22 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Leongreen2 sentences2023See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984) (establishing the good faith exception). 28 and the evidence obtained from the execution of the warrants was properly admitted because each warrant was supported by probable cause. 2021United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,922 (1984)(recognizing the good faith exception under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution). | 4 | 9 |
State of Maine v. Oscar Nunezgreen2 sentences2021In fact, the Law Court has specifically observed in a previous instance "that a number of state supreme courts have rejected the good faith exception on state constitutional grounds." State v. Nunez, 2016 ME 185 , j 17, n. 8, 153 A.3d 84 . 2021In fact, the Law Court has specifically observed in a previous instance "that a number of state supreme courts have rejected the good faith exception on state constitutional grounds." State v. Nunez, 2016 ME 185 , j 17, n. 8, 153 A.3d 84 . | 2 | 2 |
State of Maine v. Christopher J. Johndrogreen2 sentences2019See State v. Johndro, 2013 ME 106 , 82 A.3d 820 (unreasonable for officer to rely on affidavit that described the only link between defendant and the crime as him driving his car in the area at the time which is "entirely noncriminal and unsuspicious on its own"); State v. Diamond, 18 628 A.2d 1032 (Me. 1993) (affidavit was based on solely on 18 Johndro described Diamond clearly. 2019See State v. Johndro, 2013 ME 106 , 82 A.3d 820 (unreasonable for officer to rely on affidavit that described the only link between defendant and the crime as him driving his car in the area at the time which is "entirely noncriminal and unsuspicious on its own"); State v. Diamond, 18 628 A.2d 1032 (Me. 1993) (affidavit was based on solely on 18 Johndro described Diamond clearly. | 2 | 2 |
Lyon v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2008The purpose of the good faith clause is to shield donees from liability in situations where “because of confusion, an organ is removed without genuine consent.” 9 Lyon v. United States, 843 F.Supp. 531, 536 (D.Minn.1994). 2006The good faith immunity "is designed for situations . . . where because of confusion, an organ is removed without genuine consent." Lyon v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 531,536 (D. | 2 | 2 |
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Vidal Galdon Aquino, Government of the Virgin Islands v. Ishmael Guillerma Reyesgreen2 sentences1993The good-faith effort must be “genuine and bona fide,” Government of the Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 552 (3d Cir.1967), and exercised with “reasonable diligence and care,” United States v. Lynch, 499 F.2d 1011, 1022-23 (D.C.Cir.1974). 1981The good-faith effort must be “genuine and bona fide,” Government of the Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 552 (3d Cir. 1967), and exercised with “reasonable diligence and care,” United States v. Lynch, 499 F.2d 1011, 1022-23 (D.C.Cir.1974). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Perry Lynchgreen2 sentences1993The good-faith effort must be “genuine and bona fide,” Government of the Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 552 (3d Cir.1967), and exercised with “reasonable diligence and care,” United States v. Lynch, 499 F.2d 1011, 1022-23 (D.C.Cir.1974). 1981The good-faith effort must be “genuine and bona fide,” Government of the Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 552 (3d Cir. 1967), and exercised with “reasonable diligence and care,” United States v. Lynch, 499 F.2d 1011, 1022-23 (D.C.Cir.1974). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Diamondgreen2 sentences2019See State v. Johndro, 2013 ME 106 , 82 A.3d 820 (unreasonable for officer to rely on affidavit that described the only link between defendant and the crime as him driving his car in the area at the time which is "entirely noncriminal and unsuspicious on its own"); State v. Diamond, 18 628 A.2d 1032 (Me. 1993) (affidavit was based on solely on 18 Johndro described Diamond clearly. 2016See Johndro, 2013 ME 106, ¶¶ 19-20 , 82 A.3d 820 ; State v. Diamond, 628 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Me. 1993). | 1 | 3 |
State of Maine v. Randall J. Weddlegreen2 sentences2023In light of this determination, the court need not address the other contentions raised by the State in support of the search, including: search incident to Defendant's probation conditions (U.S. v. Knights, 534 US. 112, 119-21 (2001)(Discussing the significantly diminished expectation of privacy of a probationer); search incident to Defendant’s probation, claiming reasonable grounds to believe contraband was present based on the allegations in the warrant request combined with the discovery of contraband on Defendant's spouse (Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987); or the good faith 2021Therefore, in order for this court to properly determine whether the good faith exception applies, the Court will "examine whether the [exclusionary] rule's deterrent effect will be achieved ... [by] weigh[ing] the likelihood of such deterrence against the costs of withholding reliable information from the truth-seeking process." Page 9 of 17 Weddle, 2020 ME 12 , ! 33, 224 A.3d 1035 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Estabrookgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Estabrook, 2007 ME 130, ¶¶ 1, 9 , 932 A.2d 549 (affirming trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress on the ground that the warrant affidavit was supported by probablé cause and declining to address the good faith exception); State v. Marquis, 525 A.2d 1041, 1042-43 (Me. 1987) (declining to address good faith—the only issue argued by the State on appeal— and instead first considering probable cause). 8 B. 2016See State v. Estabrook, 2007 ME 130, ¶¶ 1, 9 , 932 A.2d 549 (affirming trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress on the ground that the warrant affidavit was supported by probablé cause and declining to address the good faith exception); State v. Marquis, 525 A.2d 1041, 1042-43 (Me. 1987) (declining to address good faith—the only issue argued by the State on appeal— and instead first considering probable cause). 8 B. | 1 | 2 |
Griffin v. Wisconsingreen1 sentence2023In light of this determination, the court need not address the other contentions raised by the State in support of the search, including: search incident to Defendant's probation conditions (U.S. v. Knights, 534 US. 112, 119-21 (2001)(Discussing the significantly diminished expectation of privacy of a probationer); search incident to Defendant’s probation, claiming reasonable grounds to believe contraband was present based on the allegations in the warrant request combined with the discovery of contraband on Defendant's spouse (Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987); or the good faith | 1 | 1 |
State v. Izzogreen1 sentence2021Automobile Exception Maine has adopted the United States Supreme Court's automobile exception to the warrant requirement in that "the existence of probable cause justifies a warrantless seizure and reasonable search of a motor vehicle ... whether or not exigent circumstances prevailed at either the time of the seizure or the time of the search." State v. Lzzo, 623 A .2d 1277, 1181-82 (Me. 1993 )( citations and quotations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Morgan v. Kooistragreen2 sentences2021See Morgan v. Kooistra, 2008 ME 26, ¶¶ 31-38 , 941 A.2d 447 . 2021See Morgan v. Kooistra, 2008 ME 26, ¶¶ 31-38 , 941 A.2d 447 . | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 241 (2011) (“Evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule.”); State v. Ward, 604 N.W.2d 517, 525-31 (Wis. 2000) (applying the good faith exception when officers executed a search pursuant to a no-knock police entry policy that had been twice approved by the state’s highest court). [¶36] Although we have not previously relied on the good faith exception, we do so today because, in these unique circumstances, the suppression of the results of the warrantless blood draw wo 2020See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 241 (2011) (“Evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule.”); State v. Ward, 604 N.W.2d 517, 525-31 (Wis. 2000) (applying the good faith exception when officers executed a search pursuant to a no-knock police entry policy that had been twice approved by the state’s highest court). [¶36] Although we have not previously relied on the good faith exception, we do so today because, in these unique circumstances, the suppression of the results of the warrantless blood draw wo | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rochegreen1 sentence2020The officer who ordered Weddle’s blood draw acted in good faith reliance on a statute blessed as constitutional as recently as 2007, Cormier, 2007 ME 112, ¶ 37 , 928 A.2d 753 , and whose predecessor statute we also upheld in State v. Roche, 681 A.2d 472, 475 (Me. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wardgreen2 sentences2020See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 241 (2011) (“Evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule.”); State v. Ward, 604 N.W.2d 517, 525-31 (Wis. 2000) (applying the good faith exception when officers executed a search pursuant to a no-knock police entry policy that had been twice approved by the state’s highest court). [¶36] Although we have not previously relied on the good faith exception, we do so today because, in these unique circumstances, the suppression of the results of the warrantless blood draw wo 2020See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 241 (2011) (“Evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule.”); State v. Ward, 604 N.W.2d 517, 525-31 (Wis. 2000) (applying the good faith exception when officers executed a search pursuant to a no-knock police entry policy that had been twice approved by the state’s highest court). [¶36] Although we have not previously relied on the good faith exception, we do so today because, in these unique circumstances, the suppression of the results of the warrantless blood draw wo | 1 | 1 |
Herring v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2019As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systematic negligence. 14 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009). 53. | 1 | 1 |
Greenstreet v. Stategreen2 sentences2019It discussed relevant portions of Leon, [n]oting that one purpose of the exclusionary rule is to alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers and their departments to deter them from willful or negligent conduct depriving a defendant of some right, the [Leon] Court observed that this deterrent policy 'cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.' 898 A.2d 961, 976 (Md. 2006). 56. 2019Id. at 979 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Chapmangreen1 sentence2017See State v. Chapman, 495 A.2d at 317 . 5 The State has not argued that the good faith exception applies here. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Canelogreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376 , 653 A.2d 1097, 1105 (1995); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431 , 863 P.2d 1052, 1068 (1993); State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171 , 598 A.2d 119, 121-22 (Vt. 1991); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95 , 519 A.2d 820, 857 (1987). 9 . 2016See, e.g., State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376 , 653 A.2d 1097, 1105 (1995); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431 , 863 P.2d 1052, 1068 (1993); State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171 , 598 A.2d 119, 121-22 (Vt. 1991); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95 , 519 A.2d 820, 857 (1987). 9 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Novembrinogreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376 , 653 A.2d 1097, 1105 (1995); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431 , 863 P.2d 1052, 1068 (1993); State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171 , 598 A.2d 119, 121-22 (Vt. 1991); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95 , 519 A.2d 820, 857 (1987). 9 . 2016See, e.g., State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376 , 653 A.2d 1097, 1105 (1995); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431 , 863 P.2d 1052, 1068 (1993); State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171 , 598 A.2d 119, 121-22 (Vt. 1991); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95 , 519 A.2d 820, 857 (1987). 9 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376 , 653 A.2d 1097, 1105 (1995); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431 , 863 P.2d 1052, 1068 (1993); State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171 , 598 A.2d 119, 121-22 (Vt. 1991); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95 , 519 A.2d 820, 857 (1987). 9 . 2016See, e.g., State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376 , 653 A.2d 1097, 1105 (1995); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431 , 863 P.2d 1052, 1068 (1993); State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171 , 598 A.2d 119, 121-22 (Vt. 1991); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95 , 519 A.2d 820, 857 (1987). 9 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Oakesgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376 , 653 A.2d 1097, 1105 (1995); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431 , 863 P.2d 1052, 1068 (1993); State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171 , 598 A.2d 119, 121-22 (Vt. 1991); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95 , 519 A.2d 820, 857 (1987). 9 . 2016See, e.g., State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376 , 653 A.2d 1097, 1105 (1995); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431 , 863 P.2d 1052, 1068 (1993); State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171 , 598 A.2d 119, 121-22 (Vt. 1991); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95 , 519 A.2d 820, 857 (1987). 9 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Marquisgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Estabrook, 2007 ME 130, ¶¶ 1, 9 , 932 A.2d 549 (affirming trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress on the ground that the warrant affidavit was supported by probablé cause and declining to address the good faith exception); State v. Marquis, 525 A.2d 1041, 1042-43 (Me. 1987) (declining to address good faith—the only issue argued by the State on appeal— and instead first considering probable cause). 8 B. 2016See, e.g., Arbour, 2016 ME 126 , ¶ 16 n.12, 146 A.3d 1106 (“Because we conclude that there was a substantial basis for the finding of probable cause to issue the search warrant, we do not consider the State’s alternative ‘good faith' argument,"); State v. Nadeau, 2010 ME 71 , ¶ 48 n.10, 1 A.3d 445 (“We do not discuss the Superior Court’s application of the good faith exception because the search warrant, which authorized the July forensic examination of the computer, never ‘expired.’ ’’); Estabrook, 2007 ME 130, ¶¶ 1, 9 , 932 A.2d 549 ; State v. Veglia, 620 A.2d 276 , 277-79 & n.3 (Me. 1993) ( | 1 | 1 |
State of Maine v. Franklin F. Arbour Jr.green2 sentences2016See, e.g., Arbour, 2016 ME 126 , ¶ 16 n.12, 146 A.3d 1106 (“Because we conclude that there was a substantial basis for the finding of probable cause to issue the search warrant, we do not consider the State’s alternative ‘good faith' argument,"); State v. Nadeau, 2010 ME 71 , ¶ 48 n.10, 1 A.3d 445 (“We do not discuss the Superior Court’s application of the good faith exception because the search warrant, which authorized the July forensic examination of the computer, never ‘expired.’ ’’); Estabrook, 2007 ME 130, ¶¶ 1, 9 , 932 A.2d 549 ; State v. Veglia, 620 A.2d 276 , 277-79 & n.3 (Me. 1993) ( 2016See, e.g., Arbour, 2016 ME 126 , ¶ 16 n.12, 146 A.3d 1106 (“Because we conclude that there was a substantial basis for the finding of probable cause to issue the search warrant, we do not consider the State’s alternative ‘good faith' argument,"); State v. Nadeau, 2010 ME 71 , ¶ 48 n.10, 1 A.3d 445 (“We do not discuss the Superior Court’s application of the good faith exception because the search warrant, which authorized the July forensic examination of the computer, never ‘expired.’ ’’); Estabrook, 2007 ME 130, ¶¶ 1, 9 , 932 A.2d 549 ; State v. Veglia, 620 A.2d 276 , 277-79 & n.3 (Me. 1993) ( | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tarantinogreen1 sentence2016See, e.g., Arbour, 2016 ME 126 , ¶ 16 n.12, 146 A.3d 1106 (“Because we conclude that there was a substantial basis for the finding of probable cause to issue the search warrant, we do not consider the State’s alternative ‘good faith' argument,"); State v. Nadeau, 2010 ME 71 , ¶ 48 n.10, 1 A.3d 445 (“We do not discuss the Superior Court’s application of the good faith exception because the search warrant, which authorized the July forensic examination of the computer, never ‘expired.’ ’’); Estabrook, 2007 ME 130, ¶¶ 1, 9 , 932 A.2d 549 ; State v. Veglia, 620 A.2d 276 , 277-79 & n.3 (Me. 1993) ( | 1 | 1 |
| McCall Co. v. Wrightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| John T. Demars v. General Dynamics Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Perry v. Saint Francis Hospital & Medical Center, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Purdy v. Community Telecommunications Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Michael Hawkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Department of Environmental Protection v. Woodman
green
2 sentences2021Id. [¶26] As to Thurlow’s burden, the focus is not on what the Nelsons considered to be a reasonable factual support for their letter or their interpretation of the facts;7 it is on whether the facts as presented by Thurlow, see also Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Woodman, 1997 ME 164 , ¶ 3 n.3, 697 A.2d 1295 (“It is well established that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as represented parties.”). 7 The Nelsons’ understanding of the facts could affect a good-faith analysis should they successfully assert a conditional privilege as to the underlying defamation claim. 2021Id. [¶26] As to Thurlow’s burden, the focus is not on what the Nelsons considered to be a reasonable factual support for their letter or their interpretation of the facts;7 it is on whether the facts as presented by Thurlow, see also Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Woodman, 1997 ME 164 , ¶ 3 n.3, 697 A.2d 1295 (“It is well established that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as represented parties.”). 7 The Nelsons’ understanding of the facts could affect a good-faith analysis should they successfully assert a conditional privilege as to the underlying defamation claim. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Ralph Nader v. Maine Democratic Party
green
1 sentence2021Id. [¶26] As to Thurlow’s burden, the focus is not on what the Nelsons considered to be a reasonable factual support for their letter or their interpretation of the facts;7 it is on whether the facts as presented by Thurlow, see also Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Woodman, 1997 ME 164 , ¶ 3 n.3, 697 A.2d 1295 (“It is well established that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as represented parties.”). 7 The Nelsons’ understanding of the facts could affect a good-faith analysis should they successfully assert a conditional privilege as to the underlying defamation claim. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Illinois v. Krull
green
2 sentences2020However, the Supreme Court has also applied the good faith exception to situations where an officer has obtained evidence by acting in “objectively reasonable reliance on a statute.” Krull, 480 U.S. at 349 . 2020Nor can a law enforcement officer be said to have acted in good-faith reliance upon a statute if its provisions are such that a reasonable officer should have known that the statute was unconstitutional.” Id. at 355 . [¶35] Accordingly, the good faith exception has been applied when a law enforcement officer reasonably relies, in good faith, on a statute or common law rule that the officer has no reason to believe was unconstitutional and which has previously been declared constitutional by an appellate court with binding authority. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Cormier
green
2 sentences2020The officer who ordered Weddle’s blood draw acted in good faith reliance on a statute blessed as constitutional as recently as 2007, Cormier, 2007 ME 112, ¶ 37 , 928 A.2d 753 , and whose predecessor statute we also upheld in State v. Roche, 681 A.2d 472, 475 (Me. 1996). 2020The officer who ordered Weddle’s blood draw acted in good faith reliance on a statute blessed as constitutional as recently as 2007, Cormier, 2007 ME 112, ¶ 37 , 928 A.2d 753 , and whose predecessor statute we also upheld in State v. Roche, 681 A.2d 472, 475 (Me. 1996). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Stewart-Dore v. Webber Hospital Ass'n
green
1 sentence2017Ass'n, 2011 ME 26 , 1 11. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Veglia green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Nadeau green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Bodman v. Maine, Department of Health & Human Services green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Costain v. Sunbury Primary Care, P.A. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Wyatt v. Cole green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Webb v. Haas green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Leibowitz v. Szoverffy neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Union Building & Saving Ass'n v. Soderquist green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.