good faith exception in Minnesota

2025In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed the district court’s order, holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule that we articulated in State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. 2015), applied to the search of Douglas’s vehicle.

2025Malecha, 3 N.W.3d at 573, 579 (stating that we independently determine whether constitutional remedies, such as exclusion, apply under the Minnesota Constitution and declining to adopt the Evans good-faith exception); see also State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn. 1995) (declining to adopt the Leon good-faith exception); Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d at 877 (declining to decide whether the good-faith exception should apply in other circumstances). 7 869 N.W.2d at 865 .

2025United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984). 6 We have adopted the good-faith exception in one limited circumstance.

2024Under the good-faith exception, the exclusionary rule does not apply unless suppression “result[s] in appreciable deterrence.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2025Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d at 877–78. 4 We held that the exception applies where an officer acts in objectively reasonable 4 Four years before our decision in Lindquist, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the good-faith exception under similar circumstances in Davis v. United States. 564 U.S. 229 (2011).

2025We stated that the good-faith exception is narrowly focused, applying only if “binding precedent . . . specifically authorize[d] the behavior” and, as noted above, that “[l]aw enforcement cannot ‘extend the law’ to areas in which no precedent exists or the law is unsettled.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Davis, 564 U.S. at 250 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).

2015See Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 575 n. 3 (Stras, J., concurring). 8 By contrast, other state courts that have rejected a good-faith exception based on a statutory exclusionary rule have done so when the statute contains mandatory requirements for the exclusion of evidence.

2015See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 575 (Minn.2013) (Stras, J., concurring) (noting that we had yet to adopt the good-faith exception and had again declined the opportunity to do so); State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163 , 180 n. 10 (Minn.2007) (“We note, however, that we have consistently declined to adopt, much less even address, the Leon ‘good faith’ exception.”); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782 , 791 n. 1 (Minn.1999) (“[W]e need not address the state’s request for us to adopt the ‘good faith’ exception to the warrant requirement-”); State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn.1995) (“[W

2025Malecha, 3 N.W.3d at 573, 579 (stating that we independently determine whether constitutional remedies, such as exclusion, apply under the Minnesota Constitution and declining to adopt the Evans good-faith exception); see also State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn. 1995) (declining to adopt the Leon good-faith exception); Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d at 877 (declining to decide whether the good-faith exception should apply in other circumstances). 7 869 N.W.2d at 865 .

2024Before Lindquist, we declined to address the applicability of the good-faith exception even when police acted in good-faith reliance on a warrant later found to lack probable cause, first in Zanter, 535 N.W.2d at 634 , then in Garza, 632 N.W.2d at 638 .

2015See State v. Wasson, 615 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Minn. 2000); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782 , 791 n.1 (Minn. 1999); State v. Lindsey, 473 N.W.2d 857 , 864 n.4 (Minn. 1991); State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700 , 701 n.1 (Minn. 1990); State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265 , 269 n.2 (Minn. 1985); see also State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922 , 929 n.7 (Minn. 2006) (resolving the issue on statutory grounds and declining to consider the good-faith exception articulated in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006)).

2015See State v. Wasson, 615 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Minn.2000); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782 , 791 n. 1 (Minn.1999); State v. Lindsey, 473 N.W.2d 857 , 864 n. 4 (Minn.1991); State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700 , 701 n. 1 (Minn.1990); State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265 , 269 n. 2 (Minn.1985); see also State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922 , 929 n. 7 (Minn.2006) (resolving the issue on statutory grounds and declining to consider the good-faith exception articulated in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006)).

2015See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 575 (Minn. 2013) (Stras, J., concurring) (noting that we had yet to adopt the good-faith exception and had again declined the opportunity to do so); State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163 , 180 n.10 (Minn. 2007) (“We note, however, that we have consistently declined to adopt, much less even address, the Leon ‘good faith’ exception.”); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782 , 791 n.1 (Minn. 1999) (“[W]e need not address the state’s request for us to adopt the ‘good faith’ exception to the warrant requirement . . . .”); State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn. 1

2015See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 575 (Minn.2013) (Stras, J., concurring) (noting that we had yet to adopt the good-faith exception and had again declined the opportunity to do so); State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163 , 180 n. 10 (Minn.2007) (“We note, however, that we have consistently declined to adopt, much less even address, the Leon ‘good faith’ exception.”); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782 , 791 n. 1 (Minn.1999) (“[W]e need not address the state’s request for us to adopt the ‘good faith’ exception to the warrant requirement-”); State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn.1995) (“[W

2015See State v. Wasson, 615 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Minn.2000); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782 , 791 n. 1 (Minn.1999); State v. Lindsey, 473 N.W.2d 857 , 864 n. 4 (Minn.1991); State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700 , 701 n. 1 (Minn.1990); State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265 , 269 n. 2 (Minn.1985); see also State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922 , 929 n. 7 (Minn.2006) (resolving the issue on statutory grounds and declining to consider the good-faith exception articulated in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006)).

2015See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 575 (Minn.2013) (Stras, J., concurring) (noting that we had yet to adopt the good-faith exception and had again declined the opportunity to do so); State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163 , 180 n. 10 (Minn.2007) (“We note, however, that we have consistently declined to adopt, much less even address, the Leon ‘good faith’ exception.”); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782 , 791 n. 1 (Minn.1999) (“[W]e need not address the state’s request for us to adopt the ‘good faith’ exception to the warrant requirement-”); State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn.1995) (“[W

1995See also Sticha v. McDonald’s No. 291, 346 N.W.2d 138 (Minn.1984) (employee who stated that she needed time off to attend a funeral, when she in fact needed the time to prepare for a wake, which she considered to be part of the funeral, evinced a good-faith error in judgment, not misconduct); Tuckerman Optical Corp. v. Thoeny, 407 N.W.2d 491 (Minn.App.1987) (no misconduct by employee who deviated from employer’s regular time-card policy where employee acted innocently and had no intent to be disobedient or to harm employer).

1986The court reversed the Commissioner’s representative’s determination that the employee had engaged in misconduct, finding that “the employee’s conduct evinced a good-faith error in judgment in an isolated instance during her 10 years of employment and did not adversely affect the employer’s business.” Id. at 140 .

2016See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2186-87 , 2186 n.9 (vacating judgment of state court, remanding for state court “to reevaluate [defendant]’s consent given the partial inaccuracy of the officer’s advisory,” and noting that state court “will have to address whether the evidence obtained in the search must be suppressed” if state court finds on remand that defendant did not voluntarily consent to blood test).

2016In Birehfield, the Court reversed appellant Birchfield’s test refusal conviction, which involved the refusal of a warrantless blood test. — U.S. at -, 136 S.Ct. at 2186 .

2015See State v. Wasson, 615 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Minn.2000); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782 , 791 n. 1 (Minn.1999); State v. Lindsey, 473 N.W.2d 857 , 864 n. 4 (Minn.1991); State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700 , 701 n. 1 (Minn.1990); State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265 , 269 n. 2 (Minn.1985); see also State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922 , 929 n. 7 (Minn.2006) (resolving the issue on statutory grounds and declining to consider the good-faith exception articulated in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006)).

2015See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 575 (Minn.2013) (Stras, J., concurring) (noting that we had yet to adopt the good-faith exception and had again declined the opportunity to do so); State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163 , 180 n. 10 (Minn.2007) (“We note, however, that we have consistently declined to adopt, much less even address, the Leon ‘good faith’ exception.”); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782 , 791 n. 1 (Minn.1999) (“[W]e need not address the state’s request for us to adopt the ‘good faith’ exception to the warrant requirement-”); State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn.1995) (“[W

2015See State v. Wasson, 615 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Minn.2000); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782 , 791 n. 1 (Minn.1999); State v. Lindsey, 473 N.W.2d 857 , 864 n. 4 (Minn.1991); State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700 , 701 n. 1 (Minn.1990); State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265 , 269 n. 2 (Minn.1985); see also State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922 , 929 n. 7 (Minn.2006) (resolving the issue on statutory grounds and declining to consider the good-faith exception articulated in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006)).

2015See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 575 (Minn.2013) (Stras, J., concurring) (noting that we had yet to adopt the good-faith exception and had again declined the opportunity to do so); State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163 , 180 n. 10 (Minn.2007) (“We note, however, that we have consistently declined to adopt, much less even address, the Leon ‘good faith’ exception.”); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782 , 791 n. 1 (Minn.1999) (“[W]e need not address the state’s request for us to adopt the ‘good faith’ exception to the warrant requirement-”); State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn.1995) (“[W

2014“A good-faith error in judgment is not employment misconduct only in situations when judgment is required.” Marn v. Fairview Pharmacy Servs., LLC, 756 N.W.2d 117, 122 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Dec. 16, 2008); see Minn. Stat. § 268.095 , subd. 6(b)(6) (2012).

2014“A good-faith error in judgment is not employment misconduct only in situations when judgment is required.” Marn v. Fairview Pharmacy Servs., LLC, 756 N.W.2d 117, 122 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Dec. 16, 2008); see also Minn. Stat. § 268.095 , subd. 6(b)(6).

2015The district court, relying upon State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014), filed a second pretrial order in May 2014 that granted Stavish’s motion to reconsider and suppressed the alcohol concentration test results on the ground that this court declined to resolve Brooks on the basis of a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

2015The district court, relying upon State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn.2013), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1799 , 188 L.Ed.2d 759 (2014), filed a second pretrial order in May 2014 that granted Stavish’s motion to reconsider and suppressed the alcohol concentration test results on the ground that this court declined to resolve Brooks on the basis of a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

2024See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 359–60 (1987) (rejecting exclusion when police reasonably rely on a statute later deemed unconstitutional); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 , 137–38, 147 (2009) (rejecting exclusion when police reasonably rely on an arrest warrant database managed by law enforcement); Davis, 564 U.S. at 241 (rejecting exclusion when police obtain evidence in reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent).

2015Subsequent cases have extended the Leon good-faith exception to reasonable reliance on statutes later found unconstitutional, see Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), and reasonable reliance on an arrest warrant database, see Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (database managed by the police); Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (database managed by the judiciary). 10 The most recent good-faith exception, and the one the State urges us to adopt, was articulated in Davis, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2419 .

2024Before Lindquist, we declined to address the applicability of the good-faith exception even when police acted in good-faith reliance on a warrant later found to lack probable cause, first in Zanter, 535 N.W.2d at 634 , then in Garza, 632 N.W.2d at 638 .

2015I also agree with Justice Lil-lehaug’s analysis that MinmStat. § 626.21 is a statutory codification of the exclusionary rule that prevents the application of the good-faith exception in Minnesota, and I join that portion of his dissent. 1 See, e.g., Garza v. State, 632 N.W.2d 633, 640 (Minn.2001) (concluding that “the good faith of the police cannot cure the absence of particularized circumstances in the warrant application”); State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn.1995) (declining to adopt a good-faith exception, despite not questioning “the good faith of the police”).

2016Id.

2015See 870 N.W.2d at 405 ; see also Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d at 876 .

2015See State v. Wasson, 615 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Minn.2000); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782 , 791 n. 1 (Minn.1999); State v. Lindsey, 473 N.W.2d 857 , 864 n. 4 (Minn.1991); State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700 , 701 n. 1 (Minn.1990); State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265 , 269 n. 2 (Minn.1985); see also State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922 , 929 n. 7 (Minn.2006) (resolving the issue on statutory grounds and declining to consider the good-faith exception articulated in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006)).

2015See State v. Wasson, 615 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Minn.2000); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782 , 791 n. 1 (Minn.1999); State v. Lindsey, 473 N.W.2d 857 , 864 n. 4 (Minn.1991); State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700 , 701 n. 1 (Minn.1990); State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265 , 269 n. 2 (Minn.1985); see also State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922 , 929 n. 7 (Minn.2006) (resolving the issue on statutory grounds and declining to consider the good-faith exception articulated in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006)).

2015Minnesota has not adopted a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.4 State v. Martinez, 579 N.W.2d 144, 149 (Minn. App. 1998), review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998); see State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163 , 180 n.10 (Minn. 2007) (commenting that Minnesota has “consistently declined to adopt, much less even address, the . . . ‘good faith’ exception”). “[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.” Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987).

2015Minnesota has not adopted a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.4 State v. Martinez, 579 N.W.2d 144, 149 (Minn. App. 1998), review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998); see State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163 , 180 n.10 (Minn. 2007) (commenting that Minnesota has “consistently declined to adopt, much less even address, the . . . ‘good faith’ exception”). “[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.” Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987).

2026Smith, 110 F.4th at 829, 840 .

2026It therefore does not fall within the purview of Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) and need not satisfy the immediate episode or Spreigl exceptions. 32 the prior bad act and the charged crime.” State v. Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 425 (Minn. 2009).

2025In State v. Pierce, the court of appeals plainly stated in a published and precedential decision that “the detection of odors alone, which trained police officers can identify as being illicit, constitutes probable cause to search automobiles for further evidence of crime.” 347 N.W.2d 829, 833 (Minn. App. 1984).

2025A. To start, I am not convinced by Douglas’s argument that the rule of law stated in Pierce is “dicta.” Instead, I would conclude that Pierce held that “the detection of odors alone, which trained police officers can identify as being illicit, constitutes probable cause to search automobiles for further evidence of crime.” 347 N.W.2d at 833 .

2025While Lindquist was appealing her case, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 165 (2013), which held that metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream does not create a per se exigency justifying a warrantless blood draw for individuals suspected of driving while intoxicated.

2024Id. at 14 (citing State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 871 (Ariz. 1994)).