right, but not to the contractual books and records right); In re Paine Webber Qualified Plan Prop.

2020Section 7.9(a) requires the General Partner “not to make such determinations, or take or omit to take such action, in Bad Faith,” 67 with Bad Faith defined as the “belief that such determination, action or omission was adverse to the 64 P’ship Agreement § 7.9(c). 65 Id. (emphasis added). 66 Id. § 7.1(a)(ii) (giving the General Partner power over “the making of . . . regulatory and other filings, or rendering of periodic or other reports to governmental or other agencies having jurisdiction over the business or assets of the Partnership”). 67 P’ship Agreement § 7.9(a). 24 Partnership.” 68 This

2018Partners, L.P., 67 A.3d 354, 367-68 (Del. 2013) (en banc) (holding that a “pass-through” entity was entitled to a good-faith presumption under a limited partnership agreement when the board of its parent entity met the requirements for that presumption); Kuroa’a v. SPJS Holdings, L.L.C., 971 A.2d 872, 884 (Del.

2026Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001); Pyott v. Louisiana Mun.

2024Co. v. Rachlin Clothes Shop, 125 A. 184, 188 (Del. 1924) (“A corporation being a purely metaphysical creature, having no mind with which to think, no will with which to determine and no voice with which to speak, must depend upon the faculties of natural persons to determine for it its policies and direct the agencies through which they are to be effectuated.”); see also 2A C.J.S.

2023The inevitable-discovery exception, by contrast, allows the admission of the evidence not because of the officers’ good faith but because the evidence would inevitably have been discovered. 108 State v. Phelps, 297 N.W. 2d 769, 775 (N.D. 1990); see also Com. v. O’Connor, 546 N.E. 2d 336, 340 (Mass. 1989) (“Bad faith of the police, shown by such activities as conducting an unlawful search in order to accelerate discovery of the evidence, will be relevant in assessing the severity of any constitutional violation.”).

2023The inevitable-discovery exception, by contrast, allows the admission of the evidence not because of the officers’ good faith but because the evidence would inevitably have been discovered. 108 State v. Phelps, 297 N.W. 2d 769, 775 (N.D. 1990); see also Com. v. O’Connor, 546 N.E. 2d 336, 340 (Mass. 1989) (“Bad faith of the police, shown by such activities as conducting an unlawful search in order to accelerate discovery of the evidence, will be relevant in assessing the severity of any constitutional violation.”).

2021See 3 LaFave, supra note 65, § 5.1(h) n.377. 92 866 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1988). 93 Id. at 1075 . 94 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 34 to suppress.

2021See 3 LaFave, supra note 65, § 5.1(h) n.377. 92 866 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1988). 93 Id. at 1075 . 94 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 34 to suppress.

2020Jan. 29, 2002) (“Although the statute provides for a good faith defense to a statutory claim for production of books and records . . . this does not appear to be the proper standard to apply in response to a contractual claim to inspect books and records.” (citation omitted)); Bond Purchase, 746 A.2d at 850–64 (applying the Delaware LP Act’s proper purpose requirement and good faith defense to the statutory books and records right, but not to the contractual books and records right); In re Paine Webber, 698 A.2d at 392 (“[P]laintiffs are not required to demonstrate a proper purpose to enforce

2018Partners, L.P., 67 A.3d 354, 367-68 (Del. 2013) (en banc) (holding that a “pass-through” entity was entitled to a good-faith presumption under a limited partnership agreement when the board of its parent entity met the requirements for that presumption); Kuroa’a v. SPJS Holdings, L.L.C., 971 A.2d 872, 884 (Del.

2017Where contractual language imposes a restriction on a plaintiff rather than an obligation on the defendant, it cannot serve as the basis of a good faith claim against that defendant.103 But the 102 Moran v. Erk, 901 N.E.2d 187, 190 (N.Y. 2008). 155 Pl.’s Comp1.11 150. 104 Pl.’s Ans. at 25. 103 Wolyj”, 65 F. App’x at 739 . _27_ Subcontract provides that “[BAE] shall be solely responsible for all liaison and coordination with [South Korea].”106 BAE could therefore be found to have been contractually obliged to manage all liaison and coordination with South Korea, and, under New York law, to do s

2017Section 7.10(b) could be read to afford additional protection to SEP GP when a Conflicts Committee seeks guidance from advisors, thus heightening the Plaintiff’s burden in overcoming the good faith presumption resulting from a Special Approval.101 100 See Brinkerhoff V, 2017 WL 1046224, at *9 (providing that the Court should “prefer specific provisions over more general ones”) (citations omitted). 101 In other words, the Defendants urge a reading that Section 7.10(b) supplements the safe harbor when advisors are involved in the Special Approval process, a matter not otherwise contemplated by S

2015Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006). 49 Id. at 66 . 50 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).

2015Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006). 49 Id. at 66 . 50 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).

2015Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006). 49 Id. at 66 . 50 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).