minimum standard (North Carolina) · Go Syfert
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minimum standard in North Carolina

29 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1941–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. McGradygreen
nc · 2016 · cited in 3 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2016–2022
2 sentences

2016The testimony must go beyond meeting the minimum standard for logical relevance established by Rule 401; it must “assist the trier of fact” by providing “insight beyond the conclusions that jurors can readily draw from their own experiences,” and “do more than invite the jury to ‘substitut[e] [the expert’s] judgment of the meaning of the facts of the case’ for its own.” McGrady, 368 N.C. at 889 , 787 S.E.2d at 8 (first quoting N.C.

2016The testimony must go beyond meeting the minimum standard for logical relevance established by Rule 401; it must “assist the trier of fact” by providing “insight beyond the conclusions that jurors can readily draw from their own experiences,” and “do more than invite the jury to ‘substitut[e] [the expert’s] judgment of the meaning of the facts of the case’ for its own.” McGrady, 368 N.C. at 889 , 787 S.E.2d at 8 (first quoting N.C.

33
Leandro v. Stategreen
nc · 1997 · cited in 2 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
2 sentences

2020“An education that does not serve the purpose of preparing students to participate and compete in the society in which they live and work is devoid of substance and is constitutionally inadequate.” Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 345 , 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (1997).

2020“An education that does not serve the purpose of preparing students to participate and compete in the society in which they live and work is devoid of substance and is constitutionally inadequate.” Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 345 , 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (1997).

22
Patterson v. LM PARKER & COMPANYgreen
ncctapp · 1968 · cited in 4 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1982–2010
2 sentences

2007However, "[i]f the defendant had [three] or more 'regularly employed' employees, the fact that he fell below the minimum requirement on the actual date of injury would not preclude coverage." Id.

1996In considering whether defendants had four or more regularly employed workers, “the fact that [the employer] fell below the minimum requirement on the actual date of injury would not preclude coverage.” Patterson, 2 N.C.

14
Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd.red
nc · 2004 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016See Howerton, 358 N.C. at 462 , 597 S.E.2d at 688 (“[W]e defer to the traditional definition of relevancy set forth in the North Carolina Rules of Evidence ....” (citing N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2003))).

11
In the Matter of Yocumred
nc · 2003 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016See Howerton, 358 N.C. at 462 , 597 S.E.2d at 688 (“[W]e defer to the traditional definition of relevancy set forth in the North Carolina Rules of Evidence ....” (citing N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2003))).

11
State v. Raelgreen
nc · 1988 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010“The issue of the competency of a witness to testify rests in the sound discretion of the trial court based upon its observation of the witness.” State v. Rael, 321 N.C. 528, 532 , 364 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1988).

2010“The issue of the competency of a witness to testify rests in the sound discretion of the trial court based upon its observation of the witness.” State v. Rael, 321 N.C. 528, 532 , 364 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1988).

11
State v. DeLeonardogreen
nc · 1986 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010“This subdivision (b) establishes a minimum standard for competency of a witness ... .” State v. DeLeonardo, 315 N.C. 762, 766 , 340 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1986).

2010“This subdivision (b) establishes a minimum standard for competency of a witness ... .” State v. DeLeonardo, 315 N.C. 762, 766 , 340 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1986).

11
Hart v. Iveygreen
nc · 1992 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006App. at 16 , 303 S.E.2d at 593 ; see also Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co., 349 N.C. 196, 202 , 505 S.E.2d 131, 135 (1998) (common law negligence claim may be maintained against commercial vendor based upon sale of alcohol to underage individual); Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299, 305 , 420 S.E.2d 174, 178 (1992) (common law negligence claim may be maintained against social host based upon service of alcohol to intoxicated individual). *315 However, in order to prevail in such an action, a plaintiff whose injury was proximately caused by a patron must also allege and prove “(1) that the patron was

2006App. at 16 , 303 S.E.2d at 593 ; see also Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co., 349 N.C. 196, 202 , 505 S.E.2d 131, 135 (1998) (common law negligence claim may be maintained against commercial vendor based upon sale of alcohol to underage individual); Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299, 305 , 420 S.E.2d 174, 178 (1992) (common law negligence claim may be maintained against social host based upon service of alcohol to intoxicated individual). *315 However, in order to prevail in such an action, a plaintiff whose injury was proximately caused by a patron must also allege and prove “(1) that the patron was

11
Estate of Mullis Ex Rel. Dixon v. Monroe Oil Co.green
nc · 1998 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006App. at 16 , 303 S.E.2d at 593 ; see also Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co., 349 N.C. 196, 202 , 505 S.E.2d 131, 135 (1998) (common law negligence claim may be maintained against commercial vendor based upon sale of alcohol to underage individual); Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299, 305 , 420 S.E.2d 174, 178 (1992) (common law negligence claim may be maintained against social host based upon service of alcohol to intoxicated individual). *315 However, in order to prevail in such an action, a plaintiff whose injury was proximately caused by a patron must also allege and prove “(1) that the patron was

2006App. at 16 , 303 S.E.2d at 593 ; see also Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co., 349 N.C. 196, 202 , 505 S.E.2d 131, 135 (1998) (common law negligence claim may be maintained against commercial vendor based upon sale of alcohol to underage individual); Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299, 305 , 420 S.E.2d 174, 178 (1992) (common law negligence claim may be maintained against social host based upon service of alcohol to intoxicated individual). *315 However, in order to prevail in such an action, a plaintiff whose injury was proximately caused by a patron must also allege and prove “(1) that the patron was

11
Buncombe County Ex Rel. Blair v. Jacksongreen
ncctapp · 2000 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
1 sentence

2001See Buncombe, 138 N.C.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (20)

CaseCitedYears
Goodson v. P. H. Glatfelter Co. green
· 2005
2 sentences

2020Glatfelter Co., 171 N.C.

2020Glatfelter Co., 171 N.C.

22020–2020
State v. McKoy green
ncctapp · 1972
2 sentences

2016In the present case, the affiant's statement that the confidential informant had given this agent good and reliable information in the past that had been checked by the affiant and found to be true also meets this minimum standard. 16 N.C.App. 349 , 351-52, 191 S.E.2d 897 , 899 (1972) (citation, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted).

2016In the present case, the affiant's statement that the confidential informant had given this agent good and reliable information in the past that had been checked by the affiant and found to be true also meets this minimum standard. 16 N.C.App. 349 , 351-52, 191 S.E.2d 897 , 899 (1972) (citation, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted).

22003–2016
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co. green
scotus · 1937
2 sentences

1941Steward Machine Co. v. Davis , 301 U.S. 548 ; Carmichael v. Southern Oil Co. , 301 U.S. 495 .

1941Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S., 548 ; Carmichael v. Southern Oil Co., 301 U. S., 495 .

21941–1941
Steward MacHine Co. v. Davis green
scotus · 1937
2 sentences

1941Steward Machine Co. v. Davis , 301 U.S. 548 ; Carmichael v. Southern Oil Co. , 301 U.S. 495 .

1941Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S., 548 ; Carmichael v. Southern Oil Co., 301 U. S., 495 .

21941–1941
Penland v. Harris green
ncctapp · 1999
1 sentence

2013As this Court has recognized, “[t]here is no bright line rule to determine what conduct on the part of a natural parent will result in a forfeiture of the constitutionally protected status[.]” Penland v. Harris, 135 N.C.

12013–2013
Venters v. Albritton green
ncctapp · 2007
1 sentence

2011Richards’ testimony was substantially the same as Johnson’s challenged testimony, and “it is the well-established rule that the admission of evidence without objection waives any prior or subsequent objection to the admission of evidence of a similar character.” Venters v. Albritton, 184 N.C.

12011–2011
Grouse v. DRB Baseball Management, Inc. green
ncctapp · 1996
2 sentences

2010Still, “[i]n considering whether [D]efendant[] had [three] or more regularly employed workers, ‘the fact that [the employer] fell below the minimum requirement on the actual date of injury would not preclude coverage.’ ” Grouse, 121 N.C.

2010App. at 379 , 465 S.E.2d at 570 (quoting Patterson, 2 N.C.

12010–2010
Hutchens v. Hankins green
ncctapp · 1983
2 sentences

2006With respect to the sale of alcoholic beverages by ABC licensed or permitted businesses, N.C.G.S. § 18B-305(a) (2003) provides that it is “unlawful for a permittee or his employee ... to knowingly sell or give alcoholic beverages to any person who is intoxicated.” In Hutchens , after examining the general purposes of the statute, this Court “adopt[ed] the requirements of G.S. 18A-34 [now N.C.G.S. § 18B-305] as the minimum standard of conduct” for businesses having a license or permit to sell alcoholic beverages, and held that violation of the statute “can give rise to an action for negligence

2006As previously noted, however, this Court in Hutchens adopted the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 18A-34 (no ABC licensee or permittee shall “upon the licensed premises . . . [knowingly sell [alcoholic] beverages to any person while such person is in an intoxicated condition”) (now N.C.G.S. § 18B-305) as “the minimum standard of conduct for” licensed or permitted vendors of alcohol, id. at 16, 303 S.E.2d at 593 .

12006–2006
Strickland v. Washington green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

1987Neither does the state challenge, as unsupported by the evidence or the findings, the trial court's overall conclusion that Paul's performance "was significantly deficient and fell well below the minimum standard of professional competence expected and required of attorneys handling serious criminal cases in the Superior Courts of Wake County." The essence of the state's argument is: notwithstanding the trial court's unchallenged factual findings regarding Paul's deficiencies, its conclusion that Paul's substandard representation did not prejudice defendant should be sustained under the standa

1987Neither does the state challenge, as unsupported by the evidence or the findings, the trial court's overall conclusion that Paul's performance "was significantly deficient and fell well below the minimum standard of professional competence expected and required of attorneys handling serious criminal cases in the Superior Courts of Wake County." The essence of the state's argument is: notwithstanding the trial court's unchallenged factual findings regarding Paul's deficiencies, its conclusion that Paul's substandard representation did not prejudice defendant should be sustained under the standa

11987–1987
State v. Braswell green
nc · 1985
2 sentences

1987Neither does the state challenge, as unsupported by the evidence or the findings, the trial court's overall conclusion that Paul's performance "was significantly deficient and fell well below the minimum standard of professional competence expected and required of attorneys handling serious criminal cases in the Superior Courts of Wake County." The essence of the state's argument is: notwithstanding the trial court's unchallenged factual findings regarding Paul's deficiencies, its conclusion that Paul's substandard representation did not prejudice defendant should be sustained under the standa

1987Neither does the state challenge, as unsupported by the evidence or the findings, the trial court's overall conclusion that Paul's performance "was significantly deficient and fell well below the minimum standard of professional competence expected and required of attorneys handling serious criminal cases in the Superior Courts of Wake County." The essence of the state's argument is: notwithstanding the trial court's unchallenged factual findings regarding Paul's deficiencies, its conclusion that Paul's substandard representation did not prejudice defendant should be sustained under the standa

11987–1987
MacKey v. Montrym green
scotus · 1979
2 sentences

1986In order to decide this issue we must employ the same three-factor balancing test relied upon by the superior court. *481 The United States Supreme Court relied upon this balancing test in Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 , 61 L.Ed. 2d 321 (1979), to determine the validity of a Massachusetts statute which authorized prehearing revocation of licenses of persons who refused to submit to a breath analysis test.

1986In order to decide this issue we must employ the same three-factor balancing test relied upon by the superior court. *481 The United States Supreme Court relied upon this balancing test in Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 , 61 L.Ed. 2d 321 (1979), to determine the validity of a Massachusetts statute which authorized prehearing revocation of licenses of persons who refused to submit to a breath analysis test.

11986–1986
Koury v. Follo green
nc · 1968
2 sentences

1985Koury v. Follo, 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E. 2d 548 (1968).

1985Koury v. Follo, 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E. 2d 548 (1968).

11985–1985
Bratcher v. Winters neutral
nc · 1967
2 sentences

1984Id. at 642 , 153 S.E.2d at 379 .

1984Id. at 642 , 153 S.E.2d at 379 .

11984–1984
Savage v. Savage neutral
nc · 1972
1 sentence

1980App. 257 , 189 S.E. 2d 793 (1972), cert. denied, 281 N.C. 759 , 191 S.E. 2d 362 (1973), this Court held that a statement in an affidavit to obtain a search warrant that a confidential informant “has proven reliable and credible in the past” meets the minimum standard for setting forth the circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the informant was reliable.

11980–1980
State v. Altman neutral
nc · 1972
1 sentence

1980App. 257 , 189 S.E. 2d 793 (1972), cert. denied, 281 N.C. 759 , 191 S.E. 2d 362 (1973), this Court held that a statement in an affidavit to obtain a search warrant that a confidential informant “has proven reliable and credible in the past” meets the minimum standard for setting forth the circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the informant was reliable.

11980–1980
State v. Altman green
ncctapp · 1972
2 sentences

1980App. 257 , 189 S.E. 2d 793 (1972), cert. denied, 281 N.C. 759 , 191 S.E. 2d 362 (1973), this Court held that a statement in an affidavit to obtain a search warrant that a confidential informant “has proven reliable and credible in the past” meets the minimum standard for setting forth the circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the informant was reliable.

1980“The statement that the informant has proven reliable in the past is a statement of fact and not a mere conclusion.” Id. at 259, 189 S.E. 2d at 795 .

11980–1980
United States v. Harris green
scotus · 1971
2 sentences

1972Since the affidavit in question meets the Aguilar requirements, it clearly meets the less technical requirements of U.S. v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 , 29 L.Ed. 2d 723 , 91 S.Ct. 2075 (1971).

1972Since the affidavit in question meets the Aguilar requirements, it clearly meets the less technical requirements of U.S. v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 , 29 L.Ed. 2d 723 , 91 S.Ct. 2075 (1971).

11972–1972
State v. Barnes green
nc · 1961
2 sentences

1963State v. Barnes, 253 N.C. 711, 717 , 117 S.E.2d 849 , and cases cited; State v. Wilson, 218 N.C. 769 , 12 S.E.2d 654 , and cases cited.

1963State v. Barnes, 253 N.C. 711, 717 , 117 S.E.2d 849 , and cases cited; State v. Wilson, 218 N.C. 769 , 12 S.E.2d 654 , and cases cited.

11963–1963
State v. . Wilson green
nc · 1941
2 sentences

1963State v. Barnes, 253 N.C. 711, 717 , 117 S.E.2d 849 , and cases cited; State v. Wilson, 218 N.C. 769 , 12 S.E.2d 654 , and cases cited.

1963State v. Barnes, 253 N.C. 711, 717 , 117 S.E.2d 849 , and cases cited; State v. Wilson, 218 N.C. 769 , 12 S.E.2d 654 , and cases cited.

11963–1963
Harris v. Atlantic Greyhound Corporation green
nc · 1956
2 sentences

1961This Court said in Harris v. Greyhound Corporation, 243 N.C. 346 , 90 S.E. 2d 710 : “The definition adopted by this Court and stated repeatedly is that a carrier owes its passengers ‘the highest degree of care for their safety so far as is consistent with the practical operation and conduct of its business.’ ” The complaint and application allege that since applicant commenced the operation of the Charlotte transit system in 1955, it has required all drivers of passenger busses to meet the minimum requirements prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and it quotes from such requiremen

1961This Court said in Harris v. Greyhound Corporation, 243 N.C. 346 , 90 S.E. 2d 710 : “The definition adopted by this Court and stated repeatedly is that a carrier owes its passengers ‘the highest degree of care for their safety so far as is consistent with the practical operation and conduct of its business.’ ” The complaint and application allege that since applicant commenced the operation of the Charlotte transit system in 1955, it has required all drivers of passenger busses to meet the minimum requirements prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and it quotes from such requiremen

11961–1961

Statutes the citing opinions construe

NC § N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1 (4) NC § N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 134 (1885–2025) NY 103 (1926–2026) CA 93 (1943–2025) IL 92 (1956–2026) PA 73 (1942–2025) LA 67 (1959–2021) OH 51 (1948–2026) MO 47 (1941–2024) NJ 45 (1959–2026) FL 41 (1956–2026) MD 38 (1955–2025) WA 35 (1955–2025) TN 34 (1956–2023) MA 33 (1918–2025) GA 31 (1974–2025) NC 29 (1941–2022) OR 28 (1953–2026) MS 28 (1967–2020) MI 27 (1943–2021) ND 25 (1962–2016) NM 25 (1943–2025) CT 22 (1983–2026) AZ 20 (1971–2023) AL 20 (1926–2024) CO 19 (1975–2026) WI 17 (1969–2020) IA 16 (1961–2022) DC 16 (1950–2015) MT 16 (1925–2026) IN 16 (1953–2017) OK 16 (1945–2025) MN 14 (1960–2017) AK 14 (1961–2016) KS 12 (1967–2026) SC 11 (1987–2026) RI 11 (1977–2020) HI 11 (1961–2025) VA 11 (1955–2024) ID 10 (1967–2023) KY 10 (1923–2026) NE 9 (1942–2018) UT 9 (1978–2024) WV 8 (1968–2021) ME 8 (1973–2021) WY 8 (1981–2006) VT 8 (1988–2023) DE 6 (1971–2025) NH 5 (1945–2007) SD 4 (1980–2014) NV 3 (1981–2022) AR 3 (1982–2018) PR 2 (1943–1963)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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