minimum standard in Alabama

20 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1926–2024 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (14)

Case	Followed	Cited
Hall v. Stategreen alacrimapp · 2016 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024 1 sentence 2024(Ramirez's brief, p. 14.) However, as Ramirez notes, Rule 18.4 expressly states that the parties may consent to a number of prospective jurors that is less than the minimum required by the rule, i.e., that they may waive the minimum number, and this Court has held that "statutes or rules that are written in 'mandatory' terms but that are capable of being waived are not 'jurisdictional.' " Hall v. State, 223 So. 3d 977, 981 (Ala. Crim.	1	1
West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of Floridagreen ala · 1989 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023 1 sentence 2023Section 6-5-549, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part: "In any action for injury or damages or wrongful death, whether in contract or in tort, against a health care provider based on a breach of the standard of care, the minimum standard of proof required to test the sufficiency of the evidence to support any issue of fact shall be proof by substantial evidence." See also Hrynkiw v. Trammell, 96 So. 3d 794, 797 (Ala. 2012) (indicating that, to avoid the entry of a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants, the plaintiffs in a medical-malpractice action bore the burden of pr	1	1
Hrynkiw v. Trammellgreen ala · 2012 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023 1 sentence 2023Section 6-5-549, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part: "In any action for injury or damages or wrongful death, whether in contract or in tort, against a health care provider based on a breach of the standard of care, the minimum standard of proof required to test the sufficiency of the evidence to support any issue of fact shall be proof by substantial evidence." See also Hrynkiw v. Trammell, 96 So. 3d 794, 797 (Ala. 2012) (indicating that, to avoid the entry of a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants, the plaintiffs in a medical-malpractice action bore the burden of pr	1	1
American Cas. Co. v. Wrightgreen ala · 1989 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993 1 sentence 1993See, American Casualty Co. v. Wright , 554 So.2d 1015 (Ala. 1989).	1	1
Mead Corp. v. Hicksgreen ala · 1983 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989 2 sentences 1989This they have failed to do. 883 The minimum requirement for proving fault against a defendant in a defamation case is that the plaintiff "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent in making the statement." Mead Corp. v. Hicks, supra, at 313 (emphasis supplied). 1989*Here, in determining the fault of the defendants (the individual defendants who supplied the information to the newspaper, and the defendant newspaper that published the article based on the information), a jury should be allowed to "take into account the thoroughness of the check that a reasonable person would make before publishing the statement, the nature of the interests that the defendant was seeking to promote in publishing the statement, and the extent of damage to which the statement exposed the plaintiff's reputation." Mead Corp. v. Hicks, supra, at 312.	1	1
Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Board of the City of Montgomery v. Normangreen · 1968 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988 2 sentences 1988In examining the testimony by the experts for both the Whites and the Clinic, we are guided by the standard set by this Court: “The ground of the motion that the verdict of the jury is contrary to the law and the evidence presents no other question than a consideration of the evidence to see if allowing all reasonable presumptions in favor of the correctness of the verdict, the evidence against the verdict is so decided as to clearly convince the court that it is wrong and unjust.” Shiver v. Waites, 408 So.2d 502, 504 (Ala.1981), quoting Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Board of the City of Montgo 1988In examining the testimony by the experts for both the Whites and the Clinic, we are guided by the standard set by this Court: “The ground of the motion that the verdict of the jury is contrary to the law and the evidence presents no other question than a consideration of the evidence to see if allowing all reasonable presumptions in favor of the correctness of the verdict, the evidence against the verdict is so decided as to clearly convince the court that it is wrong and unjust.” Shiver v. Waites, 408 So.2d 502, 504 (Ala.1981), quoting Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Board of the City of Montgo	1	1
Shiver v. Waitesgreen ala · 1981 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988 1 sentence 1988In examining the testimony by the experts for both the Whites and the Clinic, we are guided by the standard set by this Court: “The ground of the motion that the verdict of the jury is contrary to the law and the evidence presents no other question than a consideration of the evidence to see if allowing all reasonable presumptions in favor of the correctness of the verdict, the evidence against the verdict is so decided as to clearly convince the court that it is wrong and unjust.” Shiver v. Waites, 408 So.2d 502, 504 (Ala.1981), quoting Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Board of the City of Montgo	1	1
Carroll v. Stategreen alacrimapp · 1984 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987 1 sentence 1987“Appellate courts are reminded that in deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim ‘counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.’ 104 S.Ct. at 2066 . ‘[W]e do not think that counsel should be penalized for the fact that he is not a magician, ... nor for his lack of “druidic magical powers to produce an acquittal.” ’ Thompson v. State, 444 So.2d 899, 902 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984).” Carroll v. State, 462 So.2d 789, 790 (Ala. Crim.App.1984).	1	1
Thompson v. Stategreen alacrimapp · 1984 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987 1 sentence 1987“Appellate courts are reminded that in deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim ‘counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.’ 104 S.Ct. at 2066 . ‘[W]e do not think that counsel should be penalized for the fact that he is not a magician, ... nor for his lack of “druidic magical powers to produce an acquittal.” ’ Thompson v. State, 444 So.2d 899, 902 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984).” Carroll v. State, 462 So.2d 789, 790 (Ala. Crim.App.1984).	1	1
Crowe v. Stategreen alacrimapp · 1984 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987 1 sentence 1987His performance met the minimum standard of “reasonably effective assistance.” “In Duncan v. State, 461 So.2d 906 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), Judge Bowen opined that ‘[i]n Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 , [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ] (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that “the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.” ’ ” Crowe v. State, 485 So.2d 351, 361 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), rev’d on other grounds, 485 So.2d 373 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 909 , 106 S.Ct. 3284 , 91 L.Ed.2d 573 (1986).	1	1
Ex Parte Tuckergreen ala · 1984 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986 1 sentence 1986See also Tucker v. State , 454 So.2d 552 , 553 (Ala. 1984) (wherein the court condemned comments containing a statement virtually identical to the one at bar and found those comments "to be so prejudicial as to be ineradicable"); Blackmon v. State , 462 So.2d 1057 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985).	1	1
Rouse v. Stategreen alactapp · 1966 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1977–1977	1	1
Thomas Lorenzo Williams v. Dr. George Beto, Director, Texas Department of Correctionsgreen ca5 · 1966 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1973–1973	1	1
Johnson v. Geraldgreen ala · 1927 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1948–1948	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (24)

Case	Cited	Years
Strickland v. Washington green scotus · 1984 2 sentences 1987His performance met the minimum standard of “reasonably effective assistance.” “In Duncan v. State, 461 So.2d 906 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), Judge Bowen opined that ‘[i]n Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 , [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ] (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that “the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.” ’ ” Crowe v. State, 485 So.2d 351, 361 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), rev’d on other grounds, 485 So.2d 373 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 909 , 106 S.Ct. 3284 , 91 L.Ed.2d 573 (1986). 1987His performance met the minimum standard of “reasonably effective assistance.” “In Duncan v. State, 461 So.2d 906 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), Judge Bowen opined that ‘[i]n Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 , [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ] (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that “the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.” ’ ” Crowe v. State, 485 So.2d 351, 361 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), rev’d on other grounds, 485 So.2d 373 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 909 , 106 S.Ct. 3284 , 91 L.Ed.2d 573 (1986).	2	1985–1987
Taylor v. State green ala · 1973 2 sentences 1983In this state, the minimum standard of competence and efficacy is the "mockery of justice rule." Taylor v. State , 291 Ala. 756 , 760 , 287 So.2d 901 (1973); McKinnis v. State , 392 So.2d 1266 , 1269 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980), cert. denied, Ex parte McKinnis , 392 So.2d 1270 (Ala. 1981). "(T)he rule in this State is that, in order to have a conviction reversed because of incompetent counsel, a defendant must show that the representation by counsel was only perfunctory, that the conduct of the attorney reduced the trial to a farce, sham, or mockery of justice, or that the representation shocks the con 1983In this state, the minimum standard of competence and efficacy is the "mockery of justice rule." Taylor v. State , 291 Ala. 756 , 760 , 287 So.2d 901 (1973); McKinnis v. State , 392 So.2d 1266 , 1269 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980), cert. denied, Ex parte McKinnis , 392 So.2d 1270 (Ala. 1981). "(T)he rule in this State is that, in order to have a conviction reversed because of incompetent counsel, a defendant must show that the representation by counsel was only perfunctory, that the conduct of the attorney reduced the trial to a farce, sham, or mockery of justice, or that the representation shocks the con	2	1982–1983
Rudolph v. Lindsay green ala · 1993 1 sentence 1999The patient’s administratrix submitted an affidavit in opposition to the psychiatrist’s summary-judgment motion; in that affidavit her expert witness opined that the psychiatrist had breached the minimum standard of care in his care and treatment of the decedent “by failing to assess the potential for suicide in light of the prior suicide attempt and his underlying psychosis,” and expressed the opinion “that the absence of proper evaluation and diagnosis by [the psychiatrist] in light of the prior suicide attempt and [the patient’s discharge] from the hospital absent suicide precautions” led t	1	1999–1999
Medlin v. Crosby green ala · 1991 2 sentences 1997In Medlin v. Crosby , 583 So.2d 1290 (Ala. 1991), this Court established a framework under § 6-5-548 for determining whether an expert witness is qualified to testify in a medical malpractice case. 1997In Medlin v. Crosby, 583 So.2d 1290 (Ala.1991), this Court established a framework under § 6-5-548 for determining whether an expert witness is qualified to testify in a medical malpractice case.	1	1997–1997
Duncan v. State green alacrimapp · 1984 1 sentence 1987His performance met the minimum standard of “reasonably effective assistance.” “In Duncan v. State, 461 So.2d 906 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), Judge Bowen opined that ‘[i]n Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 , [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ] (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that “the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.” ’ ” Crowe v. State, 485 So.2d 351, 361 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), rev’d on other grounds, 485 So.2d 373 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 909 , 106 S.Ct. 3284 , 91 L.Ed.2d 573 (1986).	1	1987–1987
Ex Parte Crowe green ala · 1985 1 sentence 1987His performance met the minimum standard of “reasonably effective assistance.” “In Duncan v. State, 461 So.2d 906 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), Judge Bowen opined that ‘[i]n Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 , [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ] (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that “the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.” ’ ” Crowe v. State, 485 So.2d 351, 361 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), rev’d on other grounds, 485 So.2d 373 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 909 , 106 S.Ct. 3284 , 91 L.Ed.2d 573 (1986).	1	1987–1987
Boggild v. Kenner Products green scotus · 1986 2 sentences 1987His performance met the minimum standard of “reasonably effective assistance.” “In Duncan v. State, 461 So.2d 906 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), Judge Bowen opined that ‘[i]n Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 , [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ] (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that “the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.” ’ ” Crowe v. State, 485 So.2d 351, 361 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), rev’d on other grounds, 485 So.2d 373 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 909 , 106 S.Ct. 3284 , 91 L.Ed.2d 573 (1986). 1987His performance met the minimum standard of “reasonably effective assistance.” “In Duncan v. State, 461 So.2d 906 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), Judge Bowen opined that ‘[i]n Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 , [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ] (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that “the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.” ’ ” Crowe v. State, 485 So.2d 351, 361 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), rev’d on other grounds, 485 So.2d 373 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 909 , 106 S.Ct. 3284 , 91 L.Ed.2d 573 (1986).	1	1987–1987
Alabama v. Crowe green scotus · 1986 1 sentence 1987His performance met the minimum standard of “reasonably effective assistance.” “In Duncan v. State, 461 So.2d 906 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), Judge Bowen opined that ‘[i]n Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 , [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ] (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that “the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.” ’ ” Crowe v. State, 485 So.2d 351, 361 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), rev’d on other grounds, 485 So.2d 373 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 909 , 106 S.Ct. 3284 , 91 L.Ed.2d 573 (1986).	1	1987–1987
Blackmon v. State green alacrimapp · 1985 1 sentence 1986See also Tucker v. State , 454 So.2d 552 , 553 (Ala. 1984) (wherein the court condemned comments containing a statement virtually identical to the one at bar and found those comments "to be so prejudicial as to be ineradicable"); Blackmon v. State , 462 So.2d 1057 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985).	1	1986–1986
Illinois v. Gates green scotus · 1983 2 sentences 1985While disavowing his intention to do so, appellant Darby is essentially urging this court to apply the now abandoned Aguilar-Spinelli rule. [ Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli 781 v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).] The United States Supreme Court overruled the Aguilar line of cases as establishing the minimum standard for making a finding of probable cause in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1982). 1985While disavowing his intention to do so, appellant Darby is essentially urging this court to apply the now abandoned Aguilar-Spinelli rule. [ Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli 781 v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).] The United States Supreme Court overruled the Aguilar line of cases as establishing the minimum standard for making a finding of probable cause in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1982).	1	1985–1985
Aguilar v. Texas red scotus · 1964 2 sentences 1985While disavowing his intention to do so, appellant Darby is essentially urging this court to apply the now abandoned Aguilar-Spinelli rule. [ Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli 781 v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).] The United States Supreme Court overruled the Aguilar line of cases as establishing the minimum standard for making a finding of probable cause in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1982). 1985While disavowing his intention to do so, appellant Darby is essentially urging this court to apply the now abandoned Aguilar-Spinelli rule. [ Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli 781 v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).] The United States Supreme Court overruled the Aguilar line of cases as establishing the minimum standard for making a finding of probable cause in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1982).	1	1985–1985
Spinelli v. United States red scotus · 1969 2 sentences 1985While disavowing his intention to do so, appellant Darby is essentially urging this court to apply the now abandoned Aguilar-Spinelli rule. [ Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli 781 v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).] The United States Supreme Court overruled the Aguilar line of cases as establishing the minimum standard for making a finding of probable cause in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1982). 1985While disavowing his intention to do so, appellant Darby is essentially urging this court to apply the now abandoned Aguilar-Spinelli rule. [ Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli 781 v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).] The United States Supreme Court overruled the Aguilar line of cases as establishing the minimum standard for making a finding of probable cause in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1982).	1	1985–1985
Bridges v. State green alacrimapp · 1980 1 sentence 1983In this state, the minimum standard of competence and efficacy is the "mockery of justice rule." Taylor v. State , 291 Ala. 756 , 760 , 287 So.2d 901 (1973); McKinnis v. State , 392 So.2d 1266 , 1269 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980), cert. denied, Ex parte McKinnis , 392 So.2d 1270 (Ala. 1981). "(T)he rule in this State is that, in order to have a conviction reversed because of incompetent counsel, a defendant must show that the representation by counsel was only perfunctory, that the conduct of the attorney reduced the trial to a farce, sham, or mockery of justice, or that the representation shocks the con	1	1983–1983
Ex Parte McKinnis green ala · 1981 1 sentence 1983In this state, the minimum standard of competence and efficacy is the "mockery of justice rule." Taylor v. State , 291 Ala. 756 , 760 , 287 So.2d 901 (1973); McKinnis v. State , 392 So.2d 1266 , 1269 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980), cert. denied, Ex parte McKinnis , 392 So.2d 1270 (Ala. 1981). "(T)he rule in this State is that, in order to have a conviction reversed because of incompetent counsel, a defendant must show that the representation by counsel was only perfunctory, that the conduct of the attorney reduced the trial to a farce, sham, or mockery of justice, or that the representation shocks the con	1	1983–1983
Ex Parte Brown green ala · 1981 1 sentence 1983In this state, the minimum standard of competence and efficacy is the "mockery of justice rule." Taylor v. State , 291 Ala. 756 , 760 , 287 So.2d 901 (1973); McKinnis v. State , 392 So.2d 1266 , 1269 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980), cert. denied, Ex parte McKinnis , 392 So.2d 1270 (Ala. 1981). "(T)he rule in this State is that, in order to have a conviction reversed because of incompetent counsel, a defendant must show that the representation by counsel was only perfunctory, that the conduct of the attorney reduced the trial to a farce, sham, or mockery of justice, or that the representation shocks the con	1	1983–1983
Meyers Et Al. v. Pennsylvania Et Al. green scotus · 1974 1 sentence 1982Taylor v. State , 291 Ala. 756 , 287 So.2d 901 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 945 , 94 S.Ct. 1955 , 40 L.Ed.2d 298 (1974).	1	1982–1982
Falkner v. Goodhart neutral scotus · 1974 1 sentence 1982Taylor v. State , 291 Ala. 756 , 287 So.2d 901 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 945 , 94 S.Ct. 1955 , 40 L.Ed.2d 298 (1974).	1	1982–1982
Hohensee v. Grier neutral scotus · 1974 1 sentence 1982Taylor v. State , 291 Ala. 756 , 287 So.2d 901 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 945 , 94 S.Ct. 1955 , 40 L.Ed.2d 298 (1974).	1	1982–1982
Robinson v. State neutral alacrimapp · 1978 1 sentence 1982Robinson , supra. The "mockery of justice" rule cited supra, has been described as a minimum standard of competence and efficacy.	1	1982–1982
United States v. Sammy Cariola green ca3 · 1963	1	1977–1977
Carroll v. United States green scotus · 1925	1	1971–1971
Ex parte Smart neutral scotus · 1924	1	1971–1971
Burnham v. Lincoln green · 1917	1	1958–1958
Vandalia Coal Co. v. Underwood neutral indctapp · 1913	1	1926–1926

Where else courts name it

TX 134 (1885–2025) NY 103 (1926–2026) CA 93 (1943–2025) IL 92 (1956–2026) PA 73 (1942–2025) LA 67 (1959–2021) OH 51 (1948–2026) MO 47 (1941–2024) NJ 45 (1959–2026) FL 41 (1956–2026) MD 38 (1955–2025) WA 35 (1955–2025) TN 34 (1956–2023) MA 33 (1918–2025) GA 31 (1974–2025) NC 29 (1941–2022) OR 28 (1953–2026) MS 28 (1967–2020) MI 27 (1943–2021) ND 25 (1962–2016) NM 25 (1943–2025) CT 22 (1983–2026) AZ 20 (1971–2023) AL 20 (1926–2024) CO 19 (1975–2026) WI 17 (1969–2020) IA 16 (1961–2022) DC 16 (1950–2015) MT 16 (1925–2026) IN 16 (1953–2017) OK 16 (1945–2025) MN 14 (1960–2017) AK 14 (1961–2016) KS 12 (1967–2026) SC 11 (1987–2026) RI 11 (1977–2020) HI 11 (1961–2025) VA 11 (1955–2024) ID 10 (1967–2023) KY 10 (1923–2026) NE 9 (1942–2018) UT 9 (1978–2024) WV 8 (1968–2021) ME 8 (1973–2021) WY 8 (1981–2006) VT 8 (1988–2023) DE 6 (1971–2025) NH 5 (1945–2007) SD 4 (1980–2014) NV 3 (1981–2022) AR 3 (1982–2018) PR 2 (1943–1963)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check