minimum standard in Georgia

2013(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 754-755 (II) (102 SC 1388, 71 LE2d 599) (1982).

2013The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication. . . . [I]n any given proceeding, the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants. 6 (Citations a

2019See, e.g., Abrams v. Laughlin , 304 Ga. 34 , 36 (2), 816 S.E.2d 26 (2018) ("[I]n construing a Georgia statute that closely tracks federal statutory law, we may look to federal *374 court decisions and commentary interpreting the federal statute as persuasive authority."); Superior Pine Products Co. v. Williams , 214 Ga. 485 , 491, 106 S.E.2d 6 (1958) (where the text of a federal statute was copied into a state statute, federal law construing that text "might be strongly persuasive").

2019See, e.g., Abrams v. Laughlin , 304 Ga. 34 , 36 (2), 816 S.E.2d 26 (2018) ("[I]n construing a Georgia statute that closely tracks federal statutory law, we may look to federal *374 court decisions and commentary interpreting the federal statute as persuasive authority."); Superior Pine Products Co. v. Williams , 214 Ga. 485 , 491, 106 S.E.2d 6 (1958) (where the text of a federal statute was copied into a state statute, federal law construing that text "might be strongly persuasive").

1985Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 719, n. 4 (95 SC 1215) (1975).” Pope v. City of Atlanta, 240 Ga. 177, 178, n. 1 ( 240 SE2d 241 ) (1977).

1977Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 719, n. 4 (95 SC 1215) (1975). [2] Pendent jurisdiction relates to issues of which the federal court would not have jurisdiction if raised independently of a federal claim.

2019As a result, "[i]n failing to adequately research and understand the defenses available to her client, defense counsel rendered assistance that fell below the minimum standard set forth in Strickland ." Id. at 517-518 , 591 S.E.2d 824 .

2019As a result, "[i]n failing to adequately research and understand the defenses available to her client, defense counsel rendered assistance that fell below the minimum standard set forth in Strickland ." Id. at 517-518 , 591 S.E.2d 824 .

2019See, e.g., Abrams v. Laughlin , 304 Ga. 34 , 36 (2), 816 S.E.2d 26 (2018) ("[I]n construing a Georgia statute that closely tracks federal statutory law, we may look to federal *374 court decisions and commentary interpreting the federal statute as persuasive authority."); Superior Pine Products Co. v. Williams , 214 Ga. 485 , 491, 106 S.E.2d 6 (1958) (where the text of a federal statute was copied into a state statute, federal law construing that text "might be strongly persuasive").

2019See, e.g., Abrams v. Laughlin , 304 Ga. 34 , 36 (2), 816 S.E.2d 26 (2018) ("[I]n construing a Georgia statute that closely tracks federal statutory law, we may look to federal *374 court decisions and commentary interpreting the federal statute as persuasive authority."); Superior Pine Products Co. v. Williams , 214 Ga. 485 , 491, 106 S.E.2d 6 (1958) (where the text of a federal statute was copied into a state statute, federal law construing that text "might be strongly persuasive").

2024The statutory backdrop in Porubiansky—which reflected “the Rymer v. Polo Golf & Country Club Homeowners Assn., Inc., 335 Ga. App. 167, 175-76 (2) (b) (780 SE2d 95) (2015) (referencing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 to discuss a duty of one who voluntarily undertakes to perform a service for another who relies on it, to perform that service with reasonable care).

2024The statutory backdrop in Porubiansky—which reflected “the Rymer v. Polo Golf & Country Club Homeowners Assn., Inc., 335 Ga. App. 167, 175-76 (2) (b) (780 SE2d 95) (2015) (referencing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 to discuss a duty of one who voluntarily undertakes to perform a service for another who relies on it, to perform that service with reasonable care).

2019Zeigler testified that she had never arrested anyone, that she did not have the 3 See State v. Aiken, 282 Ga. 132, 136 (2), n. 21 ( 646 SE2d 222 ) (2007). 4 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 ( 84 SCt 1774 , 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 5 Georgia Bureau of Investigations Special Agent Clay Bridges testified that he was P.O.S.T.-certified, which meant “[t]he State certifies police officers by requiring a certain number of hours to become certified and to maintain that certification every year by having a minimum standard of 24 hours.” 2 authority to arrest anyone, that she had never been trained on ho

2019Zeigler testified that she had never arrested anyone, that she did not have the 3 See State v. Aiken, 282 Ga. 132, 136 (2), n. 21 ( 646 SE2d 222 ) (2007). 4 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 ( 84 SCt 1774 , 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 5 Georgia Bureau of Investigations Special Agent Clay Bridges testified that he was P.O.S.T.-certified, which meant “[t]he State certifies police officers by requiring a certain number of hours to become certified and to maintain that certification every year by having a minimum standard of 24 hours.” 2 authority to arrest anyone, that she had never been trained on ho

2016See Williams v. State, 284 Ga. 849, 851 ( 672 SE2d 619 ) (2009) (“In order to establish deficient performance based on the failure to seek suppression of evidence, a defendant must show that he or she had a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim.” (footnote omitted)); Benham v. State, 277 Ga. 516, 517-518 ( 591 SE2d 824 ) (2004) (“In failing to adequately research and understand the defenses available to her client, defense counsel rendered assistance that fell below the minimum standard set forth in Strickland, supra.”).

2016See Williams v. State, 284 Ga. 849, 851 ( 672 SE2d 619 ) (2009) (“In order to establish deficient performance based on the failure to seek suppression of evidence, a defendant must show that he or she had a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim.” (footnote omitted)); Benham v. State, 277 Ga. 516, 517-518 ( 591 SE2d 824 ) (2004) (“In failing to adequately research and understand the defenses available to her client, defense counsel rendered assistance that fell below the minimum standard set forth in Strickland, supra.”).

2004But "[i]nvoking the words `tactics' and `strategy' does not automatically immunize trial counsel against a claim that a tactical decision or strategic maneuver was an unreasonable one no competent attorney would have made under the same circumstances. `Tactics' and `strategy' provide no talismanic protection against an ineffective assistance of counsel claim." Braithwaite v. State, 275 Ga. 884, 895 , 572 S.E.2d 612 (2002) (Hunstein, J., dissenting).

2004But "[i]nvoking the words `tactics' and `strategy' does not automatically immunize trial counsel against a claim that a tactical decision or strategic maneuver was an unreasonable one no competent attorney would have made under the same circumstances. `Tactics' and `strategy' provide no talismanic protection against an ineffective assistance of counsel claim." Braithwaite v. State, 275 Ga. 884, 895 , 572 S.E.2d 612 (2002) (Hunstein, J., dissenting).

2003See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 554 (96 SC 3074, 49 LE2d 1116) (1976).

1999Estes v. State, 234 Ga. App. 150, 151 ( 505 SE2d 840 ) (1998); Giddens v. State, 190 Ga. App. 723, 725 (3) ( 380 SE2d 274 ) (1989).

1999Estes v. State, 234 Ga. App. 150, 151 ( 505 SE2d 840 ) (1998); Giddens v. State, 190 Ga. App. 723, 725 (3) ( 380 SE2d 274 ) (1989).

1999See Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 8 (2) ( 471 SE2d 849 ) (1996); Ballenger Paving Co. v. Gaines, 231 Ga. App. 565, 567 (1) ( 499 SE2d 722 ) (1998); Dept. of Transp. v. Blair, 220 Ga. App. 342, 343 (1) ( 469 SE2d 446 ) (1996); Isom v. Schettino, supra at 75.

1999Only the slightest movement of the victim is required to constitute the necessary element of asportation. [Cits.] In establishing the element of asportation, there is no minimum requirement as to the distance a victim is moved, nor is there a minimum requirement as to the time the victim is held. [Cits.] Evans v. State, 240 Ga. App. 215, 216 (1) ( 522 SE2d 506 ) (1999).

1999Only the slightest movement of the victim is required to constitute the necessary element of asportation. [Cits.] In establishing the element of asportation, there is no minimum requirement as to the distance a victim is moved, nor is there a minimum requirement as to the time the victim is held. [Cits.] Evans v. State, 240 Ga. App. 215, 216 (1) ( 522 SE2d 506 ) (1999).

1999See Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 8 (2) ( 471 SE2d 849 ) (1996); Ballenger Paving Co. v. Gaines, 231 Ga. App. 565, 567 (1) ( 499 SE2d 722 ) (1998); Dept. of Transp. v. Blair, 220 Ga. App. 342, 343 (1) ( 469 SE2d 446 ) (1996); Isom v. Schettino, supra at 75.

1999See Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 8 (2) ( 471 SE2d 849 ) (1996); Ballenger Paving Co. v. Gaines, 231 Ga. App. 565, 567 (1) ( 499 SE2d 722 ) (1998); Dept. of Transp. v. Blair, 220 Ga. App. 342, 343 (1) ( 469 SE2d 446 ) (1996); Isom v. Schettino, supra at 75.

1999See Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 8 (2) ( 471 SE2d 849 ) (1996); Ballenger Paving Co. v. Gaines, 231 Ga. App. 565, 567 (1) ( 499 SE2d 722 ) (1998); Dept. of Transp. v. Blair, 220 Ga. App. 342, 343 (1) ( 469 SE2d 446 ) (1996); Isom v. Schettino, supra at 75.

1999See Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 8 (2) ( 471 SE2d 849 ) (1996); Ballenger Paving Co. v. Gaines, 231 Ga. App. 565, 567 (1) ( 499 SE2d 722 ) (1998); Dept. of Transp. v. Blair, 220 Ga. App. 342, 343 (1) ( 469 SE2d 446 ) (1996); Isom v. Schettino, supra at 75.

1999See Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 8 (2) ( 471 SE2d 849 ) (1996); Ballenger Paving Co. v. Gaines, 231 Ga. App. 565, 567 (1) ( 499 SE2d 722 ) (1998); Dept. of Transp. v. Blair, 220 Ga. App. 342, 343 (1) ( 469 SE2d 446 ) (1996); Isom v. Schettino, supra at 75.

1999See Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 8 (2) ( 471 SE2d 849 ) (1996); Ballenger Paving Co. v. Gaines, 231 Ga. App. 565, 567 (1) ( 499 SE2d 722 ) (1998); Dept. of Transp. v. Blair, 220 Ga. App. 342, 343 (1) ( 469 SE2d 446 ) (1996); Isom v. Schettino, supra at 75.

1999Estes v. State, 234 Ga. App. 150, 151 ( 505 SE2d 840 ) (1998); Giddens v. State, 190 Ga. App. 723, 725 (3) ( 380 SE2d 274 ) (1989).

1999Estes v. State, 234 Ga. App. 150, 151 ( 505 SE2d 840 ) (1998); Giddens v. State, 190 Ga. App. 723, 725 (3) ( 380 SE2d 274 ) (1989).

1997Riggins v. State, 134 Ga.App. 941, 944 , 216 S.E.2d 723 (1975) (decision to revoke appeal bond should be accompanied by at least minimal due process protections); see King v. Zimmerman, 632 F.Supp. 271, 277 (E.D.Pa.1986) (revocation of bail sua sponte, in chambers without providing notice or opportunity to be heard, is an arbitrary denial of due process); Hohman v. Hogan, 474 F.Supp. 1290, 1296 (D.Vt.1979) (defendant entitled to opportunity to present evidence in opposition to state's motion to revoke bail).

1997Riggins v. State, 134 Ga.App. 941, 944 , 216 S.E.2d 723 (1975) (decision to revoke appeal bond should be accompanied by at least minimal due process protections); see King v. Zimmerman, 632 F.Supp. 271, 277 (E.D.Pa.1986) (revocation of bail sua sponte, in chambers without providing notice or opportunity to be heard, is an arbitrary denial of due process); Hohman v. Hogan, 474 F.Supp. 1290, 1296 (D.Vt.1979) (defendant entitled to opportunity to present evidence in opposition to state's motion to revoke bail).

1997Riggins v. State, 134 Ga.App. 941, 944 , 216 S.E.2d 723 (1975) (decision to revoke appeal bond should be accompanied by at least minimal due process protections); see King v. Zimmerman, 632 F.Supp. 271, 277 (E.D.Pa.1986) (revocation of bail sua sponte, in chambers without providing notice or opportunity to be heard, is an arbitrary denial of due process); Hohman v. Hogan, 474 F.Supp. 1290, 1296 (D.Vt.1979) (defendant entitled to opportunity to present evidence in opposition to state's motion to revoke bail).

1997Riggins v. State, 134 Ga.App. 941, 944 , 216 S.E.2d 723 (1975) (decision to revoke appeal bond should be accompanied by at least minimal due process protections); see King v. Zimmerman, 632 F.Supp. 271, 277 (E.D.Pa.1986) (revocation of bail sua sponte, in chambers without providing notice or opportunity to be heard, is an arbitrary denial of due process); Hohman v. Hogan, 474 F.Supp. 1290, 1296 (D.Vt.1979) (defendant entitled to opportunity to present evidence in opposition to state's motion to revoke bail).

1992In Georgia, “the standard to be used to establish professional medical negligence under OCGA § 51-1-27 is that standard of care which, under similar conditions and like circumstances, is ordinarily employed by the medical profession generally.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McDaniel v. Hendrix, 260 Ga. 857, 859 (1) ( 401 SE2d 260 ) (1991).

1992In Georgia, “the standard to be used to establish professional medical negligence under OCGA § 51-1-27 is that standard of care which, under similar conditions and like circumstances, is ordinarily employed by the medical profession generally.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McDaniel v. Hendrix, 260 Ga. 857, 859 (1) ( 401 SE2d 260 ) (1991).

1985Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 719, n. 4 (95 SC 1215) (1975).” Pope v. City of Atlanta, 240 Ga. 177, 178, n. 1 ( 240 SE2d 241 ) (1977).