21 Virginia opinions name it 6 courts 1897–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Npa v. Wbagreen2 sentences2010“The ‘[e]lements necessary to establish equitable estoppel, absent a showing of fraud and deception, are a representation, reliance, a change of position, and detriment.’” NPA v. WBA, 8 Va. App. 246, 253 , 380 S.E.2d 178, 182 (1989) (quoting Dominick v. Vassar, 235 Va. 295, 298 , 367 S.E.2d 487, 489 (1988)). 2010“The ‘[e]lements necessary to establish equitable estoppel, absent a showing of fraud and deception, are a representation, reliance, a change of position, and detriment.’” NPA v. WBA, 8 Va. App. 246, 253 , 380 S.E.2d 178, 182 (1989) (quoting Dominick v. Vassar, 235 Va. 295, 298 , 367 S.E.2d 487, 489 (1988)). | 2 | 2 |
Dominick v. Vassargreen2 sentences2010“The ‘[e]lements necessary to establish equitable estoppel, absent a showing of fraud and deception, are a representation, reliance, a change of position, and detriment.’” NPA v. WBA, 8 Va. App. 246, 253 , 380 S.E.2d 178, 182 (1989) (quoting Dominick v. Vassar, 235 Va. 295, 298 , 367 S.E.2d 487, 489 (1988)). 2010“The ‘[e]lements necessary to establish equitable estoppel, absent a showing of fraud and deception, are a representation, reliance, a change of position, and detriment.’” NPA v. WBA, 8 Va. App. 246, 253 , 380 S.E.2d 178, 182 (1989) (quoting Dominick v. Vassar, 235 Va. 295, 298 , 367 S.E.2d 487, 489 (1988)). | 2 | 2 |
Webb v. Webbgreen2 sentences1995Defense of Equitable Estoppel Husband argues that wife is barred from recovering any spousal support arrearage under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. "'The elements necessary to establish equitable estoppel are (1) a representation, (2) reliance, (3) change of position, and (4) detriment, and the party who relies upon estoppel must prove each element by clear, precise, and unequivocal evidence.'" Webb v. Webb, 16 Va. App. 486, 494-95 , 431 S.E.2d 55, 61 (1993) (citation omitted). 1995Defense of Equitable Estoppel Husband argues that wife is barred from recovering any spousal support arrearage under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. "'The elements necessary to establish equitable estoppel are (1) a representation, (2) reliance, (3) change of position, and (4) detriment, and the party who relies upon estoppel must prove each element by clear, precise, and unequivocal evidence.'" Webb v. Webb, 16 Va. App. 486, 494-95 , 431 S.E.2d 55, 61 (1993) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
cluster 461231green2 sentences2000It is well established, however, that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply to situations in which the party asserting the estoppel has suffered detriment resulting solely from another party’s failure to perform an obligation under the oral agreement. 777 F.2d at 945 (citations omitted). 1995Marchiafava, Inc. v. Haft, supra. In Marchiafava, the Fourth Circuit held that “it is well established” that the “doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply to situations in which the party asserting the estoppel has suffered detriment resulting solely from another party’s failure to perform an obligation under an oral agreement.” 777 F.2d at 945 . | 2 | 2 |
Cibula v. Allied Fibers & Plasticsgreen2 sentences1996However, a claimant need not prove a false representation, concealment of a material fact, or fraudulent intent, in order to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel. - 3 - Cibula v. Allied Fibers & Plastics, 14 Va. App. 319, 324-25 , 416 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1992), aff'd, 245 Va. 337 , 428 S.E.2d 905 (1993). 1996However, a claimant need not prove a false representation, concealment of a material fact, or fraudulent intent, in order to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel. - 3 - Cibula v. Allied Fibers & Plastics, 14 Va. App. 319, 324-25 , 416 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1992), aff'd, 245 Va. 337 , 428 S.E.2d 905 (1993). | 2 | 2 |
Boykins Narrow Fabrics Corp. v. Weldon Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc.green2 sentences2014Cf. Moorman v. Blackstock, Inc., 276 Va. 64, 78 , 661 S.E.2d 404, 411 (2008) (applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel) (quoting Boykins Narrow Fabrics Corp. v. Weldon Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 221 Va. 81, 86 , 266 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1980)). 2014Cf. Moorman v. Blackstock, Inc., 276 Va. 64, 78 , 661 S.E.2d 404, 411 (2008) (applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel) (quoting Boykins Narrow Fabrics Corp. v. Weldon Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 221 Va. 81, 86 , 266 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1980)). | 1 | 2 |
Birchwood-Manassas Assocs., L.L.C. v. Birchwood at Oak Knoll Farm, L.L.C.green1 sentence2024SDI bore the “burden to prove its entitlement to the tolling of the statute of limitations.” Birchwood-Manassas Assocs., L.L.C. v. Birchwood at Oak Knoll Farm, L.L.C., 290 Va. 5, 7 (2015). | 1 | 1 |
Moorman v. Blackstock, Inc.green2 sentences2014Cf. Moorman v. Blackstock, Inc., 276 Va. 64, 78 , 661 S.E.2d 404, 411 (2008) (applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel) (quoting Boykins Narrow Fabrics Corp. v. Weldon Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 221 Va. 81, 86 , 266 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1980)). 2014Cf. Moorman v. Blackstock, Inc., 276 Va. 64, 78 , 661 S.E.2d 404, 411 (2008) (applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel) (quoting Boykins Narrow Fabrics Corp. v. Weldon Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 221 Va. 81, 86 , 266 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1980)). | 1 | 1 |
T v. Tgreen1 sentence2012In order to show the equitable estoppel exception to a violation of the statute of frauds, the individual seeking to enforce an agreement, “absent a showing of fraud and deception,” must prove representation, reliance, a change of position, and detriment.” T. v. T, 216 Va. 867, 872-73 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Finnerty v. Thornton Hall, Inc.green2 sentences2007Under such circumstances, we hold that wife did not present to the trial court “clear, precise and unequivocal evidence,” Finnerty v. Thornton Hall, Inc., 42 Va. App. 628, 640 , 593 S.E.2d 568, 574 (2004) (citation omitted), sufficient to require the application of the equitable estoppel doctrine. 2007Under such circumstances, we hold that wife did not present to the trial court “clear, precise and unequivocal evidence,” Finnerty v. Thornton Hall, Inc., 42 Va. App. 628, 640 , 593 S.E.2d 568, 574 (2004) (citation omitted), sufficient to require the application of the equitable estoppel doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
Luddeke v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc.green1 sentence2003Accord Luddeke, 239 Va. at 208 (affirming a circuit court’s denial of an equitable estoppel claim where the only evidence before the trial court tending to show that the respondents had lulled the complainants into inaction was plaintiffs testimony that defendant’s agent led plaintiff to believe that defendant was “working on taking care of the problem” and that “very likely ... they would replace the system.”), and Westminster Invest Corp. v. Lamps Unltd., 237 Va. 543 , 379 S.E.2d 316 (1989) (evidence that landlord gave “continued assurances that it would take appropriate measures” to correct | 1 | 1 |
Westminster Investing Corp. v. Lamps Unlimited, Inc.green2 sentences2003Accord Luddeke, 239 Va. at 208 (affirming a circuit court’s denial of an equitable estoppel claim where the only evidence before the trial court tending to show that the respondents had lulled the complainants into inaction was plaintiffs testimony that defendant’s agent led plaintiff to believe that defendant was “working on taking care of the problem” and that “very likely ... they would replace the system.”), and Westminster Invest Corp. v. Lamps Unltd., 237 Va. 543 , 379 S.E.2d 316 (1989) (evidence that landlord gave “continued assurances that it would take appropriate measures” to correct 2003Accord Luddeke, 239 Va. at 208 (affirming a circuit court’s denial of an equitable estoppel claim where the only evidence before the trial court tending to show that the respondents had lulled the complainants into inaction was plaintiffs testimony that defendant’s agent led plaintiff to believe that defendant was “working on taking care of the problem” and that “very likely ... they would replace the system.”), and Westminster Invest Corp. v. Lamps Unltd., 237 Va. 543 , 379 S.E.2d 316 (1989) (evidence that landlord gave “continued assurances that it would take appropriate measures” to correct | 1 | 1 |
Odom v. Red Lobster 235green2 sentences1997Odom v. Red Lobster -9- #235, 20 Va. App. 228, 233-34 , 456 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1995). 1997Odom v. Red Lobster -9- #235, 20 Va. App. 228, 233-34 , 456 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Owens v. Ashland Oil, Inc.green1 sentence1995Accord Owens v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 757 (W.D. | 1 | 1 |
Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissionergreen1 sentence1980Main was not a tax case, and we recognize that ours may be a minority view and that the recent trend appears to be to the contrary. 4 But cf. Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183 (1957) (“The doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a bar to the correction by the Commissioner [of Internal Revenue] of a mistake of law.”) Without trenching upon precedent and, for purposes of this opinion only, we assume that the doctrine may be applied to the State Corporation Commission in a case such as this. | 1 | 1 |
Mercantile Co-Operative Bank v. Browngreen1 sentence1969In Mercantile Co-operative Bank v. Brown, 96 Va. 614, 622, 32 S. E. 64, 66 (1899), is found the following statement: “Actual knowledge of the truth as to the material facts, represented or concealed, is generally indispensable to the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, but like other general rules it has its exceptions. | 1 | 1 |
Flood's Adm'r v. Huttergreen1 sentence1969In Mercantile Co-operative Bank v. Brown, 96 Va. 614, 622, 32 S. E. 64, 66 (1899), is found the following statement: “Actual knowledge of the truth as to the material facts, represented or concealed, is generally indispensable to the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, but like other general rules it has its exceptions. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Allied Fibers & Plastics v. Cibula
green
2 sentences1996However, a claimant need not prove a false representation, concealment of a material fact, or fraudulent intent, in order to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel. - 3 - Cibula v. Allied Fibers & Plastics, 14 Va. App. 319, 324-25 , 416 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1992), aff'd, 245 Va. 337 , 428 S.E.2d 905 (1993). 1996However, a claimant need not prove a false representation, concealment of a material fact, or fraudulent intent, in order to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel. - 3 - Cibula v. Allied Fibers & Plastics, 14 Va. App. 319, 324-25 , 416 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1992), aff'd, 245 Va. 337 , 428 S.E.2d 905 (1993). | 2 | 1996–1997 |
Commonwealth Ex Rel. Attorney General of Virginia v. Washington Gas Light Co.
green
2 sentences2014The manual expressly indicates, however, that “[providers will be required to refund payments made by Medicaid if they are found to have billed Medicaid contrary to policy....” The record contains no evidence that the manual allows relief “in cases of financial hardship.” LifeCare next argues that the circuit court improperly ignored the holding in Commonwealth v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 221 Va. 315 , 269 S.E.2d 820 (1980), which applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to the State Corporation Commission. 2014The manual expressly indicates, however, that “[providers will be required to refund payments made by Medicaid if they are found to have billed Medicaid contrary to policy....” The record contains no evidence that the manual allows relief “in cases of financial hardship.” LifeCare next argues that the circuit court improperly ignored the holding in Commonwealth v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 221 Va. 315 , 269 S.E.2d 820 (1980), which applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to the State Corporation Commission. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Cottrell v. Nurnberger
green
1 sentence2000To support this proposition, however, the Marchiafava court relied on West Virginia case law, citing to Cottrell v. Nurnberger, 131 W. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Nargi v. CaMac Corp.
green
1 sentence1995Marchiafava cited no Virginia case in support of its holding; it has not been followed by any Virginia appellate court It was criticized as being contrary to the holding of T. v. T. in Nargi v. Comac Corp., 820 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Repass v. Richmond
green
2 sentences1962Repass v. Richmond, 99 Va. 508, 511 , 39 S. E. 160 ; County School Bd. v. First Nat. 1962Repass v. Richmond, 99 Va. 508, 511 , 39 S. E. 160 ; County School Bd. v. First Nat. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Cardwell v. Kelly
neutral
2 sentences1956The authorities relied on by Sutton deal in the main with the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which is succinctly stated in Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Walker, 100 Va. 69, 91 , 40 S.E. 633 , thus: “The general rule of equitable estoppel, or as it is frequently called, estoppel in pais, is that when one person, by his statements, conduct, action, behavior, concealment or even silence has induced another, who has a right to rely upon those statements, etc., and who does rely upon them in good faith, to believe in the existence of the state of facts with which they are compatible, and 1956The authorities relied on by Sutton deal in the main with the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which is succinctly stated in Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Walker, 100 Va. 69, 91 , 40 S.E. 633 , thus: “The general rule of equitable estoppel, or as it is frequently called, estoppel in pais, is that when one person, by his statements, conduct, action, behavior, concealment or even silence has induced another, who has a right to rely upon those statements, etc., and who does rely upon them in good faith, to believe in the existence of the state of facts with which they are compatible, and | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Walker
green
2 sentences1956The authorities relied on by Sutton deal in the main with the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which is succinctly stated in Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Walker, 100 Va. 69, 91 , 40 S.E. 633 , thus: “The general rule of equitable estoppel, or as it is frequently called, estoppel in pais, is that when one person, by his statements, conduct, action, behavior, concealment or even silence has induced another, who has a right to rely upon those statements, etc., and who does rely upon them in good faith, to believe in the existence of the state of facts with which they are compatible, and 1956The authorities relied on by Sutton deal in the main with the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which is succinctly stated in Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Walker, 100 Va. 69, 91 , 40 S.E. 633 , thus: “The general rule of equitable estoppel, or as it is frequently called, estoppel in pais, is that when one person, by his statements, conduct, action, behavior, concealment or even silence has induced another, who has a right to rely upon those statements, etc., and who does rely upon them in good faith, to believe in the existence of the state of facts with which they are compatible, and | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Isaac Eberly & Co. v. Gibson
neutral
2 sentences1956The authorities relied on by Sutton deal in the main with the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which is succinctly stated in Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Walker, 100 Va. 69, 91 , 40 S.E. 633 , thus: “The general rule of equitable estoppel, or as it is frequently called, estoppel in pais, is that when one person, by his statements, conduct, action, behavior, concealment or even silence has induced another, who has a right to rely upon those statements, etc., and who does rely upon them in good faith, to believe in the existence of the state of facts with which they are compatible, and 1956The authorities relied on by Sutton deal in the main with the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which is succinctly stated in Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Walker, 100 Va. 69, 91 , 40 S.E. 633 , thus: “The general rule of equitable estoppel, or as it is frequently called, estoppel in pais, is that when one person, by his statements, conduct, action, behavior, concealment or even silence has induced another, who has a right to rely upon those statements, etc., and who does rely upon them in good faith, to believe in the existence of the state of facts with which they are compatible, and | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Heath v. Valentine
green
2 sentences1956The authorities relied on by Sutton deal in the main with the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which is succinctly stated in Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Walker, 100 Va. 69, 91 , 40 S.E. 633 , thus: “The general rule of equitable estoppel, or as it is frequently called, estoppel in pais, is that when one person, by his statements, conduct, action, behavior, concealment or even silence has induced another, who has a right to rely upon those statements, etc., and who does rely upon them in good faith, to believe in the existence of the state of facts with which they are compatible, and 1956The authorities relied on by Sutton deal in the main with the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which is succinctly stated in Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Walker, 100 Va. 69, 91 , 40 S.E. 633 , thus: “The general rule of equitable estoppel, or as it is frequently called, estoppel in pais, is that when one person, by his statements, conduct, action, behavior, concealment or even silence has induced another, who has a right to rely upon those statements, etc., and who does rely upon them in good faith, to believe in the existence of the state of facts with which they are compatible, and | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Tuggle v. Sutherland
neutral
1 sentence1935This view is maintained by the main current of decisions.’ ” See also, Camp Manufacturing Co. v. Green, 129 Va. 360, 372 , 106 S. E. 394 ; Tuggle v. Sutherland, 98 W. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Camp Manufacturing Co. v. Green
green
2 sentences1935This view is maintained by the main current of decisions.’ ” See also, Camp Manufacturing Co. v. Green, 129 Va. 360, 372 , 106 S. E. 394 ; Tuggle v. Sutherland, 98 W. 1935This view is maintained by the main current of decisions.’ ” See also, Camp Manufacturing Co. v. Green, 129 Va. 360, 372 , 106 S. E. 394 ; Tuggle v. Sutherland, 98 W. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Bellenot v. City of Richmond
green
1 sentence1912Rep. 860 ; Bunting v. Danville, supra; Bellenot v. City of Richmond, supra. Neither has such right been lost under the doctrine of equitable estoppel (even if that doctrine exists in this State in cases like this, as to which we express no opinion) for in those jurisdictions where that doctrine does prevail, according to Judge Dillon (one of its. strongest advocates), as stated in a note to section 1194 of the fifth edition of his work on Municipal Corporations, “The principle of estoppel in pais has been applied to exceptional cases where the elements calling for its exercise appear to have b | 1 | 1912–1912 |
The \Juniata.\""
green
1 sentence1897It is essential for the application of the doctrine of estoppel in pais with respect to the title of real property, said Justice Field, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court in Brant v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co, et als, 93 U. S. 337 , “that the party claiming to have been influenced by the conduct or declarations of another to his injury was himself not only destitute of knowledge of the true state of the title, but also of any convenient and available means ' of acquiring such knowledge. | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.