minimum standard in Texas

2021App. P. 11 (stating that “[u]nless otherwise provided in these rules, no agreement between attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless . . .”) (emphasis added); Kennedy, 682 S.W.2d at 528 (stating that “[a] better statement of the general rule is that Rule 11 is a minimum requirement for enforcement of all agreements concerning pending suits, including, but not limited to, agreed judgments”) (emphasis added).

2013The Texas Supreme Court has stated: “Rule 11 is a minimum requirement for enforcement of all agreements concerning pending suits.” Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Tex.1984).

2003Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 460 (Tex. 1995) (citing Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Tex. 1984) (“Rule 11 is a minimum requirement for enforcement of all agreements concerning pending suits, including, but not limited to, agreed judgments.”)); Roeglin v. Daves, 83 S.W.3d 326, 330 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied). “[C]ompliance with Rule 11 is a general prerequisite for any judgment enforcing an agreement touching a pending suit.” Kennedy, 682 S.W.2d at 529 .

2003Padilla v. LaFrance , 907 S.W.2d 454, 460 (Tex. 1995) (citing Kennedy v. Hyde , 682 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Tex. 1984) ("Rule 11 is a minimum requirement for enforcement of all agreements concerning pending suits, including, but not limited to, agreed judgments.")); Roeglin v. Daves , 83 S.W.3d 326, 330 (Tex. App.--Austin 2002, pet. denied). "[C]ompliance with Rule 11 is a general prerequisite for any judgment enforcing an agreement touching a pending suit." Kennedy , 682 S.W.2d at 529 .

2010Citing Jackson v. Virginia, 5 the Court observed “the United States Constitution requires that a criminal conviction be supported by a rational trier of fact’s findings that the accused is guilty of every essential element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 517 ; Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (noting Jackson sets “the minimum standard for sustaining a conviction under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).

1999This argument is properly categorized under the rubric of "legal insufficiency." See id. at 132-34 (describing legal insufficiency as a question of law "compris[ing] the minimum standard for comporting with federal due process").

2003Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 460 (Tex. 1995) (citing Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Tex. 1984) (“Rule 11 is a minimum requirement for enforcement of all agreements concerning pending suits, including, but not limited to, agreed judgments.”)); Roeglin v. Daves, 83 S.W.3d 326, 330 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied). “[C]ompliance with Rule 11 is a general prerequisite for any judgment enforcing an agreement touching a pending suit.” Kennedy, 682 S.W.2d at 529 .

2003Padilla v. LaFrance , 907 S.W.2d 454, 460 (Tex. 1995) (citing Kennedy v. Hyde , 682 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Tex. 1984) ("Rule 11 is a minimum requirement for enforcement of all agreements concerning pending suits, including, but not limited to, agreed judgments.")); Roeglin v. Daves , 83 S.W.3d 326, 330 (Tex. App.--Austin 2002, pet. denied). "[C]ompliance with Rule 11 is a general prerequisite for any judgment enforcing an agreement touching a pending suit." Kennedy , 682 S.W.2d at 529 .

2025In re S.N., 272 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.).

2024In re S.N., 272 S.W.3d 45 , 49 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.).

1989Recently, in Sullivan v. Fairman, 819 F.2d 1382 (7th cir.1987), the Court of Appeals held that the failure of defendant’s attorney to locate and interview witnesses identified in police reports fell below the minimum standard of performance expected of defense counsel as set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

1989Recently, in Sullivan v. Fairman, 819 F.2d 1382 (7th cir.1987), the Court of Appeals held that the failure of defendant’s attorney to locate and interview witnesses identified in police reports fell below the minimum standard of performance expected of defense counsel as set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

2008See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737 , 123 S.Ct. at 1983 .

2008See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737 , 123 S.Ct. at 1983 .

2003As a general rule, “[j]udgment is rendered when the trial court officially announces its decision in open court or by written memorandum filed with the clerk.” Reppert v. Beasley, 943 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ) (citing S & A Rest Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855 , 857 n.1 (Tex. 1995)).

2003As a general rule, "[j]udgment is rendered when the trial court officially announces its decision in open court or by written memorandum filed with the clerk." Reppert v. Beasley , 943 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1997, no writ) (citing S & A Rest Corp. v. Leal , 892 S.W.2d 855 , 857 n.1 (Tex. 1995)).

2002See Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex.1985).

1992See Whitworth v. Bynum , 699 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. 1985).

2006Review for legal sufficiency assesses the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and is the minimum standard for comporting with federal due process as stated in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could any rational trier of fact find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt).

2005Review for legal sufficiency assesses the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and is the minimum standard for comporting with federal due process as stated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 318-19 , 99 S.Ct. at 2788-89 .

2007Although the Court did not define the standard for general applicability, the Court held that “these ordinances fall well below the minimum standard necessary to protect First Amendment rights.” Id.

2007Although the Court did not define the standard for general applicability, the Court held that "these ordinances fall well below the minimum standard necessary to protect First Amendment rights." Id.

2024A federal safety regulation still serves as a minimum standard even if a jury disagrees with the promulgating agency and finds it inadequate to protect the public.27 And by complying with the applicable minimum standard, a manufacturer acquires the protection of a presumption that imposes an additional hurdle before liability will attach while still bearing any resulting tort liability “as a cost of doing business.”28 27 See MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475, 495 (Tex. 2010) (“[W]e must be mindful that Congress generally intended the federal safety standards to set a minimum st

2024A federal safety regulation still serves as a minimum standard even if a jury disagrees with the promulgating agency and finds it inadequate to protect the public.27 And by complying with the applicable minimum standard, a manufacturer acquires the protection of a presumption that imposes an additional hurdle before liability will attach while still bearing any resulting tort liability “as a cost of doing business.”28 27 See MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475, 495 (Tex. 2010) (“[W]e must be mindful that Congress generally intended the federal safety standards to set a minimum st

2024A federal safety regulation still serves as a minimum standard even if a jury disagrees with the promulgating agency and finds it inadequate to protect the public.27 And by complying with the applicable minimum standard, a manufacturer acquires the protection of a presumption that imposes an additional hurdle before liability will attach while still bearing any resulting tort liability “as a cost of doing business.”28 27 See MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475, 495 (Tex. 2010) (“[W]e must be mindful that Congress generally intended the federal safety standards to set a minimum st

2024A federal safety regulation still serves as a minimum standard even if a jury disagrees with the promulgating agency and finds it inadequate to protect the public.27 And by complying with the applicable minimum standard, a manufacturer acquires the protection of a presumption that imposes an additional hurdle before liability will attach while still bearing any resulting tort liability “as a cost of doing business.”28 27 See MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475, 495 (Tex. 2010) (“[W]e must be mindful that Congress generally intended the federal safety standards to set a minimum st

2024Code Ann. § 22.002 ; see also Ramsey v. Jones Enters., 810 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1991, writ denied) (stating that Texas Property Code § 22.002 “sets out what we perceive to be the minimum requirement to maintain a trespass to try title action”).

2021See Ramsey v. Jones Enters., 810 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1991, writ denied) (stating that “[s]ection 22.002 of chapter 22 sets out what we perceive to be the minimum requirement to maintain a trespass to try title action”).

2022While the testifying expert can rely upon information from a non-testifying analyst, the testifying expert cannot act as a surrogate to introduce that information.” Paredes v. State, 462 S.W.3d 510, 517-18 (Tex. Crim.

2021While the testifying expert can rely upon information from a non-testifying analyst, the testifying expert cannot act as a surrogate to introduce that information.” Paredes v. State, 6 Our dissenting colleague opines that we believe “Dreyer establishes a minimum standard for reliability, which the current case fails to meet because Symonds did not work for Bode[.]” We do not; instead, we believe Dreyer is persuasive authority, we agree with its reasoning, and we establish the minimum standard for reliability in this court via this en banc opinion. 24 462 S.W.3d 510, 517-18 (Tex. Crim.

2009See Zauber , 591 S.W.2d at 937 (stating that requirement in article 5.14(B) was "only a minimum requirement").

2009See Zauber, 591 S.W.2d at 937 (stating that requirement in article 5.14(B) was “only a minimum requirement”).

1999See Bossley , 968 S.W.2d at 343 .

1999See Bossley, 968 S.W.2d at 343 .

1996Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

1993Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 , 87 S.Ct. 788, 791 , 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967); Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

2019The Supreme Court established a minimum test requirement for determining public official status: “The ‘public official’ designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.” Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 , 86 S. Ct. 669, 676 , 15 L.

2019The Supreme Court established a minimum test requirement for determining public official status: “The ‘public official’ designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.” Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 , 86 S. Ct. 669, 676 , 15 L.

2011Recently, the Texas Supreme Court considered the minimum standard an expert report must meet in Scoresby v. Santillan, 346 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. 2011).

2011Recently, the Texas Supreme Court considered the minimum standard an expert report must meet in Scoresby v. Santillan, 346 S.W.3d 546 (Tex.2011).

2023Courts in the United States may also “properly decline to extend comity to the foreign court’s determination if it clearly misinterprets the Hague Convention, contravenes the Convention’s fundamental premises or objectives, or fails to meet a minimum standard of reasonableness.” Smedley v. Smedley, 772 F.3d 184, 189 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1014 (9th Cir. 2009)).

2018However, a court may decline to extend comity if the foreign court "clearly misinterprets the Hague Convention, contravenes the Convention's fundamental premises or objectives, or fails to meet a minimum standard of reasonableness." Smedley v. Smedley , 772 F.3d 184 , 189 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Asvesta , 580 F.3d at 1014 ).

2023Courts in the United States may also “properly decline to extend comity to the foreign court’s determination if it clearly misinterprets the Hague Convention, contravenes the Convention’s fundamental premises or objectives, or fails to meet a minimum standard of reasonableness.” Smedley v. Smedley, 772 F.3d 184, 189 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1014 (9th Cir. 2009)).

2018However, a court may decline to extend comity if the foreign court "clearly misinterprets the Hague Convention, contravenes the Convention's fundamental premises or objectives, or fails to meet a minimum standard of reasonableness." Smedley v. Smedley , 772 F.3d 184 , 189 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Asvesta , 580 F.3d at 1014 ).

2017This means that a 'divide-and-conquer' or piecemeal approach is prohibited."). 52 See, e.g. , Almeida-Sanchez v. United States , 413 U.S. 266 , 269, 93 S.Ct. 2535 , 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973) (discussing Carroll v. United States , 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) ) ("Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the search."); Chambers v. Maroney , 399 U.S. 42 , 51, 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) ("In enforcing the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for

2017This means that a 'divide-and-conquer' or piecemeal approach is prohibited."). 52 See, e.g. , Almeida-Sanchez v. United States , 413 U.S. 266 , 269, 93 S.Ct. 2535 , 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973) (discussing Carroll v. United States , 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) ) ("Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the search."); Chambers v. Maroney , 399 U.S. 42 , 51, 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) ("In enforcing the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for

1998Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d 756, 762 (Tex.Crim.App.1972).

1987However, as we noted, we are instructed by the Court in Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d at 772 , that Tex. Const, art.