minimum standard in Pennsylvania

1983By so defining dependency, “the Act limits the Commonwealth’s coercive interference with the family unit to those cases where the parents have not provided ‘a minimum standard of care for a child’s physical, intellectual and moral well being.’ ... [Pjarental care which is both ‘necessary’ and ‘proper’ is not the best care possible but that care which (1) is geared to the particularized needs of the child and (2) at a minimum, is likely to prevent serious injury to the child.” In re *496 Pernishek, supra, 268 Pa.Super. at 458 , 408 A.2d at 877-878 , quoting In re Rinker, 180 Pa.Super. 143, 148

1983By so defining dependency, “the Act limits the Commonwealth’s coercive interference with the family unit to those cases where the parents have not provided ‘a minimum standard of care for a child’s physical, intellectual and moral well being.’ ... [Pjarental care which is both ‘necessary’ and ‘proper’ is not the best care possible but that care which (1) is geared to the particularized needs of the child and (2) at a minimum, is likely to prevent serious injury to the child.” In re *496 Pernishek, supra, 268 Pa.Super. at 458 , 408 A.2d at 877-878 , quoting In re Rinker, 180 Pa.Super. 143, 148

2022Commonwealth v. Hamm, 447 A.2d 960, 962 (Pa.Super. 1982) (“At the least, the evidence must show that the defendant knew of the existence of the item.”) (citations omitted).

2022Commonwealth v. Hamm, 447 A.2d 960, 962 (Pa.Super. 1982) (“At the least, the evidence must show that the defendant knew of the existence of the item.”) (citations omitted).

2009In this regard, the Ninth Circuit took note of the following statements made by the Supreme Court in its O’Neil decision: (1) that Section 16(b) “constitutes a Congressional recognition that failure to pay the statutory minimum on time may be so detrimental to maintenance of the minimum standard of living ‘necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers’ and to the free flow of com merce, that double payment must be made in the event of delay in order to insure restoration of the worker to that minimum standard of well-being[;]” (2) that reparations are necessary for “ ‘fai

2009In this regard, the Ninth Circuit took note of the following statements made by the Supreme Court in its O’Neil decision: (1) that Section 16(b) “constitutes a Congressional recognition that failure to pay the statutory minimum on time may be so detrimental to maintenance of the minimum standard of living ‘necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers’ and to the free flow of com merce, that double payment must be made in the event of delay in order to insure restoration of the worker to that minimum standard of well-being[;]” (2) that reparations are necessary for “ ‘fai

1999Citing the analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), we noted: In Addington v. Texas 441 U.S. 418 [ 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 ] (1979), the Court, by unanimous vote of the participating Justices, declared: “The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudi

1999Citing the analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), we noted: In Addington v. Texas 441 U.S. 418 [ 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 ] (1979), the Court, by unanimous vote of the participating Justices, declared: “The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudi

1986“An insurance company is free, out of motives of altruism, generosity or naked commercial advantage, to provide broader coverage than the No-Fault Act, and if it does so, the policy language controls.” Drake v. Donegal Mutual Insurance Company, 422 F.Supp. 272, 274 (W.D.Pa.1976); 7 Blashfield Automobile Law and Practice, Section 2715, pp. 7-8 (3d ed. 1966).

1984“An insurance company is free, out of motives of altruism, generosity or naked commercial advantage, to provide broader coverage than the No-Fault Act, and if it does so, the policy language controls.” Drake v. Donegal Mutual Insurance Company, 422 F.Supp. 272, 274 (W.D.Pa.1976); 7 Blashfield Automobile Law and Practice, Section 2715, pp. 7-8 (3d ed. 1966).

2021Id. at 21, citing Wojdak, 466 A.2d at 966 and Commonwealth v. Packard, 767 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2001), abrogated on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109 , 1112 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2016).

2021Id.

2002As we turn to the Juvenile Act, the most common category of the definitions for a “dependent child” is set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. §6302(1), as follows: “A child who (1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals.” This has been further explained to mean that “the Act limits the Commonwealth’s coercive interference with the family unit to those cases where the parents have not provided ‘a minimum standard of care for a child’s physical, intellectual and moral well

2002As we turn to the Juvenile Act, the most common category of the definitions for a “dependent child” is set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. §6302(1), as follows: “A child who (1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals.” This has been further explained to mean that “the Act limits the Commonwealth’s coercive interference with the family unit to those cases where the parents have not provided ‘a minimum standard of care for a child’s physical, intellectual and moral well

2016See Dens/er v. Metropolitan Edison Company, 345 A.2d 758 (Pa. Super. 1975); Poorbaugh v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 666 A.2d 744 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995).

1995Densler v. Metropolitan Edison Company, 235 Pa.Superior Ct. 585, 592 n. 1, 345 A.2d 758 , 762 n. 1 (1975). . 66 Pa.C.S. § 1501.

2025Commonwealth v. Perez, 666 Pa. 29 , 48, 249 A.3d 1092 , 1102-03 (2021) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “[A] perpetrator’s identity may be established with circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Dunkins, 229 A.3d 622, 632 (Pa.Super. 2020), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 142 S.Ct. 1679 , 212 L.Ed.2d 584 (2022).

2024If the evidence supporting any element is insufficient, “the trial court has the right to deny use of the defense[.]” Commonwealth v. Billings, 793 A.2d 914, 916 (Pa. Super. 2002) (quoting Capitolo, 498 A.2d at 809 ).

2021Id. at 21, citing Wojdak, 466 A.2d at 966 and Commonwealth v. Packard, 767 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2001), abrogated on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109 , 1112 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2016).

2020Based on these considerations, the Board properly concluded that Applicant failed to establish it “acted in good faith and relied innocently upon the 18 Even in those instances where applicants have inquired of township officials whether an intended use was permitted, this Court has held that “[t]hese inquiries are not sufficient to establish good faith reliance where [the a]pplicant never reviewed the relevant zoning ordinances.” Hafner, 974 A.2d at 1212 ; see also Moses, 487 A.2d at 485 (“While Appellants did make a minimum inquiry [into how the property was zoned without investigating wheth

2020Based on these considerations, the Board properly concluded that Applicant failed to establish it “acted in good faith and relied innocently upon the 18 Even in those instances where applicants have inquired of township officials whether an intended use was permitted, this Court has held that “[t]hese inquiries are not sufficient to establish good faith reliance where [the a]pplicant never reviewed the relevant zoning ordinances.” Hafner, 974 A.2d at 1212 ; see also Moses, 487 A.2d at 485 (“While Appellants did make a minimum inquiry [into how the property was zoned without investigating wheth

2020Based on these considerations, the Board properly concluded that Applicant failed to establish it “acted in good faith and relied innocently upon the 18 Even in those instances where applicants have inquired of township officials whether an intended use was permitted, this Court has held that “[t]hese inquiries are not sufficient to establish good faith reliance where [the a]pplicant never reviewed the relevant zoning ordinances.” Hafner, 974 A.2d at 1212 ; see also Moses, 487 A.2d at 485 (“While Appellants did make a minimum inquiry [into how the property was zoned without investigating wheth

2020See Lang, 528 A.2d at 1342 (“The use of the words ‘welfare and benefit’ in addition to the usual ‘support and maintenance’ language in the first clause of [the trust], which defines the support standard, also indicates an intent to give [the] trustee the discretion to do more than ensure a minimum standard of living for [the beneficiary].”); In re Swinson’s ____________________________________________ 4 James further argues that, because Gary’s receipt of trust funds would disqualify him from SSI benefits pursuant to federal regulations, James should be permitted to make distributions on Gary’

2019McCauley, 797 A.2d at 920 ; Commonwealth v. Young, 695 A.2d 414, 417 (Pa. Super. 1997).

2018See id. (holding that retrial will be barred under double jeopardy where “prosecutorial misconduct is intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial, [or] when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the - 10 - J-A08044-18 defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial”).

2018See Tibbs v. Florida , 457 U.S. 31 , 45, 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982) ("The Due Process Clause ... sets a lower limit on an appellate court's definition of evidentiary sufficiency.").

2018See Tibbs v. Florida , 457 U.S. 31 , 45, 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982) ("The Due Process Clause ... sets a lower limit on an appellate court's definition of evidentiary sufficiency.").

2016See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991) (stating the minimum factors to be presented and briefed by a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute).