good faith exception in Iowa

2024State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 293 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (declining to adopt a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for unconstitutional searches because “[t]o do so would elevate the goals of law enforcement above our citizens’ constitutional rights”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 , 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).

2024State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 293 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (declining to adopt a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for unconstitutional searches because “[t]o do so would elevate the goals of law enforcement above our citizens’ constitutional rights”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 , 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).

2019Yet in United States v. Leon , the Court found a good-faith exception to the exclusionary *881 rule. 468 U.S. 897 , 913, 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 3415, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).

2019Yet in United States v. Leon , the Court found a good-faith exception to the exclusionary *881 rule. 468 U.S. 897 , 913, 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 3415, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).

2019See id. at 291 (declining to follow the Supreme Court by rejecting notion that parolees may be subject to broad, warrantless searches by law enforcement); State v. Cline , 617 N.W.2d 277 , 278 (Iowa 2000) (declining to follow the Supreme Court by rejecting a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases under article I, section 8 ), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner , 630 N.W.2d 601 , 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).

2014See, e.g., Null, 836 N.W.2d at 70 -74 & n. 7 (extending, under article I, section 17, the rationale of Miller to sentences that are equivalent to life without paróle); State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 170-72 (Iowa 2013) (declining to adopt a special-needs exception for searches of the homes of parolees under article I, section 8); Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 802-03 (holding a parole agreement does not establish consent to a warrantless, suspicionless search under article I, section 8); State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 291 (Iowa 2010) (holding parole status does not alone permit a warrantless, suspi-cio

2024State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 293 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (declining to adopt a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for unconstitutional searches because “[t]o do so would elevate the goals of law enforcement above our citizens’ constitutional rights”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 , 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).

2024State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 293 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (declining to adopt a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for unconstitutional searches because “[t]o do so would elevate the goals of law enforcement above our citizens’ constitutional rights”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 , 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).

2017In light of the clear purpose of section 808.3, permitting a good faith exception to failure to comply with the statute would be tantamount to judicial repeal of the statute. 30 Id.

2017In Beckett, we stated that “[a]dopting a good faith exception to the statutory requirement would effectively defeat the purpose of the statute because failure to comply with the statute would be of no consequence.” Id.

2016The Marquart court noted that the New Mexico Supreme Court had rejected a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Gutierrez, 863 P.2d at 1067 . 945 P.2d at 1031 .

2016The Marquart court noted that the New Mexico Supreme Court had rejected a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Gutierrez, 863 P.2d at 1067 . 945 P.2d at 1031 .

2014See, e.g., Null, 836 N.W.2d at 70–74 & n.7 (extending, under article I, section 17, the rationale of Miller to sentences that are equivalent to life without parole); State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149 , 170–72 (Iowa 2013) (declining to adopt a special-needs exception for searches of the homes of parolees under article I, section 8); Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 802–03 (holding a parole agreement does not establish consent to a warrantless, suspicionless search under article I, section 8); State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 291 (Iowa 2010) (holding parole status does not alone permit a warrantless, suspicionl

2014See, e.g., Null, 836 N.W.2d at 70 -74 & n. 7 (extending, under article I, section 17, the rationale of Miller to sentences that are equivalent to life without paróle); State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 170-72 (Iowa 2013) (declining to adopt a special-needs exception for searches of the homes of parolees under article I, section 8); Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 802-03 (holding a parole agreement does not establish consent to a warrantless, suspicionless search under article I, section 8); State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 291 (Iowa 2010) (holding parole status does not alone permit a warrantless, suspi-cio

2019See State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 290 (Iowa 2000), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001); see also State v. Prior, 617 N.W.2d 260, 268 (Iowa 2000).

2004In holding the good faith exception did not apply to this search, the district court relied on State v. Prior, 617 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 2000).

2014See, e.g., Null, 836 N.W.2d at 70–74 & n.7 (extending, under article I, section 17, the rationale of Miller to sentences that are equivalent to life without parole); State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149 , 170–72 (Iowa 2013) (declining to adopt a special-needs exception for searches of the homes of parolees under article I, section 8); Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 802–03 (holding a parole agreement does not establish consent to a warrantless, suspicionless search under article I, section 8); State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 291 (Iowa 2010) (holding parole status does not alone permit a warrantless, suspicionl

2014See, e.g., Null, 836 N.W.2d at 70 -74 & n. 7 (extending, under article I, section 17, the rationale of Miller to sentences that are equivalent to life without paróle); State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 170-72 (Iowa 2013) (declining to adopt a special-needs exception for searches of the homes of parolees under article I, section 8); Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 802-03 (holding a parole agreement does not establish consent to a warrantless, suspicionless search under article I, section 8); State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 291 (Iowa 2010) (holding parole status does not alone permit a warrantless, suspi-cio

2025To start, the Worrells have not shown by clear and positive proof that they had a good-faith claim of right to the disputed land. “[T]he adverse possession doctrine has no application to one who actually knows that he has no claim, or title, or right to a title.” Carpenter, 315 N.W.2d at 785 (cleaned up).

2007See Carpenter , 315 N.W.2d at 786 (indicating a good faith claim of right may be satisfied by confusion or mistake); Mitchell , 509 N.W.2d at 500 n. 3 (stating when the plaintiff knows he lacks title to land, "[a]n oral agreement is a sufficient basis for a claim of right of an adverse possessor" (citing Burch v. Wickliff , 209 Iowa 582 , 588 , 227 N.W. 133 , 135 (1929)).

2020And in Illinois v. Krull, the Court applied the good-faith exception and did not require suppression of evidence from a warrantless search authorized by a state statute that was subsequently declared unconstitutional. 480 U.S. 340 , 349–50, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 1167 (1987).

2020And in Illinois v. Krull, the Court applied the good-faith exception and did not require suppression of evidence from a warrantless search authorized by a state statute that was subsequently declared unconstitutional. 480 U.S. 340 , 349–50, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 1167 (1987).

2017See, e.g., City of Riverdale v. Diercks, 806 N.W.2d 643, 655 (Iowa 2011) (“Under these circumstances, we must assume the district court implicitly rejected the City’s good-faith defense.”); Schutjer v. Algona Manor Care Ctr., 780 N.W.2d 549 , 560- 61 (Iowa 2010) (applying standard to “work backward” and ascertain implicit credibility findings in workers’ compensation commissioner’s decision); Norland v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 412 N.W.2d 904, 909 (Iowa 1987) (deducing “the department implicitly found that there was no good cause to refuse the offered work in this case”).

2016See Iowa Code § 21.6 (3) (providing remedies for violations of chapter 21); City of Postville v. Upper Explorerland Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 834 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2013) (“Generally, Iowa law makes members of governmental bodies subject to liability for [chapter 21] violations.”); cf. City of Riverdale v. Diercks, 806 N.W.2d 643 , 654–59 (Iowa 2011) (discussing the good-faith defense to fee awards under the Open Records Act, Iowa Code chapter 22).

2019Co., 603 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Iowa 1999) (citation omitted), we will not vacate a default judgment “when the movant has ignored the rules of procedure with ample opportunity to abide by them.” Sheeder, 764 N.W.2d at 780 . 8 When deciding whether excusable neglect rises to the level of good cause to set aside a default judgment, we consider (1) whether the defaulting party actually intended to defend, (2) whether the party asserted a good faith claim or defense, and (3) whether the party willfully ignored or defied the rules of procedure rather than defaulting as the result of a mistake.

2019See Brandenburg, 603 N.W.2d at 584 .

2017See, e.g., Schubert, 528 F. App’x at 618 ; Guzman, 507 F.3d at 685– 86; Leonard, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849 .

2017See, e.g., Schubert, 528 F. App’x at 618 ; Guzman, 507 F.3d at 685– 86; Leonard, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849 .

2017The good-faith exception did not apply, the Indiana appellate court reasoned, because an oath or affirmation is an “essential prerequisite to obtaining a valid search warrant.” Id. at 421 (quoting State v. Tye, 636 N.W.2d 473, 477 (Wis. 2001)).

2017The good-faith exception did not apply, the Indiana appellate court reasoned, because an oath or affirmation is an “essential prerequisite to obtaining a valid search warrant.” Id. at 421 (quoting State v. Tye, 636 N.W.2d 473, 477 (Wis. 2001)).

2016See Iowa Code § 21.6 (3) (providing remedies for violations of chapter 21); City of Postville v. Upper Explorerland Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 834 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2013) (“Generally, Iowa law makes members of governmental bodies subject to liability for [chapter 21] violations.”); cf. City of Riverdale v. Diercks, 806 N.W.2d 643 , 654–59 (Iowa 2011) (discussing the good-faith defense to fee awards under the Open Records Act, Iowa Code chapter 22).

2016See Iowa Code § 21.6 (3) (providing remedies for violations of chapter 21); City of Postville v. Upper Explorerland Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 834 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2013) (“Generally, Iowa law makes members of governmental bodies subject to liability for [chapter 21] violations.”); cf. City of Biverdale v. Diercks, 806 N.W.2d 643, 654-59 (Iowa 2011) (discussing the good-faith defense to fee awards under the Open Records Act, Iowa Code chapter 22).

2014See, e.g., Null, 836 N.W.2d at 70–74 & n.7 (extending, under article I, section 17, the rationale of Miller to sentences that are equivalent to life without parole); State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149 , 170–72 (Iowa 2013) (declining to adopt a special-needs exception for searches of the homes of parolees under article I, section 8); Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 802–03 (holding a parole agreement does not establish consent to a warrantless, suspicionless search under article I, section 8); State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 291 (Iowa 2010) (holding parole status does not alone permit a warrantless, suspicionl

2014See, e.g., Null, 836 N.W.2d at 70 -74 & n. 7 (extending, under article I, section 17, the rationale of Miller to sentences that are equivalent to life without paróle); State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 170-72 (Iowa 2013) (declining to adopt a special-needs exception for searches of the homes of parolees under article I, section 8); Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 802-03 (holding a parole agreement does not establish consent to a warrantless, suspicionless search under article I, section 8); State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 291 (Iowa 2010) (holding parole status does not alone permit a warrantless, suspi-cio

1954Independent of any title based on the theory of accretions, appellee knew he possessed neither title nor right to the land.” In Roth v. Munzenmaier, 118 Iowa 326, 330 , 91 N.W. 1072, 1073 , the need for good faith is recognized by this language: “The deed, although made by one having no authority to convey, is sufficient to support a claim of adverse possession, provided such possession is in good fwith.” (Italics supplied.) The necessity for good faith was impliedly held in Vander Zyl v. Muilenberg, 239 Iowa 73, 80 , 29 N.W.2d 412, 415 , when *920 we said: “* * * the entire record satisfies u

1954Independent of any title based on the theory of accretions, appellee knew he possessed neither title nor right to the land.” In Roth v. Munzenmaier, 118 Iowa 326, 330 , 91 N.W. 1072, 1073 , the need for good faith is recognized by this language: “The deed, although made by one having no authority to convey, is sufficient to support a claim of adverse possession, provided such possession is in good fwith.” (Italics supplied.) The necessity for good faith was impliedly held in Vander Zyl v. Muilenberg, 239 Iowa 73, 80 , 29 N.W.2d 412, 415 , when *920 we said: “* * * the entire record satisfies u

2017The good-faith exception did not apply, the Indiana appellate court reasoned, because an oath or affirmation is an “essential prerequisite to obtaining a valid search warrant.” Id. at 421 (quoting State v. Tye, 636 N.W.2d 473, 477 (Wis. 2001)).

2017The good-faith exception did not apply, the Indiana appellate court reasoned, because an oath or affirmation is an “essential prerequisite to obtaining a valid search warrant.” Id. at 421 (quoting State v. Tye, 636 N.W.2d 473, 477 (Wis. 2001)).