equitable estoppel doctrine in Montana

2013Johnson Farms, Inc. v. Halland, 2012 MT 215, ¶ 28 , 366 Mont. 299 , 291 P.3d 1096 ; Pankratz Farms, Inc. v. Pankratz, 2004 MT 180, ¶ 67 , 322 Mont. 133 , 95 P.3d 671 . ¶25 Bell fails to establish the elements necessary to support the imposition of equitable estoppel.

2013Johnson Farms, Inc. v. Halland, 2012 MT 215, ¶ 28 , 366 Mont. 299 , 291 P.3d 1096 ; Pankratz Farms, Inc. v. Pankratz, 2004 MT 180, ¶ 67 , 322 Mont. 133 , 95 P.3d 671 . ¶25 Bell fails to establish the elements necessary to support the imposition of equitable estoppel.

2019Laws ch. 96, § 10. ¶18 Despite the "forever barred" language of the statute, this Court first recognized an equitable estoppel exception to the limitations period in Lindblom v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. , 88 Mont. 488 , 295 P. 1007 (1930).

2019Laws ch. 96, § 10. ¶18 Despite the "forever barred" language of the statute, this Court first recognized an equitable estoppel exception to the limitations period in Lindblom v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. , 88 Mont. 488 , 295 P. 1007 (1930).

2013Johnson Farms, Inc. v. Halland, 2012 MT 215, ¶ 28 , 366 Mont. 299 , 291 P.3d 1096 ; Pankratz Farms, Inc. v. Pankratz, 2004 MT 180, ¶ 67 , 322 Mont. 133 , 95 P.3d 671 . ¶25 Bell fails to establish the elements necessary to support the imposition of equitable estoppel.

2013Johnson Farms, Inc. v. Halland, 2012 MT 215, ¶ 28 , 366 Mont. 299 , 291 P.3d 1096 ; Pankratz Farms, Inc. v. Pankratz, 2004 MT 180, ¶ 67 , 322 Mont. 133 , 95 P.3d 671 . ¶25 Bell fails to establish the elements necessary to support the imposition of equitable estoppel.

2001Billings Post, 284 Mont. at 91 , 943 P.2d at 521 . ¶19 The same reasoning applies in the present case.

2001Billings Post, 284 Mont. at 91 , 943 P.2d at 521 . ¶19 The same reasoning applies in the present case.

2022Arthur v. Pierre Ltd., 2004 MT 303, ¶ 30 , 323 Mont. 453 , 100 P.3d 987 (internal citations omitted).

2022Arthur v. Pierre Ltd., 2004 MT 303, ¶ 30 , 323 Mont. 453 , 100 P.3d 987 (internal citations omitted).

2021Corp., 2000 MT 76, ¶ 10 , 299 Mont. 127 , 998 P.2d 156 , which delineated the “six elements [] necessary in order to establish an equitable estoppel claim,” including detrimental reliance.

2021Corp., 2000 MT 76, ¶ 10 , 299 Mont. 127 , 998 P.2d 156 , which delineated the “six elements [] necessary in order to establish an equitable estoppel claim,” including detrimental reliance.

2001Jefferson County v. McCauley Ranches, 1999 MT 333, ¶ 6 , 297 Mont. 392, ¶ 6 , 994 P.2d 11, ¶ 6 , citing Butler v. Germann (1991), 251 Mont. 107, 114 , 822 P.2d 1067, 1072 . ¶14 Town Pump's primary argument under this issue is that its affirmative defense under the doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes Whitefish's claims.

2001Jefferson County v. McCauley Ranches, 1999 MT 333, ¶ 6 , 297 Mont. 392, ¶ 6 , 994 P.2d 11, ¶ 6 , citing Butler v. Germann (1991), 251 Mont. 107, 114 , 822 P.2d 1067, 1072 . ¶14 Town Pump's primary argument under this issue is that its affirmative defense under the doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes Whitefish's claims.

2001Jefferson County v. McCauley Ranches, 1999 MT 333, ¶ 6 , 297 Mont. 392, ¶ 6 , 994 P.2d 11, ¶ 6 , citing Butler v. Germann (1991), 251 Mont. 107, 114 , 822 P.2d 1067, 1072 . ¶14 Town Pump's primary argument under this issue is that its affirmative defense under the doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes Whitefish's claims.

2001Jefferson County v. McCauley Ranches, 1999 MT 333, ¶ 6 , 297 Mont. 392, ¶ 6 , 994 P.2d 11, ¶ 6 , citing Butler v. Germann (1991), 251 Mont. 107, 114 , 822 P.2d 1067, 1072 . ¶14 Town Pump's primary argument under this issue is that its affirmative defense under the doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes Whitefish's claims.

2001Nevertheless, the fact is that Town Pump has advanced no authority under which equitable “removal damages” have been awarded where an equitable estoppel defense to the injunctive relief has been successful, much less where-as here-the defense has failed. ¶35 While it is true that a court sitting in equity is empowered to grant all relief necessary to the entire adjustment of the subject matter of the litigation-the general proposition for which Town Pump cites Galleria, 239 Mont. at 265 , 780 P.2d at 617 — that rule of law does not aid Town Pump's argument here.

2001Nevertheless, the fact is that Town Pump has advanced no authority under which equitable “removal damages” have been awarded where an equitable estoppel defense to the injunctive relief has been successful, much less where-as here-the defense has failed. ¶35 While it is true that a court sitting in equity is empowered to grant all relief necessary to the entire adjustment of the subject matter of the litigation-the general proposition for which Town Pump cites Galleria, 239 Mont. at 265 , 780 P.2d at 617 — that rule of law does not aid Town Pump's argument here.

1999Further, in Godfrey v. Pilon (1974), 165 Mont. 439, 448 , 529 P.2d 1372, 1377 , we concluded that both misrepresentation and detrimental reliance “are necessary for a finding of estoppel.” ¶15 In the present case, the Flaigs have not shown that the Gramms misrepresented any material facts.

1999Further, in Godfrey v. Pilon (1974), 165 Mont. 439, 448 , 529 P.2d 1372, 1377 , we concluded that both misrepresentation and detrimental reliance “are necessary for a finding of estoppel.” ¶15 In the present case, the Flaigs have not shown that the Gramms misrepresented any material facts.

1998Hooper, 247 Mont. at 325 , 806 P.2d at 543 . ¶ 15 The abbreviated statement of the elements of equitable estoppel in back-due child support cases as set forth in Hooper and upon which the mother relies was first articulated in In re Marriage of Jensen (1986), 223 Mont. 434, 439-40 , 727 P.2d 512, 515-16 .

1998Hooper, 247 Mont. at 325 , 806 P.2d at 543 . ¶ 15 The abbreviated statement of the elements of equitable estoppel in back-due child support cases as set forth in Hooper and upon which the mother relies was first articulated in In re Marriage of Jensen (1986), 223 Mont. 434, 439-40 , 727 P.2d 512, 515-16 .

1998Hooper, 247 Mont. at 325 , 806 P.2d at 543 . ¶ 15 The abbreviated statement of the elements of equitable estoppel in back-due child support cases as set forth in Hooper and upon which the mother relies was first articulated in In re Marriage of Jensen (1986), 223 Mont. 434, 439-40 , 727 P.2d 512, 515-16 .

1998Hooper, 247 Mont. at 325 , 806 P.2d at 543 . ¶ 15 The abbreviated statement of the elements of equitable estoppel in back-due child support cases as set forth in Hooper and upon which the mother relies was first articulated in In re Marriage of Jensen (1986), 223 Mont. 434, 439-40 , 727 P.2d 512, 515-16 .

1998Dagel, 250 Mont. at 234-35 , 819 P.2d at 192-93 ; see also Ducham, 265 Mont. at 441-42 , 877 P.2d at 1006 ; Kephart v. Portmann (1993), 259 Mont. 232, 237 , 855 P.2d 120, 123 .

1998Dagel, 250 Mont. at 234-35 , 819 P.2d at 192-93 ; see also Ducham, 265 Mont. at 441-42 , 877 P.2d at 1006 ; Kephart v. Portmann (1993), 259 Mont. 232, 237 , 855 P.2d 120, 123 .

1997This is “the statutory codification of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.” Belehumeur v. Dawson (D.Mont.1964), 229 F.Supp. 78, 86 .

1997Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply System (Wash.1984), 691 P.2d 524, 542 . *167 Knuchel, a practicing attorney, represented the Landowners at the informal meetings with the representatives of Park County.

1994The FCB cites this Court’s decision in Sherrodd, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Company (1991), 249 Mont. 282 , 815 P.2d 1135 , for the proposition that oral negotiations which contradict the terms of the written contract are not admissible and that on this basis the District Court’s order denying summary judgment should be reversed.

1994The FCB cites this Court’s decision in Sherrodd, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Company (1991), 249 Mont. 282 , 815 P.2d 1135 , for the proposition that oral negotiations which contradict the terms of the written contract are not admissible and that on this basis the District Court’s order denying summary judgment should be reversed.

1982We refer to the recent case of Frost v. Anaconda Company, (1982) Mont., 645 P.2d 419, 1982 .

1979The elements of this doctrine were set forth in Smith v. Krutar (1969), 153 Mont. 325, 332 , 457 P.2d 459 , 463: “. . . (1) there must be conduct, acts, language, or silence amounting to a representation or a concealment of material facts; (2) these facts must be known to the party estopped at the time of his conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to him; (3) the truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other party claiming the benefit of the estoppel at the time it was acted upon by him; (4) the conduct must be done with th

1979The elements of this doctrine were set forth in Smith v. Krutar (1969), 153 Mont. 325, 332 , 457 P.2d 459 , 463: “. . . (1) there must be conduct, acts, language, or silence amounting to a representation or a concealment of material facts; (2) these facts must be known to the party estopped at the time of his conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to him; (3) the truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other party claiming the benefit of the estoppel at the time it was acted upon by him; (4) the conduct must be done with th

1973R.C.M. 1947, if the claimant is misled or otherwise prevented, from filing his claim by (1) the employer or its agent (McCoy v. Mike Horse Mining & Milling Co., 126 Mont. 435 , 252 P.2d. 1036 [company doctor]; Levo v. Gen.-Shea-Morrison, 128 Mont-570, 280 P.2d 1986 [company lawyer and company personnel, manager); (2) the insurer or its agent (Lindblom v. Employ er’s Etc.

1973R.C.M. 1947, if the claimant is misled or otherwise prevented, from filing his claim by (1) the employer or its agent (McCoy v. Mike Horse Mining & Milling Co., 126 Mont. 435 , 252 P.2d. 1036 [company doctor]; Levo v. Gen.-Shea-Morrison, 128 Mont-570, 280 P.2d 1986 [company lawyer and company personnel, manager); (2) the insurer or its agent (Lindblom v. Employ er’s Etc.

1958City of Billings v. Pierce Packing Co., 117 Mont. 255 , 161 Pac. (2d) 636 ; Lindblom v. Employers’ etc., Assur.

1958City of Billings v. Pierce Packing Co., 117 Mont. 255 , 161 Pac. (2d) 636 ; Lindblom v. Employers’ etc., Assur.

1955Lindblom v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., supra, which is the classic authority in this court defining the doctrine of equitable estoppel, is but a restatement of the rule elaborated in Waddell v. School District No. 2, 74 Mont. 91 , 238 Pac. 884 ; and both of these decisions are only judicial applications of our controlling statute, R.C.M. 1947, sec. 93-1301-6, subd. 3.

1955Lindblom v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., supra, which is the classic authority in this court defining the doctrine of equitable estoppel, is but a restatement of the rule elaborated in Waddell v. School District No. 2, 74 Mont. 91 , 238 Pac. 884 ; and both of these decisions are only judicial applications of our controlling statute, R.C.M. 1947, sec. 93-1301-6, subd. 3.

1917If it turns out to be false, A is answerable for the damage which may have accrued to B from having acted upon, and B is entitled, in respect of anything done in the belief that it was true, to object to any denial of it by A.” In the note to the text of Mr. Pomeroy, supra, this remark is made referring to the cases cited: “Some of these eases may be referred to the doctrine of equitable estoppel; but it is plain that, where the representation is that of a fact in the future, and not a mere promise, and it is relied upon, and turns out to be false, the rights and remedies of the injured party

1917If it turns out to be false, A is answerable for the damage which may have accrued to B from having acted upon, and B is entitled, in respect of anything done in the belief that it was true, to object to any denial of it by A.” In the note to the text of Mr. Pomeroy, supra, this remark is made referring to the cases cited: “Some of these eases may be referred to the doctrine of equitable estoppel; but it is plain that, where the representation is that of a fact in the future, and not a mere promise, and it is relied upon, and turns out to be false, the rights and remedies of the injured party

1910(John Mouat Lumber Co. v. City of Denver, 21 Colo. 1 , 40 Pac. 237 ; Baldwin v. Trimble, 85 Md. 396 , 37 Atl. 176 , 36 L.

1910(John Mouat Lumber Co. v. City of Denver, 21 Colo. 1 , 40 Pac. 237 ; Baldwin v. Trimble, 85 Md. 396 , 37 Atl. 176 , 36 L.