minimum standard in Indiana

1987As authority for its reference to the intent to convey or transport, as an element of the crime, Klopfenstein cited State v. Cox, supra. Noting the absence of any evidence that a vehicle had been driven or moved while a handgun was in it, the Cox opinion stated: While we are not prepared to say that locomotion must be proven in order to constitute the offense of "carrying" an unlicensed pistol in a vehicle, we, nevertheless, feel that as a minimum requirement the State must at least offer evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably infer an intention to convey or transport the weapo

1987As authority for its reference to the intent to convey or transport, as an element of the crime, Klopfenstein cited State v. Cox, supra. Noting the absence of any evidence that a vehicle had been driven or moved while a handgun was in it, the Cox opinion stated: While we are not prepared to say that locomotion must be proven in order to constitute the offense of "carrying" an unlicensed pistol in a vehicle, we, nevertheless, feel that as a minimum requirement the State must at least offer evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably infer an intention to convey or transport the weapo

1968The court spelled out the minimum requirement for a notice in a juvenile proceeding stating that it would be necessary that the child and his parent or guardian be notified in writing of a specific charge or factual allegation to be considered at the hearing and that such written notice be given at the earliest practical time, and in any event sufficiently in advance *337 of the hearing to permit preparation, see In the Matter of Gault, supra .

1968The court spelled out the minimum requirement for a notice in a juvenile proceeding stating that it would be necessary that the child and his parent or guardian be notified in writing of a specific charge or factual allegation to be considered at the hearing and that such written notice be given at the earliest practical time, and in any event sufficiently in ad vanee of the hearing to permit preparation, see In the Matter of Gault, supra. In this instance where a summons is issued in a juvenile matter and on the next day the cause set for trial, the cause is neither at issue nor has a plea be

2017For example, in Jaynes v. McConnell, 238 Ariz. 211 , 358 P.3d 632, 638 (App. 2015), the court held that, where the personal practices of the medical expert went above and beyond the minimum standard of care the expert had described at trial, testimony about such personal practices was “relevant to assist the jury in its factually intensive determination of the relevant standard of care,” and the testimony was also pertinent to the expert’s “credibility as an expert witness by suggesting that his personal practices differ from the standard of care he espoused.” See also Smethers v. Campion, 210

2017For example, in Jaynes v. McConnell, 238 Ariz. 211 , 358 P.3d 632, 638 (App. 2015), the court held that, where the personal practices of the medical expert went above and beyond the minimum standard of care the expert had described at trial, testimony about such personal practices was “relevant to assist the jury in its factually intensive determination of the relevant standard of care,” and the testimony was also pertinent to the expert’s “credibility as an expert witness by suggesting that his personal practices differ from the standard of care he espoused.” See also Smethers v. Campion, 210

2011Dist. v. State, 335 S.C. 58 , 515 S.E.2d 535 (1999)). [3] In other cases, our supreme court has noted the Education Clause entrusts the legislative branch of government with "considerable discretion in determining what will and what will not come within the meaning of a public education system." Nagy ex rel.

2011Dist. v. State, 335 S.C. 58 , 515 S.E.2d 535 (1999)). [3] In other cases, our supreme court has noted the Education Clause entrusts the legislative branch of government with "considerable discretion in determining what will and what will not come within the meaning of a public education system." Nagy ex rel.

2010We reach this conclusion in light of Shane and the great deference we pay the trial court's assessment of the prima facie evidence offered to establish a meritorious claim. 869 N.E.2d at 1238 .

1998Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481-82 , 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1177-78 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Williams v. State, 525 N.E.2d 1238, 1240 (Ind.1988).

1998Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481-82 , 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1177-78 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Williams v. State, 525 N.E.2d 1238, 1240 (Ind.1988).

1988United States v. Jeffers (1975), 7th Cir., 520 F.2d 1256 .

1988United States v. Jeffers (1975), 7th Cir., 520 F.2d 1256 .

1985U.S. v. Weston, 708 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1983).

1981The minimum standard of merchantability was defined by Judge Hoffman as concerning “whether the product is fit for the ordinary purpose for which it is used; does it meet the general description of a serviceable prototype *978 [truck].” (Emphasis added.) Richard v. Goerg Boat & Motor [Works], Inc., (1979) Ind.App., 384 N.E.2d 1084, 1091 , trans. denied.

1969This view is supported by School District for City of Holland v. Holland Education Association (1968), 380 Mich. 314 , 157 N. W. 2d 206 .

1969This view is supported by School District for City of Holland v. Holland Education Association (1968), 380 Mich. 314 , 157 N. W. 2d 206 .

1953Detrich and Clark, who were convicted of the offense of bank robbery in the Vermillion Circuit Court and who are the appellants, Detrich and Clark, in in 223 Ind. 106 , 58 N. E. 2d 108 , supra, subsequent to the decision of this court in that case, each filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, which petitions were denied and the decision of the District Court dismissing each of the petitions was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

1953Detrich and Clark, who were convicted of the offense of bank robbery in the Vermillion Circuit Court and who are the appellants, Detrich and Clark, in in 223 Ind. 106 , 58 N. E. 2d 108 , supra, subsequent to the decision of this court in that case, each filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, which petitions were denied and the decision of the District Court dismissing each of the petitions was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.