minimum standard in Connecticut

2009State v. Ritrovato, 280 Conn. 36, 51-52 , 905 A.2d 1079 (2006). “[A] [trial] court maintains the obligation to ensure [only] that a witness’ testimony meets the minimum standard of credibility necessary to permit a reasonable person to put any credence in that testimony.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Weinberg, 215 Conn. 231, 243 , 575 A.2d 1003 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 , 111 S. Ct. 430 , 112 L.

2009State v. Ritrovato, 280 Conn. 36, 51-52 , 905 A.2d 1079 (2006). “[A] [trial] court maintains the obligation to ensure [only] that a witness’ testimony meets the minimum standard of credibility necessary to permit a reasonable person to put any credence in that testimony.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Weinberg, 215 Conn. 231, 243 , 575 A.2d 1003 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 , 111 S. Ct. 430 , 112 L.

2009State v. Ritrovato, 280 Conn. 36, 51-52 , 905 A.2d 1079 (2006). “[A] [trial] court maintains the obligation to ensure [only] that a witness’ testimony meets the minimum standard of credibility necessary to permit a reasonable person to put any credence in that testimony.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Weinberg, 215 Conn. 231, 243 , 575 A.2d 1003 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 , 111 S. Ct. 430 , 112 L.

2006Turning first to the court’s credibility determination, it has long been established that “a court maintains the *52 obligation to ensure [only] that a witness’ testimony meets the minimum standard of credibility necessary to permit a reasonable person to put any credence in that testimony.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Weinberg, 215 Conn. 231, 243 , 575 A.2d 1003 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 , 111 S. Ct. 430 , 112 L.

2009State v. Ritrovato, 280 Conn. 36, 51-52 , 905 A.2d 1079 (2006). “[A] [trial] court maintains the obligation to ensure [only] that a witness’ testimony meets the minimum standard of credibility necessary to permit a reasonable person to put any credence in that testimony.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Weinberg, 215 Conn. 231, 243 , 575 A.2d 1003 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 , 111 S. Ct. 430 , 112 L.

2006Turning first to the court’s credibility determination, it has long been established that “a court maintains the *52 obligation to ensure [only] that a witness’ testimony meets the minimum standard of credibility necessary to permit a reasonable person to put any credence in that testimony.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Weinberg, 215 Conn. 231, 243 , 575 A.2d 1003 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 , 111 S. Ct. 430 , 112 L.

2009State v. Ritrovato, 280 Conn. 36, 51-52 , 905 A.2d 1079 (2006). “[A] [trial] court maintains the obligation to ensure [only] that a witness’ testimony meets the minimum standard of credibility necessary to permit a reasonable person to put any credence in that testimony.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Weinberg, 215 Conn. 231, 243 , 575 A.2d 1003 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 , 111 S. Ct. 430 , 112 L.

2006Turning first to the court’s credibility determination, it has long been established that “a court maintains the *52 obligation to ensure [only] that a witness’ testimony meets the minimum standard of credibility necessary to permit a reasonable person to put any credence in that testimony.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Weinberg, 215 Conn. 231, 243 , 575 A.2d 1003 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 , 111 S. Ct. 430 , 112 L.

1997In Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters Joiners of America, supra, 430 U.S. 290 , the petitioner brought a claim, against the defendants in the Superior Court of California for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

1997In Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters Joiners of America, supra, 430 U.S. 290 , the petitioner brought a claim against the defendants in the Superior Court of California for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

2019State v. Harris , supra, at 116 , 191 A.3d 119 . 7 See, e.g., State v. Dickson , 322 Conn. 410 , 420, 141 A.3d 810 (2016) (both initial identification, if unduly suggestive, and in-court identification may be excluded if improper procedure in former created substantial likelihood of misidentification), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2263 , 198 L.Ed.2d 713 (2017). 8 The defendant does not argue that there was a violation of her constitutional rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution but relies solely on the due process clause of the

2019State v. Harris , supra, at 116 , 191 A.3d 119 . 7 See, e.g., State v. Dickson , 322 Conn. 410 , 420, 141 A.3d 810 (2016) (both initial identification, if unduly suggestive, and in-court identification may be excluded if improper procedure in former created substantial likelihood of misidentification), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2263 , 198 L.Ed.2d 713 (2017). 8 The defendant does not argue that there was a violation of her constitutional rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution but relies solely on the due process clause of the

2019State v. Harris , supra, at 116 , 191 A.3d 119 . 7 See, e.g., State v. Dickson , 322 Conn. 410 , 420, 141 A.3d 810 (2016) (both initial identification, if unduly suggestive, and in-court identification may be excluded if improper procedure in former created substantial likelihood of misidentification), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2263 , 198 L.Ed.2d 713 (2017). 8 The defendant does not argue that there was a violation of her constitutional rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution but relies solely on the due process clause of the

2019State v. Harris , supra, at 116 , 191 A.3d 119 . 7 See, e.g., State v. Dickson , 322 Conn. 410 , 420, 141 A.3d 810 (2016) (both initial identification, if unduly suggestive, and in-court identification may be excluded if improper procedure in former created substantial likelihood of misidentification), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2263 , 198 L.Ed.2d 713 (2017). 8 The defendant does not argue that there was a violation of her constitutional rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution but relies solely on the due process clause of the

2019State v. Harris , supra, at 116 , 191 A.3d 119 . 7 See, e.g., State v. Dickson , 322 Conn. 410 , 420, 141 A.3d 810 (2016) (both initial identification, if unduly suggestive, and in-court identification may be excluded if improper procedure in former created substantial likelihood of misidentification), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2263 , 198 L.Ed.2d 713 (2017). 8 The defendant does not argue that there was a violation of her constitutional rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution but relies solely on the due process clause of the

2019State v. Harris , supra, at 116 , 191 A.3d 119 . 7 See, e.g., State v. Dickson , 322 Conn. 410 , 420, 141 A.3d 810 (2016) (both initial identification, if unduly suggestive, and in-court identification may be excluded if improper procedure in former created substantial likelihood of misidentification), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2263 , 198 L.Ed.2d 713 (2017). 8 The defendant does not argue that there was a violation of her constitutional rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution but relies solely on the due process clause of the

2019State v. Harris , supra, at 116 , 191 A.3d 119 . 7 See, e.g., State v. Dickson , 322 Conn. 410 , 420, 141 A.3d 810 (2016) (both initial identification, if unduly suggestive, and in-court identification may be excluded if improper procedure in former created substantial likelihood of misidentification), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2263 , 198 L.Ed.2d 713 (2017). 8 The defendant does not argue that there was a violation of her constitutional rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution but relies solely on the due process clause of the

2013“We are mindful that a trial court, in considering whether there is evidence from which the jury reasonably could conclude that the defendant actually committed the prior act of misconduct, acts as an evidentiary gatekeeper when considering the admissibility of such evidence. . . . [A]s a gatekeeper, the trial court . . . considers whether evidence reasonably supports the finding for which it is offered.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Cutler, 293 Conn. 303 , 319 n.17, 977 A.2d 209 (2009). “[I]t has long been established that a court maintains the obligation to ensure [only] that a witness’ tes

2013“We are mindful that a trial court, in considering whether there is evidence from which the jury reasonably could conclude that the defendant actually committed the prior act of misconduct, acts as an evidentiary gatekeeper when considering the admissibility of such evidence. . . . [A]s a gatekeeper, the trial court . . . considers whether evidence reasonably supports the finding for which it is offered.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Cutler, 293 Conn. 303 , 319 n.17, 977 A.2d 209 (2009). “[I]t has long been established that a court maintains the obligation to ensure [only] that a witness’ tes

2009State v. Ritrovato, 280 Conn. 36, 51-52 , 905 A.2d 1079 (2006). “[A] [trial] court maintains the obligation to ensure [only] that a witness’ testimony meets the minimum standard of credibility necessary to permit a reasonable person to put any credence in that testimony.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Weinberg, 215 Conn. 231, 243 , 575 A.2d 1003 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 , 111 S. Ct. 430 , 112 L.

2009State v. Ritrovato, 280 Conn. 36, 51-52 , 905 A.2d 1079 (2006). “[A] [trial] court maintains the obligation to ensure [only] that a witness’ testimony meets the minimum standard of credibility necessary to permit a reasonable person to put any credence in that testimony.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Weinberg, 215 Conn. 231, 243 , 575 A.2d 1003 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 , 111 S. Ct. 430 , 112 L.

2008It is well settled that "[t]he function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause and in the realm of factfinding, is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication. . . . [I]n any given proceeding, the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed betw

2008It is well settled that "[t]he function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause and in the realm of factfinding, is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication. . . . [I]n any given proceeding, the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed betw

2001The facts of this case distinguish it from Picketts v. International Playtex, Inc., supra, 215 Conn. 490 .

2000“It constitutes a Congressional recognition that failure to pay the statutory minimum on time may be so detrimental to maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being of workers and to the free flow of commerce, that double payment must be paid in the event of delay in order to insure restoration of the worker to that minimum standard of well-being.” Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 , 65 S. Ct. 895 , 89 L.

2000“It constitutes a Congressional recognition that failure to pay the statutory minimum on time may be so detrimental to maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being of workers and to the free flow of commerce, that double payment must be paid in the event of delay in order to insure restoration of the worker to that minimum standard of well-being.” Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 , 65 S. Ct. 895 , 89 L.

2000Addington [v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)] teaches that, in any given proceeding, the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the CT Page 6172 litigants.

1998State v. Barton , 219 Conn. 529 , S46, 594 A.2d 917 (1991).

1998State v. Barton , 219 Conn. 529 , S46, 594 A.2d 917 (1991).

1998The defendant makes persuasive arguments to the effect that even if there had been deductions of leave time taken from the plaintiff no deduction in "pay" would have been made because fringe benefits are not pay under the Wage Payment Act, Fulco v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 27 Conn. App. 800 , 804 (1992) "the definition of wages is limited to remuneration for labor or services rendered, and does not include vacation pay which is compensation for loss of wages", id., p. 804.

1997The defendants argue that the court should strike counts one through six as they CT Page 13245 constitute a claim for educational malpractice, a claim the Connecticut Supreme Court declined to recognize in Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital , 239 Conn. 574 , 687 A.2d 111 (1996).

1997The defendants argue that the court should strike counts one through six as they CT Page 13245 constitute a claim for educational malpractice, a claim the Connecticut Supreme Court declined to recognize in Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital , 239 Conn. 574 , 687 A.2d 111 (1996).

1997Co., 181 App. Div. 2d 342, 343, 585 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1992), the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division held that since Ontario, Canada’s Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act had a minimum requirement of $200,000 of uninsured motorist coverage, that the limits of $10,000 of uninsured motorist coverage in the insured’s New York policy became $200,000 for the accident in Ontario.

1994Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 789 n.12, 93 S. Ct. 1756 , 36 L.

1994Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 789 n.12, 93 S. Ct. 1756 , 36 L.

1993See, e.g., State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 610 A.2d 1225 (1992) (exclusionary rule provided by the state constitution affords a higher level of protection than the minimum standard provided by the federal constitution); State v. Miller, 29 Conn. App. 207 , 614 A.2d 1229 (1992), aff'd, 227 Conn. 363 , 630 A.2d 1027 (1993) (exception to warrant requirement of state constitution for cases involving automobile searches is narrower than exception to federal constitution).

1993See, e.g., State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 610 A.2d 1225 (1992) (exclusionary rule provided by the state constitution affords a higher level of protection than the minimum standard provided by the federal constitution); State v. Miller, 29 Conn. App. 207 , 614 A.2d 1229 (1992), aff'd, 227 Conn. 363 , 630 A.2d 1027 (1993) (exception to warrant requirement of state constitution for cases involving automobile searches is narrower than exception to federal constitution).

1993See, e.g., State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 610 A.2d 1225 (1992) (exclusionary rule provided by the state constitution affords a higher level of protection than the minimum standard provided by the federal constitution); State v. Miller, 29 Conn. App. 207 , 614 A.2d 1229 (1992), aff'd, 227 Conn. 363 , 630 A.2d 1027 (1993) (exception to warrant requirement of state constitution for cases involving automobile searches is narrower than exception to federal constitution).

1993See, e.g., State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 610 A.2d 1225 (1992) (exclusionary rule provided by the state constitution affords a higher level of protection than the minimum standard provided by the federal constitution); State v. Miller, 29 Conn. App. 207 , 614 A.2d 1229 (1992), aff'd, 227 Conn. 363 , 630 A.2d 1027 (1993) (exception to warrant requirement of state constitution for cases involving automobile searches is narrower than exception to federal constitution).