34 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1956–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kinggreen2 sentences2015See King, 432 S.W.3d at 326-28 . 2014See King, 432 S.W.3d at 326-28. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Dicksgreen2 sentences2013Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 338 (citing State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tenn. 1981) (recognizing that this Court may impose higher standards and stronger protections than those set by the federal constitution)). 2013Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 338 (citing State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tenn.1981) (recognizing that this Court may impose higher standards and stronger protections than those set by the federal constitution)). | 2 | 2 |
Frazier v. Stategreen2 sentences2022However, our supreme court has stated that while these rules “set forth a minimum standard of service to which post-conviction counsel is held,” they “do not provide any basis for relief from a conviction or sentence.” Id. at 681 . 2017However, our supreme court has stated that while Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28 section 6(C)(2) and section 6(C)(3) “set forth a minimum standard of service to which post-conviction counsel is held,” they “do not provide any basis for relief from a conviction or sentence.” Id. at 681 . | 1 | 7 |
House v. Stategreen1 sentence2022“All that due process requires in the post- conviction setting is that the defendant have ‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Stokes v. State, 146 S.W.3d 56, 61 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 711 (Tenn. 1995)). | 1 | 1 |
Stokes v. Stategreen1 sentence2022“All that due process requires in the post- conviction setting is that the defendant have ‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Stokes v. State, 146 S.W.3d 56, 61 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 711 (Tenn. 1995)). | 1 | 1 |
Hessmer v. Hessmergreen1 sentence2017The Court of Appeals found Mr. Mathes’s argument “unavailing,” explaining that “[t]he leniency we may afford to pleadings drafted by pro se litigants does not extend to excusing such litigants ‘from complying with the same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected to observe.’” Id. at *7 (quoting Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dycusgreen1 sentence2016See Dycus, 456 S.W.3d at 930 (concluding that the trial court‟s analysis of one of the factors was not adequate to “satisfy the minimum standard set forth in King”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wadegreen1 sentence2004A minimum requirement mandated by the Due Process Clause includes, “written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 , 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1761-62 (1973) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 , 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2604 (1972); see also Wade, 863 S.W.2d at 408 . | 1 | 1 |
Gagnon v. Scarpellired2 sentences2004A minimum requirement mandated by the Due Process Clause includes, “written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 , 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1761-62 (1973) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 , 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2604 (1972); see also Wade, 863 S.W.2d at 408 . 2004A minimum requirement mandated by the Due Process Clause includes, “written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 , 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1761-62 (1973) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 , 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2604 (1972); see also Wade, 863 S.W.2d at 408 . | 1 | 1 |
Morrissey v. Brewergreen2 sentences2004A minimum requirement mandated by the Due Process Clause includes, “written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 , 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1761-62 (1973) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 , 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2604 (1972); see also Wade, 863 S.W.2d at 408 . 2004A minimum requirement mandated by the Due Process Clause includes, “written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 , 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1761-62 (1973) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 , 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2604 (1972); see also Wade, 863 S.W.2d at 408 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Melsongreen1 sentence2001See State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342 (Tenn. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1137 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Bolder v. Missourigreen1 sentence2001See State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342 (Tenn. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1137 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Marks v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2000See Marks 430 U.S. at 193, 97 S.Ct. at 993 . 2000See Marks 430 U.S. at 193, 97 S.Ct. at 993 . | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Norrisgreen2 sentences1998As I noted in Black , however, the determinations of the United States Supreme Court set only a minimum standard and do not limit this Court’s authority to provide greater protection under the Tennessee Constitution. 815 S.W.2d at 192 (citing Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834, 838 (Tenn.1988) and Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tenn.1979)). 1998As I noted in Black , however, the determinations of the United States Supreme Court set only a minimum standard and do not limit this Court's authority to provide greater protection under the Tennessee Constitution. 815 S.W.2d at 192 (citing Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834, 838 (Tenn.1988) and Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tenn.1979)). | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Stategreen2 sentences1998As I noted in Black , however, the determinations of the United States Supreme Court set only a minimum standard and do not limit this Court’s authority to provide greater protection under the Tennessee Constitution. 815 S.W.2d at 192 (citing Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834, 838 (Tenn.1988) and Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tenn.1979)). 1998As I noted in Black , however, the determinations of the United States Supreme Court set only a minimum standard and do not limit this Court's authority to provide greater protection under the Tennessee Constitution. 815 S.W.2d at 192 (citing Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834, 838 (Tenn.1988) and Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tenn.1979)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Howellgreen1 sentence1994See State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 267-68 (Tenn.1993) (Reid, C.J., concurring). . | 1 | 1 |
California v. Greenwoodgreen2 sentences1991California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-1014 , 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3460 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983); see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 50 , 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1630 , 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 , 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1219 , 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 , 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1901-1902 , 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). 1991California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-1014 , 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3460 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983); see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 50 , 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1630 , 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 , 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1219 , 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 , 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1901-1902 , 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
| Tutton v. Pattersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schneckloth v. Bustamontegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Middlebrooks
red
2 sentences2013Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 338 (citing State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tenn. 1981) (recognizing that this Court may impose higher standards and stronger protections than those set by the federal constitution)). 2013Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 338 (citing State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tenn. 1981) (recognizing that this Court may impose higher standards and stronger protections than those set by the federal constitution)). | 3 | 1994–2013 |
Miller v. Berry
green
2 sentences2001Miller, 457 S.W.2d at 862-63 . 2001Miller, 457 S.W.2d at 862-63 . | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Brady v. United States
green
2 sentences1992He thus stands as a witness against himself and he is shielded by the Fifth Amendment from being compelled to do so — hence the minimum requirement that his plea be the voluntary expression of his own choice. 397 U.S. at 748 , 90 S.Ct. at 1468-69 . 1992He thus stands as a witness against himself and he is shielded by the Fifth Amendment from being compelled to do so — hence the minimum requirement that his plea be the voluntary expression of his own choice. 397 U.S. at 748 , 90 S.Ct. at 1468-69 . | 2 | 1992–1992 |
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences2015In Santosky v. Kramer, the United States Supreme Court determined that' “in any given proceeding, the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.” 455 U.S. 745, 755 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). 2015In Santosky v. Kramer, the United States Supreme Court determined that' “in any given proceeding, the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.” 455 U.S. 745, 755 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2010Other jurisdictions have similarly held that a statutory right to post-conviction counsel, while not requiring the level of performance set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), does require a minimum level of assistance. 2010Other jurisdictions have similarly held that a statutory right to post-conviction counsel, while not requiring the level of performance set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), does require a minimum level of assistance. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
O'Hara Ex Rel. H.O. v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence2010Id. at 763 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah
green
2 sentences2001Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533 , 113 S.Ct. at 2227 . 2001Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533 , 113 S.Ct. at 2227 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Davis v. United States
green
2 sentences2000The Davis court stated that the suspect “must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 , 114 S. Ct. at 2355 . 2000The Davis court stated that the suspect “must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 , 114 S. Ct. at 2355 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Black
green
2 sentences1998As I noted in Black , however, the determinations of the United States Supreme Court set only a minimum standard and do not limit this Court’s authority to provide greater protection under the Tennessee Constitution. 815 S.W.2d at 192 (citing Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834, 838 (Tenn.1988) and Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tenn.1979)). 1998As I noted in Black , however, the determinations of the United States Supreme Court set only a minimum standard and do not limit this Court's authority to provide greater protection under the Tennessee Constitution. 815 S.W.2d at 192 (citing Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834, 838 (Tenn.1988) and Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tenn.1979)). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Tennessee v. Middlebrooks
green
2 sentences1994Tennessee’s first degree murder statute, as amended in 1989, remains the most unrestricted definition of a class of death-eligible defendants permitted under the federal constitution. 1 State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 337-38 , c ert. dismissed, — U.S.—, 114 S.Ct. 651 , 126 L.Ed.2d 555 (1993). 1994Tennessee’s first degree murder statute, as amended in 1989, remains the most unrestricted definition of a class of death-eligible defendants permitted under the federal constitution. 1 State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 337-38 , c ert. dismissed, — U.S.—, 114 S.Ct. 651 , 126 L.Ed.2d 555 (1993). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Sibron v. New York
green
2 sentences1991California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-1014 , 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3460 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983); see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 50 , 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1630 , 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 , 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1219 , 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 , 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1901-1902 , 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). 1991California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-1014 , 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3460 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983); see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 50 , 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1630 , 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 , 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1219 , 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 , 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1901-1902 , 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Oregon v. Hass
green
2 sentences1991California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-1014 , 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3460 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983); see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 50 , 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1630 , 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 , 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1219 , 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 , 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1901-1902 , 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). 1991California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-1014 , 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3460 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983); see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 50 , 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1630 , 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 , 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1219 , 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 , 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1901-1902 , 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
California v. Ramos
green
2 sentences1991California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-1014 , 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3460 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983); see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 50 , 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1630 , 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 , 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1219 , 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 , 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1901-1902 , 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). 1991California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-1014 , 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3460 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983); see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 50 , 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1630 , 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 , 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1219 , 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 , 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1901-1902 , 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Ake v. Oklahoma green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Boughton v. Price green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Harris v. France green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Godsey v. Lenderson neutral | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Jowett v. Pennsylvania Power Co. green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.