8 Wyoming opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wyoming courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nuspl v. Nusplgreen2 sentences1991But it should be made clear that we are not setting a minimum standard for the support of two children in every case, for we have said in Nuspl v. Nuspl, 717 P.2d 341, 344 (Wyo. 1986) that: "The fact noticed in the present case was the `cost' of raising one, two and three children. 1991But it should be made clear that we are not setting a minimum standard for the support of two children in every case, for we have said in Nuspl v. Nuspl, 717 P.2d 341, 344 (Wyo. 1986) that: “The fact noticed in the present case was the ‘cost’ of raising one, two and three children. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stitzelgreen2 sentences1989The Minnesota Court of Appeals acknowledged that Barker established only a minimum standard as had the Minnesota Supreme Court in establishing a supervisory rule: "Nothing we have said should be interpreted as disapproving a presumptive rule adopted by a court in the exercise of its supervisory powers which establishes a fixed time period within which cases must normally be brought." State v. Stitzel, 351 N.W.2d 409, 410 (Minn. App. 1984) (quoting from Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 n. 29, 92 S.Ct. at 2192 n. 29). 1989The Minnesota Court of Appeals acknowledged that Barker established only a minimum standard as had the Minnesota Supreme Court in establishing a supervisory rule: “Nothing we have said should be interpreted as disapproving a presumptive rule adopted by a court in the exercise of its supervisory powers which establishes a fixed time period within which cases must normally be brought.” State v. Stitzel, 351 N.W.2d 409, 410 (Minn.App.1984) (quoting from Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 n. 29, 92 S.Ct. at 2192 n. 29). | 1 | 1 |
Nehring v. Russellgreen2 sentences1989Cheyenne Airport Board v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 726 (Wyo. 1985); Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 77 (Wyo. 1978). 1989Cheyenne Airport Board v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 726 (Wyo.1985); Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 77 (Wyo.1978). | 1 | 1 |
Cheyenne Airport Board v. Rogersgreen2 sentences1989Cheyenne Airport Board v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 726 (Wyo. 1985); Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 77 (Wyo. 1978). 1989Cheyenne Airport Board v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 726 (Wyo.1985); Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 77 (Wyo.1978). | 1 | 1 |
Edward Morgan MacKenna v. O. B. Ellis, Director, Texas Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences1981Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1975); the Fourth Circuit, to “representation within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977); the Fifth Circuit, to “counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance,” (emphasis in original) MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960); and the Third Circuit, to “[t]he standard of normal competency,” Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3rd Cir. 1970). 1981Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir.1975); the Fourth Circuit, to "representation within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases," Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir.1977); the Fifth Circuit, to "counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably *194 effective assistance," (emphasis in original) MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir.1960); and the Third Circuit, to "[t]he standard of normal competency," Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3rd Cir.1970). | 1 | 1 |
Gratton Earl Moore v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1981Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1975); the Fourth Circuit, to “representation within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977); the Fifth Circuit, to “counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance,” (emphasis in original) MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960); and the Third Circuit, to “[t]he standard of normal competency,” Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3rd Cir. 1970). 1981Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir.1975); the Fourth Circuit, to "representation within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases," Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir.1977); the Fifth Circuit, to "counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably *194 effective assistance," (emphasis in original) MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir.1960); and the Third Circuit, to "[t]he standard of normal competency," Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3rd Cir.1970). | 1 | 1 |
United States of America Ex Rel. Countee Williams v. John J. Twomey, Wardengreen2 sentences1981Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1975); the Fourth Circuit, to “representation within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977); the Fifth Circuit, to “counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance,” (emphasis in original) MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960); and the Third Circuit, to “[t]he standard of normal competency,” Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3rd Cir. 1970). 1981Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir.1975); the Fourth Circuit, to "representation within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases," Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir.1977); the Fifth Circuit, to "counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably *194 effective assistance," (emphasis in original) MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir.1960); and the Third Circuit, to "[t]he standard of normal competency," Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3rd Cir.1970). | 1 | 1 |
Victor Dennis Marzullo v. State of Marylandgreen2 sentences1981Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1975); the Fourth Circuit, to “representation within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977); the Fifth Circuit, to “counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance,” (emphasis in original) MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960); and the Third Circuit, to “[t]he standard of normal competency,” Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3rd Cir. 1970). 1981Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir.1975); the Fourth Circuit, to "representation within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases," Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir.1977); the Fifth Circuit, to "counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably *194 effective assistance," (emphasis in original) MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir.1960); and the Third Circuit, to "[t]he standard of normal competency," Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3rd Cir.1970). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wyoming. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Id. [¶ 24] From the record before us, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision not to accept the UBC and the industry standards as defining the minimum standard of care in this case. 1988I recognize that the majority is inhibited by the limitation of the labeling claimed by the concurring opinions in Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195 (Wyo. 1987). | 2 | 1988–2005 |
Landsiedel v. BUFFALO PROPERTIES, LLC.
green
2 sentences2006Landsiedel, 2005 WY 61, ¶ 22 , 112 P.3d at 616 . 2006Landsiedel, 2005 WY 61, ¶ 22 , 112 P.3d at 616 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Godinez v. Moran
green
1 sentence2001Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399-400 , 118 S.Ct. 2680 , 2686-87, 125 LEd.2d 8321 (1998) While the issue of whether this standard would apply under a state constitutional analysis is not before us, Godinez does represent the very minimum that the standard could be and supports our determination that the district court could not logically decide that Hauck was incompetent to stand trial, but competent to represent himself, The district court, therefore, did not err in failing to hold a hearing on the self-representation request. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Bean
neutral
2 sentences1989Cf. State v. Bean, 236 Kan. 389 , 691 P.2d 30 (1984). 1989Cf. State v. Bean, 236 Kan. 389 , 691 P.2d 30 (1984). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences1989The Minnesota Court of Appeals acknowledged that Barker established only a minimum standard as had the Minnesota Supreme Court in establishing a supervisory rule: “Nothing we have said should be interpreted as disapproving a presumptive rule adopted by a court in the exercise of its supervisory powers which establishes a fixed time period within which cases must normally be brought.” State v. Stitzel, 351 N.W.2d 409, 410 (Minn.App.1984) (quoting from Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 n. 29, 92 S.Ct. at 2192 n. 29). 1989The Minnesota Court of Appeals acknowledged that Barker established only a minimum standard as had the Minnesota Supreme Court in establishing a supervisory rule: “Nothing we have said should be interpreted as disapproving a presumptive rule adopted by a court in the exercise of its supervisory powers which establishes a fixed time period within which cases must normally be brought.” State v. Stitzel, 351 N.W.2d 409, 410 (Minn.App.1984) (quoting from Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 n. 29, 92 S.Ct. at 2192 n. 29). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Distad v. Cubin
green
2 sentences1988My understanding of that opinion, Distad v. Cuban, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 1981), and the provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), which are alluded to in those opinions, is that the suggested rule does nothing more than recognize the authority of a legislative or regulatory body to articulate a minimum standard of care. 1988My understanding of that opinion, Distad v. Cuban, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo.1981), and the provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), which are alluded to in those opinions, is that the suggested rule does nothing more than recognize the authority of a legislative or regulatory body to articulate a minimum standard of care. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.