minimum standard in Missouri

1975V, § 22 makes a “broader review the minimum standard which may be established for review in any case decided on a hearing before an administrative officer or body.” Wood v. Wagner Electric Corporation, 355 Mo. 670 , 197 S.W.2d 647, 649 (banc 1946).

1975V, § 22 makes a “broader review the minimum standard which may be established for review in any case decided on a hearing before an administrative officer or body.” Wood v. Wagner Electric Corporation, 355 Mo. 670 , 197 S.W.2d 647, 649 (banc 1946).

2014Id. 12 .

2003Review under section 302.535, the Court stated, “is considerably more broad than the minimum standard of review mandated by Article V., Section 18.” Id.

2024Moore v. State, 827 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Mo. banc 1992) (“[T]hough the [evidence] may not have changed the result, that very real probability cannot be ignored, and meets the minimum standard of undermining confidence in the outcome of the case.”).

2023While trial counsel's failure to investigate a firearms expert and call him as a witness may not have changed the result, "that very real probability cannot be ignored, and meets the minimum standard of undermining confidence in the outcome of the case." Perkey v. State, 68 S.W.3d 547, 552 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) (quoting Moore v. State, 827 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Mo. banc 1992)). 17 The motion court's judgment denying Beckett's amended motion contained several findings of fact and conclusions of law that Beckett challenges on appeal.

2024To be sure, “Strickland and the Missouri decisions following it create a strict standard, but the purpose is not to set an impossible standard.” Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Beckett, 675 S.W.3d at 544 (quoting Perkey v. State, 68 S.W.3d 547, 552 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001)) (noting that while trial counsel’s failure to consult or call a firearms expert may or may not have changed the overall result, “that very real probability cannot be ignored, and meets the minimum standard of undermining confidence in the outcome of the case”).

2023While trial counsel's failure to investigate a firearms expert and call him as a witness may not have changed the result, "that very real probability cannot be ignored, and meets the minimum standard of undermining confidence in the outcome of the case." Perkey v. State, 68 S.W.3d 547, 552 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) (quoting Moore v. State, 827 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Mo. banc 1992)). 17 The motion court's judgment denying Beckett's amended motion contained several findings of fact and conclusions of law that Beckett challenges on appeal.

1997Brown, 490 F.2d at 766, n. 25 .

1997United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 766, n. 25 (D.C.Cir.1973).

2016In In re Estate of L.G.T., 442 S.W.3d 96 , 107 n. 11 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014), the Southern District opined in dicta that the trial court's use of a clear and convincing standard of proof may 11 "The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to 'instruct the factfinding concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.'" Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harl

2016In In re Estate of L.G.T., 442 S.W.3d 96 , 107 n. 11 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014), the Southern District opined in dicta that the trial court's use of a clear and convincing standard of proof may 11 "The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to 'instruct the factfinding concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.'" Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harl

2024“Strickland clearly and explicitly holds that an outcome-determinative test cannot be applied in a post-conviction setting.” Deck, 68 S.W.3d at 427 ; Schnelle v. State, 103 S.W.3d 165, 177 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003) (stating similar).

2019See, e.g., Alderson v. Fatlan, 898 N.E.2d 595, 602 (Ill. 2008) (in addition to permanence, as “a minimum requirement” a court will require a showing “the party invoking the rule has relied upon use of the artificial body of water without dispute for a lengthy period of time”); accord United States v. 1,629.6 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Sussex Cnty., Del., 503 F.2d 764, 768 (3d Cir. 1974). 5 The Edlers cannot claim they have relied on use of Main Lake for a lengthy period, as the Edlers have never had use of the lake for dock purposes or paid assessments for its maintenance in their capacit

2019See, e.g., Alderson v. Fatlan, 898 N.E.2d 595, 602 (Ill. 2008) (in addition to permanence, as “a minimum requirement” a court will require a showing “the party invoking the rule has relied upon use of the artificial body of water without dispute for a lengthy period of time”); accord United States v. 1,629.6 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Sussex Cnty., Del., 503 F.2d 764, 768 (3d Cir. 1974). 5 The Edlers cannot claim they have relied on use of Main Lake for a lengthy period, as the Edlers have never had use of the lake for dock purposes or paid assessments for its maintenance in their capacit

2016In In re Estate of L.G.T., 442 S.W.3d 96 , 107 n. 11 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014), the Southern District opined in dicta that the trial court's use of a clear and convincing standard of proof may 11 "The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to 'instruct the factfinding concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.'" Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harl

2016In In re Estate of L.G.T., 442 S.W.3d 96 , 107 n. 11 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014), the Southern District opined in dicta that the trial court's use of a clear and convincing standard of proof may 11 "The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to 'instruct the factfinding concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.'" Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harl

2016In In re Estate of L.G.T., 442 S.W.3d 96 , 107 n. 11 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014), the Southern District opined in dicta that the trial court's use of a clear and convincing standard of proof may 11 "The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to 'instruct the factfinding concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.'" Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harl

2013“In order to override this assumption, [Husband] needed to produce evidence in the trial court of the nature and amount by which his particular support costs exceeded the ‘self-support reserve’ attributed generally to people in his income level.” In re Marriage of Bottorff, 221 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Mo.App.2007).

2013See Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 358 S.W.3d 48, 51 (Mo. banc 2011) (“A [party] wishing to succeed on a summary decision motion ... must establish that there is no genuine dispute as to those material facts upon which the claimant would have had the burden of persuasion at the hearing.”).

2007In addressing father’s expenses over and above those necessary for him to maintain a minimum standard of living, we note that: “It was not the trial court’s business, and it is not ours, to show how [father’s] income can be made to cover his debts and current expenses.” Cash v. Cash, 812 S.W.2d 265, 267 (Mo.App.1991).

2007Rather, it is father’s place to “adjust income or obligations, or both, in such a way as to provide the payment of the child support he is ordered to pay.” Id.

2007Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 110 (Mo. banc 1996), citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755, 102 S.Ct. 1388 ; see also MAI 3.01.

2004McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d at 156, 157 ; Bruflat, 933 S.W.2d at 833 .

2001See Nelson, 384 N.W.2d at 425 (stating that Michigan’s standard requiring that special educational services be designed “to develop the maximum potential of every handicapped person” is “more rigorous” than the minimum standard set by the predecessor to the IDEA).

2001Thus, while the IDEA sets forth the minimum standard a state’s program must meet, “[i]f a state legislature chooses to require more for its program, the state standard must be met in order to obtain federal special education funds.” Gill v. Columbia 93 School Dist., 217 F.3d 1027, 1035 (8th Cir.2000). 4 Missouri receives federal special education funds through the IDEA, and the statutes setting forth this state’s special education policy and program are found in §§ 162.670 to 162.995.