50 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1927–2025 19 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bowling v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Governmentgreen2 sentences2024Id. -12- “A public agency’s mere refusal to furnish records based on a good faith claim of a statutory exemption, which is later determined to be incorrect, is insufficient to establish a willful violation of the Act.” Bowling v. Lexington- Fayette Urban County Government, 172 S.W.3d 333, 343 (Ky. 2005) (citation omitted). 2024Id. -12- “A public agency’s mere refusal to furnish records based on a good faith claim of a statutory exemption, which is later determined to be incorrect, is insufficient to establish a willful violation of the Act.” Bowling v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 172 S.W.3d 333, 343 (Ky. 2005) (citation omitted). | 8 | 9 |
Clark v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2023The trial court serves an important evidentiary-screening function to ensure that, to the extent possible, only relevant evidence is admitted.5 Moreover, even in the context of relevant evidence, the trial court has a duty to balance the potential for undue prejudice against the probative worth of proffered evidence.6 Here, the trial court abdicated its gatekeeping role by allowing the jury to hear presentation of a wide range of other-incidents evidence without making any determination until near the end of the trial on whether the other instances were substantially similar to the accident un 2022The trial court serves an important evidentiary-screening function to ensure that, to the extent possible, only relevant evidence is admitted.5 Moreover, even in the context of relevant evidence, the trial court has a duty to balance the potential for undue prejudice against the probative worth of proffered evidence.6 3 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000). 5 See, e.g., Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Ky. 2007) (acknowledging “the trial court’s unique role as gatekeeper of evidence”); Dunnaway v. Commonwealth, | 2 | 2 |
Leatherman v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2023The trial court serves an important evidentiary-screening function to ensure that, to the extent possible, only relevant evidence is admitted.5 Moreover, even in the context of relevant evidence, the trial court has a duty to balance the potential for undue prejudice against the probative worth of proffered evidence.6 Here, the trial court abdicated its gatekeeping role by allowing the jury to hear presentation of a wide range of other-incidents evidence without making any determination until near the end of the trial on whether the other instances were substantially similar to the accident un 2022The trial court serves an important evidentiary-screening function to ensure that, to the extent possible, only relevant evidence is admitted.5 Moreover, even in the context of relevant evidence, the trial court has a duty to balance the potential for undue prejudice against the probative worth of proffered evidence.6 3 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000). 5 See, e.g., Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Ky. 2007) (acknowledging “the trial court’s unique role as gatekeeper of evidence”); Dunnaway v. Commonwealth, | 2 | 2 |
Marshall v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2022In Marshall v. Commonwealth, we held “[a] trial court cannot merely rely on the Commonwealth's assurances of unavailability in deciding to admit hearsay evidence that is conditioned upon unavailability.” 60 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Ky. 2001). 2021In Marshall v. Commonwealth, we held “[a] trial court cannot merely rely on the Commonwealth's assurances of unavailability in deciding to admit hearsay evidence that is conditioned upon unavailability.” 60 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Ky. 2001). | 2 | 2 |
Lang v. Sappgreen2 sentences2012In other words, a technical violation of the Act is not enough; the existence of bad faith is required.” Bowling, 172 S.W.3d at 343 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Sinha, 284 S.W.3d at 162 (“In order to show that the University’s actions were willful, Sinha was required to show that the University acted in bad faith with an intent to violate the Open Records Act and without plausible explanation for the alleged errors.”); Lang v. Sapp, 71 S.W.3d 133, 135-36 (Ky.App.2002). 2005See Blair v. Hendricks, 30 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Ky.App.2000), overruled on other grounds by Lang v. Sapp, 71 S.W.3d 133, 135-36 (Ky.App.2002). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Leongreen2 sentences2021Alternatively, the Commonwealth argued that even if the search warrant was invalid, the officers who executed it reasonably relied on it; therefore, the evidence recovered from the residence should be admissible pursuant to the good faith exception found in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). 1 Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1412. -4- A hearing on the motions to suppress was held on February 28, 2020, and Officer Messinger was the only witness to testify. 2021Alternatively, the Commonwealth argued that even if the search warrant was invalid, the officers who executed it reasonably relied on it; therefore, the evidence recovered from the residence should be admissible pursuant to the good faith exception found in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). 1 Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1412. -4- A hearing on the motions to suppress was held on February 28, 2020, and Officer Messinger was the only witness to testify. | 1 | 17 |
Crayton v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2025The Supreme Court of Kentucky applied this exception in Crayton v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1992), determining the good faith exception did not violate Section 10 of Kentucky’s Constitution. 2023In Leon, the Supreme Court announced a good-faith exception to the general rule that evidence obtained through an illegal search is not admissible against the accused, which was subsequently adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Crayton v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684 (1992). | 1 | 11 |
Davis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014In support, the Commonwealth- leans heavily on Davis v. United States, which held that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule allows for the admission- of evidence obtained as a result of an Objectively reasonable reliance on “binding appellate precedent.” — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011). 2014In support, the Commonwealth- leans heavily on Davis v. United States, which held that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule allows for the admission- of evidence obtained as a result of an Objectively reasonable reliance on “binding appellate precedent.” — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011). | 1 | 3 |
Segura v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2022The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained through an illegal search is not admissible against the accused.78 The rule extends not only to the evidence immediately discovered in the illegal search (Reed’s real-time CSLI, in this case) but also to the “indirect products of official misconduct” (the weapon discovered in Reed’s vehicle during the traffic stop, in this case).79 This rule is a court-created remedy rather than an independent constitutional right.80 There are several established exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the independent-source doctrine,81 the inevitabl 1986U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984); Segura v. U.S., 468 U.S. 796 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984). | 1 | 2 |
Crest Coal Co., Inc. v. Baileygreen2 sentences1983These issues must be resolved on a motion for a directed verdict or upon a jury verdict after a plenary trial on the merits and after application of the good faith standard established in Crest Coal Company, Inc. v. Bailey, Ky., 602 S.W.2d 425 (1980). 1983These issues must be resolved on a motion for a directed verdict or upon a jury verdict after a plenary trial on the merits and after application of the good faith standard established in Crest Coal Company, Inc. v. Bailey, Ky., 602 S.W.2d 425 (1980). | 1 | 2 |
Parker v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2025Moreover, we agree with the circuit court that Trooper Davis acted in good faith, and we further agree with the Commonwealth that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule serves as an independent basis for denying suppression.3 The exclusionary rule holds that “unlawfully obtained evidence and the fruits resulting therefrom are inadmissible in criminal proceedings.” Parker v. Commonwealth, 440 S.W.3d 381, 386 (Ky. 2014). 2025And, although Kentucky has yet to apply the specific good faith exception articulated in Krull, “we have consistently interpreted Section 10 of our state Constitution in congruence with the Fourth Amendment regarding the application of both rights and remedies.” Parker, 440 S.W.3d at 387 . | 1 | 1 |
Pettiway v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2024“An Alford plea is a ‘plea of guilty,’ regardless of any denial of underlying facts, and clearly constitutes a criminal conviction.” Pettiway v. Commonwealth, 860 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Ky. 1993). -13- The dilemma from the court’s perspective was this: “I’m clearly struggling with the notion of: (A) what the Court of Appeals asked me to do, and [(B)] the effect of the guilty plea with regard to this good faith analysis which is what I believe the Court of Appeals asked me to do.” (VR 10:36:00–10:36:09) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2023Moore, 159 S.W.3d at 328 (citations omitted). “[W]hen assessing the objective good faith of police executing a warrant, we must look to the totality of the circumstances, including any information known to the officer but not presented to the issuing magistrate.” Id. (citing United States v. Simpkins, 914 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1990)). 2023Moore, 159 S.W.3d at 328 (citations omitted). “[W]hen assessing the objective good faith of police executing a warrant, we must look to the totality of the circumstances, including any information known to the officer but not presented to the issuing magistrate.” Id. (citing United States v. Simpkins, 914 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1990)). | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2022The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained through an illegal search is not admissible against the accused.78 The rule extends not only to the evidence immediately discovered in the illegal search (Reed’s real-time CSLI, in this case) but also to the “indirect products of official misconduct” (the weapon discovered in Reed’s vehicle during the traffic stop, in this case).79 This rule is a court-created remedy rather than an independent constitutional right.80 There are several established exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the independent-source doctrine,81 the inevitabl 2022The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained through an illegal search is not admissible against the accused.78 The rule extends not only to the evidence immediately discovered in the illegal search (Reed’s real-time CSLI, in this case) but also to the “indirect products of official misconduct” (the weapon discovered in Reed’s vehicle during the traffic stop, in this case).79 This rule is a court-created remedy rather than an independent constitutional right.80 There are several established exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the independent-source doctrine,81 the inevitabl | 1 | 1 |
Wong Sun v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2022The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained through an illegal search is not admissible against the accused.78 The rule extends not only to the evidence immediately discovered in the illegal search (Reed’s real-time CSLI, in this case) but also to the “indirect products of official misconduct” (the weapon discovered in Reed’s vehicle during the traffic stop, in this case).79 This rule is a court-created remedy rather than an independent constitutional right.80 There are several established exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the independent-source doctrine,81 the inevitabl | 1 | 1 |
Hughes v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2022The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained through an illegal search is not admissible against the accused.78 The rule extends not only to the evidence immediately discovered in the illegal search (Reed’s real-time CSLI, in this case) but also to the “indirect products of official misconduct” (the weapon discovered in Reed’s vehicle during the traffic stop, in this case).79 This rule is a court-created remedy rather than an independent constitutional right.80 There are several established exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the independent-source doctrine,81 the inevitabl | 1 | 1 |
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompsongreen1 sentence2022The trial court serves an important evidentiary-screening function to ensure that, to the extent possible, only relevant evidence is admitted.5 Moreover, even in the context of relevant evidence, the trial court has a duty to balance the potential for undue prejudice against the probative worth of proffered evidence.6 3 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000). 5 See, e.g., Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Ky. 2007) (acknowledging “the trial court’s unique role as gatekeeper of evidence”); Dunnaway v. Commonwealth, | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2014E.g., State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431 , 863 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1993); State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171 , 598 A.2d 119 (1991); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991). 2014E.g., State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431 , 863 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1993); State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171 , 598 A.2d 119 (1991); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Humble & McLendon v. Wyattgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hensley v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shyamashree Sinha, Md v. Univ. of Kent.green | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. John Henry Morgangreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. George Whiting, and Theodore Whitinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dixon v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Blair v. Hendricksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Frankfort Publishing Co. v. Kentucky State University Foundation, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024Id. -12- “A public agency’s mere refusal to furnish records based on a good faith claim of a statutory exemption, which is later determined to be incorrect, is insufficient to establish a willful violation of the Act.” Bowling v. Lexington- Fayette Urban County Government, 172 S.W.3d 333, 343 (Ky. 2005) (citation omitted). 2024Id. -12- “A public agency’s mere refusal to furnish records based on a good faith claim of a statutory exemption, which is later determined to be incorrect, is insufficient to establish a willful violation of the Act.” Bowling v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 172 S.W.3d 333, 343 (Ky. 2005) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Illinois v. Krull
green
2 sentences2025Applying Krull, the question is whether Trooper Davis’s reliance on KRS 189A.105 was objectively reasonable when he advised Towne of the consequences of his decision to refuse a blood draw, 480 U.S. at 349-50 , 107 S. Ct. at 1167 , and we conclude that it was. 2025Applying Krull, the question is whether Trooper Davis’s reliance on KRS 189A.105 was objectively reasonable when he advised Towne of the consequences of his decision to refuse a blood draw, 480 U.S. at 349-50 , 107 S. Ct. at 1167 , and we conclude that it was. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Shelton
green
1 sentence2024That exception provides that “evidence obtained as a result of a search warrant which later was determined to be technically deficient [is not] suppressed if the police acted with objective reasonableness in relying on the warrant.” Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Kentucky New Era, Inc. v. City of Hopkinsville
green
1 sentence2024“In addition, it shall be within the discretion of the court to award the person an amount not to exceed twenty-five dollars ($25) for each day that he was denied the right to inspect or copy said public record.” Id. 24 In determining what constitutes a “willful violation” of the Open Records Act, this Court has before stated that, “A public agency’s mere refusal to furnish records based on a good faith claim of a statutory exemption, which is later determined to be incorrect, is insufficient to establish a willful violation of the Act.” Bowling v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. Winston M. Simpkins
green
1 sentence2023Moore, 159 S.W.3d at 328 (citations omitted). “[W]hen assessing the objective good faith of police executing a warrant, we must look to the totality of the circumstances, including any information known to the officer but not presented to the issuing magistrate.” Id. (citing United States v. Simpkins, 914 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1990)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Yanero v. Davis
green
1 sentence2022Yanero, 65 S.W.3d 510 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Hedgepath v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2022Additionally, the Court of Appeals found that the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement did not apply because this Court’s decision in Hedgepath v. Commonwealth alerted officers that the warrant requirement for obtaining real-time CSLI was an unsettled point of law.1 The Court of Appeals remanded 1 441 S.W.3d 119 (Ky. 2014). 3 the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this holding. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Harris v. Thompson
green
1 sentence2022The trial court serves an important evidentiary-screening function to ensure that, to the extent possible, only relevant evidence is admitted.5 Moreover, even in the context of relevant evidence, the trial court has a duty to balance the potential for undue prejudice against the probative worth of proffered evidence.6 3 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000). 5 See, e.g., Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Ky. 2007) (acknowledging “the trial court’s unique role as gatekeeper of evidence”); Dunnaway v. Commonwealth, | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Nix v. Williams
green
1 sentence2022The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained through an illegal search is not admissible against the accused.78 The rule extends not only to the evidence immediately discovered in the illegal search (Reed’s real-time CSLI, in this case) but also to the “indirect products of official misconduct” (the weapon discovered in Reed’s vehicle during the traffic stop, in this case).79 This rule is a court-created remedy rather than an independent constitutional right.80 There are several established exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the independent-source doctrine,81 the inevitabl | 1 | 2022–2022 |
United States v. Calandra
green
2 sentences2018Suppression is "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." United States v. Calandra , 414 U.S. 338 , 348, 94 S.Ct. 613 , 620, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). 2018Suppression is "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." United States v. Calandra , 414 U.S. 338 , 348, 94 S.Ct. 613 , 620, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Oakes
green
2 sentences2014E.g., State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431 , 863 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1993); State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171 , 598 A.2d 119 (1991); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991). 2014E.g., State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431 , 863 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1993); State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171 , 598 A.2d 119 (1991); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Commonwealth v. Edmunds green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Krueger
green
2 sentences2014People v. Krueger, 175 Ill.2d 60 , 221 Ill.Dec. 409 , 675 N.E.2d 604 (1996). 2014People v. Krueger, 175 Ill.2d 60 , 221 Ill.Dec. 409 , 675 N.E.2d 604 (1996). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Deadwyler v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Arlinghaus Builders, Inc. v. Kentucky Public Service Commission neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Guth v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Missouri v. Seibert green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Commonwealth v. Litke neutral | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Commonwealth v. Smith green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Robin L. Albright v. The Upjohn Company green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Massachusetts v. Sheppard green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Potts v. Moran's Executors neutral | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Kramer v. Mobley green | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Brown v. Honniss neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Hawkins v. Brown neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Weber v. Lightfoot neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Combs v. Deaton green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.