good faith exception in Maryland

2025The court expressly 7 As an alternate ground for affirmance, the State invokes the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule (see generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)), to argue that the officers proceeded in good faith reliance on a facially valid warrant and, thus, that a court should not suppress the evidence that they seized.

2024Instead, we recognize and routinely apply the good-faith exception that was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

2021The Court of Special Appeals noted that this Court has applied the good faith exception even in cases where “there was no substantial basis for probable cause.” Id. at 493 , 230 A.3d at 173 (citing Patterson v. State, 401 Md. 76, 82 , 930 A.2d 348, 351-52 (2007)).

2021The Court of Special Appeals noted that this Court has applied the good faith exception even in cases where “there was no substantial basis for probable cause.” Id. at 493 , 230 A.3d at 173 (citing Patterson v. State, 401 Md. 76, 82 , 930 A.2d 348, 351-52 (2007)).

2017Connelly v. State, 322 Md. 719, 725-35 , 589 A.2d 958 (1991); Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707, 712-20 , 641 A.2d 214 (1994) (“A test that looks to whether the police officer knew that the warrant issued by the judge should not have been issued would seem to place the police officer in the position of reviewing the decision made by the judge, but that is not what Leon requires.”); McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 467-73 , 701 A.2d 675 (1997); Patterson v. State, supra, 401 Md. at 104-111 , 930 A.2d 348 (“Officer Haak’s affidavit was not ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official

2017Connelly v. State, 322 Md. 719, 725-35 , 589 A.2d 958 (1991); Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707, 712-20 , 641 A.2d 214 (1994) (“A test that looks to whether the police officer knew that the warrant issued by the judge should not have been issued would seem to place the police officer in the position of reviewing the decision made by the judge, but that is not what Leon requires.”); McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 467-73 , 701 A.2d 675 (1997); Patterson v. State, supra, 401 Md. at 104-111 , 930 A.2d 348 (“Officer Haak’s affidavit was not ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official

2020The Court of Appeals has instructed that there are four scenarios in which a court should not apply the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule to an invalid warrant: (1) where the issuing authority is “misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard for the truth;” (2) “where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role . . .;” (3) where “no reasonably well-trained officer should rely on the warrant . . . [such as] an affidavit ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official

2020“Where the defect in the warrant is not readily apparent to a well-trained officer, or, where the warrant is based on ‘evidence sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause,’ then the good faith exception will apply.” Id. at 679 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 926 ).

2016See, e.g., Spence v. State, 444 Md. 1, 12-13 , 118 A.3d 864 (2015) (wherein the police officer, in searching a cell phone and reading text messages during a search incident to arrest, was *420 acting in good faith reliance on then-controlling authority in Maryland); Agurs, 415 Md. at 83 , 998 A.2d 868 (concluding that the good faith exception did not apply where “no reasonably well-trained police officer could have relied on the warrant that authorized the search of Agurs’ home.”).

2016See, e.g., Spence v. State, 444 Md. 1, 12-13 , 118 A.3d 864 (2015) (wherein the police officer, in searching a cell phone and reading text messages during a search incident to arrest, was *420 acting in good faith reliance on then-controlling authority in Maryland); Agurs, 415 Md. at 83 , 998 A.2d 868 (concluding that the good faith exception did not apply where “no reasonably well-trained police officer could have relied on the warrant that authorized the search of Agurs’ home.”).

2017Connelly v. State, 322 Md. 719, 725-35 , 589 A.2d 958 (1991); Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707, 712-20 , 641 A.2d 214 (1994) (“A test that looks to whether the police officer knew that the warrant issued by the judge should not have been issued would seem to place the police officer in the position of reviewing the decision made by the judge, but that is not what Leon requires.”); McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 467-73 , 701 A.2d 675 (1997); Patterson v. State, supra, 401 Md. at 104-111 , 930 A.2d 348 (“Officer Haak’s affidavit was not ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official

2017Connelly v. State, 322 Md. 719, 725-35 , 589 A.2d 958 (1991); Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707, 712-20 , 641 A.2d 214 (1994) (“A test that looks to whether the police officer knew that the warrant issued by the judge should not have been issued would seem to place the police officer in the position of reviewing the decision made by the judge, but that is not what Leon requires.”); McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 467-73 , 701 A.2d 675 (1997); Patterson v. State, supra, 401 Md. at 104-111 , 930 A.2d 348 (“Officer Haak’s affidavit was not ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official

2024See Marshall v. State, 415 Md. 399, 409-10 (2010) (“[T]he standard of factual support required to be presented by the affidavit in order for evidence to be admitted under the good faith exception is considerably lower than the standard for establishing a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause by a judge issuing a search warrant.”).

2020See Marshall v. State, 415 Md. 399, 402 (2010) (assuming that the search warrant was issued improperly and analyzing only the application of the good faith exception).

2019And, in considering it and appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we will address whether New Jersey law or Maryland law applies. *654 The United States Supreme Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals have adopted a good faith exception to the warrant requirement, under which "evidence seized under a warrant subsequently determined to be invalid may be admissible if the executing officers acted in objective good faith with reasonable reliance on the warrant." McDonald v. State , 347 Md. 452 , 467, 701 A.2d 675 (1997) ; see United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897 , 919-22, 104 S.Ct.

2019And, in considering it and appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we will address whether New Jersey law or Maryland law applies. *654 The United States Supreme Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals have adopted a good faith exception to the warrant requirement, under which "evidence seized under a warrant subsequently determined to be invalid may be admissible if the executing officers acted in objective good faith with reasonable reliance on the warrant." McDonald v. State , 347 Md. 452 , 467, 701 A.2d 675 (1997) ; see United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897 , 919-22, 104 S.Ct.

2021“We are nonetheless constrained to address it, as an alternative holding, in an effort to stem the tide of what we perceive to be a recent and promiscuous overuse of Leon’s rare exemptions from the good faith exception in a way 36 that Leon never intended.”26 State v. Jenkins, 178 Md.

2010In a recent Court of Special Appeals decision discussing Patterson , Judge Moylan explained that the third limitation to the good faith exception "was clearly intended to deal with warrant applications which were nothing beyond mere conclusions and was not intended to deal with fuller warrant applications that turned out, on further legal examination, to be somehow flawed.” State v. Jenkins, 178 Md.App. 156, 203 , 941 A.2d 517, 544 (2008).

2017For example, the Supreme Court has held the good faith exception applicable when law enforcement officers (1) conducted a search pursuant to a facially 24 valid search warrant that was later found to lack probable cause,27 (2) conducted a search pursuant to a statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches that was later held to be unconstitutional,28 (3) made an arrest pursuant to a warrant listed in a judicially- maintained database that was later revealed to be inaccurate because the warrant had been quashed,29 (4) made an arrest pursuant to a warrant listed in a law enforcement-mai

2017For example, the Supreme Court has held the good faith exception applicable when law enforcement officers (1) conducted a search pursuant to a facially 24 valid search warrant that was later found to lack probable cause,27 (2) conducted a search pursuant to a statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches that was later held to be unconstitutional,28 (3) made an arrest pursuant to a warrant listed in a judicially- maintained database that was later revealed to be inaccurate because the warrant had been quashed,29 (4) made an arrest pursuant to a warrant listed in a law enforcement-mai

2007The Court of Special Appeals’ Davis opinion alternatively held that, even if the affidavit does not show exigent circumstances, if the “no-knock” authorization is contained in the warrant, “the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule” is applicable ( 144 Md.App. at 158 , 797 A.2d at 93 ).

2007The Court of Special Appeals’ Davis opinion alternatively held that, even if the affidavit does not show exigent circumstances, if the “no-knock” authorization is contained in the warrant, “the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule” is applicable ( 144 Md.App. at 158 , 797 A.2d at 93 ).

2024See e.g., Richardson v. State, 481 Md. 423 , 468–69 (2022); Whittington v. State, 474 Md. 1, 37 (2021); Stevenson v. State, 455 Md. 709 (2017); Patterson v. State, 401 Md. 76 (2007); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652 (2006); Agurs v. State, 415 Md. 62 , 77–78 (2010); Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707 (1994). 26 In Leon, the Supreme Court “held that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained under a search warrant that has later been found to be deficient, so long as the law enforcement officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the warrant.” Minor, 334 Md. at 712 (ci

2024See e.g., Richardson v. State, 481 Md. 423 , 468–69 (2022); Whittington v. State, 474 Md. 1, 37 (2021); Stevenson v. State, 455 Md. 709 (2017); Patterson v. State, 401 Md. 76 (2007); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652 (2006); Agurs v. State, 415 Md. 62 , 77–78 (2010); Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707 (1994). 26 In Leon, the Supreme Court “held that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained under a search warrant that has later been found to be deficient, so long as the law enforcement officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the warrant.” Minor, 334 Md. at 712 (ci

2024See e.g., Richardson v. State, 481 Md. 423 , 468–69 (2022); Whittington v. State, 474 Md. 1, 37 (2021); Stevenson v. State, 455 Md. 709 (2017); Patterson v. State, 401 Md. 76 (2007); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652 (2006); Agurs v. State, 415 Md. 62 , 77–78 (2010); Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707 (1994). 26 In Leon, the Supreme Court “held that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained under a search warrant that has later been found to be deficient, so long as the law enforcement officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the warrant.” Minor, 334 Md. at 712 (ci

2024See e.g., Richardson v. State, 481 Md. 423 , 468–69 (2022); Whittington v. State, 474 Md. 1, 37 (2021); Stevenson v. State, 455 Md. 709 (2017); Patterson v. State, 401 Md. 76 (2007); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652 (2006); Agurs v. State, 415 Md. 62 , 77–78 (2010); Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707 (1994). 26 In Leon, the Supreme Court “held that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained under a search warrant that has later been found to be deficient, so long as the law enforcement officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the warrant.” Minor, 334 Md. at 712 (ci

2022See Moats, 455 Md. at 693 .

2022See id. at 686, 701-03 .

2015See Tull v. State, 230 Md. 152, 156 , 186 A.2d 205 (1962) (holding that it was not plain error for the court not to give a self defense jury instruction where the defendant did not request one); Martin v. State, 174 Md.App. 510, 520 , 922 A.2d 598 (2007) (“[A] party waives his/her rights when he/she fails to request an instruction----”); Cicoria v. State, 89 Md.App. 403, 426 , 598 A.2d 771 (1991) (considering Maryland Rule 4-325(e) and determining that, where a party failed to request the court to instruct the jury on a good faith defense, “he waived any possible error”), aff'd, 332 Md. 21 , 6

2015See Tull v. State, 230 Md. 152, 156 , 186 A.2d 205 (1962) (holding that it was not plain error for the court not to give a self defense jury instruction where the defendant did not request one); Martin v. State, 174 Md.App. 510, 520 , 922 A.2d 598 (2007) (“[A] party waives his/her rights when he/she fails to request an instruction----”); Cicoria v. State, 89 Md.App. 403, 426 , 598 A.2d 771 (1991) (considering Maryland Rule 4-325(e) and determining that, where a party failed to request the court to instruct the jury on a good faith defense, “he waived any possible error”), aff'd, 332 Md. 21 , 6

2010We described that exception in Coley : United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), and its companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), established the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

2010We described that exception in Coley : United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), and its companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), established the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

2023Finally, in response to the State’s good faith argument, Zadeh posits that under Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), the order here 15 does not fall within the good faith exception because it failed to “satisf[y] the [Stored Communications Act’s] then-lawful requirements” as it was invalidly issued. 2.

2023Zadeh urges that the good faith exception does not apply because, under Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), evidence obtained by “an officer in reliance on a statute later deemed unconstitutional” may be admissible only where the officer satisfied the statute’s “then-lawful requirements.” Krull, however, involved a warrantless search of an automobile wrecking yard pursuant to a statute that authorized warrantless inspections of such facilities.

2017For example, the Supreme Court has held the good faith exception applicable when law enforcement officers (1) conducted a search pursuant to a facially 24 valid search warrant that was later found to lack probable cause,27 (2) conducted a search pursuant to a statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches that was later held to be unconstitutional,28 (3) made an arrest pursuant to a warrant listed in a judicially- maintained database that was later revealed to be inaccurate because the warrant had been quashed,29 (4) made an arrest pursuant to a warrant listed in a law enforcement-mai

2017For example, the Supreme Court has held the good faith exception applicable when law enforcement officers (1) conducted a search pursuant to a facially 24 valid search warrant that was later found to lack probable cause,27 (2) conducted a search pursuant to a statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches that was later held to be unconstitutional,28 (3) made an arrest pursuant to a warrant listed in a judicially- maintained database that was later revealed to be inaccurate because the warrant had been quashed,29 (4) made an arrest pursuant to a warrant listed in a law enforcement-mai

2017For example, the Supreme Court has held the good faith exception applicable when law enforcement officers (1) conducted a search pursuant to a facially 24 valid search warrant that was later found to lack probable cause,27 (2) conducted a search pursuant to a statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches that was later held to be unconstitutional,28 (3) made an arrest pursuant to a warrant listed in a judicially- maintained database that was later revealed to be inaccurate because the warrant had been quashed,29 (4) made an arrest pursuant to a warrant listed in a law enforcement-mai

2017For example, the Supreme Court has held the good faith exception applicable when law enforcement officers (1) conducted a search pursuant to a facially 24 valid search warrant that was later found to lack probable cause,27 (2) conducted a search pursuant to a statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches that was later held to be unconstitutional,28 (3) made an arrest pursuant to a warrant listed in a judicially- maintained database that was later revealed to be inaccurate because the warrant had been quashed,29 (4) made an arrest pursuant to a warrant listed in a law enforcement-mai

2017For example, the Supreme Court has held the good faith exception applicable when law enforcement officers (1) conducted a search pursuant to a facially 24 valid search warrant that was later found to lack probable cause,27 (2) conducted a search pursuant to a statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches that was later held to be unconstitutional,28 (3) made an arrest pursuant to a warrant listed in a judicially- maintained database that was later revealed to be inaccurate because the warrant had been quashed,29 (4) made an arrest pursuant to a warrant listed in a law enforcement-mai

2017For example, the Supreme Court has held the good faith exception applicable when law enforcement officers (1) conducted a search pursuant to a facially 24 valid search warrant that was later found to lack probable cause,27 (2) conducted a search pursuant to a statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches that was later held to be unconstitutional,28 (3) made an arrest pursuant to a warrant listed in a judicially- maintained database that was later revealed to be inaccurate because the warrant had been quashed,29 (4) made an arrest pursuant to a warrant listed in a law enforcement-mai

2010See McDonald, 347 Md. at 473 , 701 A.2d at 685 (finding indicia of probable cause sufficient for reasonable police reliance even assuming that those same indicia were insufficient to provide a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause); Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707, 715-16 , 641 A.2d 214, 217-18 (finding that the absence of corroboration or verification of police informant’s information was “not necessarily fatal” to the State’s good faith exception argument); West v. State, 137 Md.App. 314, 355 , 768 A.2d 150, 173 (2001) (holding information insufficient to establish a substantial basi

2010See McDonald, 347 Md. at 473 , 701 A.2d at 685 (finding indicia of probable cause sufficient for reasonable police reliance even assuming that those same indicia were insufficient to provide a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause); Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707, 715-16 , 641 A.2d 214, 217-18 (finding that the absence of corroboration or verification of police informant’s information was “not necessarily fatal” to the State’s good faith exception argument); West v. State, 137 Md.App. 314, 355 , 768 A.2d 150, 173 (2001) (holding information insufficient to establish a substantial basi

2017Haley to state in 2016 that he would have been forthcoming about the Hailstorm technology at the time the order was issued in February 2014, in light of the nondisclosure agreement, which he acknowledged required Baltimore City police officers “to basically not talk about the – not talk about the Hailstorm.” The Supreme Court has held that there are four circumstances where the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply, and suppression remains the appropriate remedy if: (1) the magistrate or judge issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant k

2016The reasoning behind the good faith exception is “[b]ecause the *191 only purpose of the Exclusionary Rule ... is to deter unreasonable police behavior ... a mistake made by a judge in issuing a warrant should not be attributed to the police officer who executes it.” State v. Andrews, 227 Md.App. 350, 418 , 134 A.3d 324 (2016)(quotation marks and citations omitted).

2015We twice have applied the good faith doctrine, as was done in Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2423-24 , to “searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent[.]” See Kelly v. State, 436 Md. 406 , 82 A.3d 205 (2013), *12 cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 401 , 190 L.Ed.2d 289 (2014); Briscoe v. State, 422 Md. 384 , 30 A.3d 870 (2011).

2015We twice have applied the good faith doctrine, as was done in Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2423-24 , to “searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent[.]” See Kelly v. State, 436 Md. 406 , 82 A.3d 205 (2013), *12 cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 401 , 190 L.Ed.2d 289 (2014); Briscoe v. State, 422 Md. 384 , 30 A.3d 870 (2011).

2004Noting the “preference that searches be conducted pursuant to warrants issued by judicial officers,” Davis, 144 Md.App. at 155 , 797 A.2d at 90 , and proffering the benefits accruing to the officers who obtain a warrant, i.e. “(1) the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, (2) a more deferential standard of review by the suppression court, ... ánd (3) the presumption that the affidavit does establish probable cause for the search,” id. at 155-156 , 797 A.2d at 91-92 (footnote omitted) (citing and quoting McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 467 , 701 A.2d 675, 682 (1997) and citing Herbert

2004Noting the “preference that searches be conducted pursuant to warrants issued by judicial officers,” Davis, 144 Md.App. at 155 , 797 A.2d at 90 , and proffering the benefits accruing to the officers who obtain a warrant, i.e. “(1) the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, (2) a more deferential standard of review by the suppression court, ... ánd (3) the presumption that the affidavit does establish probable cause for the search,” id. at 155-156 , 797 A.2d at 91-92 (footnote omitted) (citing and quoting McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 467 , 701 A.2d 675, 682 (1997) and citing Herbert

2004See United States v. Tisdale, 195 F.3d 70 (2nd Cir.1999); United States v. Carter, 999 F.2d 182 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Moland, 996 F.2d 259 (10th Cir.1993); United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Gonzalez, 164 F.Supp.2d 119 ,(D.Mass.2001); United States v. Rivera, 2000 WL 761976 , 2000 U.S. Dist.

2003Moreover, although denying the defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis of the good faith exception, which was premised on a violation of the knock and announce rule, the court in United States v. Gonzalez, 164 F.Supp.2d 119 (D.Mass.2001) rejected the Government’s inevitable discovery argument.

2026We hold that the conduct of Detective Sergeant Wojdan and Detective Altshuler in this case was not the type of willful, knowing, or even negligent misconduct that the exclusionary rule was designed to deter, see Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447 ; Peltier, 422 U.S. at 542 ; that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies; and that the trial court did not err in denying Ms. Gambino’s motion to suppress the September 2019 video.

1992The court reasoned that the policy underlying the exclusionary rule, “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved,” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 , 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3412 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677, 687 (1984), quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S.Ct. 613, 620 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561, 571 (1974), and, in particular, “to deter police misconduct”, id., 468 U.S. at 917 , 104 S.Ct. at 3417 , 82 L.Ed.2d at 694 , is not furthered by suppressing evide

2019As to the underlying policies of the two states regarding the exclusionary rule, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the good faith exception "on independent state grounds" based on the impact that its adoption would have on "the privacy rights of [its] citizens" and the "enforcement of [New Jersey] criminal laws." See Novembrino , 519 A.2d at 850 . 21 It views the purpose of the exclusionary rule as "not merely to deter police misconduct." It is also an "indispensable mechanism" to protect the right to be free from unreasonable searches, and the adoption of the good faith exception would "d

2019As to the underlying policies of the two states regarding the exclusionary rule, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the good faith exception "on independent state grounds" based on the impact that its adoption would have on "the privacy rights of [its] citizens" and the "enforcement of [New Jersey] criminal laws." See Novembrino , 519 A.2d at 850 . 21 It views the purpose of the exclusionary rule as "not merely to deter police misconduct." It is also an "indispensable mechanism" to protect the right to be free from unreasonable searches, and the adoption of the good faith exception would "d