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61 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1860–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Spear-Newman, Inc. v. Modern Floors Corporationgreen2 sentences1992The defendant also attempts to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel: "`There are two essential elements to an estoppel — the party must do or say something that is intended or calculated to induce another to believe in the existence of certain facts and to act upon that belief; and the other party, influenced thereby, must actually change his position or do some act to his injury which he otherwise would not have done.'" Spear-Newman, Inc. v. Modern Floor Corporation, 149 Conn. 88 , 91 , 175 A.2d 565 (1961). 1992The defendant also attempts to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel: "`There are two essential elements to an estoppel — the party must do or say something that is intended or calculated to induce another to believe in the existence of certain facts and to act upon that belief; and the other party, influenced thereby, must actually change his position or do some act to his injury which he otherwise would not have done.'" Spear-Newman, Inc. v. Modern Floor Corporation, 149 Conn. 88 , 91 , 175 A.2d 565 (1961). | 2 | 4 |
W. v. W.green2 sentences2018Not all putative fathers and not all families are similarly situated; thus their ... interests cannot be protected by a blanket [rule of law] that treats all putative fathers alike." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weidenbacher v. Duclos , 234 Conn. 51 , 76, 661 A.2d 988 (1995) ; see also W. v. W. , supra, at 503-504, 728 A.2d 1076 ("[I]n deciding whether to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel, courts must act judiciously and with sensitivity to the facts particular to each case.... [E]quitably estopping parties from denying parenthood is an extraordinary measure be 2001Id., 502 . | 2 | 3 |
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Dubnogreen2 sentences2012In addition, “[i]t is the burden of the person claiming the estoppel to show that he exercised due diligence to ascertain the truth and that he not only lacked knowledge of the true state of things but had no convenient means of acquiring that knowledge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 2000The doctrine requires proof of two essential elements: (1) "The party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief and (2) The other party must change its position in reliance on those facts thereby incurring some injury." Kimberly-Clark Corporation v. Dubno , 204 Conn. 137 , 148 (1987). | 1 | 4 |
Morris v. Costagreen2 sentences2006See Morris v. Costa, 174 Conn. 592, 599 , 392 A.2d 468 (1978) (“[cjourts, applying equitable principles, have laid down the doctrine of equitable estoppel by which a defendant may be estopped by his conduct from asserting defenses such as the statute of limita! ions”). 2006See Morris v. Costa, 174 Conn. 592, 599 , 392 A.2d 468 (1978) (“[cjourts, applying equitable principles, have laid down the doctrine of equitable estoppel by which a defendant may be estopped by his conduct from asserting defenses such as the statute of limita! ions”). | 1 | 3 |
Secured Environmental Management, Inc. v. Texas Commission on Environmental Qualitygreen1 sentence2019As this court has observed, albeit in the context of commercial agreements, an enforceable nonwaiver clause "bar[s] the application of waiver and estoppel defenses unless a party establishes the existence of unequal bargaining positions or 'sharp dealing.' See Christensen v. Cutaia , [ 211 Conn. 613 , 619-20, 560 A.2d 456 (1989) ] ; S.H.V.C., Inc. v. Roy , [ 188 Conn. 503 , 507, 450 A.2d 351 (1982) ] ; see also Webster Bank v. Oakley , 265 Conn. 539 , 549-51, 830 A.2d 139 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S.Ct. 1603 , 158 L.Ed.2d 244 (2004)." Milford Paintball, LLC v. Wampus Milford Ass | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.green1 sentence2019As this court has observed, albeit in the context of commercial agreements, an enforceable nonwaiver clause "bar[s] the application of waiver and estoppel defenses unless a party establishes the existence of unequal bargaining positions or 'sharp dealing.' See Christensen v. Cutaia , [ 211 Conn. 613 , 619-20, 560 A.2d 456 (1989) ] ; S.H.V.C., Inc. v. Roy , [ 188 Conn. 503 , 507, 450 A.2d 351 (1982) ] ; see also Webster Bank v. Oakley , 265 Conn. 539 , 549-51, 830 A.2d 139 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S.Ct. 1603 , 158 L.Ed.2d 244 (2004)." Milford Paintball, LLC v. Wampus Milford Ass | 1 | 1 |
Kang v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State Universitygreen1 sentence2019As this court has observed, albeit in the context of commercial agreements, an enforceable nonwaiver clause "bar[s] the application of waiver and estoppel defenses unless a party establishes the existence of unequal bargaining positions or 'sharp dealing.' See Christensen v. Cutaia , [ 211 Conn. 613 , 619-20, 560 A.2d 456 (1989) ] ; S.H.V.C., Inc. v. Roy , [ 188 Conn. 503 , 507, 450 A.2d 351 (1982) ] ; see also Webster Bank v. Oakley , 265 Conn. 539 , 549-51, 830 A.2d 139 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S.Ct. 1603 , 158 L.Ed.2d 244 (2004)." Milford Paintball, LLC v. Wampus Milford Ass | 1 | 1 |
Webster Bank v. Oakleygreen2 sentences2019As this court has observed, albeit in the context of commercial agreements, an enforceable nonwaiver clause "bar[s] the application of waiver and estoppel defenses unless a party establishes the existence of unequal bargaining positions or 'sharp dealing.' See Christensen v. Cutaia , [ 211 Conn. 613 , 619-20, 560 A.2d 456 (1989) ] ; S.H.V.C., Inc. v. Roy , [ 188 Conn. 503 , 507, 450 A.2d 351 (1982) ] ; see also Webster Bank v. Oakley , 265 Conn. 539 , 549-51, 830 A.2d 139 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S.Ct. 1603 , 158 L.Ed.2d 244 (2004)." Milford Paintball, LLC v. Wampus Milford Ass 2019As this court has observed, albeit in the context of commercial agreements, an enforceable nonwaiver clause "bar[s] the application of waiver and estoppel defenses unless a party establishes the existence of unequal bargaining positions or 'sharp dealing.' See Christensen v. Cutaia , [ 211 Conn. 613 , 619-20, 560 A.2d 456 (1989) ] ; S.H.V.C., Inc. v. Roy , [ 188 Conn. 503 , 507, 450 A.2d 351 (1982) ] ; see also Webster Bank v. Oakley , 265 Conn. 539 , 549-51, 830 A.2d 139 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S.Ct. 1603 , 158 L.Ed.2d 244 (2004)." Milford Paintball, LLC v. Wampus Milford Ass | 1 | 1 |
Milford Paintball, LLC v. Wampus Milford Associates, LLCgreen2 sentences2019As this court has observed, albeit in the context of commercial agreements, an enforceable nonwaiver clause "bar[s] the application of waiver and estoppel defenses unless a party establishes the existence of unequal bargaining positions or 'sharp dealing.' See Christensen v. Cutaia , [ 211 Conn. 613 , 619-20, 560 A.2d 456 (1989) ] ; S.H.V.C., Inc. v. Roy , [ 188 Conn. 503 , 507, 450 A.2d 351 (1982) ] ; see also Webster Bank v. Oakley , 265 Conn. 539 , 549-51, 830 A.2d 139 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S.Ct. 1603 , 158 L.Ed.2d 244 (2004)." Milford Paintball, LLC v. Wampus Milford Ass 2019As this court has observed, albeit in the context of commercial agreements, an enforceable nonwaiver clause "bar[s] the application of waiver and estoppel defenses unless a party establishes the existence of unequal bargaining positions or 'sharp dealing.' See Christensen v. Cutaia , [ 211 Conn. 613 , 619-20, 560 A.2d 456 (1989) ] ; S.H.V.C., Inc. v. Roy , [ 188 Conn. 503 , 507, 450 A.2d 351 (1982) ] ; see also Webster Bank v. Oakley , 265 Conn. 539 , 549-51, 830 A.2d 139 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S.Ct. 1603 , 158 L.Ed.2d 244 (2004)." Milford Paintball, LLC v. Wampus Milford Ass | 1 | 1 |
Conservation Com'n of Fairfield v. Red 11green2 sentences2018See Kline v. Kline , 101 Conn. App. 402 , 404 n.3, 922 A.2d 261 (declining to review defendant appellee's alternate ground for affirmance because court did not find requisite facts for her claim of equitable estoppel), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 901 , 931 A.2d 263 (2007) ; see also Conservation Commission v. Red 11, LLC , 119 Conn. App. 377 , 388, 987 A.2d 398 (record inadequate to review defendant's claim of municipal estoppel), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 924 , 991 A.2d 566 (2010). 2018See Kline v. Kline , 101 Conn. App. 402 , 404 n.3, 922 A.2d 261 (declining to review defendant appellee's alternate ground for affirmance because court did not find requisite facts for her claim of equitable estoppel), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 901 , 931 A.2d 263 (2007) ; see also Conservation Commission v. Red 11, LLC , 119 Conn. App. 377 , 388, 987 A.2d 398 (record inadequate to review defendant's claim of municipal estoppel), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 924 , 991 A.2d 566 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
Conservation Commission of the Town of Fairfield v. Red 11, LLCgreen2 sentences2018See Kline v. Kline , 101 Conn. App. 402 , 404 n.3, 922 A.2d 261 (declining to review defendant appellee's alternate ground for affirmance because court did not find requisite facts for her claim of equitable estoppel), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 901 , 931 A.2d 263 (2007) ; see also Conservation Commission v. Red 11, LLC , 119 Conn. App. 377 , 388, 987 A.2d 398 (record inadequate to review defendant's claim of municipal estoppel), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 924 , 991 A.2d 566 (2010). 2018See Kline v. Kline , 101 Conn. App. 402 , 404 n.3, 922 A.2d 261 (declining to review defendant appellee's alternate ground for affirmance because court did not find requisite facts for her claim of equitable estoppel), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 901 , 931 A.2d 263 (2007) ; see also Conservation Commission v. Red 11, LLC , 119 Conn. App. 377 , 388, 987 A.2d 398 (record inadequate to review defendant's claim of municipal estoppel), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 924 , 991 A.2d 566 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
American Diamond Exchange, Inc. v. Alpertgreen1 sentence2018See Kline v. Kline , 101 Conn. App. 402 , 404 n.3, 922 A.2d 261 (declining to review defendant appellee's alternate ground for affirmance because court did not find requisite facts for her claim of equitable estoppel), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 901 , 931 A.2d 263 (2007) ; see also Conservation Commission v. Red 11, LLC , 119 Conn. App. 377 , 388, 987 A.2d 398 (record inadequate to review defendant's claim of municipal estoppel), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 924 , 991 A.2d 566 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
Kline v. Klinegreen1 sentence2018See Kline v. Kline , 101 Conn. App. 402 , 404 n.3, 922 A.2d 261 (declining to review defendant appellee's alternate ground for affirmance because court did not find requisite facts for her claim of equitable estoppel), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 901 , 931 A.2d 263 (2007) ; see also Conservation Commission v. Red 11, LLC , 119 Conn. App. 377 , 388, 987 A.2d 398 (record inadequate to review defendant's claim of municipal estoppel), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 924 , 991 A.2d 566 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
Kline v. Klinegreen2 sentences2018See Kline v. Kline , 101 Conn. App. 402 , 404 n.3, 922 A.2d 261 (declining to review defendant appellee's alternate ground for affirmance because court did not find requisite facts for her claim of equitable estoppel), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 901 , 931 A.2d 263 (2007) ; see also Conservation Commission v. Red 11, LLC , 119 Conn. App. 377 , 388, 987 A.2d 398 (record inadequate to review defendant's claim of municipal estoppel), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 924 , 991 A.2d 566 (2010). 2018See Kline v. Kline , 101 Conn. App. 402 , 404 n.3, 922 A.2d 261 (declining to review defendant appellee's alternate ground for affirmance because court did not find requisite facts for her claim of equitable estoppel), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 901 , 931 A.2d 263 (2007) ; see also Conservation Commission v. Red 11, LLC , 119 Conn. App. 377 , 388, 987 A.2d 398 (record inadequate to review defendant's claim of municipal estoppel), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 924 , 991 A.2d 566 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
| Lawrence v. Lawrencegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Southland Corp. v. Vernongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Town of Kent v. Prattgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stanio v. Berner Lohne Co., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Connecticut National Bank v. Voog
green
2 sentences2002Furthermore, in Connecticut, the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which we deem to be somewhat analogous to the plaintiffs argument regarding regulatory estoppel, requires proof of two essential elements: “[First] the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and [second] the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut National Bank v. Voog, 233 Conn. 352, 366 , 659 2002Furthermore, in Connecticut, the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which we deem to be somewhat analogous to the plaintiffs argument regarding regulatory estoppel, requires proof of two essential elements: “[First] the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and [second] the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut National Bank v. Voog, 233 Conn. 352, 366 , 659 | 4 | 1996–2004 |
Brant v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co.
green
2 sentences1964“For the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, there must generally be some intended deception in the conduct or declarations of the party to be estopped, or such gross negligence on his part as amounts to constructive fraud, by which another has been misled to his injury.” Bland v. Bregman, 123 Conn. 61, 65 , 192 A. 703 , quoting Monterosso v. Kent, 96 Conn. 346, 350 , 113 A. 922 , which, in turn, quoted Brant v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co., 93 U.S. 326, 335 , 23 L. 1964“For the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, there must generally be some intended deception in the conduct or declarations of the party to be estopped, or such gross negligence on his part as amounts to constructive fraud, by which another has been misled to his injury.” Bland v. Bregman, 123 Conn. 61, 65 , 192 A. 703 , quoting Monterosso v. Kent, 96 Conn. 346, 350 , 113 A. 922 , which, in turn, quoted Brant v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co., 93 U.S. 326, 335 , 23 L. | 4 | 1921–1980 |
Zoning Commission v. Lescynski
green
2 sentences1999The absence of a clear and definite promise would not preclude application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, but its two essential elements must be proved: “the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury.” Zoning Commission v. Lescynski, 188 Conn. 724, 731 , 453 A.2d 1144 (1982). 1999The absence of a clear and definite promise would not preclude application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, but its two essential elements must be proved: “the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury.” Zoning Commission v. Lescynski, 188 Conn. 724, 731 , 453 A.2d 1144 (1982). | 3 | 1993–1999 |
Tradesmens National Bank of New Haven v. Minor
green
2 sentences1997"Estoppel has its roots in equity and stems from the `voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might CT Page 13790 perhaps have otherwise existed . . . as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse. 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th Ed. 1941) § 804, p. 189; 28 Am.Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 76; accord Spear-Newman, Inc. v. Modern Floors Corporation , 149 Conn. 88 , 91 , 175 A.2d 565 (1961); Tradesmens National Bank of New 1997"Estoppel has its roots in equity and stems from the `voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might CT Page 13790 perhaps have otherwise existed . . . as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse. 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th Ed. 1941) § 804, p. 189; 28 Am.Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 76; accord Spear-Newman, Inc. v. Modern Floors Corporation , 149 Conn. 88 , 91 , 175 A.2d 565 (1961); Tradesmens National Bank of New | 2 | 1992–1997 |
Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner
green
2 sentences1996“The doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a bar to the correction by the Commissioner of a mistake of law.” Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 353 U.S. 180, 183 , 77 S. Ct. 707 , 1 L. 1996“The doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a bar to the correction by the Commissioner of a mistake of law.” Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 353 U.S. 180, 183 , 77 S. Ct. 707 , 1 L. | 2 | 1995–1996 |
Bozzi v. Bozzi
green
2 sentences1995In Bozzi v. Bozzi, 177 Conn. 232 (1979), the court held that two essential elements needed to be proved to establish the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 1992The plaintiff relies principally on Bozzi v. Bozzi, 17 Conn. 232 , 241 , 413 A.2d 834 (1979), and Papcun v. Papcun, 18 Conn. 618 , 621 , 436 A.2d 282 (1980), in arguing in part as follows: Plaintiff's former wife admitted that she entered into the termination agreement intending to induce plaintiff to believe he was ending his obligations. | 2 | 1992–1995 |
O'Sullivan v. Bergenty
green
2 sentences1992The issue raised by a suit to recover partial payments differs substantially from that raised by refusal to pay sums alleged to be due on an invalid contract.” We conclude, without deciding the applicability of the plaintiffs equitable estoppel claim, that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the factual predicate necessary to sustain an action under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. “[Equitable] estoppel is predicated on proof of two essential elements: the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certa 1992The issue raised by a suit to recover partial payments differs substantially from that raised by refusal to pay sums alleged to be due on an invalid contract.” We conclude, without deciding the applicability of the plaintiffs equitable estoppel claim, that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the factual predicate necessary to sustain an action under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. “[Equitable] estoppel is predicated on proof of two essential elements: the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certa | 2 | 1992–1993 |
Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld
green
2 sentences1993In a footnote to Wadia, the court, without deciding the applicability of the plaintiff's equitable estoppel claim, noted that the plaintiff had "failed to demonstrate the factual predicate necessary to sustain an action under the doctrine of equitable estoppel." Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, supra, 252 n. 7. 1993In a footnote to Wadia, the court, without deciding the applicability of the plaintiff's equitable estoppel claim, noted that the plaintiff had "failed to demonstrate the factual predicate necessary to sustain an action under the doctrine of equitable estoppel." Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, supra, 252 n. 7. | 2 | 1993–1993 |
Bland v. Bregman
green
2 sentences1964“For the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, there must generally be some intended deception in the conduct or declarations of the party to be estopped, or such gross negligence on his part as amounts to constructive fraud, by which another has been misled to his injury.” Bland v. Bregman, 123 Conn. 61, 65 , 192 A. 703 , quoting Monterosso v. Kent, 96 Conn. 346, 350 , 113 A. 922 , which, in turn, quoted Brant v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co., 93 U.S. 326, 335 , 23 L. 1964“For the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, there must generally be some intended deception in the conduct or declarations of the party to be estopped, or such gross negligence on his part as amounts to constructive fraud, by which another has been misled to his injury.” Bland v. Bregman, 123 Conn. 61, 65 , 192 A. 703 , quoting Monterosso v. Kent, 96 Conn. 346, 350 , 113 A. 922 , which, in turn, quoted Brant v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co., 93 U.S. 326, 335 , 23 L. | 2 | 1964–1980 |
Monterosso v. Kent
neutral
2 sentences1964“For the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, there must generally be some intended deception in the conduct or declarations of the party to be estopped, or such gross negligence on his part as amounts to constructive fraud, by which another has been misled to his injury.” Bland v. Bregman, 123 Conn. 61, 65 , 192 A. 703 , quoting Monterosso v. Kent, 96 Conn. 346, 350 , 113 A. 922 , which, in turn, quoted Brant v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co., 93 U.S. 326, 335 , 23 L. 1964“For the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, there must generally be some intended deception in the conduct or declarations of the party to be estopped, or such gross negligence on his part as amounts to constructive fraud, by which another has been misled to his injury.” Bland v. Bregman, 123 Conn. 61, 65 , 192 A. 703 , quoting Monterosso v. Kent, 96 Conn. 346, 350 , 113 A. 922 , which, in turn, quoted Brant v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co., 93 U.S. 326, 335 , 23 L. | 2 | 1964–1980 |
Guthrie v. Town of New Haven
green
2 sentences1936Guthrie v. New Haven, 31 Conn. 308, 321 . 1901Guthrie v. New Haven, 31 Conn. 308, 821 ; New York, N. H. & H. | 2 | 1901–1936 |
Whippoorwill Crest Co. v. Town of Stratford
neutral
2 sentences2021An implied dedication, that is, arising by operation of law from the conduct of the owner of the property, rests upon the broad common-law doctrine of equitable estoppel.’’ Whippoorwill Crest Co. v. Stratford, 145 Conn. 268 , 271–72, 141 A.2d 241 (1958). 2021An implied dedication, that is, arising by operation of law from the conduct of the owner of the property, rests upon the broad common-law doctrine of equitable estoppel.’’ Whippoorwill Crest Co. v. Stratford, 145 Conn. 268 , 271–72, 141 A.2d 241 (1958). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Christensen v. Cutaia
green
2 sentences2019As this court has observed, albeit in the context of commercial agreements, an enforceable nonwaiver clause "bar[s] the application of waiver and estoppel defenses unless a party establishes the existence of unequal bargaining positions or 'sharp dealing.' See Christensen v. Cutaia , [ 211 Conn. 613 , 619-20, 560 A.2d 456 (1989) ] ; S.H.V.C., Inc. v. Roy , [ 188 Conn. 503 , 507, 450 A.2d 351 (1982) ] ; see also Webster Bank v. Oakley , 265 Conn. 539 , 549-51, 830 A.2d 139 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S.Ct. 1603 , 158 L.Ed.2d 244 (2004)." Milford Paintball, LLC v. Wampus Milford Ass 2019As this court has observed, albeit in the context of commercial agreements, an enforceable nonwaiver clause "bar[s] the application of waiver and estoppel defenses unless a party establishes the existence of unequal bargaining positions or 'sharp dealing.' See Christensen v. Cutaia , [ 211 Conn. 613 , 619-20, 560 A.2d 456 (1989) ] ; S.H.V.C., Inc. v. Roy , [ 188 Conn. 503 , 507, 450 A.2d 351 (1982) ] ; see also Webster Bank v. Oakley , 265 Conn. 539 , 549-51, 830 A.2d 139 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S.Ct. 1603 , 158 L.Ed.2d 244 (2004)." Milford Paintball, LLC v. Wampus Milford Ass | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Coss v. Steward
green
2 sentences2019In its general application, we have recognized that [t]here are two essential elements to an estoppel—the party must do or say something that is intended or calculated to induce another to believe in the existence of certain facts and to act upon that belief, and that the other party, influenced thereby, must actually change his position or do some act to his injury which he otherwise would not have done.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coss v. Steward, 126 Conn. App. 30, 41 , 10 A.3d 539 (2011). ‘‘[T]here must generally be some intended deception in the conduct or declara- tions of the 2019In its general application, we have recognized that [t]here are two essential elements to an estoppel—the party must do or say something that is intended or calculated to induce another to believe in the existence of certain facts and to act upon that belief, and that the other party, influenced thereby, must actually change his position or do some act to his injury which he otherwise would not have done.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coss v. Steward, 126 Conn. App. 30, 41 , 10 A.3d 539 (2011). ‘‘[T]here must generally be some intended deception in the conduct or declara- tions of the | 1 | 2019–2019 |
S.H.V.C., Inc. v. Roy
green
2 sentences2019As this court has observed, albeit in the context of commercial agreements, an enforceable nonwaiver clause "bar[s] the application of waiver and estoppel defenses unless a party establishes the existence of unequal bargaining positions or 'sharp dealing.' See Christensen v. Cutaia , [ 211 Conn. 613 , 619-20, 560 A.2d 456 (1989) ] ; S.H.V.C., Inc. v. Roy , [ 188 Conn. 503 , 507, 450 A.2d 351 (1982) ] ; see also Webster Bank v. Oakley , 265 Conn. 539 , 549-51, 830 A.2d 139 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S.Ct. 1603 , 158 L.Ed.2d 244 (2004)." Milford Paintball, LLC v. Wampus Milford Ass 2019As this court has observed, albeit in the context of commercial agreements, an enforceable nonwaiver clause "bar[s] the application of waiver and estoppel defenses unless a party establishes the existence of unequal bargaining positions or 'sharp dealing.' See Christensen v. Cutaia , [ 211 Conn. 613 , 619-20, 560 A.2d 456 (1989) ] ; S.H.V.C., Inc. v. Roy , [ 188 Conn. 503 , 507, 450 A.2d 351 (1982) ] ; see also Webster Bank v. Oakley , 265 Conn. 539 , 549-51, 830 A.2d 139 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 , 124 S.Ct. 1603 , 158 L.Ed.2d 244 (2004)." Milford Paintball, LLC v. Wampus Milford Ass | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Weidenbacher v. Duclos
green
2 sentences2018Not all putative fathers and not all families are similarly situated; thus their ... interests cannot be protected by a blanket [rule of law] that treats all putative fathers alike." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weidenbacher v. Duclos , 234 Conn. 51 , 76, 661 A.2d 988 (1995) ; see also W. v. W. , supra, at 503-504, 728 A.2d 1076 ("[I]n deciding whether to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel, courts must act judiciously and with sensitivity to the facts particular to each case.... [E]quitably estopping parties from denying parenthood is an extraordinary measure be 2018Not all putative fathers and not all families are similarly situated; thus their ... interests cannot be protected by a blanket [rule of law] that treats all putative fathers alike." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weidenbacher v. Duclos , 234 Conn. 51 , 76, 661 A.2d 988 (1995) ; see also W. v. W. , supra, at 503-504, 728 A.2d 1076 ("[I]n deciding whether to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel, courts must act judiciously and with sensitivity to the facts particular to each case.... [E]quitably estopping parties from denying parenthood is an extraordinary measure be | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Albemarle Weston Street, LLC v. City of Hartford neutral | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Garvin green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Thompson green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Congress Street Condominium Ass'n v. Anderson green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Pfizer, Inc. v. McGirr green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Cristofaro v. Planning & Zoning Commission of Burlington green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Goold v. Goold green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| LaSalle National Bank v. Freshfield Meadows, LLC green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Ubysz v. DiPietro green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Breen v. Phelps green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Celentano v. Oaks Condominium Ass'n green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| W. v. W. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Insurance green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| In re David W. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| William Raveis Real Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| In re David W. neutral | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| William Raveis Real Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services neutral | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Currie v. Marano green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| SKW Real Estate Ltd. Partnership v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State Ex Rel. Degregorio v. Woodruff neutral | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Mhb v. Htb green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Miller v. Miller green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.