Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
103 New York opinions name it 13 courts 1926–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thompson v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2024Although "[n]o specific form of a hearing is required, . . . at a minimum the hearing must consist of an adducement of proof coupled with an opportunity to rebut it" ( Matter of Thompson v Thompson , 59 AD3d 1104, 1105 [4th Dept 2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and the court must provide "counsel reasonable opportunity to appear and present respondent's evidence and arguments" ( Matter of Lewis v Crosson , 53 AD2d 1029, 1029 [4th Dept 1976]; see Matter of Smith v Smith , 122 AD2d 546, 547-548 [4th Dept 1986]). 2019Although "[n]o specific form of a hearing is required, . . . at a minimum the hearing must consist of an adducement of proof coupled with an opportunity to rebut it" ( Thompson , 59 AD3d at 1105 [internal quotation marks omitted]). | 5 | 5 |
People v. Turnergreen2 sentences2015It is well established that the right to effective assistance of counsel in New York is “violated if a defendant’s counsel fails to meet a minimum standard of effectiveness, and defendant suffers prejudice from that failure” (People v Turner, 5 NY3d 476, 479 [2005] [emphasis added]). 2015It is well established that the right to effective assistance of counsel in New York is “violated if a defendant’s counsel fails to meet a minimum standard of effectiveness, and defendant suffers prejudice from that failure” (People v Turner, 5 NY3d 476, 479 [2005] [emphasis added]). | 5 | 5 |
Solow v. Wellnergreen2 sentences2024Habitability (fifth defense I third counterclaim) and Fitness for Occupancy (eighth defense I fourth counterclaim) The implied warranty of habitability sets forth a minimum standard to protect tenants against conditions that render residential premises uninhabitable or unusable (RPL § 235-b; see also Solow v Wellner, 86 NY2d 582 [1995].) "Tenants alleging breach of the warranty of habitability must provide evidence sufficient to support their claims" (Kent v 534 E. 11th St., 80 AD3d 106 [1 st Dept 2010]). 2010(Real Property Law § 235-b; see also Solow v Wellner, 86 NY2d 582 [1995].) Tenants alleging breach of the warranty of habitability must provide evidence sufficient to support their claims. | 2 | 2 |
Kent v. 534 East 11th Streetgreen2 sentences2024The Fourth Cause of Action for Breach of the Warranty of Habitability Pursuant to Real Property Law§ 235-b, implied in every residential lease is a warranty of habitability, which "sets forth a minimum standard to protect tenants against conditions that render residential premises uninhabitable or unusable" (Kent v 534 E. 11th St., 80 AD3d 106, 112-113 [1st Dept 201 0]). 2024Habitability (fifth defense I third counterclaim) and Fitness for Occupancy (eighth defense I fourth counterclaim) The implied warranty of habitability sets forth a minimum standard to protect tenants against conditions that render residential premises uninhabitable or unusable (RPL § 235-b; see also Solow v Wellner, 86 NY2d 582 [1995].) "Tenants alleging breach of the warranty of habitability must provide evidence sufficient to support their claims" (Kent v 534 E. 11th St., 80 AD3d 106 [1 st Dept 2010]). | 2 | 2 |
Gruen v. Brathwaitegreen2 sentences2024"It is sufficient if the expert attests to familiarity with either the standard of care in the locality or to a minimum standard applicable locally, statewide, or nationally" ( M.C. v Huntington Hosp. , 175 AD3d 578 , 580-581 [2d Dept 2019] [citations omitted]; see Gruen v Brathwaite , 215 AD3d 927, 929 [2d Dept 2023]). 2024"It is sufficient if the expert attests to familiarity with either the standard of care in the locality or to a minimum standard applicable locally, statewide, or nationally" ( M.C. v Huntington Hosp. , 175 AD3d 578 , 580-581 [2d Dept 2019] [citations omitted]; see Gruen v Brathwaite , 215 AD3d 927 , 929 [2d Dept 2023]). | 2 | 2 |
Nicholson v. Scoppettagreen2 sentences2024Nicholson v. Scoppetta , 3 NY3d 357 (2004). 2009Although petitioner established that the father’s behavior fell below a minimum standard of care and reasonableness with respect to that child, we agree with the father and the Law Guardian that Family Court erred in determining that petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that the father’s behavior placed the child’s physical, mental or emotional well-being in imminent danger of becoming impaired (see Family Ct Act § 1012 [f] [i] [B]; Nicholson v Scoppetta, 3 NY3d 357, 368 [2004]; Matter of Tajani B., 49 AD3d 876 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 703 [2008]). | 1 | 4 |
People v. McRaygreen2 sentences2024In People v McRay (51 NY2d 594 [1980]), the Court of Appeals held that the inference of probable cause may be drawn when "a trained and experienced officer observes the delivery of one or more glassine envelopes- the 'hallmark' of a drug transaction- in an area notorious for narcotics" activity, and once this minimum requirement is met, "it is a question for [the] courts with fact-finding power . . . to find as a fact whether probable cause exists" ( id. at 605). 2024In People v McRay (51 NY2d 594 [1980]), the Court of Appeals held that the inference of probable cause may be drawn when "a trained and experienced officer observes the delivery of one or more glassine envelopes- the 'hallmark' of a drug transaction- in an area notorious for narcotics" activity, and once this minimum requirement is met, "it is a question for [the] courts with fact-finding power . . . to find as a fact whether probable cause exists" ( id. at 605). | 1 | 3 |
People v. Millergreen2 sentences2019Assigned counsel's brief merely " 'state[s] a bare conclusion' that, after reviewing the record and discussing the case with the defendant, there are no nonfrivolous issues for appeal" ( People v Murray , 169 AD3d 227 , 232 [2019], quoting Matter of Giovanni S. [Jasmin A.] , 89 [*2] AD3d 252, 258 [2011]) and, therefore, fails to "meet the minimum requirement of a statement of the factual and legal issues relevant to the conviction and sentence sufficient to enable the court to evaluate and correctly decide the appeal" ( People v Miller , 99 AD2d 1021, 1021 [1984]). 1988The brief neither discusses nor analyzes potential issues presented by the record, such as the lower court’s adverse pretrial suppression ruling, and therefore, fails to "meet the minimum requirement of a statement of the factual and legal issues relevant to the conviction and sentence sufficient to enable the court to evaluate and correctly decide the appeal.” (People v Miller, 99 AD2d 1021 .) A new assignment of counsel is required, for as the Court of Appeals has observed in the context of Anders-Saunders briefs, "neither a review of the record by the Appellate Division nor a pro se brief c | 1 | 2 |
Disney Enters. v. Tax Appealsgreen1 sentence2026Put another way, "[t]he rather limited purpose of Public Law 86-272 was . . . to establish a minimum standard for imposition of a state net-income tax based on solicitation of interstate sales" ( Matter of Disney Enters., Inc. v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y. , 10 NY3d at 404 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
Fonck v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2025"To prevail on a cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6), a plaintiff must establish the violation of a specific and concrete provision of the Industrial Code, and that such violation was a proximate cause of his or her injuries" ( Bittrolff v City of New York , 237 AD3d 1024 , 1026 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Fonck v City of New York , 198 AD3d 874, 875 ). 12 NYCRR 23-1.30 provides, inter alia, "that work sites must have illumination sufficient for safe working conditions wherever workers must work and sets a minimum standard of 10-foot candles in any work area | 1 | 1 |
Murphy v. 80 Pine, LLCgreen1 sentence2025"To prevail on a cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6), a plaintiff must establish the violation of a specific and concrete provision of the Industrial Code, and that such violation was a proximate cause of his or her injuries" ( Bittrolff v City of New York , 237 AD3d 1024 , 1026 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Fonck v City of New York , 198 AD3d 874, 875 ). 12 NYCRR 23-1.30 provides, inter alia, "that work sites must have illumination sufficient for safe working conditions wherever workers must work and sets a minimum standard of 10-foot candles in any work area | 1 | 1 |
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. Stategreen2 sentences2025However, CFE I does not state that the factual assertions made in that case were the bare minimum required by CPLR 3211 and our caselaw, or that the pleading sufficiency question was "close" (86 NY2d at 317-319). 2025However, CFE I does not state that the factual assertions made in that case were the bare minimum required by CPLR 3211 and our caselaw, or that the pleading sufficiency question was "close" (86 NY2d at 317-319). | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. Crossongreen1 sentence2024Although "[n]o specific form of a hearing is required, . . . at a minimum the hearing must consist of an adducement of proof coupled with an opportunity to rebut it" ( Matter of Thompson v Thompson , 59 AD3d 1104, 1105 [4th Dept 2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and the court must provide "counsel reasonable opportunity to appear and present respondent's evidence and arguments" ( Matter of Lewis v Crosson , 53 AD2d 1029, 1029 [4th Dept 1976]; see Matter of Smith v Smith , 122 AD2d 546, 547-548 [4th Dept 1986]). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Brown v. City of Schenectadygreen1 sentence2024Under the statutory structure, local governments — cities, towns and villages — are tasked with enforcing the Uniform Code, albeit a local government may opt out of that obligation ( see Executive Law § 381 [2]; Matter of Brown v City of Schenectady , 209 AD3d 128, 132-133 [3d Dept 2022]). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Smithgreen1 sentence2024Although "[n]o specific form of a hearing is required, . . . at a minimum the hearing must consist of an adducement of proof coupled with an opportunity to rebut it" ( Matter of Thompson v Thompson , 59 AD3d 1104, 1105 [4th Dept 2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and the court must provide "counsel reasonable opportunity to appear and present respondent's evidence and arguments" ( Matter of Lewis v Crosson , 53 AD2d 1029, 1029 [4th Dept 1976]; see Matter of Smith v Smith , 122 AD2d 546, 547-548 [4th Dept 1986]). | 1 | 1 |
People ex rel. Haynes v. Artusgreen1 sentence2024Here, the court denied respondent's assigned counsel an adjournment to allow her time to prepare for the hearing, for which she had no prior notice, and further prohibited her from conferring with respondent before the court attempted to swear in respondent to testify, and the court in so doing denied respondent his right to counsel and, thus, denied him a fair hearing, prior to sentencing him to a period of incarceration ( see Matter of Worsdale v Holowchak , 170 AD3d 1027 , 1029 [2d Dept 2019]; Matter of Keenan v Keenan , 51 AD3d 1075, 1077-1078 [3d Dept 2008]; see generally People v Spears | 1 | 1 |
People v. Spearsgreen1 sentence2024Here, the court denied respondent's assigned counsel an adjournment to allow her time to prepare for the hearing, for which she had no prior notice, and further prohibited her from conferring with respondent before the court attempted to swear in respondent to testify, and the court in so doing denied respondent his right to counsel and, thus, denied him a fair hearing, prior to sentencing him to a period of incarceration ( see Matter of Worsdale v Holowchak , 170 AD3d 1027 , 1029 [2d Dept 2019]; Matter of Keenan v Keenan , 51 AD3d 1075, 1077-1078 [3d Dept 2008]; see generally People v Spears | 1 | 1 |
Silber v. Sullivan Props., L.P.green1 sentence2024This evidence submitted by the defendant's expert along with plaintiffs testimony that there was no visible debris or defect on the steps shows prima facie that there was no defective or slippery condition in existence when plaintiff fell (see Silber v Sullivan Props., L.P., 182 AD3d 512, 512-13 [1st Dept 2020]). 157391/2021 DE CLEF PINEIRO, JOHN ET AL vs. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Brannongreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Benjamingreen1 sentence2023To conduct a stop and frisk under De Bour level three, the police must at a minimum have “reasonable suspicion that the particular person has committed or is about to commit a crime” (People v Benjamin, 51 NY2d 267, 270 [1980]) or that the person is “armed or dangerous” (People v Carney, 58 NY2d 51, 52 [1982]; see People v Brannon, 16 NY3d 596, 602 [2011] [reasonable suspicion requires “specific and articulable facts which, along with any logical deductions, reasonably prompted the intrusion” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)]). -4- -5- No. 35 Here, Mr. Johnson’s actions, as ob | 1 | 1 |
People v. Carneygreen1 sentence2023To conduct a stop and frisk under De Bour level three, the police must at a minimum have “reasonable suspicion that the particular person has committed or is about to commit a crime” (People v Benjamin, 51 NY2d 267, 270 [1980]) or that the person is “armed or dangerous” (People v Carney, 58 NY2d 51, 52 [1982]; see People v Brannon, 16 NY3d 596, 602 [2011] [reasonable suspicion requires “specific and articulable facts which, along with any logical deductions, reasonably prompted the intrusion” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)]). -4- -5- No. 35 Here, Mr. Johnson’s actions, as ob | 1 | 1 |
| People ex rel. Scott v. Grahamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thomas v. Stanley Reddygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Paradies v. Benedictine Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bernard v. Blockgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gallen v. County of Rocklandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| New York Civil Liberties Union v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Specht v. Pattersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nationwide Insurance v. New York Lighter Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Youssef v. State Board for Professional Medical Conductgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Santosky v. Kramergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Colon Ex Rel. Molina v. Bic USA, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Delaware County Department of Social Services v. Manongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commissioner of Chenango County Department of Social Services v. Bondanzagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes v. City of Cohoesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Florida v. Royergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Stultzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hoagland v. Kampgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Beneventogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Cantor
green
2 sentences2005This is true whether a person submits to the authority of the badge or whether he succumbs to force.” The Court stated, “The minimum requirement for a lawful detentive stop is a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot” (Cantor, 36 NY2d at 114 ). 1994The minimum requirement for a lawful detentive stop is a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (People v Cantor, 36 NY2d 106, 114 .) Throughout the conversations between Trooper Kreppein and the defendant, the attention of the parties was significantly drawn to the dog by its barking. | 12 | 1975–2005 |
People v. Catu
green
2 sentences2009Although there is no mandatory catechism, a minimum requirement for a valid plea is that the defendant understands the direct penal consequences (see People v Catu, 4 NY3d 242 [2005]). 2008Although there is no mandatory catechism, a minimum requirement for a valid plea is that the defendant understands the direct penal consequences (see People v Catu, 4 NY3d 242 [2005]). | 2 | 2008–2009 |
People v. De Bour
green
2 sentences2005This is a level II encounter within the four-tiered De Bour analysis, involving “a somewhat greater intrusion [than a request for information] in that a policeman is entitled to interfere with a citizen to the extent necessary to gain explanatory information, but short of a forcible seizure” (People v De Bour, 40 NY2d at 223 ). 2 As the United States Supreme Court explained in Florida v Royer ( 460 US 491, 498 [1983]): “Prior to Terry v. Ohio, supra, any restraint on the person amounting to a seizure for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment was invalid unless justified by probable cause. 1979The question before the court is whether the police action was "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible” (People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 215 ). | 2 | 1979–2005 |
Quilloin v. Walcott
green
2 sentences2004Peter Stanley had lived with his children and their mother for several years before her death, at which time Illinois child welfare authorities removed the children from his care without a hearing, since Mr. Stanley was not recognized under Illinois as a "parent." The Supreme Court held that an unwed father who had "sired and raised" his children had parental rights that could not be denied without due process, at a minimum a hearing as to his fitness. ( Id. at 651-652 .) Quilloin v Walcott ( 434 US 246 [1978]) illustrates what limitations on unwed fathers' rights the Court found constitutiona 2004Mr. Quilloin, who had never had custody of his son, or provided regular financial support, or sought to legitimate him (until receiving notice of the boy's proposed adoption by the mother's new husband) was not found to have "shouldered any significant responsibility" for his child ( id. at 256 ), and the Court refused to recognize a "right to veto" the adoption by the mother's husband, which would give legal status to an existing family relationship. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Carolyn C. v. Frank G.
green
2 sentences1991(See generally, Social Services Law art 5; legislative findings, L 1969, ch 184, § 1; 18 NYCRR part 352; Matter of Carolyn C. v Frank G., 106 Misc 2d 510 [Fam Ct, NY County 1980].) Where, as here, a parent is unable to fully meet a child’s minimum needs, the parent pays a local Commissioner of Social Services the amount she/he is able in accordance with his/her means and the Commissioner supplements that amount in a payment to the child’s caretaker. 1991(See generally, Social Services Law part 5; Legislative Findings, L 1969, ch 184, § 1; 18 NYCRR part 352; Matter of Carolyn C. v Frank G., 106 Misc 2d 510 [Fam Ct, NY County 1980].) By setting a minimum standard, the Legislature has declared New York’s public policy that no child should live below that level. | 2 | 1991–1991 |
Sibron v. New York
green
2 sentences1975Our court has consistently limited this power when it has been exercised solely on the basis of vague suspicion or as a means of harassment (see, e.g., People v. Stokes, 32 N Y 2d 202; People v. Schanbarger, 24 N Y 2d 288; Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 )” (accord People v Buffolino, 48 AD2d 904 ). 1975Our court has consistently limited this power when it has been exercised solely on the basis of vague suspicion or as a means of harassment (see, e.g., People v. Stokes, 32 N Y 2d 202; People v. Schanbarger, 24 N Y 2d 288; Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40).” Here, Patrolman Carter’s testimony was that he saw the defendant and another man crouching behind a car and that the defendant had an object in his hand. | 2 | 1975–1975 |
United States v. Salvador Bugarin-Casas
green
2 sentences1975To quote again from People v Cantor (supra, p 114 ): "The minimum requirement for a lawful detentive stop is a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot (e.g., United States v. Ward, 488 F. 2d 162 ; United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F. 2d 853 , cert. den. 414 U. S. 1136 ). 1975The minimum requirement for a lawful detentive stop is a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot (e.g., United States v. Ward, 488 F. 2d 162 ; United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F. 2d 853 , cert. den. 414 U. S. 1136 ). | 2 | 1975–1975 |
United States v. Robert Portsche Ward
green
2 sentences1975To quote again from People v Cantor (supra, p 114 ): "The minimum requirement for a lawful detentive stop is a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot (e.g., United States v. Ward, 488 F. 2d 162 ; United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F. 2d 853 , cert. den. 414 U. S. 1136 ). 1975The minimum requirement for a lawful detentive stop is a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot (e.g., United States v. Ward, 488 F. 2d 162 ; United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F. 2d 853 , cert. den. 414 U. S. 1136 ). | 2 | 1975–1975 |
Hanson v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Industries, Inc.
green
2 sentences1975To quote again from People v Cantor (supra, p 114 ): "The minimum requirement for a lawful detentive stop is a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot (e.g., United States v. Ward, 488 F. 2d 162 ; United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F. 2d 853 , cert. den. 414 U. S. 1136 ). 1975The minimum requirement for a lawful detentive stop is a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot (e.g., United States v. Ward, 488 F. 2d 162 ; United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F. 2d 853 , cert. den. 414 U. S. 1136 ). | 2 | 1975–1975 |
Wisconsin Department of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co.
green
1 sentence2026Consistent with that purpose, the statute establishes a functional standard for immunity — activities that are solely solicitation — that must be applied across a wide range of business practices ( see Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v William Wrigley, Jr., Co. , 505 US at 228-229 ). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Fritz v. Sports Authority green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Lopez v. New York City Department of Environmental Protection green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Morgenthau v. Khalil green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Howard v. Stanger green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Wilson v. Dantas green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Lopez green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Respeto v. McNab green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Zeigler v. Morgenthau green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Dickson v. Morgenthau green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Colcloughley v. Johnson green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. McElveen green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| In Re WINSHIP green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Pardo green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Long green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Liquore v. Tri-Arc Manufacturing Co. neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| In re Tajani B. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Mercogliano v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Strickland v. Washington green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Powlowski v. Wullich green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Terry v. Ohio green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| People v. Baldi green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Stanley v. Illinois green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Saarinen v. Kerr green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Mulverhill v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Ballard v. Community Home Care Referral Service, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.