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183 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1885–2026 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Geddes v. Mill Creek Country Club, Inc.green2 sentences2007Even that aside, counterplaintiffs would not prevail under either the equitable estoppel doctrine or the mend the hold doctrine because both doctrines require the party asserting them to make a showing of detriment, unfair prejudice or surprise, which is lacking here. 12 As noted, counterplaintiffs seek contribution with respect to the payments made in February of 1995 and beyond, after LaSalle, in response to Lynch's phone call, began to send the guarantors monthly letters demanding payment of past due installments. 29 No. 1-04-0588 Equitable estoppel is typically invoked "where a person by h 2007Even that aside, counterplaintiffs would not prevail under either the equitable estoppel doctrine or the mend the hold doctrine because both doctrines require the party asserting them to make a showing of detriment, unfair prejudice or surprise, which is lacking here. 12 As noted, counterplaintiffs seek contribution with respect to the payments made in February of 1995 and beyond, after LaSalle, in response to Lynch's phone call, began to send the guarantors monthly letters demanding payment of past due installments. 29 No. 1-04-0588 Equitable estoppel is typically invoked "where a person by h | 4 | 6 |
W. Kenneth Tregenza, James E. Haas, and Erwin B. Seegers v. Great American Communications Company and Shearson Lehman Brothers, Incorporatedgreen2 sentences2024“Equitable tolling just means that without fault by either party the plaintiff does not have enough information to sue within the period of limitations, and *** the period of limitations doesn’t start until he has the information ***.” Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying federal law). ¶ 23 When equitable tolling applies, the limitations period begins to run when the barrier preventing the plaintiff from filing suit is removed. 2015We find the following statement by our supreme court instructive: “Generally, the doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a statute of limitations where ‘because of disability, irremediable lack of information, or other circumstances beyond his control,’ the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to file suit on time. [Citation.] Unlike the related doctrine of equitable estoppel, equitable tolling requires no fault on the part of the defendant. [Citation]; see also Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 19 | 4 | 4 |
Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. The City of Napervillegreen2 sentences2019App. 3d 489, 499 (2002) (recognizing in the context of a promissory estoppel claim that estoppel against a public body is not favored and is allowed only in rare and unusual circumstances when necessary to prevent fraud and injustice); Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 40 (noting in the context of an equitable estoppel claim that when public revenues are at stake, estoppel is particularly disfavored). 2018App. 3d 489 , 499, 269 Ill.Dec. 624 , 781 N.E.2d 421 (2002) (recognizing in the context of a promissory estoppel claim that estoppel against a public body is not favored and is allowed only in rare and unusual circumstances when necessary to prevent fraud and injustice); Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. City of Naperville , 2012 IL 113148 , ¶ 40, 364 Ill.Dec. 40 , 976 N.E.2d 318 (noting in the context of an equitable estoppel claim that when public revenues are at stake, estoppel is particularly disfavored). | 3 | 8 |
Serafin v. Seithgreen2 sentences2021App. 3d 217, 228 (1996). “[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel will not apply to a case if defendant’s conduct terminated within ample time to allow the plaintiff to still avail himself of any legal rights he may have had.” Serafin, 284 Ill. 2010App. 3d at 589 , 672 N.E.2d at 311 (“doctrine of equitable estoppel will not apply to a case if defendant’s conduct terminated within ample time to allow the plaintiff to still avail himself of any legal rights he may have had”), citing Cramsey v. Knoblock, 191 Ill. | 3 | 6 |
Smith v. Cook County Hospitalgreen2 sentences2008This is significant because “the doctrine of equitable estoppel will not apply to a case if the defendant’s conduct terminated within ample time to allow the plaintiff to still avail himself of any legal rights he may have had.” Smith v. Cook County Hospital, 164 Ill. 2008This is significant because “the doctrine of equitable estoppel will not apply to a case if the defendant’s conduct terminated within ample time to allow the plaintiff to still avail himself of any legal rights he may have had.” Smith v. Cook County Hospital, 164 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
Judy Lehman, Wife Mark Lehman, Husband v. United States of America, Judy Lehman, Wife Mark Lehman, Husband v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015We find the following statement by our supreme court instructive: “Generally, the doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a statute of limitations where ‘because of disability, irremediable lack of information, or other circumstances beyond his control,’ the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to file suit on time. [Citation.] Unlike the related doctrine of equitable estoppel, equitable tolling requires no fault on the part of the defendant. [Citation]; see also Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 19 2011Miller, 77 F.3d at 191 ; see also Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Equitable tolling just means that without fault by either party the plaintiff does not have enough information to sue within the period of limitations ***.”); Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Equitable tolling focuses primarily on the plaintiff’s excusable ignorance of the limitations period,” whereas “[ejquitable estoppel focuses on the actions of the defendant” (emphases in original)). | 3 | 3 |
Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C.green2 sentences2004See also Washington Mutual Finance Group, LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 267-68 (5th Cir. 2004); Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the court held that “a signatory to [an] agreement cannot *** ‘have it both ways’: it cannot, on the one hand, seek to hold the non[ ] signatory liable pursuant to duties imposed by the agreement, which contains an arbitration provision, but, on the other hand, deny arbitration’s applicability because the defendant is a non[ ]signatory” (emphasis omitted)). 2004See also Washington Mutual Finance Group, LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 267-68 (5th Cir. 2004); Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the court held that “a signatory to [an] agreement cannot *** ‘have it both ways’: it cannot, on the one hand, seek to hold the non[ ]signatory liable pursuant to duties imposed by the agreement, which contains an arbitration provision, but, on the other hand, deny arbitration’s applicability because the defendant is a non[ ]signatory” (emphasis in original)); International Pape | 3 | 3 |
Washington Mutual Finance Group, LLC v. Baileygreen2 sentences2004See also Washington Mutual Finance Group, LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 267-68 (5th Cir. 2004); Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the court held that “a signatory to [an] agreement cannot *** ‘have it both ways’: it cannot, on the one hand, seek to hold the non[ ] signatory liable pursuant to duties imposed by the agreement, which contains an arbitration provision, but, on the other hand, deny arbitration’s applicability because the defendant is a non[ ]signatory” (emphasis omitted)). 2004See also Washington Mutual Finance Group, LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 267-68 (5th Cir. 2004); Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the court held that “a signatory to [an] agreement cannot *** ‘have it both ways’: it cannot, on the one hand, seek to hold the non[ ]signatory liable pursuant to duties imposed by the agreement, which contains an arbitration provision, but, on the other hand, deny arbitration’s applicability because the defendant is a non[ ]signatory” (emphasis in original)); International Pape | 3 | 3 |
Ozier v. Hainesgreen2 sentences1997Ozier v. Haines, 411 Ill. 160, 163-65 (1952); Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 45 Ill. 1964As stated in Ozier v. Haines (supra), “The doctrine of equitable estoppel and that of the Statute of Frauds have developed side by side in the law, each for the ultimate purpose of preventing fraud and injustice. | 2 | 6 |
Blisset v. Blissetgreen2 sentences1993(Blisset v. Blisset (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 161 , 526 N.E.2d 125 .) Within the context of the general rules applying to child support, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is an exception to the otherwise inflexible rule that child support payments become vested when they accrue. 1993(Blisset v. Blisset (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 161 , 526 N.E.2d 125 .) Within the context of the general rules applying to child support, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is an exception to the otherwise inflexible rule that child support payments become vested when they accrue. | 2 | 5 |
Cramsey v. Knoblockgreen2 sentences2010App. 3d at 589 , 672 N.E.2d at 311 (“doctrine of equitable estoppel will not apply to a case if defendant’s conduct terminated within ample time to allow the plaintiff to still avail himself of any legal rights he may have had”), citing Cramsey v. Knoblock, 191 Ill. 2010App. 3d at 589 , 672 N.E.2d at 311 (“doctrine of equitable estoppel will not apply to a case if defendant’s conduct terminated within ample time to allow the plaintiff to still avail himself of any legal rights he may have had”), citing Cramsey v. Knoblock, 191 Ill. | 2 | 4 |
La Salle National Trust, N.A. v. Village of Westmontgreen2 sentences2000La Salle National Trust v. Village of Westmont, 264 Ill. 2000La Salle National Trust v. Village of Westmont , 264 Ill. | 2 | 4 |
Williams v. Board of Reviewgreen2 sentences2024It simply allows the plaintiff “the time necessary to find such additional information as the plaintiff absolutely needs in order to be able to file a suit.” Id. ¶ 22 “Unlike the related doctrine of equitable estoppel, equitable tolling requires no fault on the part of the defendant.” Williams v. Board of Review, 241 Ill. 2d 352, 361 (2011). 2015We find the following statement by our supreme court instructive: “Generally, the doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a statute of limitations where ‘because of disability, irremediable lack of information, or other circumstances beyond his control,’ the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to file suit on time. [Citation.] Unlike the related doctrine of equitable estoppel, equitable tolling requires no fault on the part of the defendant. [Citation]; see also Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 19 | 2 | 3 |
Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co.green2 sentences1997Ozier v. Haines, 411 Ill. 160, 163-65 (1952); Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 45 Ill. 1997Ozier v. Haines, 411 Ill. 160, 163-65 , 103 N.E.2d 485 (1952); Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 45 Ill.App.2d 10, 17-19 , 195 N.E.2d 250 (1964), aff'd, 31 Ill.2d 507 , 202 N.E.2d 516 (1964). | 2 | 3 |
| Williams v. Ingalls Memorial Hospitalgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Cohn v. Checker Motors Corp.green | 2 | 2 |
| Hamwi v. Zollargreen | 2 | 2 |
| Curtis v. Chicago Transit Authoritygreen | 2 | 2 |
| Neaterour v. Holtgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Faulkner-King v. Department of Human Rightsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reformgreen | 2 | 2 |
Barratt v. Goldberggreen2 sentences2025“The doctrine of equitable estoppel will not apply to a case if the defendant’s conduct terminated within ample time to allow the plaintiff the opportunity to file a cause of action within the limitation period.” Barratt, 296 Ill. 2011However, “[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel will not apply to a case if defendant’s conduct terminated within ample time to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to file a cause of action within the limitation period.” Barratt, 296 Ill. | 1 | 4 |
Turner v. Namagreen2 sentences2016Turner v. Nama, 294 Ill. 2010Turner, 294 Ill. | 1 | 3 |
Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGawgreen2 sentences2018"In general, issues or defenses not placed before the administrative agency will not be considered for the first time on administrative review." Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw , 182 Ill. 2d 262 , 278, 230 Ill.Dec. 991 , 695 N.E.2d 481 (1998) (citing 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 1994) ). 2018"In general, issues or defenses not placed before the administrative agency will not be considered for the first time on administrative review." Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw , 182 Ill. 2d 262 , 278, 230 Ill.Dec. 991 , 695 N.E.2d 481 (1998) (citing 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 1994) ). | 1 | 2 |
In re Marriage of Sheaffergreen2 sentences2017See Sheaffer, 2013 IL App (2d) 121049, ¶ 12 ; Heady, 398 Ill. 2016Sheaffer, 2013 IL App (2d) 121049, ¶ 12 . | 1 | 2 |
| Greer v. Carter Oil Co.green | 1 | 2 |
| CENTRAL TRANSPORT v. Village of Hillsidegreen | 1 | 2 |
| In Re Custody of DAgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Feiler v. Covenant Medical Center of Champaign-Urbanagreen | 1 | 2 |
| Lissner v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Centergreen | 1 | 2 |
| Witherell v. Weimergreen | 1 | 2 |
| First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Sherwood Commons Townhome Owners Ass'n v. DuBoisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Wagnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vail v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| First National Bank of Chicago v. Atlantic Tele-Network Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| DeLuna v. Burciagagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Anderson v. Anderson
green
2 sentences1975The court pointed out that, although past-due installments of child support could not be reduced, .this did not mean that in a proper case the court could not “give effect to an agreement by a party to waive the payments or accept a lesser amount.” ( 48 Ill.App.2d 140, 147 .) The court also stated that the doctrine of equitable estoppel could be applied to past installments “in an appropriate case.” On remand, the trial court found that plaintiff was equitably estopped to claim certain payments which had acciued during a period of time in which defendant relied on representation of plaintiff a 1974However, in Anderson v. Anderson, 48 Ill.App.2d 140 , 198 N.E.2d 342 , the court indicated that in a proper case it will give effect to an agreement by the parties to waive payments or accept a lesser amount or will apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel where that doctrine is appropriate. | 7 | 1972–1988 |
Matzen v. Matzen
green
2 sentences1989App. 3d 69, 72 , 387 N.E.2d 14 .) In order to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the party asserting the existence of the estoppel must prove six elements: (1) words or conduct by the party against whom the estoppel is alleged amounting to a misrepresentation or concealment of material facts; (2) the party against whom the estoppel is alleged must have knowledge, either actual or implied, at the time the representations were made, that they were untrue; (3) the truth respecting the representations so made must be unknown to the party claiming the benefit of the estoppel at the time the 1987While in the proper case courts will give effect to an agreement between the parties to waive or reduce payments, in some instances applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel (Matzen v. Matzen (1979), 69 Ill. | 4 | 1980–1989 |
Lowenberg v. Booth
green
2 sentences1979App. 3d 1000, 1003 , 339 N.E.2d 515, 518 , citing Lowenberg v. Booth (1928), 330 Ill. 548, 555-56 , 162 N.E. 191, 195 , the court set out six elements which must be proved to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel: “(1) Words or conduct by the party against whom the estoppel is alleged amounting to a misrepresentation or concealment of material facts; (2) the party against whom the estoppel is alleged must have knowledge, either actual or implied, at the time the representations were made, that they were untrue; (3) the truth respecting the representations so made must be unknown to the par 1979App. 3d 1000, 1003 , 339 N.E.2d 515, 518 , citing Lowenberg v. Booth (1928), 330 Ill. 548, 555-56 , 162 N.E. 191, 195 , the court set out six elements which must be proved to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel: “(1) Words or conduct by the party against whom the estoppel is alleged amounting to a misrepresentation or concealment of material facts; (2) the party against whom the estoppel is alleged must have knowledge, either actual or implied, at the time the representations were made, that they were untrue; (3) the truth respecting the representations so made must be unknown to the par | 4 | 1949–1979 |
People ex rel. Beardsley v. City of Rock Island
green
2 sentences1976Beardsley v. City of Rock Island, 215 Ill. 488 , the rule was expressed as follows: ‘Where a party acting in good faith under affirmative acts of a city has made such expensive and permanent improvements that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the rights acquired, the doctrine of equitable estoppel will be applied.’ But before the doctrine can be invoked there must have been some positive acts by the municipal officers which may have induced the action of the adverse party. 1972Beardsley v. City of Rock Island, 215 Ill. 488 , the rule was expressed as follows: ‘Where a party acting in good faith under affirmative acts of a city has made such expensive and permanent improvements that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the rights acquired, the doctrine of equitable estoppel will be applied.’ But before the doctrine can be invoked there must have been some positive acts by the municipal officers which may have induced the action of the adverse party. | 4 | 1915–1976 |
Miller Amf v. Runyon
green
2 sentences2020Williams, 241 Ill. 2d at 361 (citing Miller, 77 F. 3d at 191 ). ¶ 28 Based upon the foregoing, we will address plaintiff’s equitable tolling issue raised on appeal. ¶ 29 In this case, plaintiff contends that the circuit court’s finding that she failed to exercise due diligence should be overturned because she was diligent in serving NG&G; however, NG&G failed to appear in the time allotted by statute after being served. ¶ 30 In contrast, ABG contends that plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations because she did not request expedited disco 2011Miller, 77 F.3d at 191 ; see also Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Equitable tolling just means that without fault by either party the plaintiff does not have enough information to sue within the period of limitations ***.”); Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Equitable tolling focuses primarily on the plaintiff’s excusable ignorance of the limitations period,” whereas “[ejquitable estoppel focuses on the actions of the defendant” (emphases in original)). | 3 | 2011–2020 |
Crittendon v. State Oil Co.
green
2 sentences1993The doctrine of apparent agency is based upon the doctrine of equitable estoppel (Crittendon v. State Oil Co. (1966), 78 Ill. 1993App. 2d 112, 115 , 222 N.E.2d 561, 563-64 , quoting Morse v. Illinois Power & Light Corp., 294 Ill. | 3 | 1988–1993 |
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad v. City of Joliet
green
2 sentences1993Co. v. City of Joliet (1875), 79 Ill. 25 ), a finding of estoppel against a public entity is not favored. 1906(Chicago, Rock Island and Pacinic Railroad Co. v. City of Joliet, 79 Ill. 25 .) The naked fact of possession by an individual or non-user by the public authorities for any length of time will not create such an estoppel; (City of Sullivan v. Tichenor, 179 Ill. 97 ;) nor will the fact that there are some trifling improvements on the property, such as a picket fence, maple tree, lilac bush, creeping vine and grass, the destruction or removal of which will not cause any substantial injury to the individual. | 3 | 1899–1993 |
Stewart v. O'BRYAN
green
2 sentences1987App. 3d 436 , 289 N.E.2d 484 .) Six elements must be shown in order for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply: “(1) words or conduct by the party against whom the estoppel is alleged constituting either a misrepresentation or concealment of material facts; (2) knowledge on the part of the party against whom the estoppel is alleged that representations made were untrue; (3) the party claiming the benefit of an estoppel must not have known the representations to be false either at the time they were made or at the time they were acted upon; (4) the party estopped must either intend or expe 1983In order for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply, the following elements must be present: “(1) Words or conduct by the party against whom the estoppel is alleged constituting either a misrepresentation or concealment of material facts; (2) knowledge on the part of the party against whom the estoppel is alleged that representations made were untrue; (3) the party claiming the benefit of an estoppel must have not known the representations to be false either at the time they were made or at the time they were acted upon; (4) the party estopped must either intend or expect that his conduct | 3 | 1983–1987 |
In Re Estate of Neirinck
neutral
2 sentences1985In re Estate of Neirinck (1978), 62 Ill. 1979(In re Estate of Neirinck (3d Dist. 1978), 62 Ill. | 3 | 1979–1985 |
Jordan v. City of Chenoa
neutral
2 sentences1915(Jordan v. City of Chenoa, 166 Ill. 530 ; City of Carlinville v. Castle, 177 id. 105; People v. City of Rock Island, 215 id. 488.) In this case for thirty years the rights now claimed for the public have not been exercised, but the place in controversy has been held adversely to such rights with the acquiescence of the public, and neither the public authorities nor any individual has protested against or sought to prevent such adverse holding. 1897The Supreme Court, as an illustration of this doctrine in discussing the question, have said in Lee v. Town of Mound Station, 118 Ill. 317 : “ It is true we have held where the public have long withheld the assertion of control over streets,' and private parties have been by the acts of those representing the public, induced to believe the streets abandoned by the public, and on the faith of that belief, and with acquiescence of those representing the public, they have placed themselves, by making structures or improvements in the street, in a situation where they must suffer great pecuniary l | 3 | 1897–1915 |
Boswell v. City of Chicago
green
2 sentences2017Boswell v. City of Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 150871, ¶ 31 . ¶ 24 We do not believe Weaver’s case presents extraordinary or compelling circumstances, but even assuming that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable, Weaver’s claim nevertheless fails. 2017Boswell v. City of Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 150871, ¶ 31 . ¶ 24 We do not believe Weaver’s case presents extraordinary or compelling circumstances, but even assuming that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable, Weaver’s claim nevertheless fails. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Matthews v. Chicago Transit Authority
green
2 sentences2017As our supreme court recently observed in Matthews v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2016 IL 117638 , ¶ 94: “Illinois courts have consistently held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel will not be applied to governmental entities absent extraordinary and compelling circumstances.” Compelling circumstances may include the need to prevent fraud and injustice. 2017As our supreme court recently observed in Matthews v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2016 IL 117638 , ¶ 94: “Illinois courts have consistently held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel will not be applied to governmental entities absent extraordinary and compelling circumstances.” Compelling circumstances may include the need to prevent fraud and injustice. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
| Kheirkhahvash v. Baniassadi green | 2 | 2016–2017 |
| Wolfram Partnership, Ltd. v. LaSalle National Bank green | 2 | 2015–2015 |
| Hester v. Diaz green | 2 | 2010–2010 |
| UNION NAT'L BK & TRUST CO. v. Carlstrom green | 2 | 1989–2009 |
| City of Chicago v. Unit One Corp. green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| In Re Marriage of Smith green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| Ervin v. Nokia, Inc. green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| DSMC Inc. v. Convera Corp. green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| Tim Thompson, Inc. v. Village of Hinsdale green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| In Re Marriage of Schlam green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| Augustus v. Estate of Somers green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| Northern Trust Co. v. St. Francis Hospital green | 2 | 1992–1995 |
| Pack v. Santa Fe Park Enterprises, Inc. green | 2 | 1994–1994 |
| Vaughn v. Speaker green | 2 | 1994–1994 |
| Smith v. City of Chicago Heights green | 2 | 1994–1994 |
| Elliott v. Elliott green | 2 | 1986–1993 |
| Britt v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n of St. Louis green | 2 | 1990–1990 |
| Real v. Kim green | 2 | 1987–1989 |
| Strum v. Strum green | 2 | 1979–1988 |
| Jozwick v. Jozwick green | 2 | 1980–1984 |
| Mills v. Graves neutral | 2 | 1936–1982 |
| Ellingwood v. Ellingwood green | 2 | 1977–1978 |
| Needler v. Needler green | 2 | 1972–1975 |
| Kelly v. Fischer neutral | 2 | 1928–1935 |
| Lee v. Town of Mound Station neutral | 2 | 1897–1906 |
| Nickels v. Reid green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Senior Housing, Inc. v. Nakawatase, Rutkowski, Wyns & Yi, Inc. green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Fidelity National Title Insurance Company of New York v. Howard Savings Bank green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.