equitable estoppel doctrine in New Mexico

2014With respect to the first two issues, they have been resolved by virtue of our decision in Millar v. New Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions, 2013-NMCA-055 , 304 P.3d 427 , cert. denied, 2013-NMCERT-004 , 301 P.3d 858 , and accordingly, we reverse that portion of the district court’s order.

2014However, Millar does not consider or decide the constitutionality of DWS’s overpayment claims process. 2013-NMCA-055 , ¶ 16 (declaring this case does not involve a claim of constitutional deprivation).

2013In early May 2008, the Garcias signed an easement over the property with El Paso Electric Company after Willie Garcia was informed by the project manager for Sonoma Ranch that Sonoma Ranch did not have any objection to the Garcias doing so. {33} The focus of the doctrine of equitable estoppel is “preventing a party from benefitting from deception or misleading conduct.” Mannick v. Wakeland, 2005-NMCA-098, ¶ 28 , 138 N.M. 113 , 117 P.3d 919 , aff’d by Coppler & Mannick P.C. v. Wakeland, 2005-NMSC-022 , 138 N.M. 108 , 117 P.3d 914 .

2013In early May 2008, the Garcias signed an easement over the property with El Paso Electric Company after Willie Garcia was informed by the project manager for Sonoma Ranch that Sonoma Ranch did not have any objection to the Garcias doing so. {33} The focus of the doctrine of equitable estoppel is “preventing a party from benefitting from deception or misleading conduct.” Mannick v. Wakeland, 2005-NMCA-098, ¶ 28 , 138 N.M. 113 , 117 P.3d 919 , aff’d by Coppler & Mannick P.C. v. Wakeland, 2005-NMSC-022 , 138 N.M. 108 , 117 P.3d 914 .

2013In early May 2008, the Garcias signed an easement over the property with El Paso Electric Company after Willie Garcia was informed by the project manager for Sonoma Ranch that Sonoma Ranch did not have any objection to the Garcias doing so. {33} The focus of the doctrine of equitable estoppel is “preventing a party from benefitting from deception or misleading conduct.” Mannick v. Wakeland, 2005-NMCA-098, ¶ 28 , 138 N.M. 113 , 117 P.3d 919 , aff’d by Coppler & Mannick P.C. v. Wakeland, 2005-NMSC-022 , 138 N.M. 108 , 117 P.3d 914 .

2012Particularly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff should have been equitably estopped from proceeding with the foreclosure action and judicial sale while Plaintiff negotiated a loan modification with Defendant and, further, that Plaintiff told Defendant her application for a loan modification was likely to be approved, Plaintiff did not notify Defendant when her loan modification was rejected, and Defendant reasonably relied on Plaintiff’s misrepresentations regarding approval of the loan modification and therefore did notpursue other options to prevent the sale of her property. {20} “[T]he doctri

2013Specifically, the district court relied on the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision in Waters-Haskins v. New Mexico Human Services Department, 2009-NMSC-031 , 146 N.M. 391 , 210 P.3d 817 , in reaching its decision.

2013Specifically, the district court relied on the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision in Waters-Haskins v. New Mexico Human Services Department, 2009-NMSC-031 , 146 N.M. 391 , 210 P.3d 817 , in reaching its decision.

2025See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 11-16 (holding that a non-signatory could 13 be bound by an arbitration provision under the doctrine of equitable estoppel where 14 the non-signatory voluntarily sought to directly benefit from the agreement by 15 attempting to enforce it); Monette v. Tinsley, 1999-NMCA-040, ¶¶ 9-12 , 126 N.M. 16 748, 975 P.2d 361 (holding that a guarantor was not a party to the contract and was 17 not bound by the contract’s arbitration provision); Murken v. Suncor Energy, Inc., 18 2005-NMCA-102, ¶ 5 , 138 N.M. 179 , 117 P.3d 985 (deciding that a non-signatory 19 plaintiff could not be compe

2025See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 11-16 (holding that a non-signatory could 13 be bound by an arbitration provision under the doctrine of equitable estoppel where 14 the non-signatory voluntarily sought to directly benefit from the agreement by 15 attempting to enforce it); Monette v. Tinsley, 1999-NMCA-040, ¶¶ 9-12 , 126 N.M. 16 748, 975 P.2d 361 (holding that a guarantor was not a party to the contract and was 17 not bound by the contract’s arbitration provision); Murken v. Suncor Energy, Inc., 18 2005-NMCA-102, ¶ 5 , 138 N.M. 179 , 117 P.3d 985 (deciding that a non-signatory 19 plaintiff could not be compe

2025See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 11-16 (holding that a non-signatory could 13 be bound by an arbitration provision under the doctrine of equitable estoppel where 14 the non-signatory voluntarily sought to directly benefit from the agreement by 15 attempting to enforce it); Monette v. Tinsley, 1999-NMCA-040, ¶¶ 9-12 , 126 N.M. 16 748, 975 P.2d 361 (holding that a guarantor was not a party to the contract and was 17 not bound by the contract’s arbitration provision); Murken v. Suncor Energy, Inc., 18 2005-NMCA-102, ¶ 5 , 138 N.M. 179 , 117 P.3d 985 (deciding that a non-signatory 19 plaintiff could not be compe

2025See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 11-16 (holding that a non-signatory could 13 be bound by an arbitration provision under the doctrine of equitable estoppel where 14 the non-signatory voluntarily sought to directly benefit from the agreement by 15 attempting to enforce it); Monette v. Tinsley, 1999-NMCA-040, ¶¶ 9-12 , 126 N.M. 16 748, 975 P.2d 361 (holding that a guarantor was not a party to the contract and was 17 not bound by the contract’s arbitration provision); Murken v. Suncor Energy, Inc., 18 2005-NMCA-102, ¶ 5 , 138 N.M. 179 , 117 P.3d 985 (deciding that a non-signatory 19 plaintiff could not be compe

2016The doctrine of equitable estoppel is “premised on the notion that the one who has prevented the plaintiff from bringing suit within the statutory period should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitation as a defense.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {24} To prevail on his claim of equitable estoppel, Little was required to prove that Baigas “(1) concealed material facts, falsely represented material facts, or made representations of fact different or inconsistent with later assertions in court; (2) had an intent or expectation that such conduct would be acted up

2012Therefore, because New Mexico law clearly permits courts to consider course of dealing and course of performance evidence when determining whether a contractual term is ambiguous, Mark V, Inc., 114 N.M. at 781 , 845 P.2d at 1235 , the district court’s reliance on course of dealing and course of performance evidence was proper. {30} Commissioner also contends that the district court’s bifurcation of the legal and factual questions precluded it from considering extrinsic evidence in making the legal determination that the net proceeds language was unambiguous as a matter of law.

2012Therefore, because New Mexico law clearly permits courts to consider course of dealing and course of performance evidence when determining whether a contractual term is ambiguous, Mark V, Inc., 114 N.M. at 781 , 845 P.2d at 1235 , the district court’s reliance on course of dealing and course of performance evidence was proper. {30} Commissioner also contends that the district court’s bifurcation of the legal and factual questions precluded it from considering extrinsic evidence in making the legal determination that the net proceeds language was unambiguous as a matter of law.

2009“Estoppel cannot lie against the state when the act sought would be contrary to the requirements expressed by statute,” Kilmer v. Goodwin, 2004-NMCA-122 , ¶26, 136 N.M. 440 , 99 P.3d 690 , and therefore, we will not entertain an equitable estoppel defense that would prevent an agency from discharging its statutory duties, see, e.g., Rainaldi v. Pub.

2009“Estoppel cannot lie against the state when the act sought would be contrary to the requirements expressed by statute,” Kilmer v. Goodwin, 2004-NMCA-122 , ¶26, 136 N.M. 440 , 99 P.3d 690 , and therefore, we will not entertain an equitable estoppel defense that would prevent an agency from discharging its statutory duties, see, e.g., Rainaldi v. Pub.

2009Therefore, the majority held that deciding the equitable estoppel claim was premature and “vacat[ed] the judgment of the district court with instructions to remand this matter to the Department to reopen the fair hearing so that the Department may exercise the discretion conferred by federal law to settle, adjust, or compromise the overpayment claim.” Id.

2009The 10 party arguing estoppel must (1) not know the real facts, and (2) change 11 his or her position in reliance on the estopped party’s representations. 12 13 Blea v. Fields, 2005-NMSC-029, ¶ 20 , 138 N.M. 348 , 120 P.3d 430 .

2009The 10 party arguing estoppel must (1) not know the real facts, and (2) change 11 his or her position in reliance on the estopped party’s representations. 12 13 Blea v. Fields, 2005-NMSC-029, ¶ 20 , 138 N.M. 348 , 120 P.3d 430 .

2009Triple B Corp., 106 N.M. at 102 , 739 P.2d at 971 .

2009Triple B Corp., 106 N.M. at 102 , 739 P.2d at 971 .

2005The parties do not dispute that the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and the related concept of fraudulent concealment for tolling a statute of limitations, are equitable in nature, see Tomlinson v. George, 2005-NMSC-20, ¶¶ 13-14, 25, 138 N.M. 34 , 116 P.3d 105 ; Kern v. St.

2005The parties do not dispute that the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and the related concept of fraudulent concealment for tolling a statute of limitations, are equitable in nature, see Tomlinson v. George, 2005-NMSC-20, ¶¶ 13-14, 25, 138 N.M. 34 , 116 P.3d 105 ; Kern v. St.

2003While considered “not dispositive” by La Farge, 119 N.M. at 537 n. 1, 893 P.2d at 433 n. 1, the words “within the statutory period” were used by the Court in Kern no less than three times in its enunciation of when tolling would be available — a fair reading of which is if a plaintiff who files after the Section 41-5-13 deadline after discovering the act of malpractice within the statutory period, the claim would be barred notwithstanding fraudulent concealment. {13} La Farge limits that broad implication from Kern, not through application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, but by resort t

2003While considered “not dispositive” by La Farge, 119 N.M. at 537 n. 1, 893 P.2d at 433 n. 1, the words “within the statutory period” were used by the Court in Kern no less than three times in its enunciation of when tolling would be available — a fair reading of which is if a plaintiff who files after the Section 41-5-13 deadline after discovering the act of malpractice within the statutory period, the claim would be barred notwithstanding fraudulent concealment. {13} La Farge limits that broad implication from Kern, not through application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, but by resort t

2002The LaFarge formulation seems to us to strike a more satisfying balance between the purpose of equitable estoppel, which is to insure that “no person may obtain advantage by his own wrong.” Hardin, 87 N.M. at 145 , 530 P.2d at 409 , and the equitable principle that “equity aids those who have been vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights,” 27 A Am.Jur.2d Equity § 130 (1966).

2002The LaFarge formulation seems to us to strike a more satisfying balance between the purpose of equitable estoppel, which is to insure that “no person may obtain advantage by his own wrong.” Hardin, 87 N.M. at 145 , 530 P.2d at 409 , and the equitable principle that “equity aids those who have been vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights,” 27 A Am.Jur.2d Equity § 130 (1966).

1997The In re Adoption of Lori Gay W. opinion also set out the equitable estoppel doctrine, but held that the birth mother had become aware of the fraud more than a year before she filed suit, so the statute of limitations could still be used as a defense. 589 P.2d at 221 . 14.

1993I question only the premise for its application and the discussion of detrimental reliance and imposition of burden under the third and fourth prongs of the balancing test as elucidated in Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d at 390 .

1992Reynolds v. McLean, 76 N.M. 45 , 412 P.2d 1 (1966).

1992Reynolds v. McLean, 76 N.M. 45 , 412 P.2d 1 (1966).