11 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kealoha v. Machado.green2 sentences2025Akana’s fiduciary obligations do not exempt her from compliance with the Ethics Code Akana next contends that because OHA trustee conduct “can be reviewed only for abuse of discretion,” under Kealoha v. Machado, 131 Hawaiʻi 62, 77-78, 315 P.3d 213, 228-29 (2013), courts “cannot interfere with [her] exercise of discretionary power without first finding a breach of fiduciary duty.” Therefore, Akana argues, the Commission cannot punish her for 34 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Ethics Code violations because trustee expenditures can only be reviewed by court 2025Akana’s fiduciary obligations do not exempt her from compliance with the Ethics Code Akana next contends that because OHA trustee conduct “can be reviewed only for abuse of discretion,” under Kealoha v. Machado, 131 Hawaiʻi 62, 77-78, 315 P.3d 213, 228-29 (2013), courts “cannot interfere with [her] exercise of discretionary power without first finding a breach of fiduciary duty.” Therefore, Akana argues, the Commission cannot punish her for 34 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Ethics Code violations because trustee expenditures can only be reviewed by court | 1 | 1 |
Beneficial Hawai'i, Inc. v. Caseygreen1 sentence2021See Beneficial Hawaii, Inc. v. Casey, 98 Hawaiʻi 159, 164-65, 45 P.3d 359 , 364- 65 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Lemaster v. Oakleygreen2 sentences2008Lemaster v. Oakley, 157 W.Va. 590 , 203 S.E.2d 140, 145 (1974) (concluding that “[cjonsidering the complexity of charges potentially directed to allegedly neglectful parents, the sources available to the State as charging party, the potential for the State viewing the parents’ defensive testimony as probative of criminal conduct and the fundamental nature of the parents’ rights to the care, custody and companionship of their natural children, we are impelled to hold that a minimum standard of due process requires indigent parents faced with charges of neglect and the potential for termination 2008Lemaster v. Oakley, 157 W.Va. 590 , 203 S.E.2d 140, 145 (1974) (concluding that “[cjonsidering the complexity of charges potentially directed to allegedly neglectful parents, the sources available to the State as charging party, the potential for the State viewing the parents’ defensive testimony as probative of criminal conduct and the fundamental nature of the parents’ rights to the care, custody and companionship of their natural children, we are impelled to hold that a minimum standard of due process requires indigent parents faced with charges of neglect and the potential for termination | 1 | 1 |
Hawkins v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2004See also Hawkins, 663 A.2d at 1226 (stating that "the police are justified in stopping witnesses only where exigent circumstances are present, such as where a crime has recently been reported") (emphasis in original), and Spencer, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483 , 646 N.E.2d at 790 (holding that traffic stop of defendant is not justified where "there was no genuine need for so immediate and intrusive an action"). 2004See also Hawkins, 663 A.2d at 1226 (stating that “the police are justified in stopping witnesses only where exigent circumstances are present, such as where a crime has recently been reported”) (emphasis in original), and Spencer, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483 , 646 N.E.2d at 790 (holding that traffic stop of defendant is not justified where “there was no genuine need for so immediate and intrusive an action”). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Spencergreen2 sentences2004See also Hawkins, 663 A.2d at 1226 (stating that "the police are justified in stopping witnesses only where exigent circumstances are present, such as where a crime has recently been reported") (emphasis in original), and Spencer, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483 , 646 N.E.2d at 790 (holding that traffic stop of defendant is not justified where "there was no genuine need for so immediate and intrusive an action"). 2004See also Hawkins, 663 A.2d at 1226 (stating that "the police are justified in stopping witnesses only where exigent circumstances are present, such as where a crime has recently been reported") (emphasis in original), and Spencer, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483 , 646 N.E.2d at 790 (holding that traffic stop of defendant is not justified where "there was no genuine need for so immediate and intrusive an action"). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Carmichaelgreen1 sentence2002See also plurality 99 Hawai`i at 78, 53 P.3d at 217 . [5] The legislature could not have intended that the court become an arena where criminal culpability is determined based on quantities other than those legislatively designated. [6] *225 In fact, the legislature sought to avoid a battle of the experts by specifically making criminal "any amount." For the court to establish the minimum standard through a parade of case law would require the court to substitute its wisdom for that of the legislature. | 1 | 1 |
Dependents of Akamine v. Hawaiian Packing & Crating Co.green2 sentences2001See Akamine, 53 Haw. at 409 , 495 P.2d at 1167 (“[t]o be substantial, the evidence, as a minimum requirement, must be credible and relevant”). 2001See Akamine, 53 Haw. at 409 , 495 P.2d at 1167 (“[t]o be substantial, the evidence, as a minimum requirement, must be credible and relevant”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Pebria
green
1 sentence2006In addition to being inadmissible for the reasons stated above, the post- Miranda portion of the statement is also independently inadmissible pursuant to State v. Pebria, 85 Hawai`i 171, 938 P.2d 1190 (Haw.App.1997) in that it was tainted by the unlawfully obtained pre-Miranda portion of the statement. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. Robert Portsche Ward
green
2 sentences2004Such a generalized detentive stop would not be valid because: (1) "founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot is a minimum requirement for any lawful detentive stop," Ward, 488 F.2d at 169 ; (2) there are no crimes "afoot" with "no exigent circumstances warranting the extreme nature of a vehicular stop by a siren on a public street," id.; and (3) "the stop [is] not made pursuant to [an officer's] founded suspicion that the detainee [is] involved or about to be involved in criminal activity." Id. (emphasis in original). 2004Such a generalized detentive stop would not be valid because: (1) "founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot is a minimum requirement for any lawful detentive stop," Ward, 488 F.2d at 169 ; (2) there are no crimes "afoot" with "no exigent circumstances warranting the extreme nature of a vehicular stop by a siren on a public street," id.; and (3) "the stop [is] not made pursuant to [an officer's] founded suspicion that the detainee [is] involved or about to be involved in criminal activity." Id. (emphasis in original). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Colgrove
green
1 sentence2004The Colgrove court thus held "that the investigatory stop in this case was in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and Article I, section 7, of the Constitution of Nebraska." [10] Id. (emphasis added). *1083 The Ninth Circuit, in Ward , reiterated that "[i]n conformity with Terry , ... a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot is a minimum requirement for any lawful detentive stop." 488 F.2d at 169 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Lee
green
2 sentences1998No. 138, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), which “set up the motorcycle safety helmet as a minimum standard to which state highway safety programs must conform,” (2) certain published statistics of the New York Department of Motor Vehicles, and (3) data promulgated by the Michigan State Police, id. at 519-20 , 465 P.2d at 576 , the Lee majority engaged in the following analysis: In our opinion!,] these statistics fairly show that motorcycle accidents are significantly more dangerous than motor vehicle accidents; that there is an enormous increase in motorcycle registrations; [and] that there is a 1998No. 138, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), which “set up the motorcycle safety helmet as a minimum standard to which state highway safety programs must conform,” (2) certain published statistics of the New York Department of Motor Vehicles, and (3) data promulgated by the Michigan State Police, id. at 519-20 , 465 P.2d at 576 , the Lee majority engaged in the following analysis: In our opinion!,] these statistics fairly show that motorcycle accidents are significantly more dangerous than motor vehicle accidents; that there is an enormous increase in motorcycle registrations; [and] that there is a | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Green
green
1 sentence1979Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 468 ; State v. Green, 51 Haw. at 264 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
1 sentence1979Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 468 ; State v. Green, 51 Haw. at 264 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Henriques v. Vinhaca
green
2 sentences1963Our garnishment statute, R.L.H. 1955, § 237-1, clearly expresses the intent of the legislature that the remedy shall be available only to enforce the payment of a “debt.” Apart from providing none of the safeguards furnished elsewhere for the protection and relief of the defendant in his property rights, our statute contains no expression of legislative intent other than that found in the use of the words “creditor” and “debtor.” 5 Henriques v. Vinhaca, supra, 20 Haw. 702 , clearly holds that a claim for unliquidated damages does not constitute a “debt.” Nothing can be found to warrant and jus 1963Our garnishment statute, R.L.H. 1955, § 237-1, clearly expresses the intent of the legislature that the remedy shall be available only to enforce the payment of a “debt.” Apart from providing none of the safeguards furnished elsewhere for the protection and relief of the defendant in his property rights, our statute contains no expression of legislative intent other than that found in the use of the words “creditor” and “debtor.” 5 Henriques v. Vinhaca, supra, 20 Haw. 702 , clearly holds that a claim for unliquidated damages does not constitute a “debt.” Nothing can be found to warrant and jus | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Lazenby v. Ark. State Highway Commission
green
1 sentence1961Lazenby v. Arkansas *155 State Highway Commission, Ark., 331 S.W. 2d 705 ; Wishek Investment Co. v. McIntosh County, supra. The record here discloses that, except for Parcel 138 (driveway), the smallest of the parcels taken was just under 10,000 square feet in area, the minimum requirement for a houselot in that vicinity under zoning ordinances in force at the time of condemnation. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.