11 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1996–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Leongreen2 sentences2024See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980). 2024See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Jensengreen2 sentences2024See State v. Jensen, 217 Mont. 272 , 277–78, 704 P.2d 45, 48 (1985). 2024See State v. Jensen, 217 Mont. 272 , 277–78, 704 P.2d 45, 48 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
City of Cut Bank v. Birdgreen2 sentences2024See City of Cut Bank v. Bird, 2001 MT 296, ¶ 20 , 307 Mont. 460 , 38 P.3d 804 . 2024See City of Cut Bank v. Bird, 2001 MT 296, ¶ 20 , 307 Mont. 460 , 38 P.3d 804 . | 1 | 1 |
In Re Search Warrant for Records From AT & Tgreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., In re Search Warrant for Records from AT&T, 165 A.3d 711 (N.H. 2017); State v. Rose, 330 P.3d 680 (Ore. 2014). 11 ¶23 We have acknowledged a good-faith exception under the exclusionary rule. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gouletgreen2 sentences2018See State v. Goulet , 283 Mont. 38 , 41, 938 P.2d 1330 , 1332 (1997) (defendant entitled to jury instructions "on any theory ... supported by the record"); State v. Hagen , 273 Mont. 432 , 442, 903 P.2d 1381 , 1387 (1995) (jury instructions are generally matters of trial strategy). 2018See State v. Goulet , 283 Mont. 38 , 41, 938 P.2d 1330 , 1332 (1997) (defendant entitled to jury instructions "on any theory ... supported by the record"); State v. Hagen , 273 Mont. 432 , 442, 903 P.2d 1381 , 1387 (1995) (jury instructions are generally matters of trial strategy). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sevillagreen2 sentences2018See People v. Sevilla , 132 Ill.2d 113 , 138 Ill.Dec. 148 , 547 N.E.2d 117 , 123 (1989) ; Lewis v. People , 99 Colo. 102 , 60 P.2d 1089 , 1096-97 (1936) ; People v. Goodin , 136 Cal. 455 , 69 P. 85 , 86 (1902) ; People v. Eastman , 77 Cal. 171 , 19 P. 266 , 267 (1888) ; People v. Vineberg , 125 Cal.App.3d 127 , 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 , 824 (1981) ; Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 178 (5th ed. 2009) (mistake about a separate law implicated on the facts by requisite mental state for the offense exculpates if negates specific intent, but does not exculpate with respect to a general intent 2018See People v. Sevilla , 132 Ill.2d 113 , 138 Ill.Dec. 148 , 547 N.E.2d 117 , 123 (1989) ; Lewis v. People , 99 Colo. 102 , 60 P.2d 1089 , 1096-97 (1936) ; People v. Goodin , 136 Cal. 455 , 69 P. 85 , 86 (1902) ; People v. Eastman , 77 Cal. 171 , 19 P. 266 , 267 (1888) ; People v. Vineberg , 125 Cal.App.3d 127 , 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 , 824 (1981) ; Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 178 (5th ed. 2009) (mistake about a separate law implicated on the facts by requisite mental state for the offense exculpates if negates specific intent, but does not exculpate with respect to a general intent | 1 | 1 |
Price Building Service, Inc. v. Holmsgreen2 sentences2016Additionally, the State maintains that § 18-1-404, MCA, provides a good faith exception to the rule that interest commences when payment on the contract is due which allows for interest to be assessed following a court’s resolution of the good faith dispute. ¶12 We have previously stated that “prejudgment interest is to be awarded unless either the law or the creditor prevents the payment of principal.” Byrne v. Terry, 228 Mont. 387, 391 , 741 P.2d 1341, 1343 (1987) (citing Price Building Services, Inc. v. Holms, 214 Mont. 456, 468-69 , 693 P.2d 553, 559-60 (1985)). 2016Additionally, the State maintains that § 18-1-404, MCA, provides a good faith exception to the rule that interest commences when payment on the contract is due which allows for interest to be assessed following a court’s resolution of the good faith dispute. ¶12 We have previously stated that “prejudgment interest is to be awarded unless either the law or the creditor prevents the payment of principal.” Byrne v. Terry, 228 Mont. 387, 391 , 741 P.2d 1341, 1343 (1987) (citing Price Building Services, Inc. v. Holms, 214 Mont. 456, 468-69 , 693 P.2d 553, 559-60 (1985)). | 1 | 1 |
Byrne v. Terrygreen2 sentences2016Additionally, the State maintains that § 18-1-404, MCA, provides a good faith exception to the rule that interest commences when payment on the contract is due which allows for interest to be assessed following a court’s resolution of the good faith dispute. ¶12 We have previously stated that “prejudgment interest is to be awarded unless either the law or the creditor prevents the payment of principal.” Byrne v. Terry, 228 Mont. 387, 391 , 741 P.2d 1341, 1343 (1987) (citing Price Building Services, Inc. v. Holms, 214 Mont. 456, 468-69 , 693 P.2d 553, 559-60 (1985)). 2016Additionally, the State maintains that § 18-1-404, MCA, provides a good faith exception to the rule that interest commences when payment on the contract is due which allows for interest to be assessed following a court’s resolution of the good faith dispute. ¶12 We have previously stated that “prejudgment interest is to be awarded unless either the law or the creditor prevents the payment of principal.” Byrne v. Terry, 228 Mont. 387, 391 , 741 P.2d 1341, 1343 (1987) (citing Price Building Services, Inc. v. Holms, 214 Mont. 456, 468-69 , 693 P.2d 553, 559-60 (1985)). | 1 | 1 |
Hafer v. Melogreen2 sentences1997See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 , 112 S.Ct. at 361-62 . 1997See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 , 112 S.Ct. at 361-62 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Jo Ann Williams
green
1 sentence2024See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Sedler
green
2 sentences2024“Generally, an appellate court does not address issues raised for the first time on appeal.” State v. Sedler, 2020 MT 248, ¶ 10 , 401 Mont. 437 , 473 P.3d 406 (citations omitted). 2024“Generally, an appellate court does not address issues raised for the first time on appeal.” State v. Sedler, 2020 MT 248, ¶ 10 , 401 Mont. 437 , 473 P.3d 406 (citations omitted). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Rose
green
1 sentence2024See, e.g., In re Search Warrant for Records from AT&T, 165 A.3d 711 (N.H. 2017); State v. Rose, 330 P.3d 680 (Ore. 2014). 11 ¶23 We have acknowledged a good-faith exception under the exclusionary rule. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. Jeffrey H. Feingold
green
1 sentence2020Feingold, 454 F.3d at 1004-06 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Goodin
green
2 sentences2018See People v. Sevilla , 132 Ill.2d 113 , 138 Ill.Dec. 148 , 547 N.E.2d 117 , 123 (1989) ; Lewis v. People , 99 Colo. 102 , 60 P.2d 1089 , 1096-97 (1936) ; People v. Goodin , 136 Cal. 455 , 69 P. 85 , 86 (1902) ; People v. Eastman , 77 Cal. 171 , 19 P. 266 , 267 (1888) ; People v. Vineberg , 125 Cal.App.3d 127 , 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 , 824 (1981) ; Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 178 (5th ed. 2009) (mistake about a separate law implicated on the facts by requisite mental state for the offense exculpates if negates specific intent, but does not exculpate with respect to a general intent 2018See People v. Sevilla , 132 Ill.2d 113 , 138 Ill.Dec. 148 , 547 N.E.2d 117 , 123 (1989) ; Lewis v. People , 99 Colo. 102 , 60 P.2d 1089 , 1096-97 (1936) ; People v. Goodin , 136 Cal. 455 , 69 P. 85 , 86 (1902) ; People v. Eastman , 77 Cal. 171 , 19 P. 266 , 267 (1888) ; People v. Vineberg , 125 Cal.App.3d 127 , 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 , 824 (1981) ; Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 178 (5th ed. 2009) (mistake about a separate law implicated on the facts by requisite mental state for the offense exculpates if negates specific intent, but does not exculpate with respect to a general intent | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Lewis v. People
green
2 sentences2018See People v. Sevilla , 132 Ill.2d 113 , 138 Ill.Dec. 148 , 547 N.E.2d 117 , 123 (1989) ; Lewis v. People , 99 Colo. 102 , 60 P.2d 1089 , 1096-97 (1936) ; People v. Goodin , 136 Cal. 455 , 69 P. 85 , 86 (1902) ; People v. Eastman , 77 Cal. 171 , 19 P. 266 , 267 (1888) ; People v. Vineberg , 125 Cal.App.3d 127 , 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 , 824 (1981) ; Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 178 (5th ed. 2009) (mistake about a separate law implicated on the facts by requisite mental state for the offense exculpates if negates specific intent, but does not exculpate with respect to a general intent 2018See People v. Sevilla , 132 Ill.2d 113 , 138 Ill.Dec. 148 , 547 N.E.2d 117 , 123 (1989) ; Lewis v. People , 99 Colo. 102 , 60 P.2d 1089 , 1096-97 (1936) ; People v. Goodin , 136 Cal. 455 , 69 P. 85 , 86 (1902) ; People v. Eastman , 77 Cal. 171 , 19 P. 266 , 267 (1888) ; People v. Vineberg , 125 Cal.App.3d 127 , 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 , 824 (1981) ; Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 178 (5th ed. 2009) (mistake about a separate law implicated on the facts by requisite mental state for the offense exculpates if negates specific intent, but does not exculpate with respect to a general intent | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Hagen
green
2 sentences2018See State v. Goulet , 283 Mont. 38 , 41, 938 P.2d 1330 , 1332 (1997) (defendant entitled to jury instructions "on any theory ... supported by the record"); State v. Hagen , 273 Mont. 432 , 442, 903 P.2d 1381 , 1387 (1995) (jury instructions are generally matters of trial strategy). 2018See State v. Goulet , 283 Mont. 38 , 41, 938 P.2d 1330 , 1332 (1997) (defendant entitled to jury instructions "on any theory ... supported by the record"); State v. Hagen , 273 Mont. 432 , 442, 903 P.2d 1381 , 1387 (1995) (jury instructions are generally matters of trial strategy). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Vineberg
green
2 sentences2018See People v. Sevilla , 132 Ill.2d 113 , 138 Ill.Dec. 148 , 547 N.E.2d 117 , 123 (1989) ; Lewis v. People , 99 Colo. 102 , 60 P.2d 1089 , 1096-97 (1936) ; People v. Goodin , 136 Cal. 455 , 69 P. 85 , 86 (1902) ; People v. Eastman , 77 Cal. 171 , 19 P. 266 , 267 (1888) ; People v. Vineberg , 125 Cal.App.3d 127 , 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 , 824 (1981) ; Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 178 (5th ed. 2009) (mistake about a separate law implicated on the facts by requisite mental state for the offense exculpates if negates specific intent, but does not exculpate with respect to a general intent 2018See People v. Sevilla , 132 Ill.2d 113 , 138 Ill.Dec. 148 , 547 N.E.2d 117 , 123 (1989) ; Lewis v. People , 99 Colo. 102 , 60 P.2d 1089 , 1096-97 (1936) ; People v. Goodin , 136 Cal. 455 , 69 P. 85 , 86 (1902) ; People v. Eastman , 77 Cal. 171 , 19 P. 266 , 267 (1888) ; People v. Vineberg , 125 Cal.App.3d 127 , 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 , 824 (1981) ; Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 178 (5th ed. 2009) (mistake about a separate law implicated on the facts by requisite mental state for the offense exculpates if negates specific intent, but does not exculpate with respect to a general intent | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Trujillo
green
2 sentences2018State v. Payne , 2011 MT 35 , ¶ 22, 359 Mont. 270 , 248 P.3d 842 ; State v. Trujillo , 2008 MT 101 , ¶¶ 14-15, 342 Mont. 319 , 180 P.3d 1153 . 10 The critical distinction between this ancient principle and the narrow good-faith claim-of-right defense is that theft, as defined by §§ 45-6-301(1)(a) and 45-2-101(20)(a), (65), MCA, requires proof of a specific purpose to deprive another of property, whether permanently or conditionally, without lawful authority and the resulting fact defense to the requisite mental state applies to a point of civil law separate and apart from mere ignorance of the 2018State v. Payne , 2011 MT 35 , ¶ 22, 359 Mont. 270 , 248 P.3d 842 ; State v. Trujillo , 2008 MT 101 , ¶¶ 14-15, 342 Mont. 319 , 180 P.3d 1153 . 10 The critical distinction between this ancient principle and the narrow good-faith claim-of-right defense is that theft, as defined by §§ 45-6-301(1)(a) and 45-2-101(20)(a), (65), MCA, requires proof of a specific purpose to deprive another of property, whether permanently or conditionally, without lawful authority and the resulting fact defense to the requisite mental state applies to a point of civil law separate and apart from mere ignorance of the | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Payne
green
2 sentences2018State v. Payne , 2011 MT 35 , ¶ 22, 359 Mont. 270 , 248 P.3d 842 ; State v. Trujillo , 2008 MT 101 , ¶¶ 14-15, 342 Mont. 319 , 180 P.3d 1153 . 10 The critical distinction between this ancient principle and the narrow good-faith claim-of-right defense is that theft, as defined by §§ 45-6-301(1)(a) and 45-2-101(20)(a), (65), MCA, requires proof of a specific purpose to deprive another of property, whether permanently or conditionally, without lawful authority and the resulting fact defense to the requisite mental state applies to a point of civil law separate and apart from mere ignorance of the 2018State v. Payne , 2011 MT 35 , ¶ 22, 359 Mont. 270 , 248 P.3d 842 ; State v. Trujillo , 2008 MT 101 , ¶¶ 14-15, 342 Mont. 319 , 180 P.3d 1153 . 10 The critical distinction between this ancient principle and the narrow good-faith claim-of-right defense is that theft, as defined by §§ 45-6-301(1)(a) and 45-2-101(20)(a), (65), MCA, requires proof of a specific purpose to deprive another of property, whether permanently or conditionally, without lawful authority and the resulting fact defense to the requisite mental state applies to a point of civil law separate and apart from mere ignorance of the | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. McMillen
green
1 sentence2018Tufunga , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 143 , 987 P.2d at 177-81 ; State v. McMillen , 925 P.2d 1088 , 1090-91 (Haw. 1996) ; People v. Pagan , 19 N.Y.3d 91 , 945 N.Y.S.2d 606 , 968 N.E.2d 960 , 963 (2012) ; People v. Reid , 69 N.Y.2d 469 , 515 N.Y.S.2d 750 , 508 N.E.2d 661 , 664 (1987). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Tufunga
green
2 sentences2018Tufunga , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 143 , 987 P.2d at 177-81 ; State v. McMillen , 925 P.2d 1088 , 1090-91 (Haw. 1996) ; People v. Pagan , 19 N.Y.3d 91 , 945 N.Y.S.2d 606 , 968 N.E.2d 960 , 963 (2012) ; People v. Reid , 69 N.Y.2d 469 , 515 N.Y.S.2d 750 , 508 N.E.2d 661 , 664 (1987). 2018Tufunga , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 143 , 987 P.2d at 177-81 ; State v. McMillen , 925 P.2d 1088 , 1090-91 (Haw. 1996) ; People v. Pagan , 19 N.Y.3d 91 , 945 N.Y.S.2d 606 , 968 N.E.2d 960 , 963 (2012) ; People v. Reid , 69 N.Y.2d 469 , 515 N.Y.S.2d 750 , 508 N.E.2d 661 , 664 (1987). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Eastman
green
2 sentences2018See People v. Sevilla , 132 Ill.2d 113 , 138 Ill.Dec. 148 , 547 N.E.2d 117 , 123 (1989) ; Lewis v. People , 99 Colo. 102 , 60 P.2d 1089 , 1096-97 (1936) ; People v. Goodin , 136 Cal. 455 , 69 P. 85 , 86 (1902) ; People v. Eastman , 77 Cal. 171 , 19 P. 266 , 267 (1888) ; People v. Vineberg , 125 Cal.App.3d 127 , 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 , 824 (1981) ; Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 178 (5th ed. 2009) (mistake about a separate law implicated on the facts by requisite mental state for the offense exculpates if negates specific intent, but does not exculpate with respect to a general intent 2018See People v. Sevilla , 132 Ill.2d 113 , 138 Ill.Dec. 148 , 547 N.E.2d 117 , 123 (1989) ; Lewis v. People , 99 Colo. 102 , 60 P.2d 1089 , 1096-97 (1936) ; People v. Goodin , 136 Cal. 455 , 69 P. 85 , 86 (1902) ; People v. Eastman , 77 Cal. 171 , 19 P. 266 , 267 (1888) ; People v. Vineberg , 125 Cal.App.3d 127 , 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 , 824 (1981) ; Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 178 (5th ed. 2009) (mistake about a separate law implicated on the facts by requisite mental state for the offense exculpates if negates specific intent, but does not exculpate with respect to a general intent | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Pagan
green
2 sentences2018Tufunga , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 143 , 987 P.2d at 177-81 ; State v. McMillen , 925 P.2d 1088 , 1090-91 (Haw. 1996) ; People v. Pagan , 19 N.Y.3d 91 , 945 N.Y.S.2d 606 , 968 N.E.2d 960 , 963 (2012) ; People v. Reid , 69 N.Y.2d 469 , 515 N.Y.S.2d 750 , 508 N.E.2d 661 , 664 (1987). 2018Tufunga , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 143 , 987 P.2d at 177-81 ; State v. McMillen , 925 P.2d 1088 , 1090-91 (Haw. 1996) ; People v. Pagan , 19 N.Y.3d 91 , 945 N.Y.S.2d 606 , 968 N.E.2d 960 , 963 (2012) ; People v. Reid , 69 N.Y.2d 469 , 515 N.Y.S.2d 750 , 508 N.E.2d 661 , 664 (1987). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Reid
green
2 sentences2018Tufunga , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 143 , 987 P.2d at 177-81 ; State v. McMillen , 925 P.2d 1088 , 1090-91 (Haw. 1996) ; People v. Pagan , 19 N.Y.3d 91 , 945 N.Y.S.2d 606 , 968 N.E.2d 960 , 963 (2012) ; People v. Reid , 69 N.Y.2d 469 , 515 N.Y.S.2d 750 , 508 N.E.2d 661 , 664 (1987). 2018Tufunga , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 143 , 987 P.2d at 177-81 ; State v. McMillen , 925 P.2d 1088 , 1090-91 (Haw. 1996) ; People v. Pagan , 19 N.Y.3d 91 , 945 N.Y.S.2d 606 , 968 N.E.2d 960 , 963 (2012) ; People v. Reid , 69 N.Y.2d 469 , 515 N.Y.S.2d 750 , 508 N.E.2d 661 , 664 (1987). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Lorang v. Fortis Insurance
green
2 sentences2015The fact that damages due to a breach of the UTPA may also be damages arising out of a breach of contract should not preclude the award of punitive damages if it can be shown that the insurer acted with malice. ¶51 In Lorang v. Fortis, 2008 MT 252 , 345 Mont. 12 , 192 P.3d 186 , we held that “Montana’s statutory law provides that punitive damages may be assessed against an insurer which has committed the UTPA violations alleged here.” Lorang , ¶ 90 (citing § 33-18-242(4), MCA). 2015The fact that damages due to a breach of the UTPA may also be damages arising out of a breach of contract should not preclude the award of punitive damages if it can be shown that the insurer acted with malice. ¶51 In Lorang v. Fortis, 2008 MT 252 , 345 Mont. 12 , 192 P.3d 186 , we held that “Montana’s statutory law provides that punitive damages may be assessed against an insurer which has committed the UTPA violations alleged here.” Lorang , ¶ 90 (citing § 33-18-242(4), MCA). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 216-17 , 114 S.Ct. 1461 . 2005Id. at 216-17 , 114 S.Ct. 1461 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Lundberg v. LIBERTY NORTHWEST INS. CO. INC.
green
2 sentences2003Co. (1994), 268 Mont. 499, 503-04 , 887 P.2d 156, 158-59 , the fact that Mathews was not engaged in an independent business is decisive of the fact that Mathews was not an IC. ¶31 Accordingly, we hold, as we did in Wild , that § 39-71-401(3), MCA, read in conjunction with § 39-71-120, MCA, does require the employer to make an initial good faith inquiry of the worker to determine that he or she does, in fact, meet the control and independently established business tests before the employer employs the worker as an IC and if the employer determines the worker is an IC, to thereafter treat the wo 2003Co. (1994), 268 Mont. 499, 503-04 , 887 P.2d 156, 158-59 , the fact that Mathews was not engaged in an independent business is decisive of the fact that Mathews was not an IC. ¶31 Accordingly, we hold, as we did in Wild , that § 39-71-401(3), MCA, read in conjunction with § 39-71-120, MCA, does require the employer to make an initial good faith inquiry of the worker to determine that he or she does, in fact, meet the control and independently established business tests before the employer employs the worker as an IC and if the employer determines the worker is an IC, to thereafter treat the wo | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Pierson v. Ray
green
2 sentences1996The theory of qualified immunity first arose as a defense for police officers in Pierson v. Ray (1967), 386 U.S. 547 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 . 1996The theory of qualified immunity first arose as a defense for police officers in Pierson v. Ray (1967), 386 U.S. 547 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.