equitable estoppel doctrine in Colorado

2015The supreme court thus concluded that "regardless of whether the Lottery breached any contractual duties, the essence of the injury [was] tortious in nature" and "would appear to support a tort claim." Id. {18 Similarly, in Board of County Commissioners v. DeLozier, the supreme court explained that "an equitable estoppel claim for negligent misrepresentation of facts" lies in tort for purposes of the CGIA. 917 P.2d 714, 716 (Colo. 1996).

2013See Bd. of County Commis. v. DeLozier, 917 P.2d 714, 716 (Colo.1996) ("The doctrine of promissory estoppel should not be confused with the doctrine of equitable estoppel.").

1997See Dove v. Delgado, 808 P.2d 1270, 1275 (Colo.1991); Department of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243, 247 (Colo.1984).

1995See Department of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243 (Colo.1984).

1995Ralston Oil and Gas Co. v. July Corp., 719 P.2d 334, 340 (Colo.App.1985); Mountain Stone Co. v. H.W.

1990See Ralston Oil & Gas Co. v. July Corp., 719 P.2d 334 (Colo.App.1985).

2025In re Marriage of Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 62 . ¶ 75 There are three elements of an equitable estoppel claim as it relates to the party estopped: • “[c]onduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert,” City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 76 (Colo. 1996) (quoting Aubert v. Town of Fruita, 559 P.2d 232, 234 (Colo. 1977)); 37 • “intention, or at least expectation, that such conduct

2019Co. , 926 P.2d 1 , 75 (Colo. 1996) ).

2009Johnson v. Neel, 123 Colo. 377, 388 , 229 P.2d 939, 944 (1951) (under doctrine of equitable estoppel, constitutional rights may be effectively waived by conduct consisting of action or failure to act); see Fifth Church of Christ, 109 Colo. at 106 , 122 P.2d at 888 (party's effective waiver of constitutional right, by act or omission, "is nothing more than the equitable doctrine of estoppel applied in the realm of constitutional law and is uniformly upheld in cases where the constitutional provision is solely protective of property rights") (quoting Wilson v. Sch.

2009Johnson v. Neel, 123 Colo. 377, 388 , 229 P.2d 939, 944 (1951) (under doctrine of equitable estoppel, constitutional rights may be effectively waived by conduct consisting of action or failure to act); see Fifth Church of Christ, 109 Colo. at 106 , 122 P.2d at 888 (party's effective waiver of constitutional right, by act or omission, "is nothing more than the equitable doctrine of estoppel applied in the realm of constitutional law and is uniformly upheld in cases where the constitutional provision is solely protective of property rights") (quoting Wilson v. Sch.

2025Relying on the quoted language from P-W Investments, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 655 P.2d 1365, 1372 (Colo. 1982), SOSVV asserts that “[w]ithin the context of a C.R.C.P. 106 appeal, a government body’s findings of fact and determination regarding equitable estoppel must be upheld so long as it was not an abuse of discretion.” Martin Marietta argues that because “P-W treats a review of equitable reliance as an application of law to fact,” the proper standard of review is whether the Director’s decision rejecting the equitable estoppel claim has reasonable basis in law.

2025Bd., 140 P.3d 44, 53 (Colo. App. 2005) (concluding that the district court properly declined to address a party’s equitable estoppel claim in the C.R.C.P. 106 28 action where that claim wasn’t raised in the administrative proceedings). ¶ 45 And like the Director, we also conclude that the remaining communications don’t satisfy the elements of equitable estoppel.

2025In re Marriage of Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 62 . ¶ 75 There are three elements of an equitable estoppel claim as it relates to the party estopped: • “[c]onduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert,” City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 76 (Colo. 1996) (quoting Aubert v. Town of Fruita, 559 P.2d 232, 234 (Colo. 1977)); 37 • “intention, or at least expectation, that such conduct

2025In re Marriage of Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 62 . ¶ 75 There are three elements of an equitable estoppel claim as it relates to the party estopped: • “[c]onduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert,” City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 76 (Colo. 1996) (quoting Aubert v. Town of Fruita, 559 P.2d 232, 234 (Colo. 1977)); 37 • “intention, or at least expectation, that such conduct

2025See Santich v. VCG Holding Corp., 2019 CO 67, ¶ 7 . ¶ 50 In sum, the record shows that Martin Marietta didn’t ask for — and the county didn’t make — a determination about whether the permit had remained valid under the lapse provision.

2025Heartland cannot now rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel, as it would be inconsistent with the position it previously took. ¶ 80 Although the court did not address the CGIA as a basis to deny Heartland’s equitable estoppel claim, “we may affirm the trial court’s ruling based on any grounds that are supported by the record.” Rush Creek Sols., Inc. v. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402, 406 (Colo. App. 2004).

2019See Ouadani , 876 F.3d at 38 ; Smith , 171 P.3d at 1274 . ¶40 For all of these reasons, we conclude that RIM, as a nonsignatory to the Sanction Agreement, is not bound by that Agreement's arbitration provision, and therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that RIM was required to arbitrate the claims against it.

2017In re Marriage of Beatty, 2012 COA 71, ¶ 13 (child support).

2013Comm. for Better Health Care for All Colo. Citizens v. Meyer, 830 P.2d 884, 891 (Colo.1992); Kruse v. Town of Castle Rock, 192 P.3d 591, 608 (Colo.App.2008).

2013Comm. for Better Health Care for All Colo. Citizens v. Meyer, 830 P.2d 884, 891 (Colo.1992); Kruse v. Town of Castle Rock, 192 P.3d 591, 608 (Colo.App.2008).

2012In re Marriage of Dennin, 811 P.2d 449, 450-51 (Colo.App.1991).

2012Pursuant to section 14-10-122(1)(c), C.R.S.2011, a court-ordered child support payment becomes a final money judgment "when it is due and not paid" and such judgment "shall not be retroactively modified." Combs, 148 P.3d at 434 ; In re Marriage of Greenblatt, 789 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Colo.App.1990) ¶ 13 The equitable estoppel doctrine may provide an exception to the rule to allow relief from accrued arrearages.

2012Id.; Allen Homesite Grp. v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 19 P.3d 32, 35 (Colo.App.2000). 129 Here, the Providers brought an equitable estoppel claim based on alleged actions and representations by the County, which according to the Providers, led them to reasonably believe that a dispensary was a permitted use of their property.

2012Co., 764 P.2d 1191, 1198 (Colo.1988). {20 Even in the area of insurance law, however, our supreme court has observed that the equitable estoppel and waiver doe-trines may be applied to preclude an insurer from asserting a forfeiture of a policy.

2012See, e.g., Kane v. Aetna Life Ins., 893 F.2d 1283 , 1285-86 (11th Cir.1990) (noting that the equitable estoppel doctrine could apply when an insurer's representations to its insured were interpretations, as opposed to oral modifications, of an ambiguous policy provision and when the insured relied on those interpretations to her detriment); Derry Twp.

2012See City of Black Hawk v. Ficke, 215 P.3d 1129, 1132 (Colo.App.2008).

2012See People v. Blue, 253 P.3d 1273, 1276 (Colo.App.2011) (observing, in the context of a question of appellate jurisdiction, that when the underlying facts are not disputed and the issue is purely one of law, we review the issue de novo). $18 As our supreme court has long recognized, one form of estoppel arises from acts done under or in the performance of a contract.