good faith exception in Texas

2025Importantly, even if this Court determines Storable did not have a legal right to interfere, Storable cannot be liable for tortious interference if Storable had a “a good-faith claim to a colorable legal right, even though that claim ultimately proves to be mistaken.” Tex. Beef Cattle Co., 921 S.W.2d at 211 (emphasis added).

2025Storable cannot be liable for tortious interference if Storable had “a good-faith claim to a colorable legal right, even though that claim ultimately proves to be mistaken.” Tex. Beef Cattle Co., 921 S.W.2d at 211 .

2026The good-faith standard is analogous to the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard that protects “all but the plainly incompetent.” Id. (quoting Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656 ).

2026The HCSO report also states that the “driver of a vehicle traveling southbound in the outside lane of the service road [Gariet] did not see the police car in the intersection.” 11 In City of Lancaster v. Chambers, the Texas Supreme Court adopted the good faith test in an officer-pursuit case. 883 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex. 1994).

2015The good-faith inquiry “turns on more than an employee’s personal belief, however strongly felt or sincerely held.” Gentilello, 398 S.W.3d at 683 (citing Needham, 82 S.W.3d at 321 (emphasis in original)).

2015For an employee to satisfy the good faith requirement, he must have actually believed that the recipient of the report was an “appropriate law enforcement authority” and his belief must have been “reasonable in light of the employee’s training and experience.” Needham, 82 S.W.3d at 321 .

2017He continues that this "standard would embrace nearly every contested predicate search/seizure issue because Fourth Amendment issues are rarely governed by bright-line categorical rules but rather by multi-factor, case-by-case, totality of the circumstances analysis." Furthermore, he observes that, "[n]otably, this standard is the opposite of [the] Supreme Court's application of the good-faith exception in Davis [ v. United States ], where the court excused conduct that was clearly lawful, i.e., in strict compliance with binding precedent 'that specifically authorizes a particular police pract

2017He continues that this "standard would embrace nearly every contested predicate search/seizure issue because Fourth Amendment issues are rarely governed by bright-line categorical rules but rather by multi-factor, case-by-case, totality of the circumstances analysis." Furthermore, he observes that, "[n]otably, this standard is the opposite of [the] Supreme Court's application of the good-faith exception in Davis [ v. United States ], where the court excused conduct that was clearly lawful, i.e., in strict compliance with binding precedent 'that specifically authorizes a particular police pract

2026Wheeler, 573 S.W.3d at 442 (recognizing that the question of whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies is a question of statutory construction, which a court of appeals reviews de novo) (citing McClintock, 541 S.W.3d at 67 ).

2025The good faith exception applies when the prior law enforcement conduct was “close enough to the line of validity that an objectively reasonable officer preparing the affidavit or executing the warrant would believe that the information supporting the warrant was not tainted by unconstitutional conduct.” McClintock v. State, 541 S.W.3d 63, 73 (Tex. Crim.

2024For 87 Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 587 ; see Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex. 1997) (“Conclusory statements by an expert are insufficient to support or defeat summary judgment.”). 88 See Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457, 466 (Tex. 2002) (explaining that the good-faith test considers what a reasonable officer could have believed “based on the information [the officer] possessed at the time”). 89 For example, White opined that “if Hewitt had subjectively believed that the situation required an emergency response,” “the officers could have avoided a 30-second delay by turning on the

2024For 87 Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 587 ; see Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex. 1997) (“Conclusory statements by an expert are insufficient to support or defeat summary judgment.”). 88 See Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457, 466 (Tex. 2002) (explaining that the good-faith test considers what a reasonable officer could have believed “based on the information [the officer] possessed at the time”). 89 For example, White opined that “if Hewitt had subjectively believed that the situation required an emergency response,” “the officers could have avoided a 30-second delay by turning on the

2026However, the officer’s reliance on a defective warrant must be objectively reasonable, and law enforcement is not entitled to the good-faith exception when, “depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant [is] so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” Id. at 923 .

2025McClintock, 541 S.W.3d at 73 .” 7 Leon articulated a good faith exception to the federal exclusionary rule, such that “evidence obtained during the execution of a warrant later determined to be deficient is nonetheless admissible if the executing officer’s reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable and made in good faith.” United States v. Woerner, 709 F.3d 527, 533 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 921–25 (1984)).

2017See id. ; State v. Daugherty , 931 S.W.2d 268 , 270 (Tex. Crim.

2017When we construe Article 38.23, as with any statute, "[i]n divining legislative intent, we look first to the language of the statute[,]" and "[w]hen the meaning is plain, we look no further." Daugherty , 931 S.W.2d at 270 .

2024Further, Luman testified at his deposition that, “when the Rangers investigate, they’re investigating to determine whether there’s been a violation of law.” See, e.g., Univ. of Houston, 403 S.W.3d at 856-57 (the plaintiff’s evidence satisfied the subjective component of the good-faith inquiry where he testified that he believed the violations he reported “were violations of law”); Bexar Cnty. v. Lopez, 94 S.W.3d 711, 715-16 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (concluding the good-faith prong was met because “Lopez unequivocally state[d], in his deposition, that he believed a law had been vio

2024Further, Luman testified at his deposition that, “when the Rangers investigate, they’re investigating to determine whether there’s been a violation of law.” See, e.g., Univ. of Houston, 403 S.W.3d at 856-57 (the plaintiff’s evidence satisfied the subjective component of the good-faith inquiry where he testified that he believed the violations he reported “were violations of law”); Bexar Cnty. v. Lopez, 94 S.W.3d 711, 715-16 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (concluding the good-faith prong was met because “Lopez unequivocally state[d], in his deposition, that he believed a law had been vio

2016The Court has rejected efforts to. broaden the good faith exception using federal precedent and has refused to adopt • federal exceptions inconsistent with the text of the Texas statutory exclusionary rule, Douds, 434 S.W.3d at 861 (citing Howard v. State, 617 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (op. on reh’g)); Tercero, 467 S.W.3d at 10 ; State v. Anderson, 445 S.W.3d 895, 912 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2014, no pet).

2014And, “[t]he Court of Criminal Appeals has previously rejected an effort to broaden the good-faith exception using federal precedent, and it has refused to adopt federal exceptions inconsistent with the text of our statutory exclusionary rule.” Douds, 434 S.W.3d at 861 (citing Howard v. State, 617 S.W.2d 191, 198 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (op. on reh’g)).

2025Similarly, in Dunn v. State, a magistrate’s missing signature on an arrest warrant was held to be a defect covered by the good faith exception. 951 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex. 5 Crim.

2025Similarly, in Dunn v. State, a magistrate’s missing signature on an arrest warrant was held to be a defect covered by the good faith exception. 951 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex. Crim.

2024For 87 Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 587 ; see Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex. 1997) (“Conclusory statements by an expert are insufficient to support or defeat summary judgment.”). 88 See Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457, 466 (Tex. 2002) (explaining that the good-faith test considers what a reasonable officer could have believed “based on the information [the officer] possessed at the time”). 89 For example, White opined that “if Hewitt had subjectively believed that the situation required an emergency response,” “the officers could have avoided a 30-second delay by turning on the

2023See Univ. of Hous. v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578, 583 (Tex. 2000) (holding that the good faith factors discussed in Wadewitz apply in the police pursuit context).

2015A defendant may justify its actions “based on the exercise of either (1) [its] own legal rights or (2) a good-faith claim to a colorable legal right, even though that claim ultimately proves to be mistaken.” Id.; accord Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 691 (Tex. 1989). 2.

2015A defendant may justify its actions “based on the exercise of either (l)[its] own legal rights or (2) a good-faith claim to a colorable legal right, even though that claim ultimately proves to be mistaken.” Id.; accord Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 691 (Tex.1989). . 2.

2017Ass’n, 27 S.W.3d 81, 84 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (“an insurance company’s good faith defense do[es] not relieve the insurer from liability for damages for late payment, as long as the insurer is finally found liable for the claim.”).19 Thus, even if Old American had had a “reasonable basis” for withholding payment, it would still be liable for interest and attorney’s fees under the “prompt payment” provisions.

2016Ass'n, 27 S.W.3d 81, 84 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) ("The Fifth Circuit [in Higginbotham] recognized that courts that interpreted article 3.62 [the predecessor of art. 21.55] consistently found that an insurance company's good faith defense did not relieve the insured from liability for damages for late payment, as long as the insurer is finally found liable for the claim.") (emphasis added). 106 Lumbermens Mut.

2018A defendant may justify its actions “based on the exercise of either (1) [its] own legal rights or (2) a good-faith claim to a colorable legal right, even though that claim ultimately proves to be mistaken.” Id. at 80 .

2016Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 80 (Tex. 2000) (justification is an affirmative defense to tor-lious interference with contract; justification defense can be based on exercise of either one’s own legal rights or a good-faith claim to a colorable legal right).

2023The 11 court concluded, “If the applicant makes a reasonably satisfactory showing of a good-faith claim of ownership in the property, the mere fact that another in good faith disputes his title is not alone sufficient to defeat his right to the permit; neither is it ground for suspending the permit or abating the statutory appeal pending settlement of the title controversy.” Id.

2015This contention potentially implicated Roland's entitlement to an extension of time from the Commission to complete the required testing and plugging measures on the inactive wells (and, in turn, Roland's ability to avoid the consequences of noncompliance), as the Commission's rules allowed the agency to grant such an extension only if, among other requirements, the "operator has, and upon request provides evidence of, a good faith claim to a continuing right to operate the well.' A "good faith See id. § 3.14(b)(2)(A)(iv). 5 Id. § 3.14(b)(2)(A)(iii) (unbonded operators), (B)(ii) (bonded operat

2026ANALYSIS “The appropriate focus [of the good-faith standard] is what a reasonable officer could have believed, and the determinative inquiry is whether any reasonably prudent officer possessed of the same information could have determined the trooper’s actions were justified.” Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d at 644 .

2026The good-faith standard is analogous to the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard that protects “all but the plainly incompetent.” Id. (quoting Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656 ).

2024Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873 , 878–79 (Tex. 2001).

2017Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 879 (Tex. 2001) (explaining that a report does not meet the good faith standard if it merely states the expert’s conclusions or if it omits any of the statutory requirements).

2016See id. (citing Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2427-28.) Finally, when an officer conducts a search in good faith reliance on a warrant that is later determined to have been improperly issued, federal courts have applied the good faith exception.

2015On the basis of this rationale, the Supreme Court has long “extended the good-faith exception to searches conducted in reasonable reliance on subsequently invalidated statutes”; and it has “‘never applied’ the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained as a result of nonculpa-ble, innocent police conduct”; thus, it has held that the exclusionary rule does not apply when police conduct a search in “objectively reasonable reliance” on a warrant later held to be invalid; Id. at 2428-29 (citing Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 , 107 S.Ct. 1160, 1167 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), and quoting

2024Safety v. Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. 2015); City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 655 (Tex. 1994). 95See Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d at 643 (“Viewed properly, the good-faith standard is analogous to an abuse-of-discretion standard that protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” (quoting Ytuarte, 229 S.W.3d at 321 )); Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 426 (Tex. 2004) (noting that the good-faith “inquiry is not what was the best course of action”). 29 overarching alternative of using emergency equipment in response to a prior

2022The good faith standard is analogous to an abuse of discretion standard protecting “‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Riojas, 640 S.W.3d at 540 (quoting Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d at 643 (quoting City of San Antonio v. Ytuarte, 229 S.W.3d 318, 321 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656 , 657 n.7))).

2015See Curry, 808 S.W.2d at 482 (“[Article 38.23(b)] requires a finding of probable cause, while the exception enunciated in Leon appears more flexible in allowing a good faith exception if the officer’s belief in probable cause is reasonable.”).

2015In fact, this Court 11 explicitly qualified its holding in Curry as requiring an “initial determination of probable cause,” see Curry, 808 S.W.2d at 482 (emphasis added), which is supported by the plain wording of Article 38.23(b), that in order to apply the good-faith exception, officers must have acted in reliance upon “a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based upon probable cause.” See TEX.

2017Dist., 208 S.W.3d 64, 68 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (“In repealing article 4590i and enacting Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 74, the legislature specifically removed the trial court's ability to grant an extension based on a plaintiff's diligence.”); Kendrick v. Garcia, 171 S.W.3d 698, 705 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2005, pet. denied) (“As a result of the omission of the ‘accident or mistake’ exception in Section 74.351, we conclude that the new statute precludes the existence of a good faith exception to the requirement of timely serving expert reports.”). .

2015Dist., 208 S.W.3d 64, 68 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (“In repealing article 4590i and enacting Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 74, the legislature specifically removed the trial court's ability to grant an extension based on a plaintiff’s diligence.”); Kendrick v. Garcia, 171 S.W.3d 698, 705 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2005, pet. denied) (“As a result of the omission of the ‘accident or mistake’ exception in Section 74.351, we conclude that the new statute precludes the existence of a good faith exception to the requirement of timely serving expert reports.”).

2017Although there are no magical words which an expert report must include to satisfy the good faith requirement, “mere invocation of the phrase ‘medical probability’ is likewise no guarantee that the report will be found adequate.” Id. at 540 .

2012Cf. Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 540 (Tex.2010) (“While we have said that no ‘magical words’ need be used to meet the good-faith requirement, mere invocation of the phrase ‘medical probability’ is likewise no guarantee that the report will be found adequate.”).

2023The good faith requirement has both “subjective and objective components.” Id. (citing Wichita County v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex. 1996)).

2023The good faith requirement has both “subjective and objective components.” Id. (citing Wichita County v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex. 1996)).

2025See Woerner, 709 F.3d at 533–34 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 921–25); see also United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 530 (5th Cir. 2014). 8 The Massi court ultimately concluded: The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies here where the search warrant, though ultimately obtained as a result of an illegal detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment, was obtained and executed by a law enforcement officer in good faith and under an objectively reasonable belief that it was valid and relied upon appropriately obtained evidence.

2018The court vacated the appellate court’s judgment, based on the court’s holding in McClintock v. State that the good-faith exception of Article 38.23(b) will apply when “the prior law enforcement conduct that uncovered evidence used in the affidavit for the warrant [was] ‘close enough to the line of validity’ that an objectively reasonable officer 9 preparing the affidavit or executing the warrant would believe that the information supporting the warrant was not tainted by unconstitutional conduct[.]” 541 S.W.3d 63, 73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 528 (5

2016The good-faith inquiry “turns on more than an employee’s personal belief, however strongly felt or sincerely held.” Gentilello, 398 S.W.3d at 683 .

2015Given McMillen’s training as an attorney with over twenty years of experience, we conclude that he failed to establish that he had an objectively reasonable belief that a recipient of his alleged reports was an “appropriate law enforcement authority.” See Barth, 403 S.W.3d at 858 (holding that plaintiff failed to meet “objective component of the good-faith test” “given [plain* tiff]’s legal training and experience as a practicing attorney”); Gentilello, 398 S.W.3d at 689 (concluding that “a whistle-blower cannot reasonably believe his supervisor is an appropriate law-enforcement authority if t

2018Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 730-31 (Tex. 1993); State v. PR Invs. & Specialty Retailers, Inc., 180 S.W.3d 654, 670 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist .] 2005) (en banc), aff’d, 251 S.W.3d 472 (Tex. 2008). 8 did not argue below and do not argue substantively in this court.9 I agree with the majority that evidence of bad faith is lacking, but that observation warrants a more consequential one: the good faith presumption applies.

2018Id.

2024For 87 Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 587 ; see Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex. 1997) (“Conclusory statements by an expert are insufficient to support or defeat summary judgment.”). 88 See Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457, 466 (Tex. 2002) (explaining that the good-faith test considers what a reasonable officer could have believed “based on the information [the officer] possessed at the time”). 89 For example, White opined that “if Hewitt had subjectively believed that the situation required an emergency response,” “the officers could have avoided a 30-second delay by turning on the

2024For 87 Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 587 ; see Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex. 1997) (“Conclusory statements by an expert are insufficient to support or defeat summary judgment.”). 88 See Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457, 466 (Tex. 2002) (explaining that the good-faith test considers what a reasonable officer could have believed “based on the information [the officer] possessed at the time”). 89 For example, White opined that “if Hewitt had subjectively believed that the situation required an emergency response,” “the officers could have avoided a 30-second delay by turning on the

2024Gas Co. v. Conoco, Inc., 986 S.W.2d 603, 606-07 (Tex. 1998) ([t]he Court declined to imply a duty of good faith into the parties’ contract because their contract did not provide the underlying duty or obligation at issue, explaining that nowhere did the contract impose a duty upon Northern Natural Gas to maintain the contracts, and “[i]n the absence of a specific duty or obligation to which the good-faith standard could be tied[]”).

2019The Court declined to imply a duty of good faith into the parties’ contract because their contract did not provide the underlying duty or obligation at issue, explaining that nowhere did the contract impose a duty upon Northern Natural Gas to maintain the contracts, and “[i]n the absence of a specific duty or obligation to which the good-faith standard could be tied, section [1.304 could] not support Conoco’s claim for damages.” See id. (citing TEX.