equitable estoppel doctrine in Georgia

2025We affirmed, holding that if the jury found “evidence of defendant’s fraud or other conduct on which the plaintiff reasonably relied in forbearing the bringing of a lawsuit,” then “the 6 defendant, under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, is estopped from raising the defense of the statute of ultimate repose.” Id. at 23 .

2019See also Esener v. Kinsey , 240 Ga. App. 21 , 23, 522 S.E.2d (522) (1999) ("The statute of repose is not tolled by fraud, but fraud, instead, gives rise to the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which prevents the defendant from asserting the defense of the statute of repose, because his or her own wrongful conduct gave rise to the defense and prevented the plaintiff from exercising reasonable diligence to learn the nature and cause of the injury attributable to the defendant and from bringing suit."). 21 See Craven v. Lowndes County Hosp.

2021Although it is well-settled that a statute of repose cannot be tolled, there are “narrow circumstances [in which] a defendant may be equitably estopped from raising the statute of repose as a defense.” Balotin v. Simpson, 286 Ga. App. 772, 773 ( 650 SE2d 253 ) (2007); see also Rosenberg v. Falling Water, Inc., 289 Ga. 57, 60-61 (709 16 SE2d 227 ) (2011) (discussing context in which doctrine of equitable estoppel can be applied with respect to statutes of repose); Craven v. Lowndes County Hosp.

2013See also Rosenberg v. Falling Water, Inc., 289 Ga. 57, 60-61 ( 709 SE2d 227 ) (2011) (discussing context in which doctrine of equitable estoppel can be applied with respect to statutes of repose). [A]n equitable estoppel is based on the ground of promoting the equity and justice of the individual case by preventing a party from asserting his rights under a general technical rule of law, when he has so conducted himself that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience for him to allege and prove the truth.

2021Auth., 263 Ga. 657, 660 (3) ( 437 SE2d 308 ) (1993); Wilhelm v. Houston County, 310 Ga. App. 506, 509 (1) (c) ( 713 SE2d 660 ) (2011); Esener, 240 Ga. App. at 23 .

2021Auth., 263 Ga. 657, 660 (3) ( 437 SE2d 308 ) (1993); Wilhelm v. Houston County, 310 Ga. App. 506, 509 (1) (c) ( 713 SE2d 660 ) (2011); Esener, 240 Ga. App. at 23 .

2021Although it is well-settled that a statute of repose cannot be tolled, there are “narrow circumstances [in which] a defendant may be equitably estopped from raising the statute of repose as a defense.” Balotin v. Simpson, 286 Ga. App. 772, 773 ( 650 SE2d 253 ) (2007); see also Rosenberg v. Falling Water, Inc., 289 Ga. 57, 60-61 (709 16 SE2d 227 ) (2011) (discussing context in which doctrine of equitable estoppel can be applied with respect to statutes of repose); Craven v. Lowndes County Hosp.

2021Although it is well-settled that a statute of repose cannot be tolled, there are “narrow circumstances [in which] a defendant may be equitably estopped from raising the statute of repose as a defense.” Balotin v. Simpson, 286 Ga. App. 772, 773 ( 650 SE2d 253 ) (2007); see also Rosenberg v. Falling Water, Inc., 289 Ga. 57, 60-61 (709 16 SE2d 227 ) (2011) (discussing context in which doctrine of equitable estoppel can be applied with respect to statutes of repose); Craven v. Lowndes County Hosp.

2013See also Rosenberg v. Falling Water, Inc., 289 Ga. 57, 60-61 ( 709 SE2d 227 ) (2011) (discussing context in which doctrine of equitable estoppel can be applied with respect to statutes of repose). “[A]n equitable estoppel is based on the ground of promoting the equity and justice of the individual case by preventing a party from asserting his rights under a general technical rule of law, when he has so conducted himself that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience for him to allege and prove the truth.” (Citation omitted.) Hollifield v. Monte Vista Biblical Gardens, Inc., 251 Ga. Ap

2013See also Rosenberg v. Falling Water, Inc., 289 Ga. 57, 60-61 ( 709 SE2d 227 ) (2011) (discussing context in which doctrine of equitable estoppel can be applied with respect to statutes of repose). “[A]n equitable estoppel is based on the ground of promoting the equity and justice of the individual case by preventing a party from asserting his rights under a general technical rule of law, when he has so conducted himself that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience for him to allege and prove the truth.” (Citation omitted.) Hollifield v. Monte Vista Biblical Gardens, Inc., 251 Ga. Ap

2011As the Court of Appeals recognized in Hill, supra, to hold otherwise would subvert the purpose of the equitable estoppel doctrine by incentivizing fraud. 186 Ga.App. at 357 , 367 S.E.2d 128 .

2011As the Court of Appeals recognized in Hill, supra, to hold otherwise would subvert the purpose of the equitable estoppel doctrine by incentivizing fraud. 186 Ga.App. at 357 , 367 S.E.2d 128 .

1994And once a right is waived the waiver cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the other party, even if subsequent events prove the right waived to have been more valuable than was anticipated.’ [Cit.] In certain situations, ‘the question whether waiver will be found in any particular case depends not upon the secret intention of the party against whom it is asserted, but upon the effect which his conduct has had upon the other party, (and) (i)f intention to waive is to be implied from conduct, the conduct [as here] should speak the intent clearly.’ [Cit.] A fine and often imperceptible line

1994And once a right is waived the waiver cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the other party, even if subsequent events prove the right waived to have been more valuable than was anticipated.’ [Cit.] In certain situations, ‘the question whether waiver will be found in any particular case depends not upon the secret intention of the party against whom it is asserted, but upon the effect which his conduct has had upon the other party, (and) (i)f intention to waive is to be implied from conduct, the conduct [as here] should speak the intent clearly.’ [Cit.] A fine and often imperceptible line

2025See also Usme v. CMI Leisure Mgmt., 106 F4th 1079, 1087-1088 (III) (B) (11th Cir. 2024) (noting that under limited circumstances, “[e]quitable estoppel allows a non-party” to a contract containing an 12 arbitration agreement “to enforce the [arbitration] provisions of [that] contract against a signatory”) (emphasis supplied); Kroma Makeup EU, LLC v. Boldface Licensing + Branding, 845 F3d 1351, 1354 (II) (11th Cir. 2017) (under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, “a defendant who is a non-signatory to an agreement containing an arbitration clause can force arbitration of a signatory’s claims wh

2025See also Usme v. CMI Leisure Mgmt., 106 F4th 1079, 1087-1088 (III) (B) (11th Cir. 2024) (noting that under limited circumstances, “[e]quitable estoppel allows a non-party” to a contract containing an 12 arbitration agreement “to enforce the [arbitration] provisions of [that] contract against a signatory”) (emphasis supplied); Kroma Makeup EU, LLC v. Boldface Licensing + Branding, 845 F3d 1351, 1354 (II) (11th Cir. 2017) (under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, “a defendant who is a non-signatory to an agreement containing an arbitration clause can force arbitration of a signatory’s claims wh

2023See Osburn v. Goldman, 269 Ga. App. 303, 304 (1) (a) ( 603 SE2d 695 ) (2004) (explaining that application of equitable estoppel requires evidence of fraud “on which the plaintiff reasonably relied in forbearing the bringing of a lawsuit”).

2023See Osburn v. Goldman, 269 Ga. App. 303, 304 (1) (a) ( 603 SE2d 695 ) (2004) (explaining that application of equitable estoppel requires evidence of fraud “on which the plaintiff reasonably relied in forbearing the bringing of a lawsuit”).

2021Auth., 263 Ga. 657, 660 (3) ( 437 SE2d 308 ) (1993); Wilhelm v. Houston County, 310 Ga. App. 506, 509 (1) (c) ( 713 SE2d 660 ) (2011); Esener, 240 Ga. App. at 23 .

2021Auth., 263 Ga. 657, 660 (3) ( 437 SE2d 308 ) (1993); Wilhelm v. Houston County, 310 Ga. App. 506, 509 (1) (c) ( 713 SE2d 660 ) (2011); Esener, 240 Ga. App. at 23 .

2019Auth. , 263 Ga. at 660 (3), 437 S.E.2d 308 (Where nothing in the record showed that the doctors who reviewed a biopsy and failed to diagnose the patient's skin cancer had any knowledge of their negligence, they were not estopped from asserting the statute of repose offense.); Balotin v. Simpson , 286 Ga. App. at 772-773, 650 S.E.2d 253 (Where plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in their pending malpractice action to add as a defendant to the action a radiologist who read a CT scan more than five years before the amendment and who failed to diagnose the patient's pancreatic tumor, and where n

2019Auth. , 263 Ga. at 660 (3), 437 S.E.2d 308 (Where nothing in the record showed that the doctors who reviewed a biopsy and failed to diagnose the patient's skin cancer had any knowledge of their negligence, they were not estopped from asserting the statute of repose offense.); Balotin v. Simpson , 286 Ga. App. at 772-773, 650 S.E.2d 253 (Where plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in their pending malpractice action to add as a defendant to the action a radiologist who read a CT scan more than five years before the amendment and who failed to diagnose the patient's pancreatic tumor, and where n

2011"Equity mandates that wrongdoers should be estopped from enjoying the fruits of their fraud." Windham v. Latco of Miss., Inc., 972 So.2d 608, 612 (Miss.2008) (equitable estoppel available to bar reliance on improvement to real property statute of repose); Canton Lutheran Church v. Sovik, Mathre, Sathrum & Quanbeck, 507 F.Supp. 873, 879-880 (D.S.D.1981) (same). [8] Yet, by arbitrarily limiting the availability of equitable estoppel based on the date of the plaintiff's injury, the majority sanctions the very result that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is intended to prevent.

2011"Equity mandates that wrongdoers should be estopped from enjoying the fruits of their fraud." Windham v. Latco of Miss., Inc., 972 So.2d 608, 612 (Miss.2008) (equitable estoppel available to bar reliance on improvement to real property statute of repose); Canton Lutheran Church v. Sovik, Mathre, Sathrum & Quanbeck, 507 F.Supp. 873, 879-880 (D.S.D.1981) (same). [8] Yet, by arbitrarily limiting the availability of equitable estoppel based on the date of the plaintiff's injury, the majority sanctions the very result that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is intended to prevent.

2011“Equity mandates that wrongdoers should be estopped from enjoying the fruits of their fraud.” Windham v. Latco of Miss., Inc., 972 So.2d 608, 612 (Miss. 2008) (equitable estoppel available to bar reliance on improvement to real property statute of repose); Canton Lutheran Church v. Sovik, Mathre, Sathrum & Quanbeck, 507 FSupp 873, 879-880 (S.D. 1981) (same). 8 Yet, by arbitrarily limiting the availability of equitable estoppel based on the date of the plaintiffs injury, the majority sanctions the very result that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is intended to prevent.

2010See Tampa Bay Financial v. Nordeen, 272 Ga. App. 529, 534 (2) ( 612 SE2d 856 ) (2005). 6 Given our resolution of the easement by estoppel claim, we need not address the county’s additional argument that such a claim cannot be applied against a governmental entity such as the state or a county.

2010See Tampa Bay Financial v. Nordeen, 272 Ga. App. 529, 534 (2) ( 612 SE2d 856 ) (2005). 6 Given our resolution of the easement by estoppel claim, we need not address the county’s additional argument that such a claim cannot be applied against a governmental entity such as the state or a county.

2005In addition, the construction of a contract is a question of law for the court that is subject to de novo review.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Krut v. Whitecap Housing Group, LLC, 268 Ga. App. 436, 441 (2) ( 602 SE2d 201 ) (2004). 1.

2005In addition, the construction of a contract is a question of law for the court that is subject to de novo review.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Krut v. Whitecap Housing Group, LLC, 268 Ga. App. 436, 441 (2) ( 602 SE2d 201 ) (2004). 1.

1999Hill v. Fordham, supra at 358; accord Beck v. Dennis, 215 Ga. App. 728, 729-730 (1) ( 452 SE2d 205 ) (1994); Bynum v. Gregory, 215 Ga. App. 431, 434 (2) ( 450 SE2d 840 ) (1994); Lasoya v. Sunay, 193 Ga. App. 814, 815-816 (1) ( 389 SE2d 339 ) (1989).

1999Hill v. Fordham, supra at 358; accord Beck v. Dennis, 215 Ga. App. 728, 729-730 (1) ( 452 SE2d 205 ) (1994); Bynum v. Gregory, 215 Ga. App. 431, 434 (2) ( 450 SE2d 840 ) (1994); Lasoya v. Sunay, 193 Ga. App. 814, 815-816 (1) ( 389 SE2d 339 ) (1989).

1999Hill v. Fordham, supra at 358; accord Beck v. Dennis, 215 Ga. App. 728, 729-730 (1) ( 452 SE2d 205 ) (1994); Bynum v. Gregory, 215 Ga. App. 431, 434 (2) ( 450 SE2d 840 ) (1994); Lasoya v. Sunay, 193 Ga. App. 814, 815-816 (1) ( 389 SE2d 339 ) (1989).

1999Hill v. Fordham, supra at 358; accord Beck v. Dennis, 215 Ga. App. 728, 729-730 (1) ( 452 SE2d 205 ) (1994); Bynum v. Gregory, 215 Ga. App. 431, 434 (2) ( 450 SE2d 840 ) (1994); Lasoya v. Sunay, 193 Ga. App. 814, 815-816 (1) ( 389 SE2d 339 ) (1989).

1999Hill v. Fordham, supra at 358; accord Beck v. Dennis, 215 Ga. App. 728, 729-730 (1) ( 452 SE2d 205 ) (1994); Bynum v. Gregory, 215 Ga. App. 431, 434 (2) ( 450 SE2d 840 ) (1994); Lasoya v. Sunay, 193 Ga. App. 814, 815-816 (1) ( 389 SE2d 339 ) (1989).

1999Hill v. Fordham, supra at 358; accord Beck v. Dennis, 215 Ga. App. 728, 729-730 (1) ( 452 SE2d 205 ) (1994); Bynum v. Gregory, 215 Ga. App. 431, 434 (2) ( 450 SE2d 840 ) (1994); Lasoya v. Sunay, 193 Ga. App. 814, 815-816 (1) ( 389 SE2d 339 ) (1989).

1994And once a right is waived the waiver cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the other party, even if subsequent events prove the right waived to have been more valuable than was anticipated.’ [Cit.] In certain situations, ‘the question whether waiver will be found in any particular case depends not upon the secret intention of the party against whom it is asserted, but upon the effect which his conduct has had upon the other party, (and) (i)f intention to waive is to be implied from conduct, the conduct [as here] should speak the intent clearly.’ [Cit.] A fine and often imperceptible line

1994And once a right is waived the waiver cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the other party, even if subsequent events prove the right waived to have been more valuable than was anticipated.’ [Cit.] In certain situations, ‘the question whether waiver will be found in any particular case depends not upon the secret intention of the party against whom it is asserted, but upon the effect which his conduct has had upon the other party, (and) (i)f intention to waive is to be implied from conduct, the conduct [as here] should speak the intent clearly.’ [Cit.] A fine and often imperceptible line

1994And once a right is waived the waiver cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the other party, even if subsequent events prove the right waived to have been more valuable than was anticipated.’ [Cit.] In certain situations, ‘the question whether waiver will be found in any particular case depends not upon the secret intention of the party against whom it is asserted, but upon the effect which his conduct has had upon the other party, (and) (i)f intention to waive is to be implied from conduct, the conduct [as here] should speak the intent clearly.’ [Cit.] A fine and often imperceptible line

1994And once a right is waived the waiver cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the other party, even if subsequent events prove the right waived to have been more valuable than was anticipated.’ [Cit.] In certain situations, ‘the question whether waiver will be found in any particular case depends not upon the secret intention of the party against whom it is asserted, but upon the effect which his conduct has had upon the other party, (and) (i)f intention to waive is to be implied from conduct, the conduct [as here] should speak the intent clearly.’ [Cit.] A fine and often imperceptible line

1994And once a right is waived the waiver cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the other party, even if subsequent events prove the right waived to have been more valuable than was anticipated.’ [Cit.] In certain situations, ‘the question whether waiver will be found in any particular case depends not upon the secret intention of the party against whom it is asserted, but upon the effect which his conduct has had upon the other party, (and) (i)f intention to waive is to be implied from conduct, the conduct [as here] should speak the intent clearly.’ [Cit.] A fine and often imperceptible line

1992“An appellate court in reviewing a lower-court decision will look to the basic question, which is whether or not the judgment is valid as a matter of law; the reasons contained in the judgments are not controlling. [Cit.] Briefly expressed, a judgment right for any reason will be affirmed. [Cit.]” Adams v. Emory University Clinic, 179 Ga. App. 620, 621 ( 347 SE2d 670 ) (1986).

1992“An appellate court in reviewing a lower-court decision will look to the basic question, which is whether or not the judgment is valid as a matter of law; the reasons contained in the judgments are not controlling. [Cit.] Briefly expressed, a judgment right for any reason will be affirmed. [Cit.]” Adams v. Emory University Clinic, 179 Ga. App. 620, 621 ( 347 SE2d 670 ) (1986).

1978In accordance with BLI’s written request, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of estoppel by conduct (see Bennett v. Davis, 201 Ga. 58, 63 ( 39 SE2d 3 )) and the doctrine of equitable estoppel (Code Ann. § 38-116).

1978In accordance with BLI’s written request, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of estoppel by conduct (see Bennett v. Davis, 201 Ga. 58, 63 ( 39 SE2d 3 )) and the doctrine of equitable estoppel (Code Ann. § 38-116).

1975In State Hwy.Dept. v. Strickland, 214 Ga. 467, 472 ( 105 SE2d 299 ), the court said: "We find no case in this state in which the doctrine of equitable estoppel has been held to apply against the state. . .” Plaintiff nevertheless contends that the county’s resolutions in 1972 and 1973, raising retirement payments for 39 other retired employees creates an estoppel against challenging the 1971 amendment.

1975In State Hwy.Dept. v. Strickland, 214 Ga. 467, 472 ( 105 SE2d 299 ), the court said: "We find no case in this state in which the doctrine of equitable estoppel has been held to apply against the state. . .” Plaintiff nevertheless contends that the county’s resolutions in 1972 and 1973, raising retirement payments for 39 other retired employees creates an estoppel against challenging the 1971 amendment.