53 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1896–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
PMZ Oil Co. v. Lucroygreen2 sentences2018At the very core of the doctrine of equitable estoppel are "fundamental notions of justice and fair dealings." PMZ Oil Co. v. Lucroy , 449 So.2d 201 , 206 (Miss. 1984). 2007Berry cites PMZ Oil Co. v. Lucroy , 449 So.2d 201 , 207-08 (Miss. 1984) as holding that under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a subdivision's developer may not be allowed to disregard the covenants it has already imposed on lot owners. | 6 | 9 |
Adams v. Greenpoint Credit, LLCgreen2 sentences2014See Simmons Hous., Inc. v. Shelton, 36 So.3d 1283, 1287 (Miss.2010) (children were not referenced or alluded to in the contract and thus were not third-party beneficiaries to the agreements signed by their parents, nor did the principles of equitable estoppel apply); Adams v. Greenpoint Credit, LLC, 943 So.2d 703, 709 (Miss.2006) (daughter was a “stranger to the contract” and not bound by arbitration clause found in the contract signed by her father); Terminix Int'l, Inc. v. Rice, 904 So.2d 1051, 1058 (Miss.2004) (wife was bound by the arbitration clause in the contract signed by her husband b 2010Accordingly, this Court has stated that “a signatory may enforce an arbitration agreement against a non-signatory if the non-signatory is a third-party beneficiary or if the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies.” Qualcomm, 980 So.2d at 269 (citing Adams, 943 So.2d at 708 ). | 3 | 7 |
Mayor of Aldermen v. Welchgreen2 sentences2013“Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a party is precluded from denying any material fact, induced by his words or conduct upon which a person relied, whereby the person changed his position in such a way that injury would be suffered if such denial or contrary assertion was allowed.” Craig v. City of Yazoo City, 104 So.3d 172, 175 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (quoting Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, City of Clinton v. Welch, 888 So.2d 416, 424 (¶ 43) (Miss.2004)). 2012“When applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, ‘the test is whether it would be substantially unfair to allow a person to deny what he has previously induced another to believe and take action thereon.’ ” Welch, 888 So.2d at 427 (¶ 51) (quoting Koval, 576 So.2d at 138 )). | 3 | 3 |
Suggs v. Town of Caledoniagreen2 sentences2011At the very least, “as an essential prerequisite to application of the doctrine of estoppel[,] the party to be estopped must have had knowledge of the situation.” Suggs v. Town of Caledonia, 470 So.2d 1055, 1058 (Miss.1985). 2009At the very least, “as an essential prerequisite to application of the doctrine of estoppel[,] the party to be estopped must have had knowledge of the situation.” Suggs v. Town of Caledonia, 470 So. 2d 1055, 1058 (Miss. 1985). | 2 | 4 |
Kimball Glassco Residential Center, Inc. v. Shanksgreen2 sentences2023“For the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply, the plaintiff must have relied on a misrepresentation by the defendant[.]” Kimball Glasco Residential Ctr., Inc. v. Shanks, 64 So. 3d 941, 948 (Miss. 2011). 2016For the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply to a statute of limitations, “[i]nequitable or fraudulent conduct must be established^]” Shanks, 64 So.3d at 947 (¶ 19) (quoting Trosclair, 757 So.2d at 181 (¶ 11)). | 2 | 3 |
Craig v. City of Yazoo Citygreen2 sentences2026“When applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, ‘the test is whether it would be substantially unfair to allow a person to deny what he has previously induced another to believe and take action thereon.’” Craig v. City of Yazoo City, 104 So. 3d 172, 175 (¶10) (Miss. 2013“Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a party is precluded from denying any material fact, induced by his words or conduct upon which a person relied, whereby the person changed his position in such a way that injury would be suffered if such denial or contrary assertion was allowed.” Craig v. City of Yazoo City, 104 So.3d 172, 175 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (quoting Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, City of Clinton v. Welch, 888 So.2d 416, 424 (¶ 43) (Miss.2004)). | 2 | 2 |
SIMMONS HOUSING, INC. v. Sheltongreen2 sentences2018Shelton , 36 So.3d 1283 , 1286 (Miss. 2010) (internal citations omitted). "[A] signatory may enforce an arbitration agreement against a non-signatory if the non-signatory is a third-party beneficiary or if the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies." Id. (internal quotations omitted). ¶ 9. 2018Shelton , 36 So.3d 1283 , 1286 (Miss. 2010) (internal citations omitted). "[A] signatory may enforce an arbitration agreement against a non-signatory if the non-signatory is a third-party beneficiary or if the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies." Id. (internal quotations omitted). ¶ 9. | 2 | 2 |
Kelso v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2017Nichols, 913 So.2d at 391 (¶ 20) (quoting Kelso v. Robinson, 172 Miss. 828, 840-41 , 161 So. 135, 137 (1935)). . 2017Nichols, 913 So.2d at 391 (¶ 20) (quoting Kelso v. Robinson, 172 Miss. 828, 840-41 , 161 So. 135, 137 (1935)). . | 2 | 2 |
Ross v. Rossgreen2 sentences2015Bell, Mississippi Family Law § 10,03[3], at 294 (2005) (discussing cases in which “courts have ordered support from divorced stepparents based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel,” including Ross v. Ross, 126 N.J.Super. 394 , 314 A.2d 623, 626 (N.J.Juv. 2015Bell, Mississippi Family Law § 10,03[3], at 294 (2005) (discussing cases in which “courts have ordered support from divorced stepparents based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel,” including Ross v. Ross, 126 N.J.Super. 394 , 314 A.2d 623, 626 (N.J.Juv. | 2 | 2 |
Koval v. Kovalgreen2 sentences2012Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, City of Clinton v. Welch, 888 So.2d 416, 424 (¶ 43) (Miss.2004) (quoting Koval v. Koval, 576 So.2d 134, 137 (Miss.1991)). ¶ 9. 2012“When applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, ‘the test is whether it would be substantially unfair to allow a person to deny what he has previously induced another to believe and take action thereon.’ ” Welch, 888 So.2d at 427 (¶ 51) (quoting Koval, 576 So.2d at 138 )). | 2 | 2 |
Sullivan v. Protex Weatherproofing, Inc.green2 sentences2007See also Fradella v. Seaberry, 952 So.2d 165, 175 (Miss.2007) (nonsignatory to contract containing arbitration clause could compel arbitration against signatory where nonsignatory had certain specified rights and responsibilities to the signatory under the contract); Adams v. Greenpoint Credit, LLC, 943 So.2d 703, 708 (Miss.2006) ("arbitration agreements can be enforced against nonsignatories if such nonsignatory is a third party beneficiary" or if the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies); [5] Cleveland v. Mann, 942 So.2d 108, 119 (Miss.2006) (decedent's heirs-at-law in wrongful death actio 2006See also Fradella v. Seaberry, 952 So. 2d 165, 175 (Miss. 2007) (nonsignatory to contract containing arbitration clause could compel arbitration against signatory where nonsignatory had certain specified rights and responsibilities to the signatory under the contract); Adams v. Greenpoint Credit, LLC, 943 So. 2d 703, 708 (Miss. 2006) (“arbitration agreements can be enforced against nonsignatories if such nonsignatory is a third party beneficiary” or if the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies); 5 Cleveland v. Mann, 942 So. 2d 108, 119 (Miss. 2006) (decedent’s heirs-at-law in wrongful death a | 2 | 2 |
Cleveland v. Manngreen2 sentences2007See also Fradella v. Seaberry, 952 So.2d 165, 175 (Miss.2007) (nonsignatory to contract containing arbitration clause could compel arbitration against signatory where nonsignatory had certain specified rights and responsibilities to the signatory under the contract); Adams v. Greenpoint Credit, LLC, 943 So.2d 703, 708 (Miss.2006) ("arbitration agreements can be enforced against nonsignatories if such nonsignatory is a third party beneficiary" or if the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies); [5] Cleveland v. Mann, 942 So.2d 108, 119 (Miss.2006) (decedent's heirs-at-law in wrongful death actio 2006See also Fradella v. Seaberry, 952 So. 2d 165, 175 (Miss. 2007) (nonsignatory to contract containing arbitration clause could compel arbitration against signatory where nonsignatory had certain specified rights and responsibilities to the signatory under the contract); Adams v. Greenpoint Credit, LLC, 943 So. 2d 703, 708 (Miss. 2006) (“arbitration agreements can be enforced against nonsignatories if such nonsignatory is a third party beneficiary” or if the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies); 5 Cleveland v. Mann, 942 So. 2d 108, 119 (Miss. 2006) (decedent’s heirs-at-law in wrongful death a | 2 | 2 |
Fradella v. Seaberrygreen2 sentences2007See also Fradella v. Seaberry, 952 So.2d 165, 175 (Miss.2007) (nonsignatory to contract containing arbitration clause could compel arbitration against signatory where nonsignatory had certain specified rights and responsibilities to the signatory under the contract); Adams v. Greenpoint Credit, LLC, 943 So.2d 703, 708 (Miss.2006) ("arbitration agreements can be enforced against nonsignatories if such nonsignatory is a third party beneficiary" or if the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies); [5] Cleveland v. Mann, 942 So.2d 108, 119 (Miss.2006) (decedent's heirs-at-law in wrongful death actio 2006See also Fradella v. Seaberry, 952 So. 2d 165, 175 (Miss. 2007) (nonsignatory to contract containing arbitration clause could compel arbitration against signatory where nonsignatory had certain specified rights and responsibilities to the signatory under the contract); Adams v. Greenpoint Credit, LLC, 943 So. 2d 703, 708 (Miss. 2006) (“arbitration agreements can be enforced against nonsignatories if such nonsignatory is a third party beneficiary” or if the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies); 5 Cleveland v. Mann, 942 So. 2d 108, 119 (Miss. 2006) (decedent’s heirs-at-law in wrongful death a | 2 | 2 |
Monroe County Bd. of Educ. v. Ryegreen2 sentences2004This Court has held that “the state and its political subdivisions ‘may be equitably estopped under the proper circumstances.’ ” Hill v. Thompson, 564 So.2d 1, 14 (Miss.1989) citing Board of Trustees of Monroe County Bd. of Educ. v. Rye, 521 So.2d 900, 908-09 (Miss.1988); Suggs v. Town of Caledonia, 470 So.2d 1055 (Miss.1985); Covington County v. Page, 456 So.2d 739 (Miss.1984); State v. Stockett, 249 So.2d 388 (Miss. 1971). ¶ 44. 2003This Court has held that “the state and its political subdivisions ‘may be equitably estopped under the proper circumstances.’” Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1, 14 (Miss. 1989) citing Board of Trustees of Monroe County Bd. of Educ. v. Rye, 521 So. 2d 900, 908-09 (Miss. 1988); Suggs v. Town of Caledonia, 470 So. 2d 1055 (Miss. 1985); Covington County v. Page, 456 So. 2d 739 (Miss. 1984); State v. Stockett, 249 So. 2d 388 (Miss. 1971). ¶44. | 2 | 2 |
Hill v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2004This Court has held that “the state and its political subdivisions ‘may be equitably estopped under the proper circumstances.’ ” Hill v. Thompson, 564 So.2d 1, 14 (Miss.1989) citing Board of Trustees of Monroe County Bd. of Educ. v. Rye, 521 So.2d 900, 908-09 (Miss.1988); Suggs v. Town of Caledonia, 470 So.2d 1055 (Miss.1985); Covington County v. Page, 456 So.2d 739 (Miss.1984); State v. Stockett, 249 So.2d 388 (Miss. 1971). ¶ 44. 2003This Court has held that “the state and its political subdivisions ‘may be equitably estopped under the proper circumstances.’” Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1, 14 (Miss. 1989) citing Board of Trustees of Monroe County Bd. of Educ. v. Rye, 521 So. 2d 900, 908-09 (Miss. 1988); Suggs v. Town of Caledonia, 470 So. 2d 1055 (Miss. 1985); Covington County v. Page, 456 So. 2d 739 (Miss. 1984); State v. Stockett, 249 So. 2d 388 (Miss. 1971). ¶44. | 2 | 2 |
Qualcomm v. American Wireless Groupgreen2 sentences2019Wireless License Grp., LLC, 980 So. 2d 261, 269 (Miss. 2007) (holding that “a signatory may enforce an arbitration agreement against a non-signatory if the non-signatory is a third-party beneficiary or if the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies”). 4 (¶¶18-33). 2010Accordingly, this Court has stated that “a signatory may enforce an arbitration agreement against a non-signatory if the non-signatory is a third-party beneficiary or if the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies.” Qualcomm, 980 So.2d at 269 (citing Adams, 943 So.2d at 708 ). | 1 | 3 |
Covington County v. Pagegreen2 sentences2004This Court has held that “the state and its political subdivisions ‘may be equitably estopped under the proper circumstances.’ ” Hill v. Thompson, 564 So.2d 1, 14 (Miss.1989) citing Board of Trustees of Monroe County Bd. of Educ. v. Rye, 521 So.2d 900, 908-09 (Miss.1988); Suggs v. Town of Caledonia, 470 So.2d 1055 (Miss.1985); Covington County v. Page, 456 So.2d 739 (Miss.1984); State v. Stockett, 249 So.2d 388 (Miss. 1971). ¶ 44. 2003This Court has held that “the state and its political subdivisions ‘may be equitably estopped under the proper circumstances.’” Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1, 14 (Miss. 1989) citing Board of Trustees of Monroe County Bd. of Educ. v. Rye, 521 So. 2d 900, 908-09 (Miss. 1988); Suggs v. Town of Caledonia, 470 So. 2d 1055 (Miss. 1985); Covington County v. Page, 456 So. 2d 739 (Miss. 1984); State v. Stockett, 249 So. 2d 388 (Miss. 1971). ¶44. | 1 | 3 |
Bright v. Michelgreen2 sentences2015Bright v. Michel, 242 Miss. 738 , 137 So.2d 155, 159 (1962), Stated another- way, the Court has held-: [I]t is a-rule of almost universal application that one who stands by and sees another purchase land or enter upon it under a claim of right and permits such other to make expenditures or improvements under circumstances which, call for notice or protest cannot afterwards assert-his own title, against such person. 2015Bright v. Michel, 242 Miss. 738 , 137 So.2d 155, 159 (1962), Stated another- way, the Court has held-: [I]t is a-rule of almost universal application that one who stands by and sees another purchase land or enter upon it under a claim of right and permits such other to make expenditures or improvements under circumstances which, call for notice or protest cannot afterwards assert-his own title, against such person. | 1 | 2 |
O'Neill v. O'Neillgreen2 sentences2005"The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based upon fundamental notions of justice and fair dealing." O'Neill, 551 So.2d at 232. 2002"The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based upon fundamental notions of justice and fair dealing." O'Neill, 551 So. 2d at 232 . | 1 | 2 |
Cinque Bambini Partnership v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 521 . | 1 | 1 |
cluster 779197green1 sentence2023Co., 200 So. 3d 1048, 1052-1053 (Miss. 2016) (holding that a question of fact remained as to whether insured waived uninsured motorist coverage); Tyler v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 304 F.3d 379 , 391 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The equitable estoppel inquiry involves questions of fact and law.”). | 1 | 1 |
Sharel A. Kenney v. Foremost Insurance Companygreen1 sentence2023Co., 200 So. 3d 1048, 1052-1053 (Miss. 2016) (holding that a question of fact remained as to whether insured waived uninsured motorist coverage); Tyler v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 304 F.3d 379 , 391 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The equitable estoppel inquiry involves questions of fact and law.”). | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Daygreen1 sentence2021Strickland v. Day, 239 So. 3d 486, 493 (¶30) (Miss. 2018). | 1 | 1 |
Jon A. Swartzfager v. Thomas R. Saulgreen2 sentences2021The doctrine of equitable estoppel “is based on public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice.” Swartzfager v. Saul, 213 So. 3d 55, 65 (¶27) (Miss. 2017) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). 2021The doctrine “prevents a party from denying any material fact, induced by his or her words or conduct, upon which another person relied and changed his or her position and would suffer injury if the denial or contrary assertion was allowed.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
| National Mortg. Co. v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
Nichols v. Bushgreen2 sentences2017Nichols, 913 So. 2d at 391 (¶20) (quoting Kelso v. Robinson, 172 Miss. 828, 840-41 , 161 So. 135, 137 (1935)). 2 The Robinson court found the former property owner “had a duty to speak, and her silence as to the legitimacy of the foreclosure and the documents supporting the sale effectively estopped her from challenging the title of the subsequent purchaser.” Robinson, 179 So. 3d at 1149 (¶15) (emphasis added). 10 foreclosure that is, a foreclosure without right, which would ordinarily be ineffective and invalid irrespective of the manner in which it is executed. 2017Nichols, 913 So.2d at 391 (¶ 20) (quoting Kelso v. Robinson, 172 Miss. 828, 840-41 , 161 So. 135, 137 (1935)). . | 1 | 1 |
| Perry A. Elchos v. Kevin J. Haasgreen | 1 | 1 |
Helen Y. Robinson v. Gerald M. Warrengreen1 sentence2017Nichols, 913 So. 2d at 391 (¶20) (quoting Kelso v. Robinson, 172 Miss. 828, 840-41 , 161 So. 135, 137 (1935)). 2 The Robinson court found the former property owner “had a duty to speak, and her silence as to the legitimacy of the foreclosure and the documents supporting the sale effectively estopped her from challenging the title of the subsequent purchaser.” Robinson, 179 So. 3d at 1149 (¶15) (emphasis added). 10 foreclosure that is, a foreclosure without right, which would ordinarily be ineffective and invalid irrespective of the manner in which it is executed. | 1 | 1 |
| Trosclair v. Mississippi Dept. of Transp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Nicholas v. Nicholasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Townes v. Rusty Ellis Builder, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Terminix Intern., Inc. v. Ricegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith Barney, Inc. v. Henrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Long Meadow Homeowners' Ass'n v. Harlandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harrison Enterprises, Inc. v. Trilogy Communications, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Turner v. Terrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Izard v. Mikellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Screws v. Watsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Adams v. Petrade International, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gagne v. Bertrangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Esener v. Kinsey
green
2 sentences2008The Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the applicability of equitable estoppel to a statute of repose in Esener v. Kinsey, 240 Ga.App. 21 , 522 S.E.2d 522 (1999), finding that: if the evidence of defendant's fraud or other conduct on which the plaintiff reasonably relied in forbearing the bringing of a lawsuit is found by the jury to exist, then the defendant, under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, is estopped from raising the defense of the statute of ultimate repose. 2008The Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the applicability of equitable estoppel to a statute of repose in Esener v. Kinsey, 240 Ga.App. 21 , 522 S.E.2d 522 (1999), finding that: if the evidence of defendant's fraud or other conduct on which the plaintiff reasonably relied in forbearing the bringing of a lawsuit is found by the jury to exist, then the defendant, under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, is estopped from raising the defense of the statute of ultimate repose. | 2 | 2005–2008 |
State v. Stockett
green
2 sentences2004This Court has held that “the state and its political subdivisions ‘may be equitably estopped under the proper circumstances.’ ” Hill v. Thompson, 564 So.2d 1, 14 (Miss.1989) citing Board of Trustees of Monroe County Bd. of Educ. v. Rye, 521 So.2d 900, 908-09 (Miss.1988); Suggs v. Town of Caledonia, 470 So.2d 1055 (Miss.1985); Covington County v. Page, 456 So.2d 739 (Miss.1984); State v. Stockett, 249 So.2d 388 (Miss. 1971). ¶ 44. 2003This Court has held that “the state and its political subdivisions ‘may be equitably estopped under the proper circumstances.’” Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1, 14 (Miss. 1989) citing Board of Trustees of Monroe County Bd. of Educ. v. Rye, 521 So. 2d 900, 908-09 (Miss. 1988); Suggs v. Town of Caledonia, 470 So. 2d 1055 (Miss. 1985); Covington County v. Page, 456 So. 2d 739 (Miss. 1984); State v. Stockett, 249 So. 2d 388 (Miss. 1971). ¶44. | 2 | 2003–2004 |
Hilti, Inc. v. John Oldach
green
2 sentences2002The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Hilti, Inc. v. Oldach, 392 F.2d 368 , 369 n. 2 (1st Cir.1968) stated: "If arbitration defenses could be foreclosed simply by adding as a defendant a person not a party to an arbitration agreement, the utility of such agreements would be seriously compromised." ¶ 74. 2000The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Hilti, Inc. v. Oldach, 392 F.2d 368 , 369 n.2 (1st Cir. 1968) stated: "If arbitration defenses could be foreclosed simply by adding as a defendant a person not a party to an arbitration agreement, the utility of such agreements would be seriously compromised." ¶74. | 2 | 2000–2002 |
Thomas McDonnell, III v. Sandy Miller
green
1 sentence2026Ct. App. 2022) (stating that section 15-1-49 applies to claims for breach of contract, conversion, unjust enrichment); McDonnel v. Miller, 655 F. App’x 229 , 232 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2016) (stating that section 15-1-49 applies to an equitable estoppel claim to the extent “equitable estoppel is a separate cause of action under Mississippi law”). 21 CONCLUSION ¶44. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Ross v. Ross green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Oktibbeha County Bd. of Educ. v. Town of Sturgis green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Thomas v. Bailey green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Scotch Plywood Co. of Mississippi v. Gardner neutral | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Burton v. Redmond green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Strangi v. Wilson green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Nixon's Heirs v. Cargo's Heirs neutral | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Martin v. Hartley neutral | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Indiana v. Milk green | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| Teutonia National Bank v. Wagner neutral | 1 | 1896–1896 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.