equitable estoppel doctrine in Oregon

2025After acknowledging that “claimant contends that the employee email establishes the work event caused the T5 compression fracture,” the board found that “the record does not establish that the employee email constitutes an accep- tance of the T5 compression fracture.” In a footnote, the board stated: “To the extent that claimant’s argument raises an equi- table estoppel theory, we would find that the doctrine does not apply because the record does not persuasively estab- lish that the employee email represented that the employer was accepting claimant’s T5 compression fracture claim.” Nonprece

2025After acknowledging that “claimant contends that the employee email establishes the work event caused the T5 compression fracture,” the board found that “the record does not establish that the employee email constitutes an accep- tance of the T5 compression fracture.” In a footnote, the board stated: “To the extent that claimant’s argument raises an equi- table estoppel theory, we would find that the doctrine does not apply because the record does not persuasively estab- lish that the employee email represented that the employer was accepting claimant’s T5 compression fracture claim.” Nonprece

2025After acknowledging that “claimant contends that the employee email establishes the work event caused the T5 compression fracture,” the board found that “the record does not establish that the employee email constitutes an accep- tance of the T5 compression fracture.” In a footnote, the board stated: “To the extent that claimant’s argument raises an equi- table estoppel theory, we would find that the doctrine does not apply because the record does not persuasively estab- lish that the employee email represented that the employer was accepting claimant’s T5 compression fracture claim.” Nonprece

2025After acknowledging that “claimant contends that the employee email establishes the work event caused the T5 compression fracture,” the board found that “the record does not establish that the employee email constitutes an accep- tance of the T5 compression fracture.” In a footnote, the board stated: “To the extent that claimant’s argument raises an equi- table estoppel theory, we would find that the doctrine does not apply because the record does not persuasively estab- lish that the employee email represented that the employer was accepting claimant’s T5 compression fracture claim.” Nonprece

2025“Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a person’s acts or conduct, or silence when it was the person’s duty to speak, may preclude the person from asserting a right that the person otherwise would have had.” Knapp v. Daily, 96 Or App 327, 332 , 772 P2d 1363 (1989).

2025“Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a person’s acts or conduct, or silence when it was the person’s duty to speak, may preclude the person from asserting a right that the person otherwise would have had.” Knapp v. Daily, 96 Or App 327, 332 , 772 P2d 1363 (1989).

2025Co., 284 Or App 83, 90 , 391 P3d 871 (2017) (stat- ing the elements of equitable estoppel).

2025Co., 284 Or App 83, 90 , 391 P3d 871 (2017) (stat- ing the elements of equitable estoppel).

2020Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, “a person may be precluded by his act or conduct, or silence when it was his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had.” Day v. Advanced M&D Sales, Inc., 336 Or 511, 518 , 86 P3d 678 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2020Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, “a person may be precluded by his act or conduct, or silence when it was his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had.” Day v. Advanced M&D Sales, Inc., 336 Or 511, 518 , 86 P3d 678 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2017Specifically, in plaintiffs’ view, the evidence presented on summary judgment “clearly demonstrates issues of fact on the issue of estoppel; i.e. affirmative conduct on the part of Allstate * * * which [plaintiffs were] reasonably justified in relying upon.” “Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, ‘a person may be precluded by his act or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had.’” Day v. Advanced M&D Sales, 336 Or 511, 518 , 86 P3d 678 (2004) (quoting Marshall v. Wilson, 175 Or 506, 518 , 154 P2d 547 (1944)).

2017Specifically, in plaintiffs’ view, the evidence presented on summary judgment “clearly demonstrates issues of fact on the issue of estoppel; i.e. affirmative conduct on the part of Allstate * * * which [plaintiffs were] reasonably justified in relying upon.” “Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, ‘a person may be precluded by his act or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had.’” Day v. Advanced M&D Sales, 336 Or 511, 518 , 86 P3d 678 (2004) (quoting Marshall v. Wilson, 175 Or 506, 518 , 154 P2d 547 (1944)).

2001However, he contends that he “accepted the state’s decision to allege that all the charges arose from a single criminal episode, and he relied on the state’s choice of theories in deciding on a plea and preparing for trial.” From that argument, we infer that defendant relies on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 8 *292 The doctrine of equitable estoppel is “employed to prevent one from proving an important fact to be something other than what by act or omission he has led another party justifiably to believe.” Stovall v. Sally Salmon Seafood, 306 Or 25, 33 , 757 P2d 410 (1988) (quoting Wiggin

2001However, he contends that he “accepted the state’s decision to allege that all the charges arose from a single criminal episode, and he relied on the state’s choice of theories in deciding on a plea and preparing for trial.” From that argument, we infer that defendant relies on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 8 *292 The doctrine of equitable estoppel is “employed to prevent one from proving an important fact to be something other than what by act or omission he has led another party justifiably to believe.” Stovall v. Sally Salmon Seafood, 306 Or 25, 33 , 757 P2d 410 (1988) (quoting Wiggin

1980In the case of Johnson v. Commission, 2 OTR 504 (1967), and the appeal therefrom, Johnson v. Tax Commission, 248 Or 460 , *[387] 435 P2d 302 (1967), the equitable estoppel doctrine in Oregon as applied to a tax case was first formulated and invoked.

1980In the case of Johnson v. Commission, 2 OTR 504 (1967), and the appeal therefrom, Johnson v. Tax Commission, 248 Or 460 , *[387] 435 P2d 302 (1967), the equitable estoppel doctrine in Oregon as applied to a tax case was first formulated and invoked.

2001In order to establish equitable estoppel, a party must offer evidence from which the trier of fact could find that: “(1) a false representation (albeit an innocent one) was made (2) by someone having knowledge of the facts to (3) one who was ignorant of the truth, (4) that the statement was made with the intention that it be acted upon by the [ignorant party] and (5) that [the ignorant party] acted upon it.” Paulson v. Western Life Insurance Co., 292 Or 38, 52-53 , 636 P2d 935 (1981).

2001In order to establish equitable estoppel, a party must offer evidence from which the trier of fact could find that: “(1) a false representation (albeit an innocent one) was made (2) by someone having knowledge of the facts to (3) one who was ignorant of the truth, (4) that the statement was made with the intention that it be acted upon by the [ignorant party] and (5) that [the ignorant party] acted upon it.” Paulson v. Western Life Insurance Co., 292 Or 38, 52-53 , 636 P2d 935 (1981).

2001However, he contends that he “accepted the state’s decision to allege that all the charges arose from a single criminal episode, and he relied on the state’s choice of theories in deciding on a plea and preparing for trial.” From that argument, we infer that defendant relies on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 8 *292 The doctrine of equitable estoppel is “employed to prevent one from proving an important fact to be something other than what by act or omission he has led another party justifiably to believe.” Stovall v. Sally Salmon Seafood, 306 Or 25, 33 , 757 P2d 410 (1988) (quoting Wiggin

2001However, he contends that he “accepted the state’s decision to allege that all the charges arose from a single criminal episode, and he relied on the state’s choice of theories in deciding on a plea and preparing for trial.” From that argument, we infer that defendant relies on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 8 *292 The doctrine of equitable estoppel is “employed to prevent one from proving an important fact to be something other than what by act or omission he has led another party justifiably to believe.” Stovall v. Sally Salmon Seafood, 306 Or 25, 33 , 757 P2d 410 (1988) (quoting Wiggin

1992As such, we hold that a tax assessment itself can not be the basis for an equitable estoppel claim, in the absence of misrepresentations of fact. *718 Taxpayers have a duty “to keep themselves informed about the recurrent liability of their property for taxes.” Knapp v. Josephine County, 192 Or 327, 353 , 235 P2d 564 (1951).

1992As such, we hold that a tax assessment itself can not be the basis for an equitable estoppel claim, in the absence of misrepresentations of fact. *718 Taxpayers have a duty “to keep themselves informed about the recurrent liability of their property for taxes.” Knapp v. Josephine County, 192 Or 327, 353 , 235 P2d 564 (1951).

1992Moreover, “[t]axpayers, not the Department, have responsibility for keeping track of their property’s value.” ESCO Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., supra, 307 Or at 647 .

1989Seguin et al. v. Maloney-Chambers, 198 Or 272, 287 , 253 P2d 252 , 256 P2d 514 (1953).

1989Seguin et al. v. Maloney-Chambers, 198 Or 272, 287 , 253 P2d 252 , 256 P2d 514 (1953).

1983See Pilgrim Turkey Packers v. Dept. of Rev., 261 Or 305 , 493 P2d 1372 (1972); Johnson v. Tax Commission, 248 Or 460 , 435 P2d 302 (1967); Belton v. Buesing, 240 Or 399, 411 , 402 P2d 98 (1965); Thrift v. Adult & Family Services Div., 58 Or App 13 , 646 P2d 1358 (1982); Glover v. Adult and Family Services Division, 46 Or App 829 , 613 P2d 495 (1980); Shiloh Youth Revival Center v. Emp.

1983See Pilgrim Turkey Packers v. Dept. of Rev., 261 Or 305 , 493 P2d 1372 (1972); Johnson v. Tax Commission, 248 Or 460 , 435 P2d 302 (1967); Belton v. Buesing, 240 Or 399, 411 , 402 P2d 98 (1965); Thrift v. Adult & Family Services Div., 58 Or App 13 , 646 P2d 1358 (1982); Glover v. Adult and Family Services Division, 46 Or App 829 , 613 P2d 495 (1980); Shiloh Youth Revival Center v. Emp.

1983See Pilgrim Turkey Packers v. Dept. of Rev., 261 Or 305 , 493 P2d 1372 (1972); Johnson v. Tax Commission, 248 Or 460 , 435 P2d 302 (1967); Belton v. Buesing, 240 Or 399, 411 , 402 P2d 98 (1965); Thrift v. Adult & Family Services Div., 58 Or App 13 , 646 P2d 1358 (1982); Glover v. Adult and Family Services Division, 46 Or App 829 , 613 P2d 495 (1980); Shiloh Youth Revival Center v. Emp.

1983See Pilgrim Turkey Packers v. Dept. of Rev., 261 Or 305 , 493 P2d 1372 (1972); Johnson v. Tax Commission, 248 Or 460 , 435 P2d 302 (1967); Belton v. Buesing, 240 Or 399, 411 , 402 P2d 98 (1965); Thrift v. Adult & Family Services Div., 58 Or App 13 , 646 P2d 1358 (1982); Glover v. Adult and Family Services Division, 46 Or App 829 , 613 P2d 495 (1980); Shiloh Youth Revival Center v. Emp.

1983See Pilgrim Turkey Packers v. Dept. of Rev., 261 Or 305 , 493 P2d 1372 (1972); Johnson v. Tax Commission, 248 Or 460 , 435 P2d 302 (1967); Belton v. Buesing, 240 Or 399, 411 , 402 P2d 98 (1965); Thrift v. Adult & Family Services Div., 58 Or App 13 , 646 P2d 1358 (1982); Glover v. Adult and Family Services Division, 46 Or App 829 , 613 P2d 495 (1980); Shiloh Youth Revival Center v. Emp.

1983See Pilgrim Turkey Packers v. Dept. of Rev., 261 Or 305 , 493 P2d 1372 (1972); Johnson v. Tax Commission, 248 Or 460 , 435 P2d 302 (1967); Belton v. Buesing, 240 Or 399, 411 , 402 P2d 98 (1965); Thrift v. Adult & Family Services Div., 58 Or App 13 , 646 P2d 1358 (1982); Glover v. Adult and Family Services Division, 46 Or App 829 , 613 P2d 495 (1980); Shiloh Youth Revival Center v. Emp.

1980In the case of Johnson v. Commission, 2 OTR 504 (1967), and the appeal therefrom, Johnson v. Tax Commission, 248 Or 460 , *[387] 435 P2d 302 (1967), the equitable estoppel doctrine in Oregon as applied to a tax case was first formulated and invoked.

1951Co., 52 Or. 502 , 95 P. 722 , 98 P. 160 ; Lowell et al. v. Pendleton Auto Co., supra. It is because of these conflicts that the courts have frequently cautioned that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied in street eases only in exceptional instances of extraordinry hardship.

1951Co., 52 Or. 502 , 95 P. 722 , 98 P. 160 ; Lowell et al. v. Pendleton Auto Co., supra. It is because of these conflicts that the courts have frequently cautioned that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied in street eases only in exceptional instances of extraordinry hardship.

1926In this jurisdiction it is well established that a license is irrevocable when the licensee, in good, faith and upon reliance of his agreement, makes such valuable and permanent improvements that it would amount to the perpetration of a fraud if the license were revoked: Heisley v. Eastman, 102 Or. 137 ( 201 Pac. 872 ); Shaw v. Profit, 57 Or. 192 ( 109 Pac. 584 , 110 Pac. 1092 , Ann.

1926In this jurisdiction it is well established that a license is irrevocable when the licensee, in good, faith and upon reliance of his agreement, makes such valuable and permanent improvements that it would amount to the perpetration of a fraud if the license were revoked: Heisley v. Eastman, 102 Or. 137 ( 201 Pac. 872 ); Shaw v. Profit, 57 Or. 192 ( 109 Pac. 584 , 110 Pac. 1092 , Ann.

1926In this jurisdiction it is well established that a license is irrevocable when the licensee, in good, faith and upon reliance of his agreement, makes such valuable and permanent improvements that it would amount to the perpetration of a fraud if the license were revoked: Heisley v. Eastman, 102 Or. 137 ( 201 Pac. 872 ); Shaw v. Profit, 57 Or. 192 ( 109 Pac. 584 , 110 Pac. 1092 , Ann.

1926In this jurisdiction it is well established that a license is irrevocable when the licensee, in good, faith and upon reliance of his agreement, makes such valuable and permanent improvements that it would amount to the perpetration of a fraud if the license were revoked: Heisley v. Eastman, 102 Or. 137 ( 201 Pac. 872 ); Shaw v. Profit, 57 Or. 192 ( 109 Pac. 584 , 110 Pac. 1092 , Ann.

1921Nothing that was said in Curtis v. La Grande Water Co., 20 Or. 34 ( 23 Pac. 808 , 25 Pac. 378 , 10 L.

1921Nothing that was said in Curtis v. La Grande Water Co., 20 Or. 34 ( 23 Pac. 808 , 25 Pac. 378 , 10 L.

1914The doctrine of equitable estoppel, which in some jurisdictions is enforced against municipal corporations, is based upon the assumed injustice which would result to private parties who, relying for many years upon the tacit acquiescence of public officers to assert a right to the use of a street, have made permanent and valuable improvements therein, if they were deprived thereof by opening the highway would sustain great pecuniary loss: Schooling v. Harrisburg, 42 Or. 494 ( 71 Pac. 605 ); Oliver v. Synhorst, 48 Or. 292 ( 86 Pac. 376 , 7 L.

1914The doctrine of equitable estoppel, which in some jurisdictions is enforced against municipal corporations, is based upon the assumed injustice which would result to private parties who, relying for many years upon the tacit acquiescence of public officers to assert a right to the use of a street, have made permanent and valuable improvements therein, if they were deprived thereof by opening the highway would sustain great pecuniary loss: Schooling v. Harrisburg, 42 Or. 494 ( 71 Pac. 605 ); Oliver v. Synhorst, 48 Or. 292 ( 86 Pac. 376 , 7 L.

1914The doctrine of equitable estoppel, which in some jurisdictions is enforced against municipal corporations, is based upon the assumed injustice which would result to private parties who, relying for many years upon the tacit acquiescence of public officers to assert a right to the use of a street, have made permanent and valuable improvements therein, if they were deprived thereof by opening the highway would sustain great pecuniary loss: Schooling v. Harrisburg, 42 Or. 494 ( 71 Pac. 605 ); Oliver v. Synhorst, 48 Or. 292 ( 86 Pac. 376 , 7 L.

1914The doctrine of equitable estoppel, which in some jurisdictions is enforced against municipal corporations, is based upon the assumed injustice which would result to private parties who, relying for many years upon the tacit acquiescence of public officers to assert a right to the use of a street, have made permanent and valuable improvements therein, if they were deprived thereof by opening the highway would sustain great pecuniary loss: Schooling v. Harrisburg, 42 Or. 494 ( 71 Pac. 605 ); Oliver v. Synhorst, 48 Or. 292 ( 86 Pac. 376 , 7 L.

1905This rule is as applicable to corporations as individuals (Currie v. Bowman, 25 Or. 364 , 35 Pac. 848 ; Shepard v. Briggs, 26 Vt. 149 ), and has its foundation in the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

1905This rule is as applicable to corporations as individuals (Currie v. Bowman, 25 Or. 364 , 35 Pac. 848 ; Shepard v. Briggs, 26 Vt. 149 ), and has its foundation in the doctrine of equitable estoppel.