minimum standard in Florida

2020In the context of the statute of limitations, our supreme court has held that a “profession” means “any vocation requiring at a minimum a four-year college degree before licensing is possible in Florida.” Garden v. Frier, 602 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (Fla. 1992); see also Pierce v. AALL Ins., Inc., 531 So. 2d 84, 87 (Fla. 1988) (“[F]or purposes of the professional malpractice statute of limitations, we define a profession as a vocation requiring, as a minimum standard, a college degree in the specific field.”)1; Pensacola Exec.

1991In other words, if, under the laws and administrative rules of this state, a person can only be licensed to practice an occupation upon completion of a four-year college degree in that field, then that occupation is a profession.” Id. at 87 (emphasis added).

2025The rules opinion explained that this former judge concluded that article V, section 4(a) "sets only a minimum standard and does not prohibit en banc review by district courts of appeal." In re Rule 9.331, 374 So. 2d at 993 .

2019The Appellate Structure Commission relied on a 1961 memorandum of law by a former district court of appeal judge who concluded that "this constitutional provision sets only a minimum standard and does not prohibit en banc review by district courts of appeal." In re Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 374 So. 2d 992, 993 (Fla. 1979).

2009Id. at 23-24 (emphasis added).

2009Id. at 23-24 (emphasis added).

2017Morris v. State, 931 So. 2d 821, 827-28 (Fla. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ).

2017Morris v. State, 931 So.2d 821, 827-28 (Fla. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ).

1980See Gasson v. Gay, supra, 49 So.2d 525 .

1956See Gasson v. Gay, supra, 49 So.2d 525 .

1986We, therefore, cannot ascertain whether the minimum standard requirements for adequate representation were met, as required in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by the Florida Supreme Court. 1 Nor can we make any determination as to the possibly faulty entry of the guilty plea.

1986We, therefore, cannot ascertain whether the minimum standard requirements for adequate representation were met, as required in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by the Florida Supreme Court. 1 Nor can we make any determination as to the possibly faulty entry of the guilty plea.

2011To protect that privacy from official arbitrariness, the Court always has regarded probable cause as the minimum requirement for a lawful search." United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 , 95 S.Ct. 2585 , 45 L.Ed.2d 623 (1975) (footnote omitted).

2011To protect that privacy from official arbitrariness, the Court always has regarded probable cause as the minimum requirement for a lawful search." United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 , 95 S.Ct. 2585 , 45 L.Ed.2d 623 (1975) (footnote omitted).

2021Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 471 (1972). 7 In the instant case, the incidents alleged by Ramos involving the teaching assistant were indubitably relevant to both bias and motive.

2020In the context of the statute of limitations, our supreme court has held that a “profession” means “any vocation requiring at a minimum a four-year college degree before licensing is possible in Florida.” Garden v. Frier, 602 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (Fla. 1992); see also Pierce v. AALL Ins., Inc., 531 So. 2d 84, 87 (Fla. 1988) (“[F]or purposes of the professional malpractice statute of limitations, we define a profession as a vocation requiring, as a minimum standard, a college degree in the specific field.”)1; Pensacola Exec.

2013Within this context, the Eighth Amendment provides “a guarantee of proportionality” that “acts as a minimum standard.” Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521, 525 (Fla.1993).

2013Finally, we note that although the courts have applied a minimum requirement to what constitutes an adequate alternative forum, see, e.g., Leon, 251 F.3d at 1311 (explaining that “courts have not always required that defendants do much to refute allegations of partiality and inefficiency in the alternative forum”), the allegations from the plaintiffs expert in this case, while not tested through an eviden-tiary hearing, are of concern.

2006See In re: Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure, 374 So.2d at 993 . [5] For example, since the supreme court established its harmless beyond a reasonable doubt review standard in State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986), this court has applied that standard in over 100 written opinions, and a substantial number of them have rejected the state's harmless error argument. [6] While I agree with the result reached by the majority on the restitution issue, I question its overall importance in light of how rarely a local government is a victim and because this is an issue which can easily be remedi

2002State v. Kalogeropolous, 758 So.2d 110, 112 (Fla.2000).

2002In the instant case, the State's traverse indeed added additional material facts, even without the allegation relating to the single piece of cocaine, that met the minimum requirement of a prima facie case of constructive possession. "[I]n the case of a jointly-occupied vehicle, knowledge and ability to control the contraband may not be inferred, but must be established by independent proof." Downard v. State, 793 So.2d 83, 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

1996See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (A reviewing court must find a statute unconstitutionally vague if the statute fails to give adequate notice or the requisite definite warning of what conduct is prohibited.).

1996See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (A reviewing court must find a statute unconstitutionally vague if the statute fails to give adequate notice or the requisite definite warning of what conduct is prohibited.).

1987The constitutional theory on which the Court has based this rule is that the above-stated Florida constitutional provision "`sets only a minimum standard and does not prohibit en banc review by district courts of appeal,'" In re Rule 9.331, 374 So.2d 992, 993 (Fla. 1979) (quoting the Appellate Structure Commission's Report), modified on other grounds, 377 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1979), 416 So.2d 1127 (Fla. 1982); stated differently, the Court has "construed the `three judges shall consider each case' language of [A]rticle V, [S]ection 4[a] [of the Florida Constitution], as not restricting the district

1985See Tafero v. State, 459 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 1984).