25 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1943–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hueglingreen2 sentences2022We note that “[w]hen an individual’s competency to testify is challenged, the district courts are merely required to conduct an inquiry in order to ensure that he or she meets a minimum standard, such that a reasonable person could ‘put any credence in their testimony.’” State v. Ruiz, 2007-NMCA-014, ¶ 23 , 141 N.M. 53 , 150 P.3d 1003 (quoting State v. Hueglin, 2000-NMCA-106, ¶ 22 , 130 N.M. 54 , 16 P.3d 1113 ). 2022We note that “[w]hen an individual’s competency to testify is challenged, the district courts are merely required to conduct an inquiry in order to ensure that he or she meets a minimum standard, such that a reasonable person could ‘put any credence in their testimony.’” State v. Ruiz, 2007-NMCA-014, ¶ 23 , 141 N.M. 53 , 150 P.3d 1003 (quoting State v. Hueglin, 2000-NMCA-106, ¶ 22 , 130 N.M. 54 , 16 P.3d 1113 ). | 2 | 6 |
Concha v. Sanchezgreen2 sentences2025“If feasible, even in summary 6 proceedings for an act of direct contempt occurring in open court, an ‘adequate 7 opportunity to defend or explain one’s conduct is a minimum requirement before 8 imposition of punishment.’” Concha, 2011-NMSC-031, ¶ 27 (citation omitted). 9 {26} Conversely, indirect contempt is contemptuous conduct “‘committed outside 10 the presence of the court.’” Marshall, 2023-NMSC-009 , ¶ 14 (citation omitted). 11 Indirect contempts “‘must be resolved through . . . traditional due process 12 procedures.’” Id. (citation omitted). 2017See Concha v. Sanchez, 4 2011-NMSC-031, ¶ 27 , 150 N.M. 268 , 258 P.3d 1060 (“If feasible, even in summary 5 proceedings for an act of direct contempt occurring in open court, an adequate 6 opportunity to defend or explain one’s conduct is a minimum requirement before 7 imposition of punishment.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). | 2 | 2 |
Strausberg v. Laurel Healthcare Providers, LLCgreen2 sentences2016See Strausberg, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 33 . 2016See Strausberg, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 33 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Ruizgreen2 sentences2022We note that “[w]hen an individual’s competency to testify is challenged, the district courts are merely required to conduct an inquiry in order to ensure that he or she meets a minimum standard, such that a reasonable person could ‘put any credence in their testimony.’” State v. Ruiz, 2007-NMCA-014, ¶ 23 , 141 N.M. 53 , 150 P.3d 1003 (quoting State v. Hueglin, 2000-NMCA-106, ¶ 22 , 130 N.M. 54 , 16 P.3d 1113 ). 2022We note that “[w]hen an individual’s competency to testify is challenged, the district courts are merely required to conduct an inquiry in order to ensure that he or she meets a minimum standard, such that a reasonable person could ‘put any credence in their testimony.’” State v. Ruiz, 2007-NMCA-014, ¶ 23 , 141 N.M. 53 , 150 P.3d 1003 (quoting State v. Hueglin, 2000-NMCA-106, ¶ 22 , 130 N.M. 54 , 16 P.3d 1113 ). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Hendersongreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., Wise et al., supra at 485-97 (discussing guidelines for such system variables); see Henderson, 27 A.3d at 896-903 (discussing parameters for the New Jersey system variables), 919-22 (establishing system variables and procedures for lineups, showups, and photo arrays in New Jersey); see also N.C. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2020See Wilson, 2010-NMCA-018, ¶ 29 (holding a delay of just over five months over the minimum presumption of prejudice in a simple case weighed slightly against the state). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mauergreen2 sentences2017See Commonwealth v. Kenney, 874 N.E.2d 1089, 1102 (Mass. 2007) (noting the absence of a decision from the United States Supreme Court on what level of scienter is constitutionally required to convict a person of possession of child pornography); State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn. 2007) (noting that the minimum standard of scienter required for child pornography “remains unclear” because it has not yet been defined by the United States Supreme Court). 2017Defendant would have us follow Mauer, however, we find Kenney more persuasive, and follow its reasoning. {30} In Mauer, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered what level of scienter is required to satisfy the First Amendment under a Minnesota statute making it a crime to possess child pornography if the defendant “has reason to know” that the work involves a minor. 741 N.W.2d at 109 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Kenneygreen1 sentence2017See Commonwealth v. Kenney, 874 N.E.2d 1089, 1102 (Mass. 2007) (noting the absence of a decision from the United States Supreme Court on what level of scienter is constitutionally required to convict a person of possession of child pornography); State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn. 2007) (noting that the minimum standard of scienter required for child pornography “remains unclear” because it has not yet been defined by the United States Supreme Court). | 1 | 1 |
Arnold v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Arnold 8 v. State, 1980-NMSC-030 , ¶ 10, 94 N.M. 381 , 610 P.2d 1210 (“Legislative intent is 9 to be determined primarily from the language used in the Act or statute as a whole.”). 10 Moreover, this reading acknowledges the difficulty of avoiding large customer cap 11 costs. 12 {40} First, the renewable portfolio standard promulgated by the Renewable Energy 13 Act provides a minimum standard. 2015See Arnold 8 v. State, 1980-NMSC-030 , ¶ 10, 94 N.M. 381 , 610 P.2d 1210 (“Legislative intent is 9 to be determined primarily from the language used in the Act or statute as a whole.”). 10 Moreover, this reading acknowledges the difficulty of avoiding large customer cap 11 costs. 12 {40} First, the renewable portfolio standard promulgated by the Renewable Energy 13 Act provides a minimum standard. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stoutgreen2 sentences2011State v. Stout, 100 N.M. 472, 474 , 672 P.2d 645, 647 (1983) (holding that an attorney charged with contempt for failing to attend a scheduled hearing could be charged only with indirect, not direct, contempt because the contempt did not occur in open court and the judge did not have personal knowledge of the reasons for the attorney’s nonappearance). {29} The contempt power of a court is so broad that it is uniquely “ ‘liable to abuse.’ ” Bloom, 391 U.S. at 202 , 88 S.Ct. 1477 (quoting In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 , 9 S.Ct. 77 , 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888)). 2011State v. Stout, 100 N.M. 472, 474 , 672 P.2d 645, 647 (1983) (holding that an attorney charged with contempt for failing to attend a scheduled hearing could be charged only with indirect, not direct, contempt because the contempt did not occur in open court and the judge did not have personal knowledge of the reasons for the attorney’s nonappearance). {29} The contempt power of a court is so broad that it is uniquely “ ‘liable to abuse.’ ” Bloom, 391 U.S. at 202 , 88 S.Ct. 1477 (quoting In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 , 9 S.Ct. 77 , 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888)). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Klecangreen2 sentences2011If feasible, even in summary proceedings for an act of direct contempt occurring in open court, an “adequate opportunity to defend or explain one’s conduct is a minimum requirement before imposition of punishment.” In re Klecan, 93 N.M. at 639 , 603 P.2d at 1096 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (reversing a direct contempt citation for failure of the judge to permit the contemnor to explain his conduct). {28} When the judge has not personally witnessed the defendant’s contemptuous behavior in the course of a court proceeding, the contempt is classified as indirect criminal conte 2011If feasible, even in summary proceedings for an act of direct contempt occurring in open court, an “adequate opportunity to defend or explain one’s conduct is a minimum requirement before imposition of punishment.” In re Klecan, 93 N.M. at 639 , 603 P.2d at 1096 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (reversing a direct contempt citation for failure of the judge to permit the contemnor to explain his conduct). {28} When the judge has not personally witnessed the defendant’s contemptuous behavior in the course of a court proceeding, the contempt is classified as indirect criminal conte | 1 | 1 |
Earnest v. General Motors Corp.green1 sentence2004See Earnest, 923 F.Supp. at 1473-74 (finding that the class definition was so vague and broad, the minimum standard of definiteness was not met); see also Harris, 127 F.R.D. at 659 (holding the class “too imprecise and speculative to be certified.”). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. General Development Corp.green1 sentence2004See Earnest, 923 F.Supp. at 1473-74 (finding that the class definition was so vague and broad, the minimum standard of definiteness was not met); see also Harris, 127 F.R.D. at 659 (holding the class “too imprecise and speculative to be certified.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Marquezgreen2 sentences1982See State v. Marquez, 79 N.M. 6 , 438 P.2d 890 (1968); State v. Selgado, 78 N.M. 165 , 429 P.2d 363 (1967); State v. Gutierrez, 93 N.M. 232 , 599 P.2d 385 (Ct.App.1979); State v. French, 92 N.M. 94 , 582 P.2d 1307 (Ct.App.1978). 1982See State v. Marquez, 79 N.M. 6 , 438 P.2d 890 (1968); State v. Selgado, 78 N.M. 165 , 429 P.2d 363 (1967); State v. Gutierrez, 93 N.M. 232 , 599 P.2d 385 (Ct.App.1979); State v. French, 92 N.M. 94 , 582 P.2d 1307 (Ct.App.1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Haskins
green
2 sentences2020See id. ¶ 45 (“The jury alone is the judge of the credibility of the witnesses and determines the weight afforded to testimony.”); State v. Haskins, 2008-NMCA-086, ¶ 8 , 144 N.M. 287 , 186 P.3d 916 (“We do not substitute our judgment for that of the fact[-]finder concerning the credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given their testimony.”). 2020See id. ¶ 45 (“The jury alone is the judge of the credibility of the witnesses and determines the weight afforded to testimony.”); State v. Haskins, 2008-NMCA-086, ¶ 8 , 144 N.M. 287 , 186 P.3d 916 (“We do not substitute our judgment for that of the fact[-]finder concerning the credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given their testimony.”). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Apodaca v. AAA Gas Co.
green
2 sentences2018This determination includes an inquiry into the "witness's capacities to observe, recollect, and communicate, as well as appreciate a duty to speak the truth at the meaningful time." Apodaca , 2003-NMCA-085 , ¶ 62, 134 N.M. 77 , 73 P.3d 215 . {44} Defendant claims he was prejudiced by Richard Sr.'s inaccurate recollection of the events that took place on the date of the incident due to the pain medication Richard Sr. was taking when he testified. 2018This determination includes an inquiry into the "witness's capacities to observe, recollect, and communicate, as well as appreciate a duty to speak the truth at the meaningful time." Apodaca , 2003-NMCA-085 , ¶ 62, 134 N.M. 77 , 73 P.3d 215 . {44} Defendant claims he was prejudiced by Richard Sr.'s inaccurate recollection of the events that took place on the date of the incident due to the pain medication Richard Sr. was taking when he testified. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Ex Parte Terry
green
2 sentences2011State v. Stout, 100 N.M. 472, 474 , 672 P.2d 645, 647 (1983) (holding that an attorney charged with contempt for failing to attend a scheduled hearing could be charged only with indirect, not direct, contempt because the contempt did not occur in open court and the judge did not have personal knowledge of the reasons for the attorney’s nonappearance). {29} The contempt power of a court is so broad that it is uniquely “ ‘liable to abuse.’ ” Bloom, 391 U.S. at 202 , 88 S.Ct. 1477 (quoting In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 , 9 S.Ct. 77 , 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888)). 2011State v. Stout, 100 N.M. 472, 474 , 672 P.2d 645, 647 (1983) (holding that an attorney charged with contempt for failing to attend a scheduled hearing could be charged only with indirect, not direct, contempt because the contempt did not occur in open court and the judge did not have personal knowledge of the reasons for the attorney’s nonappearance). {29} The contempt power of a court is so broad that it is uniquely “ ‘liable to abuse.’ ” Bloom, 391 U.S. at 202 , 88 S.Ct. 1477 (quoting In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 , 9 S.Ct. 77 , 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Bloom v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2011State v. Stout, 100 N.M. 472, 474 , 672 P.2d 645, 647 (1983) (holding that an attorney charged with contempt for failing to attend a scheduled hearing could be charged only with indirect, not direct, contempt because the contempt did not occur in open court and the judge did not have personal knowledge of the reasons for the attorney’s nonappearance). {29} The contempt power of a court is so broad that it is uniquely “ ‘liable to abuse.’ ” Bloom, 391 U.S. at 202 , 88 S.Ct. 1477 (quoting In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 , 9 S.Ct. 77 , 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888)). 2011State v. Stout, 100 N.M. 472, 474 , 672 P.2d 645, 647 (1983) (holding that an attorney charged with contempt for failing to attend a scheduled hearing could be charged only with indirect, not direct, contempt because the contempt did not occur in open court and the judge did not have personal knowledge of the reasons for the attorney’s nonappearance). {29} The contempt power of a court is so broad that it is uniquely “ ‘liable to abuse.’ ” Bloom, 391 U.S. at 202 , 88 S.Ct. 1477 (quoting In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 , 9 S.Ct. 77 , 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Phillips
green
2 sentences2009State 12 v. Phillips, 2006-NMCA-001, ¶ 12 , 138 N.M. 730 , 126 P.3d 546 . 13 Here, the only evidence in the record proper of the violations upon which the 14 district court revoked Defendant’s probation appears to have come from the 15 probation officer’s testimony. [RP 145-48] There is no record that the district 16 court made a finding of good cause for the arresting officer’s failure to appear. 17 [RP 163-65] Based upon the minimum standard of due process required at a 18 probation revocation hearing, the district court could not rely upon the evidence 19 presented in the absence of the arr 2009State 12 v. Phillips, 2006-NMCA-001, ¶ 12 , 138 N.M. 730 , 126 P.3d 546 . 13 Here, the only evidence in the record proper of the violations upon which the 14 district court revoked Defendant’s probation appears to have come from the 15 probation officer’s testimony. [RP 145-48] There is no record that the district 16 court made a finding of good cause for the arresting officer’s failure to appear. 17 [RP 163-65] Based upon the minimum standard of due process required at a 18 probation revocation hearing, the district court could not rely upon the evidence 19 presented in the absence of the arr | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba County Assessor
green
2 sentences2004Jicarilla Apache Nation, 2004-NMCA-055, ¶¶ 39-40 , 135 N.M. 630 , 92 P.3d 642 . {40} The regulation, however, does not read: "This burden will be met by submitting objective evidence" of use consistent with a valid soil conservation agreement. 2004Jicarilla Apache Nation, 2004-NMCA-055, ¶¶ 39-40 , 135 N.M. 630 , 92 P.3d 642 . {40} The regulation, however, does not read: "This burden will be met by submitting objective evidence" of use consistent with a valid soil conservation agreement. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Lucas v. United States
green
2 sentences1988Some courts have construed the damage caps as social and economic legislation and have upheld them after reviewing the legislation under the rational basis test. [3] Three separate intermediate courts in Texas have invalidated legislation that limited liability for medical malpractice actions, purportedly using the rational basis standard of review. [4] The Supreme Court of Texas, also applying the minimum standard in a yet-unreleased opinion, recently affirmed the invalidity of the statutory liability limitation in Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (1988), holding the cap to be "unreason 1988Some courts have construed the damage caps as social and economic legislation and have upheld them after reviewing the legislation under the rational basis test. 3 Three separate intermediate courts in Texas have invalidated legislation that limited liability for medical malpractice actions, purportedly using the rational basis standard of review. 4 The Supreme Court of Texas, also applying the minimum standard in a yet-unreleased opinion, recently affirmed the invalidity of the statutory liability limitation in Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (1988), holding the cap to be “unreasonable | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State v. French
green
2 sentences1982See State v. Marquez, 79 N.M. 6 , 438 P.2d 890 (1968); State v. Selgado, 78 N.M. 165 , 429 P.2d 363 (1967); State v. Gutierrez, 93 N.M. 232 , 599 P.2d 385 (Ct.App.1979); State v. French, 92 N.M. 94 , 582 P.2d 1307 (Ct.App.1978). 1982See State v. Marquez, 79 N.M. 6 , 438 P.2d 890 (1968); State v. Selgado, 78 N.M. 165 , 429 P.2d 363 (1967); State v. Gutierrez, 93 N.M. 232 , 599 P.2d 385 (Ct.App.1979); State v. French, 92 N.M. 94 , 582 P.2d 1307 (Ct.App.1978). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Selgado
green
2 sentences1982See State v. Marquez, 79 N.M. 6 , 438 P.2d 890 (1968); State v. Selgado, 78 N.M. 165 , 429 P.2d 363 (1967); State v. Gutierrez, 93 N.M. 232 , 599 P.2d 385 (Ct.App.1979); State v. French, 92 N.M. 94 , 582 P.2d 1307 (Ct.App.1978). 1982See State v. Marquez, 79 N.M. 6 , 438 P.2d 890 (1968); State v. Selgado, 78 N.M. 165 , 429 P.2d 363 (1967); State v. Gutierrez, 93 N.M. 232 , 599 P.2d 385 (Ct.App.1979); State v. French, 92 N.M. 94 , 582 P.2d 1307 (Ct.App.1978). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Gutierrez
green
2 sentences1982See State v. Marquez, 79 N.M. 6 , 438 P.2d 890 (1968); State v. Selgado, 78 N.M. 165 , 429 P.2d 363 (1967); State v. Gutierrez, 93 N.M. 232 , 599 P.2d 385 (Ct.App.1979); State v. French, 92 N.M. 94 , 582 P.2d 1307 (Ct.App.1978). 1982See State v. Marquez, 79 N.M. 6 , 438 P.2d 890 (1968); State v. Selgado, 78 N.M. 165 , 429 P.2d 363 (1967); State v. Gutierrez, 93 N.M. 232 , 599 P.2d 385 (Ct.App.1979); State v. French, 92 N.M. 94 , 582 P.2d 1307 (Ct.App.1978). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Sussman v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1979And in Sussman v. Com., supra, the Massachusetts court stated: Especially in light of the potential for abuse of the contempt power, and adequate opportunity to defend or explain one’s conduct is a minimum requirement before imposition of punishment. 374 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 . 1979And in Sussman v. Com., supra, the Massachusetts court stated: Especially in light of the potential for abuse of the contempt power, and adequate opportunity to defend or explain one’s conduct is a minimum requirement before imposition of punishment. 374 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Getzy v. Miller
neutral
1 sentence1976Getzy v. Miller, 9 F.R.D. 564 (D.Ohio 1949). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
The Housing Authority v. Dockweiler
green
2 sentences1943And if the protection of women is a legitimate end of the exercise of state power, how can it be said that the requirement of the payment of a minimum wage fairly fixed in order to meet the very necessities of existence is not an admissible means to that end?” It would indeed be a strange logic which can discover a proper health factor in the amount of wages received by those of a class able and strong enough to work and yet fail to sense it in a measure providing a small sustenance to those who, through adversity and advancing age, have no wage at all nor other income. 'In the well reasoned c 1943And if the protection of women is a legitimate end of the exercise of state power, how can it be said that the requirement of the payment of a minimum wage fairly fixed in order to meet the very necessities of existence is not an admissible means to that end?” It would indeed be a strange logic which can discover a proper health factor in the amount of wages received by those of a class able and strong enough to work and yet fail to sense it in a measure providing a small sustenance to those who, through adversity and advancing age, have no wage at all nor other income. 'In the well reasoned c | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.