equitable estoppel doctrine in Maine

2017Cf. Hird v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 512 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Me. 1986) (concluding that the commission exceeded its authority in applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel where there was no “express or implied legislative authority” to do so). [¶ 14] This is in direct contrast to the statute’s inclusion of explicit procedures for adjusting benefit levels when an injured employee’s ability to be gainfully employed changes.

2017Cf. Hird v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 512 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Me. 1986) (concluding that the commission exceeded its authority in applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel where there was no “express or implied legislative authority” to do so). [¶ 14] This is in direct contrast to the statute’s inclusion of explicit procedures for adjusting benefit levels when an injured employee’s ability to be gainfully employed changes.

2001In this case, the parties focus on the second, fourth, and fifth methods for terminating easements. *608 i. Equitable Estoppel [¶ 43] The trial court found that there was “insufficient evidence that the doctrine of estoppel should be applied because of the silence of Trakas, who was unaware of the easement, during the construction by the DesJardinses of a driveway over a portion of the likely location of the easement.” The DesJardinses argue that the trial court erred by so ruling because Trakas, Casavant’s predecessor in title, through inaction and silence, caused the DesJardinses to material

2001Id. [¶ 45] Given the facts of this case, the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply.

2014Co., 632 A.2d 442, 444 (Me.1993).

1996Furthermore, we have cautioned that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be “carefully and sparingly applied,” Vacuum Systems, Inc. v. Bridge Const. Co., 632 A.2d 442, 444 (Me.1993), and that a party seeking to estop the enforcement of a zoning ordinance bears a greater burden of proof because of the “ ‘forceful public reasons that militate against restricting the enforcement of municipal zoning ordinances.’ ” F.S.

2011Put another way, "[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel, as distinguished from the doctrine of promissory estoppel, ordinarily is used defensively and requires a misrepresentation as to a past or present fact." Chrysler Credit Corp., 1998 ME 53 , ~ 28, 707 A.2d at 1318 -19 (citing Chapman v. Bomann, 381 A.2d 1123, 1127 (Me. 1978)).

1998See Chapman v. Bomann, 381 A.2d 1123, 1127 (Me.1978) (estoppel in pais involves the misrepresentation of an existing fact).

2011Put another way, "[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel, as distinguished from the doctrine of promissory estoppel, ordinarily is used defensively and requires a misrepresentation as to a past or present fact." Chrysler Credit Corp., 1998 ME 53 , ~ 28, 707 A.2d at 1318 -19 (citing Chapman v. Bomann, 381 A.2d 1123, 1127 (Me. 1978)).

2011Put another way, "[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel, as distinguished from the doctrine of promissory estoppel, ordinarily is used defensively and requires a misrepresentation as to a past or present fact." Chrysler Credit Corp., 1998 ME 53 , ~ 28, 707 A.2d at 1318 -19 (citing Chapman v. Bomann, 381 A.2d 1123, 1127 (Me. 1978)).

2020(Pl.'s Br. 17.) The doctrine of equitable estoppel "precludes an owner from asserting his legal title when, by his own action or inaction, he has caused another person to act or to alter [his] position to [his] detriment." Longley v. Knapp, 1998 lV!E 142, 'l[ 12, 713 A.2d 939 .

2001In this case, the parties focus on the second, fourth, and fifth methods for terminating easements. *608 i. Equitable Estoppel [¶ 43] The trial court found that there was “insufficient evidence that the doctrine of estoppel should be applied because of the silence of Trakas, who was unaware of the easement, during the construction by the DesJardinses of a driveway over a portion of the likely location of the easement.” The DesJardinses argue that the trial court erred by so ruling because Trakas, Casavant’s predecessor in title, through inaction and silence, caused the DesJardinses to material

2019“An abuse of discretion may be found where an appellant demonstrates that the decisionmaker exceeded the bounds of the reasonable choices available to it, considering the facts and circumstances of the particular case and the governing law.” Sager v. Town of Bowdoinham, 2004 ME 40, ¶ 11 , 845 A.2d 567 . [¶16] Equitable estoppel is an affirmative defense predicated on the principle that “[o]ne who has induced another to believe what is untrue may not later assert the truth.” City of Auburn v. Desgrosseilliers, 578 A.2d 712 , 714 8Because we affirm the judgment in F&W’s favor on GBT’s countercla

2004City of Auburn v. Desgrosseilliers, 578 A.2d 712, 715 (Me.1990). [¶ 35] The facts, even when construed in the light most favorable to KRV, do not support an equitable estoppel claim.

2009When reviewing an equitable estoppel defense, we consider “the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the government official or agency whose actions provide the basis for the claim and the governmental function being discharged by that official or agency.” Kittery Retail Ventures, 2004 ME 65, ¶ 34 , 856 A.2d at 1194 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 18] Equitable estoppel requires a misrepresentation.

2009When reviewing an equitable estoppel defense, we consider “the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the government official or agency whose actions provide the basis for the claim and the governmental function being discharged by that official or agency.” Kittery Retail Ventures, 2004 ME 65, ¶ 34 , 856 A.2d at 1194 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 18] Equitable estoppel requires a misrepresentation.

2014The Law Court has warned "that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be 'carefully and sparingly applied,' ... ."Town of Union v. Strong, 681 A.2d 14, 19 (Me. 1996) (quoting Vacuum Systems, Inc. v. Bridge Canst.

2002The Law Court has further ruled: In assessing a claim of equitable estoppel against a governmental entity we consider the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the particular governmental agency, the particular governmental function being discharged, and any considerations of public policy arising from the application of estoppel to the governmental function. . . .Furthermore, we have cautioned that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be ‘carefully and sparingly applied,. . .and that a party seeking to estop the enforcement of a zoning ordinance bears a greater burden of

2009Plummer Co. v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 612 A.2d 856, 860 (Me. 1992). [The claimant] must prove that (1) the statements or conduct of the town planner or Board induced [the claimant] to act; (2) the reliance was detrimental; and (3) the reliance was reasonable.

2004Plummer Co. v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 612 A.2d 856, 860 (Me.1992).

2012See id. ¶ 19 (“Equitable estoppel must be evaluated with circumspection and applied judiciously in the context of child support actions brought by the Department.”); Hart v. County of Sa-gadahoc, 609 A.2d 282, 284 (Me.1992) (stating, in discussing a claim of equitable es-toppel, that “[a]s a general proposition ... a governmental unit is not subject to es-toppel to the same extent as a private party”); Mathieu, 562 A.2d at 689 (stating that, as against the government, the doctrine of equitable estoppel “should be sparingly used”); Trull Nursing Home, Inc. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 461 A.2d 490

1990The party asserting estop-pel has “the burden to demonstrate that he justifiably relied upon affirmative misleading conduct of [the governmental representative] and was induced to his detriment to do an act that he would not otherwise have done.” Mathieu v. Commissioner of Human Servs., 562 A.2d 686, 689 (Me.1989); Roberts v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 404 A.2d 238, 241 (Me.1979).

2008In Littlefield v. Adler, 676 A.2d 940, 942 (Me. 1996), the Law Court set forth the elements of equitable estoppel in a property dispute context as follows: Equitable estoppel precludes an owner from asserting his legal title when, by his own action or inaction, he has caused another person to act or alter her position to her detriment.

1998Sargent, Inc. v. Town of Wells, 676 A.2d 920, 924 (Me.1996), and “should be carefully and sparingly applied,” Littlefield v. Adler, 676 A.2d 940, 942 (Me.1996) (quotations omitted). [¶ 26] L/A Auto Sales argues that CCC’s unfulfilled alleged promise to “come up with a better finance package” should allow it to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel as a shield to prevent CCC from enforcing its loan agreements, and that the court’s instructions were proper.

1990The party asserting estop-pel has “the burden to demonstrate that he justifiably relied upon affirmative misleading conduct of [the governmental representative] and was induced to his detriment to do an act that he would not otherwise have done.” Mathieu v. Commissioner of Human Servs., 562 A.2d 686, 689 (Me.1989); Roberts v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 404 A.2d 238, 241 (Me.1979).

1986Successful invocation of the equitable estoppel principle, however, requires a demonstration that the conduct “relied upon must have induced the party seeking to enforce an estoppel to do 1) what resulted to his detriment and 2) what he would not otherwise have done.” Townsend v. Appel, 446 A.2d 1132, 1133-34 (Me.1982) (quoting Roberts v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 404 A.2d 238, 241 (Me.1979).

2020To prevail, a party asserting an equitable estoppel defense against a governmental entity must show that “(1) the statements or conduct of the government official or agency induced the party to act; (2) the reliance was detrimental; and (3) the reliance was reasonable.” Pelletier, 2009 ME 11, ¶ 17 , 964 A.2d 630 .

2020To prevail, a party asserting an equitable estoppel defense against a governmental entity must show that “(1) the statements or conduct of the government official or agency induced the party to act; (2) the reliance was detrimental; and (3) the reliance was reasonable.” Pelletier, 2009 ME 11, ¶ 17 , 964 A.2d 630 .

2011Cottle Enters., Inc. v. Town ofFarmington, 1997 ME 78 , ~ 17 n. 6, 693 A.2d 330 , 335-36 n.6 (1997)) (quotations and citations omitted); see also, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp., 1998 ME 53 , ~ 28, 707 A.2d 1311, 1318-19 ("The doctrine of equitable estoppel, as distinguished from the doctrine of promissory estoppel, ordinarily is used defensively and requires a misrepresentation as to a past or present fact. ").

2011Cottle Enters., Inc. v. Town ofFarmington, 1997 ME 78 , ~ 17 n. 6, 693 A.2d 330 , 335-36 n.6 (1997)) (quotations and citations omitted); see also, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp., 1998 ME 53 , ~ 28, 707 A.2d 1311, 1318-19 ("The doctrine of equitable estoppel, as distinguished from the doctrine of promissory estoppel, ordinarily is used defensively and requires a misrepresentation as to a past or present fact. ").

2017Co .. 389 A.2d 28 . 30-32 (Me. 1978) (where the court considered an equitable estoppel claim).

2014Co., 389 A.2d 28, 30-32 (Me.1978) (where the court considered an equitable estoppel claim), the First Circuit stated that regarding equitable estoppel "Maine case law is unclear." Grande v. St.

2012However, an essential element of an equitable estoppel claim is that the party claiming equitable estoppel must establish detrimental reliance on the allegedly misleading information or conduct.~ Berry v. Board of Trustees, 663 A.2d at 18 n.8.

2011Berry, 663 A.2d at 18-20 .

1998Co., 83 Me. 100, 104 , 21 A. 740 (1890) (quotation omitted); see Berry v. Board of Trustees, 663 A.2d 14 , 18 n. 8 (Me.1995) (“Estoppel bars the assertion of the truth by one whose misleading conduct has induced another to act to his detriment in reliance on what is untrue.”) (quoting Anderson v. Commissioner of Dep’t of Human Servs., 489 A.2d 1094, 1099 (Me.1985)).

1998Co., 83 Me. 100, 104 , 21 A. 740 (1890) (quotation omitted); see Berry v. Board of Trustees, 663 A.2d 14 , 18 n. 8 (Me.1995) (“Estoppel bars the assertion of the truth by one whose misleading conduct has induced another to act to his detriment in reliance on what is untrue.”) (quoting Anderson v. Commissioner of Dep’t of Human Servs., 489 A.2d 1094, 1099 (Me.1985)).

2019See Anthem Health Plans of Me., Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins. , 2011 ME 48 , ¶¶ 5, 7, 18 A.3d 824 (explaining that an issue is moot when "there is no real and substantial controversy" and the decision "would result in no practical effect") (quotation marks omitted)).

2019See Anthem Health Plans of Me., Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins. , 2011 ME 48 , ¶¶ 5, 7, 18 A.3d 824 (explaining that an issue is moot when "there is no real and substantial controversy" and the decision "would result in no practical effect") (quotation marks omitted)).

2019See Blue Star Corp. v. CKF Props., LLC, 2009 ME 101, ¶ 26 , 980 A.2d 1270 . 10 (Me. 1990) (quotation marks omitted); see M.R.

2019See Blue Star Corp. v. CKF Props., LLC, 2009 ME 101, ¶ 26 , 980 A.2d 1270 . 10 (Me. 1990) (quotation marks omitted); see M.R.

2019See id. at 309-10 , 30 A.2d 541 . 6 Because we interpret section 1479(3)(A) to provide the remedy sought by Thornton Academy and the Arundel residents in their declaratory judgment and Rule 80B claims, we conclude that the equitable estoppel claim, which seeks the same remedy, continues to be moot.

2019See id. at 309-10 , 30 A.2d 541 . 6 Because we interpret section 1479(3)(A) to provide the remedy sought by Thornton Academy and the Arundel residents in their declaratory judgment and Rule 80B claims, we conclude that the equitable estoppel claim, which seeks the same remedy, continues to be moot.

2017See Hutz, 2011 ME 27, ¶ 12 , 12 A.3d 1174 . 13 [¶23] To prevail on an equitable estoppel claim against a government entity, the proponent of the claim must demonstrate by “clear and satisfactory” evidence that (1) the statements or conduct of a governmental official or agency induced the party to act, or here, to fail to act; (2) the reliance was detrimental to the party; and (3) the reliance was reasonable.

2017See Hutz, 2011 ME 27, ¶ 12 , 12 A.3d 1174 . 13 [¶23] To prevail on an equitable estoppel claim against a government entity, the proponent of the claim must demonstrate by “clear and satisfactory” evidence that (1) the statements or conduct of a governmental official or agency induced the party to act, or here, to fail to act; (2) the reliance was detrimental to the party; and (3) the reliance was reasonable.

2017Id.; see also Dolloff v. Gardiner, 148 Me. 176, 184 , 91 A.2d 320 (1952). [¶34] To mount an equitable estoppel defense to prevent the State from asserting an affirmative defense, Murphy Homes was required to prove “that (1) the statements or conduct of the governmental official or agency induced [it] to act; (2) the reliance was detrimental; and (3) the reliance was reasonable.” Pelletier, 2009 ME 11, ¶ 17 , 964 A.2d 630 .

2017Id.; see also Dolloff v. Gardiner, 148 Me. 176, 184 , 91 A.2d 320 (1952). [¶34] To mount an equitable estoppel defense to prevent the State from asserting an affirmative defense, Murphy Homes was required to prove “that (1) the statements or conduct of the governmental official or agency induced [it] to act; (2) the reliance was detrimental; and (3) the reliance was reasonable.” Pelletier, 2009 ME 11, ¶ 17 , 964 A.2d 630 .

2017See Pino v. Maplewood Packing Co., 375 A.2d 534, 539 (Me. 1977).

2017See Pino v. Maplewood Packing Co., 375 A.2d 534, 539 (Me. 1977).

2014No. 15 v. Raynolds, 413 A.2d 523, 533 (Me.1980)). [¶ 15] Because the doctrine of equitable estoppel requires “clear and satisfactory proof,” we have applied it “carefully and sparingly.” Vacuum Sys., Inc. v. Bridge Constr.