equitable estoppel doctrine in Tennessee

2015It may be applied, however, even where the action is governed by a statute of limitations when the plaintiff is guilty of gross laches.” Gleason v. Gleason, 164 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Dennis Joslin Co. v. Johnson, 138 S.W.3d 197, 201 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)). “„The defense of laches is based [up]on the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and is only applied where the party invoking it has been prejudiced by the delay.‟” Brown, 46 S.W.3d at 726 (quoting Freeman v. Martin Robowash, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970)).

2011They argue that if forced to proceed with the case, they will suffer prejudice and injury resulting from the loss of memory, evidence, and witnesses. “‘The defense of laches is based [up]on the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and is only applied where the party invoking it has been prejudiced by the delay.”’ Brown v. Ogle, 46 S.W.3d 721, 726 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Freeman v. Martin Robowash, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970)).

2015However, “[s]tatutes of limitations are favored because they promote the timely pursuit of legal rights by suppressing stale claims.” Id. (citing Brown v. Hipshire, 553 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tenn. 1977)). -6- In order for an equitable estoppel claim to prevail, plaintiffs “must have acted diligently in pursuing their claims both before and after the defendant induced them.” Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 461 (Tenn. 2012).

2015“The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied to prevent a defendant who has actively induced a plaintiff to delay filing suit from asserting a statute of limitations defense.” Hardcastle, 170 S.W.3d at 84 (citing Fahrner v. SW Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn. 2001)).

2015However, “[s]tatutes of limitations are favored because they promote the timely pursuit of legal rights by suppressing stale claims.” Id. (citing Brown v. Hipshire, 553 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tenn. 1977)). -6- In order for an equitable estoppel claim to prevail, plaintiffs “must have acted diligently in pursuing their claims both before and after the defendant induced them.” Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 461 (Tenn. 2012).

2015Our Supreme Court addressed the doctrine of equitable estoppel in Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436 (Tenn. 2012).

2017Standard of Review “The defense of laches is based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and is only applied where the party invoking it has been prejudiced by the delay.” Brown v. Ogle, 46 S.W. 3d 721, 726 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

2017Standard of Review ―The defense of laches is based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and is only applied where the party invoking it has been prejudiced by the delay.‖ Brown v. Ogle, 46 S.W. 3d 721, 726 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

2015See [Ingram, 993 S.W.2d at 633 .] At the point when the plaintiff knows or should know that the defendant has misled him or her, the original statute of limitations begins to run anew, and the plaintiff must file his or her claim within the statutory limitations period. [Fahrner, 48 S.W.3d at 146 .] Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 460 (footnote omitted).

2013Fahrner v. SW Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d at 145; Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611, 633 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

2024Co., 130 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting Consumer Credit Un. v. Hite, 801 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990)).

2017As related to the party claiming the estoppel they are (1) Lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (2) Reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped; and (3) Action based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially.” Consumer Credit Union v. Hite, 801 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Callahan v. Town of Middleton, 292 S.W.2d 501, 508 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954)).

2017Under Federal Law, 43 A.L.R, Fed. 2d 275 (2Ó10) (“The case law applying ‘equitable estoppel" to compel arbitration by or against a nónsignatory is a distinct body of federal law not ostensibly moored in common-law principles of equitable estoppel, which is primarily concerned with misleading statements of fact.”); Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v. Epperson, 284 S.W.3d 303, 315-16 (Tenn. 2009) (reciting elements of equitable estoppel, contrasting with judicial estoppel, and holding neither was applicable in that case), For clarity, and to avoid confusion with the common law doctrine of

2013Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v. Epperson, 284 S.W.3d 303, 315 (Tenn. 2009) (emphasis in original).

2016See Daugherty v. Toomey, 222 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tenn. 1949) (“[U]pon numerous occasions [the Court has] avoided the letter of the statute [of frauds] by the enforcement in cases of this character of the equitable estoppel rule.”); Farley v. Ellis, No. W2000-00354-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1876431 , at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2000) (“In exceptional cases, the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel has been used to mitigate the harshness of this rule, ‘where to enforce the statute of frauds would make it an instrument of hardship and oppression, verging on actual fraud.’”) (quoting Baliles

2008Id. (citing Daugherty v. Toomey, 222 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tenn. 1949); Beazley v. Turgeon, 772 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

2015It may be applied, however, even where the action is governed by a statute of limitations when the plaintiff is guilty of gross laches.” Gleason v. Gleason, 164 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Dennis Joslin Co. v. Johnson, 138 S.W.3d 197, 201 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)). “„The defense of laches is based [up]on the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and is only applied where the party invoking it has been prejudiced by the delay.‟” Brown, 46 S.W.3d at 726 (quoting Freeman v. Martin Robowash, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970)).

2015Thus, the doctrine of laches “requires more than mere delay.” Dennis Joslin Co., LLC v. Johnson, 138 S.W.3d 197, 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

2006See, e.g., ACG, 912 S.W.2d at 170 ; Robinson, 857 S.W.2d at 568 ; and Gitter v. Tennessee Farmers Mut.

1997See, e.g., ACG, 912 S.W.2d at 170 ; Robinson, 857 S.W.2d at 563; and Gitter v. Tennessee Farmers Mut.

2004See our own case of Electric Light & Power Co. v. Bristol Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 99 Tenn. 371 , 42 S.W. 19 , 21, wherein the Court held that one "will not be allowed to assert his lien to the prejudice of persons whom he has induced to believe that his debt has been satisfied, or that he will claim no lien and who, in that belief, have purchased that property on which the lien rests." The Court further held the right to invoke the doctrine "does not always rest on the intention of the party to be affected by it, but is dependent, rather, upon the reasonable or legitimate effect of hi

1970See our own case of Electric Light & Power Co. v. Bristol Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 99 Tenn. 371 , 42 S.W. 19 , 21, wherein the Court held that one ‘will not be allowed to assert his lien to the prejudice of persons whom he has induced to believe that his debt has been satisfied, or that he will claim no lien and who, in that belief, have purchased that property on which the lien rests.’ The Court further held the right to invoke the doctrine ‘does not always rest on the intention of the party to be affected by it, but is dependent, rather, upon the reasonable or legitimate effect of hi

1987State v. McPhail, 156 Tenn. 459, 460 , 2 S.W.2d 413 (1928) and Hamilton National Bank v. Woods, 34 Tenn. App. 360, 373 , 238 S.W.2d 109, 115 (1948).

1987State v. McPhail, 156 Tenn. 459, 460 , 2 S.W.2d 413 (1928) and Hamilton National Bank v. Woods, 34 Tenn. App. 360, 373 , 238 S.W.2d 109, 115 (1948).

2021The focus of an equitable estoppel inquiry “is on the defendant’s conduct and the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s reliance on that conduct.” Hardcastle v. Harris, 170 S.W.3d at 85 ; see also Fahrner v. SW Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d at 146.

2015“The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied to prevent a defendant who has actively induced a plaintiff to delay filing suit from asserting a statute of limitations defense.” Hardcastle, 170 S.W.3d at 84 (citing Fahrner v. SW Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn. 2001)).

2004The doctrine of equitable estoppel “tolls the running of the statute of limitations where the defendant has ‘misled the plaintiff into failing to file [his] action within the statutory period of limitations.’” Id. at 145 (quoting Norton v. Everhart, 895 S.W.2d 317, 321 (Tenn. 1995)) (citing Lusk v. Consol.

1997It found sufficient Tennessee’s existing doctrine of equitable estoppel, which requires “that the plaintiff’s failure to bring the action within the statutory period of limitations be attributable to deception or misconduct on the part of the defendant.” Id.

2003Molloy v. Chattanooga, 232 S.W.2d 24 (Tenn. 1950); see also Lawrence County v. White, 288 S.W.2d 735 (Tenn. 1956).

2001Relying on Malloy v. City of Chattanooga, 191 Tenn. 173 , 232 S.W.2d 24 (1950), he maintains that only after Pat Conatser agreed that he could use the route, he bought the 1,600 acre piece of property and upgraded and built roads on the Conatser tract in reliance on her assent.

2017As related to the party claiming the estoppel they are (1) Lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (2) Reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped; and (3) Action based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially.” Consumer Credit Union v. Hite, 801 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Callahan v. Town of Middleton, 292 S.W.2d 501, 508 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954)).

2017Consumer Credit Union, 801 S.W.2d at 825 (citing Callahan, 292 S.W.2d at 508 ).

2016Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 771 S.W.2d 430, 433 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989), as follows: Where by promises or appearances one party is induced to believe that the other party is going to pay a claim or otherwise satisfy the claims of the first party, and in reliance on that representation the first party delays filing 8 suit within the applicable statute of limitations, the party making the representations may be estopped to raise the statute of limitations as a defense. **** The doctrine is, of course, most clearly applicable where the aggrieved party’s delay in bringing suit was caused by

1996In Sparks v. M etro Government of N ashville and Davidson County , 771 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. App. 1989), and relied upon by defendants, this court discussed the applicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel when applied to the statute of limitations.

2006See, e.g., ACG, 912 S.W.2d at 170 ; Robinson, 857 S.W.2d at 568 ; and Gitter v. Tennessee Farmers Mut.

1997See, e.g., ACG, 912 S.W.2d at 170 ; Robinson, 857 S.W.2d at 563; and Gitter v. Tennessee Farmers Mut.

2024Co., 130 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting Consumer Credit Un. v. Hite, 801 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990)).

2016Co., 578 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tenn. 1979)).

2015Id. at 751; see also Faust v. Metropolitan Government, 206 S.W.3d 475, 497-98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

2015However, “[s]tatutes of limitations are favored because they promote the timely pursuit of legal rights by suppressing stale claims.” Id. (citing Brown v. Hipshire, 553 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tenn. 1977)). -6- In order for an equitable estoppel claim to prevail, plaintiffs “must have acted diligently in pursuing their claims both before and after the defendant induced them.” Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 461 (Tenn. 2012).

2015It may be applied, however, even where the action is governed by a statute of limitations when the plaintiff is guilty of gross laches.” Gleason v. Gleason, 164 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Dennis Joslin Co. v. Johnson, 138 S.W.3d 197, 201 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)). “„The defense of laches is based [up]on the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and is only applied where the party invoking it has been prejudiced by the delay.‟” Brown, 46 S.W.3d at 726 (quoting Freeman v. Martin Robowash, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970)).