16 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1925–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Newville v. State, Dept. of Family Servicesgreen2 sentences2026“The rationale for requiring expert testimony to establish a standard of care for professionals acting in their professional capacity is that such professionals are required to possess a minimum standard of special knowledge and ability, and as a result juries which are composed of laypersons are normally incompetent to pass judgment on such questions without the assistance of expert testimony.” Newville v. Dep’t of Family Servs., 267 Mont. 237, 257 , 883 P.2d 793, 805 (1994) (citation omitted). ¶18 As we’ve previously noted, the administrative record in this case totals approximately 2000 pag 2026“The rationale for requiring expert testimony to establish a standard of care for professionals acting in their professional capacity is that such professionals are required to possess a minimum standard of special knowledge and ability, and as a result juries which are composed of laypersons are normally incompetent to pass judgment on such questions without the assistance of expert testimony.” Newville v. Dep’t of Family Servs., 267 Mont. 237, 257 , 883 P.2d 793, 805 (1994) (citation omitted). ¶18 As we’ve previously noted, the administrative record in this case totals approximately 2000 pag | 2 | 3 |
Martel v. Montana Power Co.green2 sentences2009See Martel v. Montana Power Co., 231 Mont. 96, 104 , 752 P.2d 140, 145 (1988). ¶143 The Court asserts that Tejvidence of Evenflo’s good faith effort to comply with all government regulations, including FMVSS 213, ‘would be evidence of conduct inconsistent with the mental state requisite for punitive damages.’ ” Opinion, ¶ 99 (quoting Sunburst, ¶ 81). 2009See Martel v. Montana Power Co., 231 Mont. 96, 104 , 752 P.2d 140, 145 (1988). ¶143 The Court asserts that Tejvidence of Evenflo’s good faith effort to comply with all government regulations, including FMVSS 213, ‘would be evidence of conduct inconsistent with the mental state requisite for punitive damages.’ ” Opinion, ¶ 99 (quoting Sunburst, ¶ 81). | 2 | 2 |
Carlson v. Mortongreen2 sentences2014Newville v. Dept. of Family Servs., 267 Mont. 237, 257 , 883 P.2d 793, 805 (1994) (citing Carlson v. Morton, 229 Mont. 234, 239-40 , 745 P.2d 1133, 1137 (1987)). ¶13 Dulaney argues that the standard of care of an insurance agent procuring coverage is a matter of common knowledge, and does not involve overly technical, scientific, or specialized knowledge. 2014Newville v. Dept. of Family Servs., 267 Mont. 237, 257 , 883 P.2d 793, 805 (1994) (citing Carlson v. Morton, 229 Mont. 234, 239-40 , 745 P.2d 1133, 1137 (1987)). ¶13 Dulaney argues that the standard of care of an insurance agent procuring coverage is a matter of common knowledge, and does not involve overly technical, scientific, or specialized knowledge. | 1 | 2 |
Lutz v. National Crane Corp.green2 sentences2009The court pointed to Lutz v. National Crane Corp., 267 Mont. 368, 385 , 884 P.2d 455, 465 (1994). 2009The court pointed to Lutz v. National Crane Corp., 267 Mont. 368, 385 , 884 P.2d 455, 465 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Workman v. McIntyre Construction Co.green2 sentences1998See also Workman, 190 Mont. at 21 , 617 P.2d at 1290 (the MUTCD is promulgated by the Montana Highway Department and may be considered a standard or norm to be used for traffic control devices) (quoting Runkle, 188 Mont. 286 , 613 P.2d 982 ). ¶ 17 However, evidence of compliance with the MUTCD does not necessarily establish due care because the MUTCD, like any other national industry standard or code, is only a minimum standard. 1998See also Workman, 190 Mont. at 21 , 617 P.2d at 1290 (the MUTCD is promulgated by the Montana Highway Department and may be considered a standard or norm to be used for traffic control devices) (quoting Runkle, 188 Mont. 286 , 613 P.2d 982 ). ¶ 17 However, evidence of compliance with the MUTCD does not necessarily establish due care because the MUTCD, like any other national industry standard or code, is only a minimum standard. | 1 | 1 |
Runkle v. Burlington Northerngreen2 sentences1998See also Workman, 190 Mont. at 21 , 617 P.2d at 1290 (the MUTCD is promulgated by the Montana Highway Department and may be considered a standard or norm to be used for traffic control devices) (quoting Runkle, 188 Mont. 286 , 613 P.2d 982 ). ¶ 17 However, evidence of compliance with the MUTCD does not necessarily establish due care because the MUTCD, like any other national industry standard or code, is only a minimum standard. 1998See also Workman, 190 Mont. at 21 , 617 P.2d at 1290 (the MUTCD is promulgated by the Montana Highway Department and may be considered a standard or norm to be used for traffic control devices) (quoting Runkle, 188 Mont. 286 , 613 P.2d 982 ). ¶ 17 However, evidence of compliance with the MUTCD does not necessarily establish due care because the MUTCD, like any other national industry standard or code, is only a minimum standard. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re A.S.
green
1 sentence2023In re A.S., 2004 MT 62, ¶ 26 , 320 Mont. 268 , 87 P.3d 408 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In Re As
green
2 sentences2023In re A.S., 2004 MT 62, ¶ 26 , 320 Mont. 268 , 87 P.3d 408 . 2023In re A.S., 2004 MT 62, ¶ 26 , 320 Mont. 268 , 87 P.3d 408 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Becker
green
2 sentences2021The minimum standard of care demands that trial counsel “evaluate the statute under which [their] client was charged and advise [] accordingly.” State v. Becker, 2005 MT 75, ¶ 19 , 326 Mont. 364 , 110 P.3d 1 . 2021The minimum standard of care demands that trial counsel “evaluate the statute under which [their] client was charged and advise [] accordingly.” State v. Becker, 2005 MT 75, ¶ 19 , 326 Mont. 364 , 110 P.3d 1 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Clausell v. State
green
2 sentences2011We have noted that ‘la] defense counsel’s use of objections lies within his or her discretion” and “[i]t is also not beyond the realm of reasonableness that defense counsel would not object during certain times of the trial so as not to confuse the jury or bring undue attention to the prosecution’s case.” Clausell v. State, 2005 MT 33, ¶ 20 , 326 Mont. 63 , 106 P.3d 1175 . ¶52 While not objecting to this portion of Kemp’s testimony, Olson vigorously cross-examined Kemp and distinguished Kemp’s testimony from the defense expert’s testimony as to the cause of Kvelstad’s death. 2011We have noted that ‘la] defense counsel’s use of objections lies within his or her discretion” and “[i]t is also not beyond the realm of reasonableness that defense counsel would not object during certain times of the trial so as not to confuse the jury or bring undue attention to the prosecution’s case.” Clausell v. State, 2005 MT 33, ¶ 20 , 326 Mont. 63 , 106 P.3d 1175 . ¶52 While not objecting to this portion of Kemp’s testimony, Olson vigorously cross-examined Kemp and distinguished Kemp’s testimony from the defense expert’s testimony as to the cause of Kvelstad’s death. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Berry v. KRTV Communications, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003Berry v. KRTV Communications, Inc. (1993), 262 Mont. 415, 420 , 865 P.2d 1104, 1107-108 . 2003Berry v. KRTV Communications, Inc. (1993), 262 Mont. 415, 420 , 865 P.2d 1104, 1107-108 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Durbin v. Ross
green
2 sentences2000Durbin, 276 Mont. at 469 , 916 P.2d at 761-62 . ¶68 In Newville v. State Department of Family Services (1994), 267 Mont. 237, 257 , 883 P.2d 793, 805 , we stated that: It is the rule in Montana that expert testimony is required as to the standard of care, and as to the professional’s violation of that standard of care, before a trier of fact may find such professional negligent. • The rationale for requiring expert testimony to establish a standard of care for professionals acting in their professional capacity is that such professionals are required to possess a minimum standard of special kn 2000Durbin, 276 Mont. at 469 , 916 P.2d at 761-62 . ¶68 In Newville v. State Department of Family Services (1994), 267 Mont. 237, 257 , 883 P.2d 793, 805 , we stated that: It is the rule in Montana that expert testimony is required as to the standard of care, and as to the professional’s violation of that standard of care, before a trier of fact may find such professional negligent. • The rationale for requiring expert testimony to establish a standard of care for professionals acting in their professional capacity is that such professionals are required to possess a minimum standard of special kn | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Godfrey v. Pilon
green
2 sentences1998Godfrey, 165 Mont. at 446 , 529 P.2d at 1375 . ¶24 Following our reasoning in Godfrey , an apparent easement need not be so formal as to be an improved, paved, or even graveled two-way road. 1998Godfrey, 165 Mont. at 446 , 529 P.2d at 1375 . ¶24 Following our reasoning in Godfrey , an apparent easement need not be so formal as to be an improved, paved, or even graveled two-way road. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Nicholson v. United Pacific Insurance
green
2 sentences1987Here the majority strikes Instruction No. 24 because “the minimum requirement for the tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is actions by the defendant which are arbitrarily, capricious, or unreasonable, and exceeded plaintiffs justifiable expectation.” That statement finds its origin in Nicholson v. United Pacific Insurance Company (Mont. 1985), [ 219 Mont. 32 ,] 710 P.2d 1342 , 42 St.Rep. 1822 . 1987Here the majority strikes Instruction No. 24 because “the minimum requirement for the tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is actions by the defendant which are arbitrarily, capricious, or unreasonable, and exceeded plaintiffs justifiable expectation.” That statement finds its origin in Nicholson v. United Pacific Insurance Company (Mont. 1985), [ 219 Mont. 32 ,] 710 P.2d 1342 , 42 St.Rep. 1822 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
August v. Burns
green
2 sentences1977This Court stated 50 years ago in August v. Burns, 79 Mont. 198, 219-220 , 255 P. 737 (1927): “ * * * in a proper proceeding a child may be taken from a surviving parent, or from both parents, when it appears that such are not proper persons to have the custody of the child. 1977This Court stated 50 years ago in August v. Burns, 79 Mont. 198, 219-220 , 255 P. 737 (1927): “ * * * in a proper proceeding a child may be taken from a surviving parent, or from both parents, when it appears that such are not proper persons to have the custody of the child. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Suburban Homes Co. v. North
green
2 sentences1943In Suburban Homes Co. v. North, 50 Mont. 108 , 145 Pac. 2, 4 , Ann. 1943In Suburban Homes Co. v. North, 50 Mont. 108 , 145 Pac. 2, 4 , Ann. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Fratt v. Daniels-Jones Co.
neutral
2 sentences1943In Pratt v. Daniels-Jones Co., 47 Mont. 487 , 133 Pac. 700, 703 , this court said: “Whatever may be the correct interpretation of the language of that section [8658], this much is apparent : the very minimum requirement is that the party invoking the protection afforded by that section must set forth facts [in his pleadings] which will appeal to the conscience of a court of equity.” We have said over and over again that the one seeking relief from a forfeiture under section 8658, Revised Codes, must set out in his pleadings specific allegations of ultimate fact to show that he has not been gui 1943In Pratt v. Daniels-Jones Co., 47 Mont. 487 , 133 Pac. 700, 703 , this court said: “Whatever may be the correct interpretation of the language of that section [8658], this much is apparent : the very minimum requirement is that the party invoking the protection afforded by that section must set forth facts [in his pleadings] which will appeal to the conscience of a court of equity.” We have said over and over again that the one seeking relief from a forfeiture under section 8658, Revised Codes, must set out in his pleadings specific allegations of ultimate fact to show that he has not been gui | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Arnold v. Custer County
neutral
2 sentences1935This court has heretofore had occasion to comment upon and compare the two methods of running down the title to a tract of land, i. e., from the indices in the clerk’s office and from a “tract index,” and has said: “It appears that the latter is the only safe, reliable, and feasible method.” (Arnold v. Custer County, 83 Mont. 130 , 269 Pac. 396, 399 .) It is undisputed in the record that “the minimum requirement” of the terms used in the Act is “a tract index showing all instruments affecting all pieces of property in the county.” Such requirement increases the protection of the public in rely 1935This court has heretofore had occasion to comment upon and compare the two methods of running down the title to a tract of land, i. e., from the indices in the clerk’s office and from a “tract index,” and has said: “It appears that the latter is the only safe, reliable, and feasible method.” (Arnold v. Custer County, 83 Mont. 130 , 269 Pac. 396, 399 .) It is undisputed in the record that “the minimum requirement” of the terms used in the Act is “a tract index showing all instruments affecting all pieces of property in the county.” Such requirement increases the protection of the public in rely | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Chipman
green
2 sentences1925As to whether he was entitled to recover back what he had expended on the premises under the contract would depend upon whether he brought himself within the provisions of section 8658, Revised Codes of 1921, which reads: “Whenever, by the terms of an obligation, a party thereto incurs a forfeiture, or a loss in the nature of a forfeiture, by reason of his failure to comply with its provisions, he may be relieved therefrom, upon making full compensation to the other party, except in case of a grossly negligent, willful, or fraudulent breach of duty.” Of this section this court has said: “Whate 1925As to whether he was entitled to recover back what he had expended on the premises under the contract would depend upon whether he brought himself within the provisions of section 8658, Revised Codes of 1921, which reads: “Whenever, by the terms of an obligation, a party thereto incurs a forfeiture, or a loss in the nature of a forfeiture, by reason of his failure to comply with its provisions, he may be relieved therefrom, upon making full compensation to the other party, except in case of a grossly negligent, willful, or fraudulent breach of duty.” Of this section this court has said: “Whate | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.