minimum standard in California

2013(See People v. Garcia (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1756, 1775-1776 (Garcia), and cases cited.) “ ‘[T]he elements of force and fear do not need to be extreme for purposes of constituting robbery. [Citations.] [¶] This means that the threat of 6 bodily harm can frequently exceed the minimum requirement necessary for purposes of establishing robbery.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1776.) Arguments similar to defendant’s were rejected in People v. Cortez (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 491 , where Cortez was sentenced to the five-year upper term for robbery.

1995(People v. Reid (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 354, 369 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 186 ]; People v. Ramos *1776 (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 591, 601-602 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 179 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353, 356-357, fn. 16 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ]; People v. Cortez (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 491, 496 [163 CaLRptr. 1].) “[T]he elements of force and fear do not need to be extreme for purposes of constituting robbery. [Citations.] [H This means that the threat of bodily harm can frequently exceed the minimum requirement necessary for purposes of establishing robbery.” (

1982(Stats. 1917, ch. 586, § 46, p. 864. 7 See Campbell v. Fong Wan (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 553, 558 [ 141 P.2d 43 ].) *769 The authorities which interpreted the statute confirmed the narrow scope of the exemption.

1982(Stats. 1917, ch. 586, § 46, p. 864. 7 See Campbell v. Fong Wan (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 553, 558 [ 141 P.2d 43 ].) *769 The authorities which interpreted the statute confirmed the narrow scope of the exemption.

2022(See People v. Flynn (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 766, 771 (Flynn) [taking by force or fear includes “ ‘simply deterring a victim from preventing the theft or attempting to immediately reclaim the property’ ”].) Similarly, the victim’s fear “need not be the result of an express threat” (Flynn, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 771 ), and “[r]esistance by the victim is not a required element of robbery.” (People v. Morehead (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 .) “Intimidation of the victim equates with fear,” and “[i]f there is evidence from which fear may be inferred, 59 the victim need not explicitly testify

2022(See People v. Flynn (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 766, 771 (Flynn) [taking by force or fear includes “ ‘simply deterring a victim from preventing the theft or attempting to immediately reclaim the property’ ”].) Similarly, the victim’s fear “need not be the result of an express threat” (Flynn, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 771 ), and “[r]esistance by the victim is not a required element of robbery.” (People v. Morehead (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 .) “Intimidation of the victim equates with fear,” and “[i]f there is evidence from which fear may be inferred, 59 the victim need not explicitly testify

2021Neither purpose depends on requiring employees to submit only allegations that can already be backed by some particular quantum of admissible proof.” ( Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 545-546.) As stated by another court, the purpose of the notice provision is to “‘allow[ ] the [LWDA] to act first on more “serious” violations such as wage and hour violations and give employers an opportunity to cure less serious violations.’” (Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 375 , disapproved on another ground in ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 196, fn.

2021Neither purpose depends on requiring employees to submit only allegations that can already be backed by some particular quantum of admissible proof.” ( Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 545-546.) As stated by another court, the purpose of the notice provision is to “‘allow[ ] the [LWDA] to act first on more “serious” violations such as wage and hour violations and give employers an opportunity to cure less serious violations.’” (Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 375 , disapproved on another ground in ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 196, fn.

1980First, as the Court repeatedly has recognized, the inherent mobility of automobiles often makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant. [Citations.] In addition, the configuration, use, and regulation of automobiles often may dilute the reasonable expectation of privacy that exists with respect to differently situated property. [Citations.]” And it was held in Chambers v. Maroney, supra, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 419, 428 ]: “In enforcing the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a

1980First, as the Court repeatedly has recognized, the inherent mobility of automobiles often makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant. [Citations.] In addition, the configuration, use, and regulation of automobiles often may dilute the reasonable expectation of privacy that exists with respect to differently situated property. [Citations.]” And it was held in Chambers v. Maroney, supra, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 419, 428 ]: “In enforcing the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a

1951Co., 34 Cal.App.2d 451, 454 [ 93 P.2d 821 ].) Although we can conceive of regulatory statutes, compliance with which would be due care as a matter of law in the absence of other circumstances, . . . the regulations before us were not intended to be more than the minimum standard of care stated to meet the charge of wilful misconduct or of a criminal violation.” Appellant argues further that since he was under an obligation to construct these sills, negligence, if any, occurred as the result of some act or omission after the construction of the sill.

1951Co., 34 Cal.App.2d 451, 454 [ 93 P.2d 821 ].) Although we can conceive of regulatory statutes, compliance with which would be due care as a matter of law in the absence of other circumstances, . . . the regulations before us were not intended to be more than the minimum standard of care stated to meet the charge of wilful misconduct or of a criminal violation.” Appellant argues further that since he was under an obligation to construct these sills, negligence, if any, occurred as the result of some act or omission after the construction of the sill.

2023Where the evidence shows no unusual circumstances, but only the ordinary situation 21 contemplated by the statute or administrative rule, then ‘the minimum standard prescribed by the legislation or regulation may be accepted by the triers of fact, or by the court as a matter of law, as sufficient for the occasion . . . .’ ” (Ramirez v. Plough, Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 539, 548 ; see also Myrick v. Mastagni (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1087 .) Here, plaintiffs assert that “by virtue of being a hospital, individuals using canes, walkers, wheelchairs, or relying on prostheses, or other medical devic

2016Statutory or regulatory compliance is not a defense to tort liability because statutes and regulations ordinarily define only a minimum standard of conduct. ( Myrick v. Mastagni (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1082 , 1087, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 165 .) We believe that principle is applicable here, especially where the regulatory standards are expressly designated as the minimum standards.

2022The district attorney presented testimony from other witnesses about statements Martinez had made to them about the home invasion. 59 not need to be extreme for purposes of constituting robbery. [Citations.] [¶] This means that the threat of bodily harm can frequently exceed the minimum requirement necessary for purposes of establishing robbery.’ ” (People v. Garcia (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1756, 1776 .) Here, the jurors could reasonably conclude from the evidence that the threat posed by the gun and other intimidating acts committed during the home invasion amounted to a use of force by the intr

2022However, . . . no artificial parsing is required as to the precise moment or order in which the elements are satisfied.” (People v. Gomez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 254 , fn. omitted.) Furthermore, although “ ‘the act of force or intimidation by which the taking is accomplished in robbery must be motivated by the intent to steal’ ” (People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 994 ), “ ‘[t]he elements of force and fear do not need to be extreme for purposes of constituting robbery. [Citations.] [¶] This means that the threat of bodily harm can frequently exceed the minimum requirement necessary for p

2023Where the evidence shows no unusual circumstances, but only the ordinary situation 21 contemplated by the statute or administrative rule, then ‘the minimum standard prescribed by the legislation or regulation may be accepted by the triers of fact, or by the court as a matter of law, as sufficient for the occasion . . . .’ ” (Ramirez v. Plough, Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 539, 548 ; see also Myrick v. Mastagni (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1087 .) Here, plaintiffs assert that “by virtue of being a hospital, individuals using canes, walkers, wheelchairs, or relying on prostheses, or other medical devic

2010(Ramirez v. Plough, Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 539, 547-548 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 97 , 863 P.2d 167 ].) That is because a statute, ordinance or regulation ordinarily defines a minimum standard of conduct.

2025These facts are more than sufficient to establish that Branner used far more “force or fear” than necessary to commit the robbery. (§ 211.) Indeed, “the elements of force and fear do not need to be extreme for purposes of constituting robbery” which “means that the threat of bodily harm can frequently exceed the minimum requirement necessary for purposes of establishing robbery.” (People v. Ramos (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 591, 602 , disapproved on another ground in Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th 331 .) For example, evidence that a “victim was forced to divulge his money at knife point and 6 “An act discl

1995(People v. Reid (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 354, 369 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 186 ]; People v. Ramos *1776 (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 591, 601-602 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 179 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353, 356-357, fn. 16 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ]; People v. Cortez (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 491, 496 [163 CaLRptr. 1].) “[T]he elements of force and fear do not need to be extreme for purposes of constituting robbery. [Citations.] [H This means that the threat of bodily harm can frequently exceed the minimum requirement necessary for purposes of establishing robbery.” (

2025These facts are more than sufficient to establish that Branner used far more “force or fear” than necessary to commit the robbery. (§ 211.) Indeed, “the elements of force and fear do not need to be extreme for purposes of constituting robbery” which “means that the threat of bodily harm can frequently exceed the minimum requirement necessary for purposes of establishing robbery.” (People v. Ramos (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 591, 602 , disapproved on another ground in Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th 331 .) For example, evidence that a “victim was forced to divulge his money at knife point and 6 “An act discl

2025These facts are more than sufficient to establish that Branner used far more “force or fear” than necessary to commit the robbery. (§ 211.) Indeed, “the elements of force and fear do not need to be extreme for purposes of constituting robbery” which “means that the threat of bodily harm can frequently exceed the minimum requirement necessary for purposes of establishing robbery.” (People v. Ramos (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 591, 602 , disapproved on another ground in Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th 331 .) For example, evidence that a “victim was forced to divulge his money at knife point and 6 “An act discl

2016This is not the type of regulation ‘prescribing minimum standards for equipment, personnel or facilities,’ the breach of which can give rise to liability under Government Code section 855.” (Ibid.) We need not decide whether the California Code of Regulations, title 22, section 70583, subdivision (a)(8)’s requirement that windows in a psychiatric unit be “modified to prevent patients from leaving the unit by way of a window” constitutes a specific minimum standard under section 855 because both Baber and Lockhart require the plaintiff to carry the burden of proving a violation of mandated mini

2016This is not the type of regulation ‘prescribing minimum standards for equipment, personnel or facilities,’ the breach of which can give rise to liability under Government Code section 855.” (Ibid.) We need not decide whether the California Code of Regulations, title 22, section 70583, subdivision (a)(8)’s requirement that windows in a psychiatric unit be “modified to prevent patients from leaving the unit by way of a window” constitutes a specific minimum standard under section 855 because both Baber and Lockhart require the plaintiff to carry the burden of proving a violation of mandated mini

2014App. 106, 114 [ 11 P.3d 701, 705 ] [grammar of statute not susceptible of interpretation that definition is a minimum standard].) By the same token, the ICWA authorization for a state to provide a higher standard of protection for the rights of parents or Indian custodians of an Indian child in custody proceedings than are provided under this subchapter ( 25 U.S.C. § 1921 [referencing 25 U.S.C. § 1911 et seq.]) does not have any bearing on the definition of “Indian child,” a term which does not appear in the referenced subchapter.

2014Ct. App. 2000) 170 Or.App. 106, 114 [“Indian child” definition is not a minimum standard].) Further, a state’s right to provide greater ICWA protections would not have any bearing on the definition of “Indian child,” because the term does not appear in the subchapter of the code wherein states are granted the authority to provide a higher level of protection. ( 25 U.S.C.A. § 1921 [referencing 25 U.S.C. § 1911 et seq.].) California Rules of Court, rule 5.482(c) improperly expanded the definition of Indian child to include children eligible for membership, who did not have a parent who was a tri

1983(People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 545 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 531 P.2d 1099 ].) Where, as here, the crime predates the enactment of Proposition 8, the provisions of article I, section 13 of our state Constitution afford an independent ground for excluding the evidence seized from the defendant.

1980The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment creates only a minimum standard for reasonable searches. ( Id. ) Real party also cites People v. Carnesi (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 863 [ 94 Cal. Rptr. 555 ], where the court anticipated the DeFillippo ruling.

2023It addresses only a circumstance in which a party might prevail in an arbitration but still have no recourse due to some changing condition.” (Riverside County Sheriff’s Department v. Stiglitz (2014) 60 Cal.4th 624, 633 .) “[T]he possibility that an arbitration award might be rendered ineffectual is a threshold or minimum requirement.” (Woolley v. Embassy Suites, Inc. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1520, 1529 (Woolley).) “The logical reason” for this requirement “is to ensure that the court does not invalidate the province of the arbitrator—i.e., the court should be empowered to grant provisional relie

2023(Id. at p. 1528; see also California Retail Portfolio Fund GMBH & Co. KG v. Hopkins Real Estate Group (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 849, 856 .) Thus, a party seeking injunctive relief pursuant to section 1281.8 must demonstrate that it satisfies the traditional requirements for such relief: “that the applicant is likely to prevail on the merits, has no adequate alternative remedy, and will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied.” (Davenport v. Blue Cross of California (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 435, 450 .) 1.