28 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Downey v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Const. art. 3, § 26; see also Downey v. State, 144 So. 3d 146, 152 (¶9) (Miss. 2014) (“Davis does not require Mississippi to follow the minimum standard that the federal government has set for itself. 2019Four years later, however, our Supreme Court stated that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in “Davis does not require Mississippi to follow the minimum standard that the federal government has set for itself.” Downey v. State, 144 So. 3d 146, 151 (¶9) (Miss. 2014). | 6 | 6 |
Kelley v. Fredericgreen2 sentences2010And, as discussed in more detail in 6 Drummond v. Buckley, 627 So. 2d 264, 268 (Miss. 1993) (citing Kelley v. Frederic, 573 So. 2d 1385, 1387 (Miss. 1990); Palmer v. Biloxi Reg'l Med. 2005Kelley v. Frederic, 573 So.2d 1385, 1387 (Miss.1990); Palmer v. Biloxi Reg'l Med. | 4 | 4 |
State v. Quitman Countygreen2 sentences2005See State v. Quitman County, 807 So.2d 401, 408-09 (Miss.2001) ( "Quitman I" ). 2003See State v. Quitman County, 807 So.2d 401, 408-09 (Miss. 2001) (“Quitman I”). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Koestler for Benefit of Koestlergreen2 sentences1997The Act but reinforces the point when it empowers the parties to contract for coverage `over the minimum requirement.'" Koestler, 608 So.2d at 1263 . 1994The Act but reinforces the point when it empowers the parties to contract for coverage "over the minimum requirement." Koestler, 608 So.2d at 1263 . | 1 | 3 |
Drummond v. Buckleygreen2 sentences2010And, as discussed in more detail in 6 Drummond v. Buckley, 627 So. 2d 264, 268 (Miss. 1993) (citing Kelley v. Frederic, 573 So. 2d 1385, 1387 (Miss. 1990); Palmer v. Biloxi Reg'l Med. 1997Id. at 268 . ¶38. | 1 | 2 |
Phillips by and Through Phillips v. Hullgreen2 sentences2003Kelley v. Frederic, 573 So.2d 1385, 1387 (Miss.1990); Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1354-55 (Miss.1990); Phillips By and Through Phillips v. Hull, 516 So.2d 488, 491 (Miss.1987); Cole v. Wiggins, 487 So.2d 203, 205 (Miss.1986). "[I]n a medical malpractice action, negligence cannot be established without medical testimony that the defendant failed to use ordinary skill and care." Hull, 516 So.2d at 491 ; see also Walker v. Skiwski, 529 So.2d 184, 187 (Miss.1988) ("Our general rule is that *439 the negligence of a physician may be established only by expert medi 2003Kelley v. Frederic, 573 So.2d 1385, 1387 (Miss.1990); Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1354-55 (Miss.1990); Phillips By and Through Phillips v. Hull, 516 So.2d 488, 491 (Miss.1987); Cole v. Wiggins, 487 So.2d 203, 205 (Miss.1986). "[I]n a medical malpractice action, negligence cannot be established without medical testimony that the defendant failed to use ordinary skill and care." Hull, 516 So.2d at 491 ; see also Walker v. Skiwski, 529 So.2d 184, 187 (Miss.1988) ("Our general rule is that *439 the negligence of a physician may be established only by expert medi | 1 | 2 |
Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc.green2 sentences2003Kelley v. Frederic, 573 So.2d 1385, 1387 (Miss.1990); Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1354-55 (Miss.1990); Phillips By and Through Phillips v. Hull, 516 So.2d 488, 491 (Miss.1987); Cole v. Wiggins, 487 So.2d 203, 205 (Miss.1986). "[I]n a medical malpractice action, negligence cannot be established without medical testimony that the defendant failed to use ordinary skill and care." Hull, 516 So.2d at 491 ; see also Walker v. Skiwski, 529 So.2d 184, 187 (Miss.1988) ("Our general rule is that *439 the negligence of a physician may be established only by expert medi 1993Kelley v. Frederic, 573 So.2d 1385, 1387 (Miss. 1990); Palmer, 564 So.2d at 1355 ; Phillips, 516 So.2d at 491 . | 1 | 2 |
Harris Ex Rel. Harris v. McCraygreen1 sentence2009Id. at 196(¶ 29) (McRae, P.J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
Mississippi Dept. of Transp. v. Cargilegreen1 sentence2007As in Jones , MDOT has a duty to warn of dangerous conditions if given notice, either actual or constructive, of a dangerous condition." Accordingly, "[i]mmunity for discretionary duties is granted only when ordinary care is used." Cargile, 847 So.2d at 269 (¶ 44) (citing Brewer v. Burdette, 768 So.2d 920 (Miss.2000)). | 1 | 1 |
Walker by and Through Walker v. Skiwskigreen1 sentence2003Kelley v. Frederic, 573 So.2d 1385, 1387 (Miss.1990); Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1354-55 (Miss.1990); Phillips By and Through Phillips v. Hull, 516 So.2d 488, 491 (Miss.1987); Cole v. Wiggins, 487 So.2d 203, 205 (Miss.1986). "[I]n a medical malpractice action, negligence cannot be established without medical testimony that the defendant failed to use ordinary skill and care." Hull, 516 So.2d at 491 ; see also Walker v. Skiwski, 529 So.2d 184, 187 (Miss.1988) ("Our general rule is that *439 the negligence of a physician may be established only by expert medi | 1 | 1 |
Cole v. Wigginsgreen1 sentence2003Kelley v. Frederic, 573 So.2d 1385, 1387 (Miss.1990); Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1354-55 (Miss.1990); Phillips By and Through Phillips v. Hull, 516 So.2d 488, 491 (Miss.1987); Cole v. Wiggins, 487 So.2d 203, 205 (Miss.1986). "[I]n a medical malpractice action, negligence cannot be established without medical testimony that the defendant failed to use ordinary skill and care." Hull, 516 So.2d at 491 ; see also Walker v. Skiwski, 529 So.2d 184, 187 (Miss.1988) ("Our general rule is that *439 the negligence of a physician may be established only by expert medi | 1 | 1 |
Porter v. Shelter General Insurancegreen1 sentence1994See also Porter v. Shelter General Insurance Co., 678 F. Supp. 151, 152-53 (S.D.Miss. 1988); Williams v. Buckelew, 246 So.2d 58, 68 (La. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Buckelewgreen1 sentence1994See also Porter v. Shelter General Insurance Co., 678 F. Supp. 151, 152-53 (S.D.Miss. 1988); Williams v. Buckelew, 246 So.2d 58, 68 (La. | 1 | 1 |
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Acostagreen1 sentence1992See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Acosta, 479 So.2d 1089 (Miss. 1985); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Scitzs, 394 So.2d 1371, 1372-73 (Miss. 1981); see also, Tucker v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 609 F. Supp. 1574, 1580 (S.D.Miss. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
Tucker v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.green1 sentence1992See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Acosta, 479 So.2d 1089 (Miss. 1985); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Scitzs, 394 So.2d 1371, 1372-73 (Miss. 1981); see also, Tucker v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 609 F. Supp. 1574, 1580 (S.D.Miss. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Scitzsgreen1 sentence1992See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Acosta, 479 So.2d 1089 (Miss. 1985); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Scitzs, 394 So.2d 1371, 1372-73 (Miss. 1981); see also, Tucker v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 609 F. Supp. 1574, 1580 (S.D.Miss. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
LW v. McComb Separate Mun. School Dist.
green
2 sentences2003"Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9 requires a minimum standard of ordinary care." Jones, 744 So.2d at 263 (quoting L.W., 754 So.2d at 1141 ). [7] "[P]ublic schools have a responsibility to provide a safe environment for students; therefore ordinary care and reasonable steps must be taken to minimize risk to students.... 2001Code Ann. § 11-46-9 requires a minimum standard of ordinary care." Jones, 744 So.2d at 263 (quoting L.W., 754 So.2d at 1141 ).7 "[P]ublic schools have a responsibility to provide a safe environment for students; therefore ordinary care and reasonable steps must be taken to minimize risk to students .... | 2 | 2001–2003 |
Stewart Ex Rel. Womack v. City of Jackson
green
2 sentences2003In other words, ordinary care must have been used before a school can use the statutory shield of immunity." Stewart, 804 So.2d at 1049 (quoting Pearl Pub. 2001In other words, ordinary care must have been used before a school can use the statutory shield of immunity." Stewart, 804 So.2d at 1049 (quoting Pearl Pub. | 2 | 2001–2003 |
Jones v. Mississippi Dept. of Transp.
green
2 sentences2003"Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9 requires a minimum standard of ordinary care." Jones, 744 So.2d at 263 (quoting L.W., 754 So.2d at 1141 ). [7] "[P]ublic schools have a responsibility to provide a safe environment for students; therefore ordinary care and reasonable steps must be taken to minimize risk to students.... 2001Code Ann. § 11-46-9 requires a minimum standard of ordinary care." Jones, 744 So.2d at 263 (quoting L.W., 754 So.2d at 1141 ).7 "[P]ublic schools have a responsibility to provide a safe environment for students; therefore ordinary care and reasonable steps must be taken to minimize risk to students .... | 2 | 2001–2003 |
Smith v. Robbins
green
2 sentences2001Regarding the procedure Hughes's counsel followed, the Fifth Circuit noted that [I]f Hughes's counsel followed a procedure that "afford[ed] adequate and effective appellate review to indigent defendants" and therefore "reasonably ensure[d] that an indigent's appeal [would] be resolved in a way that [was] related to the merit of that appeal," Robbins , 528 U.S. [259] at [276], 120 *1254 S.Ct. [746] at 758, [ 145 L.Ed.2d 756 ], he was not constructively denied appellate counsel. 1999Regarding the procedure Hughes's counsel followed, the Fifth Circuit noted that [I]f Hughes's counsel followed a procedure that "afford[ed] adequate and effective appellate review to indigent defendants" and therefore "reasonably ensure[d] that an indigent's appeal [would] be resolved in a way that [was] related to the merit of that appeal," Robbins, --- U.S. at ----, 120 S.Ct. at 758 , he was not constructively denied appellate counsel. | 2 | 1999–2001 |
California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra
green
2 sentences2015In some instances, depending on the provision, the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of a constitutional right or standard can be considered as a floor, and our interpretation of a similar right under the Mississippi Constitution can create a ceiling, so long as it- does not pose a conflict.' See California Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 , 107 S.Ct. 683, 689 , 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987) (holding that a a state’s pregnancy discrimination law can go beyond the requirements of the federal Title VII); Downey v. State, 144 So.3d 146, 151 (Miss.2014) (“[Supreme Cour 2015In some instances, depending on the provision, the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of a constitutional right or standard can be considered as a floor, and our interpretation of a similar right under the Mississippi Constitution can create a ceiling, so long as it- does not pose a conflict.' See California Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 , 107 S.Ct. 683, 689 , 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987) (holding that a a state’s pregnancy discrimination law can go beyond the requirements of the federal Title VII); Downey v. State, 144 So.3d 146, 151 (Miss.2014) (“[Supreme Cour | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Gagnon v. Scarpelli
red
2 sentences2011First outlined by the Supreme Court in Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that there is no per se right to an appointed attorney at revocation hearings, but the appointment of an attorney is to be made on a case-by-case basis. 2011First outlined by the Supreme Court in Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that there is no per se right to an appointed attorney at revocation hearings, but the appointment of an attorney is to be made on a case-by-case basis. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Brewer v. Burdette
green
1 sentence2007As in Jones , MDOT has a duty to warn of dangerous conditions if given notice, either actual or constructive, of a dangerous condition." Accordingly, "[i]mmunity for discretionary duties is granted only when ordinary care is used." Cargile, 847 So.2d at 269 (¶ 44) (citing Brewer v. Burdette, 768 So.2d 920 (Miss.2000)). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Rogers v. Rogers
green
1 sentence2007Rogers, 662 So.2d at 1115 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.
green
1 sentence2000Id. at 868-870 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick
green
2 sentences1997Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 283-84 , 115 S.Ct. 1483, 1485-86 , 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995). 1997Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 283-84 , 115 S.Ct. 1483, 1485-86 , 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Roberts v. Mississippi Power & Light Co.
green
2 sentences1967Whereas a height of 13 1/2 feet from the ground was considered to be adequate for an electric line in 1942 (Roberts v. Mississippi *357 Power & Light Company, 193 Miss. 627 , 10 So.2d 542 (1942), the Legislature of Mississippi amended section 2778, Mississippi Code of 1942, by Chapter 418, Laws 1962, so as to require electric companies in all cases to construct lines so as to meet specifications of the National Electric Safety Code as a minimum requirement. 1967Whereas a height of 13 1/2 feet from the ground was considered to be adequate for an electric line in 1942 (Roberts v. Mississippi *357 Power & Light Company, 193 Miss. 627 , 10 So.2d 542 (1942), the Legislature of Mississippi amended section 2778, Mississippi Code of 1942, by Chapter 418, Laws 1962, so as to require electric companies in all cases to construct lines so as to meet specifications of the National Electric Safety Code as a minimum requirement. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.