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30 Indiana opinions name it 3 courts 1893–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc., Del Monte Corporation, Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.green2 sentences2012Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942 , 947 (11th Cir.1999); Sunkist Soft Drinks v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 756-57 (11th Cir.1993)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994); Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County Sch. 2012Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942 , 947 (11th Cir.1999); Sunkist Soft Drinks v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 756-57 (11th Cir.1993)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994); Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County Sch. | 2 | 2 |
Williams v. Orentlichergreen2 sentences2012In Williams v. Orentlicher, 939 N.E.2d 663, 670 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), this court acknowledged case law from other jurisdictions holding that, under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a nonsignatory to an agreement may bind a signatory to an arbitration clause. 12 (Citing MS Dealer Serv. 2012In Williams v. Orentlicher, 939 N.E.2d 663, 670 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), this court acknowledged case law from other jurisdictions holding that, under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a nonsignatory to an agreement may bind a signatory to an arbitration clause. [12] (Citing MS Dealer Serv. | 2 | 2 |
Damler v. Bainegreen2 sentences1999As the party claiming equitable estoppel, U.S. Outdoor must show its “‘(1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge as to the facts in question, (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped, and (3) action based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially.’” City of Crown Point v. Lake County, 510 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Ind.1987), quoting Damler v. Baine, 114 Ind.App. 534, 542-543 , 51 N.E.2d 885, 889 (1943). 1999As the party claiming equitable estoppel, U.S. Outdoor must show its “‘(1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge as to the facts in question, (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped, and (3) action based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially.’” City of Crown Point v. Lake County, 510 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Ind.1987), quoting Damler v. Baine, 114 Ind.App. 534, 542-543 , 51 N.E.2d 885, 889 (1943). | 2 | 2 |
City of Crown Point v. Lake Countygreen2 sentences1999As the party claiming equitable estoppel, U.S. Outdoor must show its “‘(1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge as to the facts in question, (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped, and (3) action based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially.’” City of Crown Point v. Lake County, 510 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Ind.1987), quoting Damler v. Baine, 114 Ind.App. 534, 542-543 , 51 N.E.2d 885, 889 (1943). 1997In order to support the equitable estoppel claim against the Commission, the appellants must show their “(1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge as to the facts in question, (2) reliance upon the *1081 conduct of the party estopped, and (3) action based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially.” Harbour Town, 540 N.E.2d at 1288 (quoting City of Crown Point v. Lake County, 510 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Ind.1987)). | 2 | 2 |
Perryman v. Motorist Mutual Insurance Co.green2 sentences2026Likewise, Indiana law allows for tolling a period of limitations under the equitable doctrine of equitable estoppel, see Kenworth of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Seventy-Seven Ltd., 134 N.E.3d 370 , 383 (Ind. 2019) (citing Perryman, 846 N.E.2d at 690–91), but also allows the doctrine to more generally prevent a party from asserting a right that it otherwise would have had. 2025Likewise, Indiana law allows for tolling a period of limitations under the equitable doctrine of equitable estoppel, see Kenworth of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Seventy-Seven Ltd., 134 N.E.3d 370 , 383 (Ind. 2019) (citing Perryman, 846 N.E.2d at 690–91), but also allows the doctrine to more generally prevent a party from asserting a right that it otherwise would have had. | 1 | 3 |
Martin v. Levinsongreen2 sentences2011In our decision, we noted that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is an “extraordinary remedy” that is not appropriate when the insurer’s conduct does not “exceed! ] the bounds of mere investigation and negotiation.” Id. at 1245 . 2011This Court addressed the doctrine of equitable estoppel in Martin v. Levinson, 409 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind.Ct.App.1980). | 1 | 2 |
Farrington v. Allsopgreen2 sentences2000Farrington v. Allsop, 670 N.E.2d 106, 109 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996) (quoting Lawshe v. Glen Park Lumber Co., 176 Ind.App. 344, 347 , 375 N.E.2d 275, 278 (1978)). 1999Before the doctrine will bar a statute of limitations defense, there must be fraud of a nature that prevents inquiry, eludes investigation, or misleads the party who claims the cause of action. 670 N.E.2d at 110 . | 1 | 2 |
Paramo v. Edwardsgreen1 sentence2019See Paramo, 563 N.E.2d at 599 . | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Shelter Insurance Companiesgreen1 sentence2016Companies, 957 N.E.2d 995, 998 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (quoting Martin v. Levinson, 409 N.E.2d 1239, 1243 (Ind.Ct.App.1980)), trans. denied. [24] Equitable . estoppel is available if one party, through its representations or course of conduct, knowingly misleads or induces another party to believe and act upon his conduct in good faith and without knowledge of the facts. | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child & Family Services, Inc.green1 sentence2016Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child & Family Servs., Inc., 718 N.E.2d 738, 745 (Ind. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
Town of New Chicago v. City of Lake Station Ex Rel. Lake Station Sanitary Districtgreen1 sentence2012To the contrary, we have observed that “equitable estoppel is available only as a defense.” Town of New Chicago v. City of Lake Station, 939 N.E.2d 638, 653 (Ind. Ct. App. 2 In its answer, Wells Fargo asserted as an affirmative defense that its mortgages have priority over Castalia’s alleged lien and requested that its mortgages be declared valid first priority liens. | 1 | 1 |
Donnella, Admrx. v. Cradygreen2 sentences2011The doctrine will apply to prevent a party from asserting a statute of limitations defense when “such party by fraud or other misconduct has prevented a party from commencing his action or induced him to delay the bringing of his action beyond the time allowed by law.” Id. at 1243 (quoting Donnella, Admrx. v. Crady, 135 Ind.App. 60 , 185 N.E.2d 623, 625 (1962), trans. denied.). 2011The doctrine will apply to prevent a party from asserting a statute of limitations defense when “such party by fraud or other misconduct has prevented a party from commencing his action or induced him to delay the bringing of his action beyond the time allowed by law.” Id. at 1243 (quoting Donnella, Admrx. v. Crady, 135 Ind.App. 60 , 185 N.E.2d 623, 625 (1962), trans. denied.). | 1 | 1 |
Metropolitan Development Commission v. Schroedergreen1 sentence2001See, e.g., Schroeder, 727 N.E.2d at 753 . | 1 | 1 |
Guy v. SCHULDTgreen2 sentences2000Schuldt, 236 Ind. 101, 107 , 138 N.E.2d 891, 894 (1956)). 2000Schuldt, 236 Ind. 101, 107 , 138 N.E.2d 891, 894 (1956)). | 1 | 1 |
Lawshe v. Glen Park Lbr. Co., Inc.green2 sentences2000Farrington v. Allsop, 670 N.E.2d 106, 109 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996) (quoting Lawshe v. Glen Park Lumber Co., 176 Ind.App. 344, 347 , 375 N.E.2d 275, 278 (1978)). 2000Farrington v. Allsop, 670 N.E.2d 106, 109 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996) (quoting Lawshe v. Glen Park Lumber Co., 176 Ind.App. 344, 347 , 375 N.E.2d 275, 278 (1978)). | 1 | 1 |
Landers v. Eversgreen1 sentence2000In rejecting Landers’s contention, the Landers court opined that “[tjhere is a distinction between concealment or misrepresentation of the identity of the party against whom a cause of action has arisen and a concealment of the cause of action.” Id. at 797. | 1 | 1 |
Spoljaric v. Pangangreen1 sentence1996Spoljaric v. Pangan, 466 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Ind.Ct.App.1984); Yarnell v. Hurley, 572 N.E.2d 1312, 1314 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Yarnell v. Hurleygreen1 sentence1996Spoljaric v. Pangan, 466 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Ind.Ct.App.1984); Yarnell v. Hurley, 572 N.E.2d 1312, 1314 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
| Barnd v. Borstgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
MS Dealer Service Corp. v. Franklin
green
2 sentences2012Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942 , 947 (11th Cir.1999); Sunkist Soft Drinks v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 756-57 (11th Cir.1993)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994); Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County Sch. 2012Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942 , 947 (11th Cir.1999); Sunkist Soft Drinks v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 756-57 (11th Cir.1993)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994); Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County Sch. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Fodor v. Time Warner, Inc.
green
2 sentences2012Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942 , 947 (11th Cir.1999); Sunkist Soft Drinks v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 756-57 (11th Cir.1993)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994); Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County Sch. 2012Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942 , 947 (11th Cir.1999); Sunkist Soft Drinks v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 756-57 (11th Cir.1993)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994); Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County Sch. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Story Bed & Breakfast, LLP v. Brown County Area Plan Commission and Patricia N. March
green
1 sentence2020The Court concluded, in part, that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Schoettmer “failed to act because of his reliance on the [insurer’s] representations.” Id. [28] Here, Murphy does not argue on appeal that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
John W. Schoettmer & Karen Schoettmer v. Jolene C. Wright & South Central Community Action Program, Inc.
green
1 sentence2020Our Supreme Court noted that “[t]he party claiming equitable estoppel must show its ‘(1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge as to the facts in question, (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped, and (3) action based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially.’” Schoettmer, 992 N.E.2d at 709 (quoting Story Bed & Breakfast LLP v. Brown Cnty. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Ludwig v. Ford Motor Co.
green
1 sentence2019See Perryman, 846 N.E.2d at 690–91; Ludwig, 510 N.E.2d at 696–98. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Robert Hrezo v. City of Lawrenceburg
green
1 sentence2018However, U.S. Bank did not raise this argument in its cross-motion for summary judgment, and it is "well-settled that '[i]ssues not raised before the trial court on summary judgment cannot be argued for the first time on appeal and are waived.' " Hrezo v. City of Lawrenceburg , 81 N.E.3d 1146 , 1156-57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Dunaway v. Allstate Ins. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Del Monte Corp.
green
2 sentences2012Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942 , 947 (11th Cir.1999); Sunkist Soft Drinks v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 756-57 (11th Cir.1993)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994); Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County Sch. 2012Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942 , 947 (11th Cir.1999); Sunkist Soft Drinks v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 756-57 (11th Cir.1993)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994); Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County Sch. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. S-W Industries, Inc.
green
2 sentences2012Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942 , 947 (11th Cir.1999); Sunkist Soft Drinks v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 756-57 (11th Cir.1993)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994); Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County Sch. 2012Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942 , 947 (11th Cir.1999); Sunkist Soft Drinks v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 756-57 (11th Cir.1993)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994); Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County Sch. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Little v. Progressive Insurance
green
1 sentence2011This Court further expanded on the doctrine of equitable estoppel in Little by requiring the trial court to consider all of the circumstances surrounding the behavior that led to the equitable estoppel argument. 783 N.E.2d at 315 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Equicor Development, Inc. v. Westfield-Washington Township Plan Commission
green
1 sentence2008Equicor, 758 N.E.2d at 39 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Hannon v. Metropolitan Development Commission
green
1 sentence2001Id. at 1080 n. 7. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Harbour Town Associates, Ltd. v. City of Noblesville
green
1 sentence1997In order to support the equitable estoppel claim against the Commission, the appellants must show their “(1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge as to the facts in question, (2) reliance upon the *1081 conduct of the party estopped, and (3) action based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially.” Harbour Town, 540 N.E.2d at 1288 (quoting City of Crown Point v. Lake County, 510 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Ind.1987)). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| In Re Lake Winnebago Development Co., Inc. neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Beecher v. CITY OF TERRE HAUTE green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Marcum v. Richmond Auto Parts Co. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Midland Building Industries, Inc. v. Oldenkamp green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Lyon Metal Products, Inc. v. Hagerman Construction Corp. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Kahf v. Charleston South Apartments green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| In Re Marriage of Murray green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Phar-Crest Land Corp. v. Therber green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Johnson v. Spencer green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Phenix Insurance Co. of Brooklyn, New York v. Lorenz neutral | 1 | 1893–1893 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.