minimum standard in Nebraska

2018The Colorado DWAI statutes required only that “a person has consumed alcohol . . . that affects the person to the - 65 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 300 Nebraska R eports STATE v. BROWN Cite as 300 Neb. 57 slightest degree.” See Colo. Rev.

2002From that finding, the trial court then went on to consider the second prong of the test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2002From that finding, the trial court then went on to consider the second prong of the test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

1996“In enforcing the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the [U.S. Supreme] Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution.” Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 , 90 S. Ct. 1975 , 26 L.

1996“In enforcing the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the [U.S. Supreme] Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution.” Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 , 90 S. Ct. 1975 , 26 L.

1994Therefore, as long as the inmate was afforded the procedural safeguards afforded in Wolff v. McDonell, supra, due process was satisfied if the committee’s findings were based on “some evidence.” Goff v. Dailey, supra. In regard to prison disciplinary proceedings, only a minimum standard of proof is necessary to comport with minimum due process requirements.

1990Bank of Bellevue v. Rose, supra at 397, 249 N.W.2d at 726 , “the ordinary 3-day rule set forth in DeLay is a minimum requirement, and such notice is not necessarily sufficient in all cases.” Therefore, the language in the proposed instruction that “[t]he notice which was given to Chadron Energy Corporation in this case was given more than three days prior to the sale, and was commercially reasonable as a matter of law” is clearly not a correct statement of the law.

1990The essence of defendant’s contention is that he based his decision to negotiate the pleas on the information contained in the Rivera statement, but since counsel failed to investigate the statement, counsel’s conduct fell below the minimum standard required of attorneys, as set forth in Ford v. Parratt, 638 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. *273 1981), vacated on other grounds 454 U.S. 934 , 102 S. Ct. 467 , 70 L.

1990Id.

1990The essence of defendant’s contention is that he based his decision to negotiate the pleas on the information contained in the Rivera statement, but since counsel failed to investigate the statement, counsel’s conduct fell below the minimum standard required of attorneys, as set forth in Ford v. Parratt, 638 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. *273 1981), vacated on other grounds 454 U.S. 934 , 102 S. Ct. 467 , 70 L.

1990The essence of defendant’s contention is that he based his decision to negotiate the pleas on the information contained in the Rivera statement, but since counsel failed to investigate the statement, counsel’s conduct fell below the minimum standard required of attorneys, as set forth in Ford v. Parratt, 638 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. *273 1981), vacated on other grounds 454 U.S. 934 , 102 S. Ct. 467 , 70 L.

1990The essence of defendant’s contention is that he based his decision to negotiate the pleas on the information contained in the Rivera statement, but since counsel failed to investigate the statement, counsel’s conduct fell below the minimum standard required of attorneys, as set forth in Ford v. Parratt, 638 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. *273 1981), vacated on other grounds 454 U.S. 934 , 102 S. Ct. 467 , 70 L.

1942Further, in case of the legislature having, as here, prescribed conditions of eligibility to admission to practice law, which are reasonable, want of such conditions should be regarded as insurmountable.” It is interesting to note in connection with this contention a later statement made by the Wisconsin court touching upon this, subject, which, for comparison, is quoted as follows : In In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374 , 240 N. W. 441 , the court held: “The qualifications required of attorneys at law fixed by the legislature in order that public interests may be protected constitute only a minimum s

1942Further, in case of the legislature having, as here, prescribed conditions of eligibility to admission to practice law, which are reasonable, want of such conditions should be regarded as insurmountable.” It is interesting to note in connection with this contention a later statement made by the Wisconsin court touching upon this, subject, which, for comparison, is quoted as follows : In In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374 , 240 N. W. 441 , the court held: “The qualifications required of attorneys at law fixed by the legislature in order that public interests may be protected constitute only a minimum s

1942Further, in case of the legislature having, as here, prescribed conditions of eligibility to admission to practice law, which are reasonable, want of such conditions should be regarded as insurmountable.” It is interesting to note in connection with this contention a later statement made by the Wisconsin court touching upon this, subject, which, for comparison, is quoted as follows : In In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374 , 240 N. W. 441 , the court held: “The qualifications required of attorneys at law fixed by the legislature in order that public interests may be protected constitute only a minimum s