25 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Malvo Ex Rel. Malvo v. J. C. Penney Co.green2 sentences1976Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 588 (1973), where we said in part: we recognize that where there is evidence that a losing party did not have a good faith claim or defense and all of the fees incurred by the prevailing party were justified, a judge might well choose to award the full amount of fees requested . 1976Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 588 (1973), where we said in part: ... we recognize that where there is evidence that a losing party did not have a good faith claim or defense and all of the fees incurred by the prevailing party were justified, a judge might well choose to award the full amount of fees requested . .. . [21] See note 16, supra. [22] Of course, in a narrow sense retention is voluntary because the offeror could offer the money without conditioning its acceptance on the foregoing of suit. | 4 | 7 |
Gilbert v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Alaska 1974) (explaining that ”[i]t is not the purpose of Rule 82 to penalize a party for litigating a good faith claim but rather partially to compensate the prevailing party where such compensation is justified”). . 1979In Gilbert we held that since "[i]t is not the purpose of Rule 82 to penalize a [plaintiff] for litigating a good faith claim ... . [i]t is an abuse of discretion to award attorneys' fees against a losing [plaintiff] who has in good faith raised a question of genuine public interest before the courts." 526 P.2d at 1136 . | 1 | 2 |
Miller v. Safeway, Inc.green1 sentence2013But given the way the immunity statute is written, Giani does not enjoy complete immunity for making a report of harm; the statutory immunity granted is qualified by a good faith requirement.9 And as demonstrated by this case, the existence 5 Olson v. City of Hooper Bay, 251 P.3d 1024, 1033 (Alaska 2011). 6 Miller v. Safeway, Inc., 170 P.3d 655, 658 (Alaska 2007). 7 AS 47.24.010(a). 8 AS 47.24.010(c). 9 AS 47.24.120(a) (“A person who in good faith makes a report under (continued...) -30- 6756 of good faith is a factual question,10 and if the subject of the report of harm is able to raise a gen | 1 | 1 |
Olson v. City of Hooper Baygreen1 sentence2013But given the way the immunity statute is written, Giani does not enjoy complete immunity for making a report of harm; the statutory immunity granted is qualified by a good faith requirement.9 And as demonstrated by this case, the existence 5 Olson v. City of Hooper Bay, 251 P.3d 1024, 1033 (Alaska 2011). 6 Miller v. Safeway, Inc., 170 P.3d 655, 658 (Alaska 2007). 7 AS 47.24.010(a). 8 AS 47.24.010(c). 9 AS 47.24.120(a) (“A person who in good faith makes a report under (continued...) -30- 6756 of good faith is a factual question,10 and if the subject of the report of harm is able to raise a gen | 1 | 1 |
Reid v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2011See Reid v. Williams, 964 P.2d 453, 461-62 (Alaska 1998) (stating that the superior court is "in the best position to determine whether a party's behavior was ... in bad faith"); see also Shooshanian v. Dire, 237 P.3d 618, 626 (Alaska 2010) (explaining that this court will "give great deference to the trial court's credibility findings"). 29 . | 1 | 1 |
Enders v. Parkergreen1 sentence2011Enders v. Parker, 125 P.3d 1027, 1030-31 (Alaska 2005) ("The good faith inquiry requires a factual determination of intent that we review for clear error."). 28 . | 1 | 1 |
Shooshanian v. Diregreen1 sentence2011See Reid v. Williams, 964 P.2d 453, 461-62 (Alaska 1998) (stating that the superior court is "in the best position to determine whether a party's behavior was ... in bad faith"); see also Shooshanian v. Dire, 237 P.3d 618, 626 (Alaska 2010) (explaining that this court will "give great deference to the trial court's credibility findings"). 29 . | 1 | 1 |
Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc. v. Department of Health & Social Servicesgreen1 sentence1997Id. at 979-80 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Barberogreen1 sentence1992We have, however, permitted full attorney’s fees to be awarded: 1) when a party asserts a frivolous claim, Crawford & Co. v. Vienna, 744 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Alaska 1987); 2) when a party litigates in bad faith, Keen v. Ruddy, 784 P.2d 653, 657 (Alaska 1989); 3) when a party is liable under an indemnity clause, Manson-Osberg Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 654, 660 (Alaska 1976); or 4) when the award is made pursuant to an express contract provision, Jackson v. Barbero, 776 P.2d 786, 788 (Alaska 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Crawford and Co. v. Viennagreen1 sentence1992We have, however, permitted full attorney’s fees to be awarded: 1) when a party asserts a frivolous claim, Crawford & Co. v. Vienna, 744 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Alaska 1987); 2) when a party litigates in bad faith, Keen v. Ruddy, 784 P.2d 653, 657 (Alaska 1989); 3) when a party is liable under an indemnity clause, Manson-Osberg Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 654, 660 (Alaska 1976); or 4) when the award is made pursuant to an express contract provision, Jackson v. Barbero, 776 P.2d 786, 788 (Alaska 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Manson-Osberg Company v. Stategreen1 sentence1992We have, however, permitted full attorney’s fees to be awarded: 1) when a party asserts a frivolous claim, Crawford & Co. v. Vienna, 744 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Alaska 1987); 2) when a party litigates in bad faith, Keen v. Ruddy, 784 P.2d 653, 657 (Alaska 1989); 3) when a party is liable under an indemnity clause, Manson-Osberg Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 654, 660 (Alaska 1976); or 4) when the award is made pursuant to an express contract provision, Jackson v. Barbero, 776 P.2d 786, 788 (Alaska 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Keen v. Ruddygreen1 sentence1992We have, however, permitted full attorney’s fees to be awarded: 1) when a party asserts a frivolous claim, Crawford & Co. v. Vienna, 744 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Alaska 1987); 2) when a party litigates in bad faith, Keen v. Ruddy, 784 P.2d 653, 657 (Alaska 1989); 3) when a party is liable under an indemnity clause, Manson-Osberg Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 654, 660 (Alaska 1976); or 4) when the award is made pursuant to an express contract provision, Jackson v. Barbero, 776 P.2d 786, 788 (Alaska 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Fife v. Barnardgreen1 sentence1984See Fife v. Barnard, 186 F.2d 655, 660 (10th Cir.1951); Armstrong v. Cities Service Gas Co., 210 Kansas 298, 502 P.2d 672, 681 (1972); Williams v. Striker, 29 Wash.App. 132 , 627 P.2d 590, 593 (1981); see generally, 2 C.J.S. | 1 | 1 |
Armstrong v. Cities Service Gas Co.green1 sentence1984See Fife v. Barnard, 186 F.2d 655, 660 (10th Cir.1951); Armstrong v. Cities Service Gas Co., 210 Kansas 298, 502 P.2d 672, 681 (1972); Williams v. Striker, 29 Wash.App. 132 , 627 P.2d 590, 593 (1981); see generally, 2 C.J.S. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Strikergreen2 sentences1984See Fife v. Barnard, 186 F.2d 655, 660 (10th Cir.1951); Armstrong v. Cities Service Gas Co., 210 Kansas 298, 502 P.2d 672, 681 (1972); Williams v. Striker, 29 Wash.App. 132 , 627 P.2d 590, 593 (1981); see generally, 2 C.J.S. 1984See Fife v. Barnard, 186 F.2d 655, 660 (10th Cir.1951); Armstrong v. Cities Service Gas Co., 210 Kansas 298, 502 P.2d 672, 681 (1972); Williams v. Striker, 29 Wash.App. 132 , 627 P.2d 590, 593 (1981); see generally, 2 C.J.S. | 1 | 1 |
Department of Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp.green2 sentences1983As the court observed with regard to the good faith requirement in State Dept. of Fisheries v. J-Z Sales, 25 Wash. App. 671 , 610 P.2d 390, 393 (1980): For purposes of accord and satisfaction, the underlying dispute over the debt must be in good faith, i.e., the parties must have a bona fide belief in the validity of their positions with respect to the claim. 1983As the court observed with regard to the good faith requirement in State Dept. of Fisheries v. J-Z Sales, 25 Wash. App. 671 , 610 P.2d 390, 393 (1980): For purposes of accord and satisfaction, the underlying dispute over the debt must be in good faith, i.e., the parties must have a bona fide belief in the validity of their positions with respect to the claim. | 1 | 1 |
Kenai Peninsula Borough School District v. Kenai Peninsula Education Ass'ngreen2 sentences1982“Collective bargaining” is a term of art in labor law that harbors the concommitant duty to bargain in good faith. 12 We recognized in Kenai Peninsula Borough School District v. Kenai Peninsula Education Association, 572 P.2d 416 (Alaska 1977), that the good faith standard of collective bargaining may affect the substantive position of the bargaining parties. 1982"Collective bargaining" is a term of art in labor law that harbors the concommitant duty to bargain *337 in good faith. [12] We recognized in Kenai Peninsula Borough School District v. Kenai Peninsula Education Association, 572 P.2d 416 (Alaska 1977), that the good faith standard of collective bargaining may affect the substantive position of the bargaining parties. | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Detroit Marine Terminals, Inc.green1 sentence1979See, e. g., Martin v. Detroit Marine Terminals, Inc., 189 F.Supp. 579 (N.D.Mich.1960); Brown v. Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp., 80 F.Supp. 257 (D.Ky.1948). 36 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Alaska Conservation Foundation v. Pebble Limited Partnership
green
2 sentences2017P’ship, 350 P.3d 273 , 279 82 (Alaska 2015) (discussing the public interest exception and the legislature’s abrogation). 2017P’ship, 350 P.3d 273 , 279 82 (Alaska 2015) (discussing the public interest exception and the legislature’s abrogation). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Anderson v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
green
2 sentences2016Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1289 . -9- 7123 do not satisfy this requirement.29 But small offers may be valid even when they are much lower than the amounts demanded.30 Such discrepancies might be justified when the claims have a “tenuous factual basis or controlling legal precedent.”31 Both the timing and the amount of an offer may bear on its validity.32 Peter’s offers of judgment complied with Rule 68 because there was an “objectively reasonable prospect” that they might start a dialogue that could lead to settlement.33 Though Peter made the offers about one month after Marshall filed her complain 2016Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1289 . . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
cluster 239
green
2 sentences2010Id. at 1182 . 2010Ibid. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Arizona v. Gant
green
1 sentence2010Why we conclude that the search of Deem-er's vehicle-more specifically, the search of Deemer's coat lying on the back seat of the vehicle-was lawful under Gant As we explained above, Gant re-affirmed the doctrine that the police have the authority to search a vehicle incident to an arrest if they have a reasonable belief that evidence relevant to "the crime of arrest" might be found in the vehicle. 129 S.Ct. at 1719 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Woodward v. State
green
2 sentences1998It is obvious that Whitescarver’s appellate attorney studiously avoided discussing (or even citing) the Alaska case most directly on point, Woodward v. State, 855 P.2d 423 (Alaska App.1993). 2 In Woodward , this court held that a defendant’s good-faith claim of ownership or entitlement to property is not a defense to the crime of extortion committed by threatening future physical injury, AS 11.41.520(a)(1). 1998Id. at 427 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Miller v. LHKM
green
1 sentence1992In Miller , we upheld an award of partial fees to a codefendant in an interpleader action, restating the well-established rule that the “purpose of the attorney’s fee rule is to partially compensate the prevailing party, not to penalize a party for litigating a good faith claim.” Id. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Kenai Lumber Co., Inc. v. LeResche
green
1 sentence1986Such a litigant is less apt than a party lacking this incentive to be deterred from bringing a good faith claim by the prospect of an adverse award of attorney’s fees. 646 P.2d at 223 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Hentzner v. State
green
1 sentence1983The holding of the Alaska Supreme Court in Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d at 824-29 , strongly suggests that, where securities violations involve a component of fraud and are thereby malum in se rather than malum prohibitum, an instruction requiring a finding of specific intent to defraud would suffice, without the need for an independent finding of an awareness of wrongdoing as to the fact that the fraudulent transaction involved a security. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Anchorage v. McCabe
green
1 sentence1979Following the rationale of Gilbert , in McCabe we said that a successful public interest plaintiff "should not be penalized by Rule 82 by failing to receive full compensation for the costs of litigating issues of public importance." 568 P.2d at 994 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Brown v. Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp.
green
1 sentence1979See, e. g., Martin v. Detroit Marine Terminals, Inc., 189 F.Supp. 579 (N.D.Mich.1960); Brown v. Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp., 80 F.Supp. 257 (D.Ky.1948). 36 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Girves v. Kenai Peninsula Borough
green
2 sentences1977We find, however, that requiring a court to award an amount less than that which constitutes full compensation is contrary to the rationale of decisions in Gilbert v. State, supra, and Girves v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, supra. In those cases, we held that since it was not the purpose of Rule 82 to penalize plaintiffs who in good faith litigate important public questions, such plaintiffs, even if unsuccessful, should not be charged with attorney’s fees. 1977We find, however, that requiring a court to award an amount less than that which constitutes full compensation is contrary to the rationale of decisions in Gilbert v. State, supra , and Girves v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, supra . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.