67 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1884–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stamey v. Eastergreen2 sentences2017This Court has, however, crafted an exception to this equitable-estoppel exception: "Where 'the language of the arbitration provisions limited arbitration to the signing parties,' this Court has not allowed the claims against the nonsignatories to be arbitrated." Id. at 380-81 (quoting Stamey , 776 So.2d at 89 ). 2017In other words, "[i]f an arbitration agreement is written in broad language so that it applies to '[a]ll disputes, claims or controversies arising from or relating to this Contract or the relationships which result from this Contract ,' Ex parte Napier , 723 So.2d 49 , 51 (Ala. 1998) (emphasis added), or even in slightly narrower language so that it applies to 'ALL DISPUTES, CLAIMS OR CONTROVERSIES ARISING FROM OR RELATING TO THIS CONTRACT OR THE PARTIES THERETO ,' Stamey , 776 So.2d at 91 (capitalization in original; emphasis added), this Court will proceed to determine whether arbitration ma | 8 | 8 |
Lambert v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plangreen2 sentences2026This court stated: " 'In order for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply, a party must demonstrate: " ' " '(1) That "[t]he person against whom estoppel is asserted, who usually must have knowledge of the facts, communicates something in a misleading way, either by words, conduct, or silence, with the intention that the communication will be acted on;" " ' " '(2) That "the person seeking to assert estoppel, who lacks knowledge of the facts, relies upon [the] communication;" and " ' " '(3) That "the person relying would be harmed materially if the actor is later permitted to 26 CL-2025-051 2015Draughon v. General Finance Credit Corp., 362 So.2d 880, 884 (Ala.1978).’ “Pierce v. Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, 678 So.2d 765, 768 (Ala.1996). ■“In order for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply, a party must demonstrate: ‘““(1) That ‘[t]he person against, whom estoppel is asserted, who usually must have knowledge of the facts, communicates something in a misleading way, either by words, conduct, or silence, with the intention that the communication will be acted on’; “ ‘ “(2) That ‘the person seeking to assert estoppel, who lacks knowledge of the facts, relies upon [t | 3 | 5 |
Ex Parte Dyessgreen2 sentences2008Pursuant to the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a plaintiff may be compelled to arbitrate his or her claims against a nonsignatory to a contract containing an arbitration provision if the claims "are founded on, and are intertwined with, the facts surrounding the underlying contract that contains the arbitration clause." Ex parte Dyess , *Page 971 709 So.2d 447 , 451 (Ala. 1997). 2002Pursuant to the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a plaintiff may be compelled to arbitrate his or her claims against a nonsignatory to a contract containing an arbitration provision if the claims `are founded on, and are intertwined with, the facts surrounding the underlying contract that contains the arbitration clause.' Ex parte Dyess , 709 So.2d 447 , 451 (Ala. 1997). | 3 | 5 |
Pierce v. Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnstongreen2 sentences2015Draughon v. General Finance Credit Corp., 362 So.2d 880, 884 (Ala.1978).’ “Pierce v. Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, 678 So.2d 765, 768 (Ala.1996). ■“In order for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply, a party must demonstrate: ‘““(1) That ‘[t]he person against, whom estoppel is asserted, who usually must have knowledge of the facts, communicates something in a misleading way, either by words, conduct, or silence, with the intention that the communication will be acted on’; “ ‘ “(2) That ‘the person seeking to assert estoppel, who lacks knowledge of the facts, relies upon [t 2007The State now petitions this Court to review the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals, and the main opinion of this Court, although acknowledging that the appeal was untimely, holds that under the doctrine of equitable estoppel Boutwell should be allowed to go forward with his appeal. “ ‘The purpose of the doctrine of equitable estoppel is to promote equity and justice in an individual case by preventing a party from asserting rights under a general rule of law when his own conduct renders the assertion of such rights contrary to equity and good conscience.’ ” Robinson v. Boohaker, Schillaci | 3 | 3 |
First National Bank of Montgomery v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2007City of Guntersville v. Alred , 495 So.2d 566 (Ala. 1986); Alford v. City of Gadsden , supra. However, "`"[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a bar to the correction . . . of a mistake of law."'" State Highway Dep't v. Headrick Outdoor Adver., Inc. , 594 So.2d at 1205 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Montgomery v. United States , 176 F.Supp. 768 , 772 (M.D.Ala. 1959) (quoting in turn Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner , 353 U.S. 180 , 182 , 77 S.Ct. 707 , 1 L.Ed.2d 746 (1957))) (emphasis omitted). 2006However, “ ‘ “[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a bar to the correction ... of a mistake of law.” ’ ” State Highway Dep’t v. Headrick Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 594 So.2d 1202, 1205 (Ala.l992)(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Montgomery v. United States, 176 F.Supp. 768, 772 (M.D.Ala.1959), affd, 285 F.2d 123 (5th Cir.1961), quoting in turn Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 182 , 77 S.Ct. 707 , 1 L.Ed.2d 746 (1957))(emphasis omitted). | 2 | 7 |
General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co.green2 sentences2026This court stated: " 'In order for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply, a party must demonstrate: " ' " '(1) That "[t]he person against whom estoppel is asserted, who usually must have knowledge of the facts, communicates something in a misleading way, either by words, conduct, or silence, with the intention that the communication will be acted on;" " ' " '(2) That "the person seeking to assert estoppel, who lacks knowledge of the facts, relies upon [the] communication;" and " ' " '(3) That "the person relying would be harmed materially if the actor is later permitted to 26 CL-2025-051 2015Draughon v. General Finance Credit Corp., 362 So.2d 880, 884 (Ala.1978).’ “Pierce v. Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, 678 So.2d 765, 768 (Ala.1996). ■“In order for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply, a party must demonstrate: ‘““(1) That ‘[t]he person against, whom estoppel is asserted, who usually must have knowledge of the facts, communicates something in a misleading way, either by words, conduct, or silence, with the intention that the communication will be acted on’; “ ‘ “(2) That ‘the person seeking to assert estoppel, who lacks knowledge of the facts, relies upon [t | 2 | 6 |
Marsh v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed.green2 sentences2013However, ‘‘[our supreme c]ourt has held that ‘[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel, as a general rule, is not applicable to the state, to municipal subdivisions, or to state-created agencies,’ because ‘ “[pjersons dealing with agencies of government are presumed to know the legal limitations upon their power and cannot plead estoppel on the theory that they have been misled as to the extent of that power.” ’ Marsh v. Binningham Board of Education, 349 So.2d 34, 36 (Ala.1977), quoting City of Birmingham v. Lee, 254 Ala. 237, 247 , 48 So.2d 47, 55-56 (1950).” Ex parte City of Jacksonville, 693 S 1996However, this Court has held that "[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel, as a general rule, is not applicable to the state, to municipal subdivisions, or to state-created agencies," because " '[p]persons dealing with agencies of government are presumed to know the legal limitations upon their power and cannot plead estoppel on the theory that they have been misled as to the extent of that power.' " Marsh v. Birmingham Board of Education , 349 So.2d 34 , 36 (Ala. 1977), quoting City of Birmingham v. Lee , 254 Ala. 237 , 247 , 48 So.2d 47 , 55-56 (1950). | 2 | 6 |
Allen v. Bennettgreen2 sentences2026This court stated: " 'In order for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply, a party must demonstrate: " ' " '(1) That "[t]he person against whom estoppel is asserted, who usually must have knowledge of the facts, communicates something in a misleading way, either by words, conduct, or silence, with the intention that the communication will be acted on;" " ' " '(2) That "the person seeking to assert estoppel, who lacks knowledge of the facts, relies upon [the] communication;" and " ' " '(3) That "the person relying would be harmed materially if the actor is later permitted to 26 CL-2025-051 2015Draughon v. General Finance Credit Corp., 362 So.2d 880, 884 (Ala.1978).’ “Pierce v. Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, 678 So.2d 765, 768 (Ala.1996). ■“In order for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply, a party must demonstrate: ‘““(1) That ‘[t]he person against, whom estoppel is asserted, who usually must have knowledge of the facts, communicates something in a misleading way, either by words, conduct, or silence, with the intention that the communication will be acted on’; “ ‘ “(2) That ‘the person seeking to assert estoppel, who lacks knowledge of the facts, relies upon [t | 2 | 4 |
BSI Rentals, Inc. v. Wendtgreen2 sentences2026This court stated: " 'In order for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply, a party must demonstrate: " ' " '(1) That "[t]he person against whom estoppel is asserted, who usually must have knowledge of the facts, communicates something in a misleading way, either by words, conduct, or silence, with the intention that the communication will be acted on;" " ' " '(2) That "the person seeking to assert estoppel, who lacks knowledge of the facts, relies upon [the] communication;" and " ' " '(3) That "the person relying would be harmed materially if the actor is later permitted to 26 CL-2025-051 2015Draughon v. General Finance Credit Corp., 362 So.2d 880, 884 (Ala.1978).’ “Pierce v. Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, 678 So.2d 765, 768 (Ala.1996). ■“In order for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply, a party must demonstrate: ‘““(1) That ‘[t]he person against, whom estoppel is asserted, who usually must have knowledge of the facts, communicates something in a misleading way, either by words, conduct, or silence, with the intention that the communication will be acted on’; “ ‘ “(2) That ‘the person seeking to assert estoppel, who lacks knowledge of the facts, relies upon [t | 2 | 3 |
City of Birmingham v. Leegreen2 sentences2013However, ‘‘[our supreme c]ourt has held that ‘[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel, as a general rule, is not applicable to the state, to municipal subdivisions, or to state-created agencies,’ because ‘ “[pjersons dealing with agencies of government are presumed to know the legal limitations upon their power and cannot plead estoppel on the theory that they have been misled as to the extent of that power.” ’ Marsh v. Binningham Board of Education, 349 So.2d 34, 36 (Ala.1977), quoting City of Birmingham v. Lee, 254 Ala. 237, 247 , 48 So.2d 47, 55-56 (1950).” Ex parte City of Jacksonville, 693 S 2013However, ‘‘[our supreme c]ourt has held that ‘[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel, as a general rule, is not applicable to the state, to municipal subdivisions, or to state-created agencies,’ because ‘ “[pjersons dealing with agencies of government are presumed to know the legal limitations upon their power and cannot plead estoppel on the theory that they have been misled as to the extent of that power.” ’ Marsh v. Binningham Board of Education, 349 So.2d 34, 36 (Ala.1977), quoting City of Birmingham v. Lee, 254 Ala. 237, 247 , 48 So.2d 47, 55-56 (1950).” Ex parte City of Jacksonville, 693 S | 2 | 2 |
State Hwy. Dept. v. HEADRICK OUTDOOR ADV.green2 sentences2007City of Guntersville v. Alred , 495 So.2d 566 (Ala. 1986); Alford v. City of Gadsden , supra. However, "`"[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a bar to the correction . . . of a mistake of law."'" State Highway Dep't v. Headrick Outdoor Adver., Inc. , 594 So.2d at 1205 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Montgomery v. United States , 176 F.Supp. 768 , 772 (M.D.Ala. 1959) (quoting in turn Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner , 353 U.S. 180 , 182 , 77 S.Ct. 707 , 1 L.Ed.2d 746 (1957))) (emphasis omitted). 2006However, “ ‘ “[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a bar to the correction ... of a mistake of law.” ’ ” State Highway Dep’t v. Headrick Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 594 So.2d 1202, 1205 (Ala.l992)(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Montgomery v. United States, 176 F.Supp. 768, 772 (M.D.Ala.1959), affd, 285 F.2d 123 (5th Cir.1961), quoting in turn Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 182 , 77 S.Ct. 707 , 1 L.Ed.2d 746 (1957))(emphasis omitted). | 1 | 5 |
Ex Parte Fieldsgreen2 sentences2006“Neither the State nor its political subdivisions ... [can] be estopped by doing that which they have no authority to do.” Ex parte Fields, 432 So.2d 1290, 1293 (Ala.1983). 2005"In Ex parte Fields , supra, at 1293 , this Court held that neither the state or its political subdivisions can be `estopped by doing that which they have no authority to do.'" The essential elements of equitable estoppel were set forth in Ledlow v. City of Pell City , 497 So.2d 86 , 89 (Ala. 1986): "`The actor, who usually must have knowledge of the true facts, communicates something in a misleading way, either by words, conduct or silence. | 1 | 4 |
Ex Parte Napiergreen2 sentences2017In other words, "[i]f an arbitration agreement is written in broad language so that it applies to '[a]ll disputes, claims or controversies arising from or relating to this Contract or the relationships which result from this Contract ,' Ex parte Napier , 723 So.2d 49 , 51 (Ala. 1998) (emphasis added), or even in slightly narrower language so that it applies to 'ALL DISPUTES, CLAIMS OR CONTROVERSIES ARISING FROM OR RELATING TO THIS CONTRACT OR THE PARTIES THERETO ,' Stamey , 776 So.2d at 91 (capitalization in original; emphasis added), this Court will proceed to determine whether arbitration ma 2010“If an arbitration agreement is written in broad language so that it applies to ‘[a]ll disputes, claims or controversies arising from or relating to this Contract or the relationships which result from this Contract,’ Ex parte Napier, 723 So.2d 49, 51 (Ala. 1998) (emphasis added), or even in slightly narrower language so that it applies to ‘ALL DISPUTES, CLAIMS OR CONTROVERSIES ARISING FROM OR RELATING TO THIS CONTRACT OR THE PARTIES THERETO,’ Stamey, 776 So.2d at 91 (capitalization in original; emphasis added), this Court will proceed to determine whether arbitration may be compelled under th | 1 | 3 |
Smith v. Mark Dodge, Inc.green2 sentences2017This Court has, however, crafted an exception to this equitable-estoppel exception: "Where 'the language of the arbitration provisions limited arbitration to the signing parties,' this Court has not allowed the claims against the nonsignatories to be arbitrated." Id. at 380-81 (quoting Stamey , 776 So.2d at 89 ). 2009Servs., Inc. v. Rogers, 736 So.2d 553 (Ala.1999) (holding that the language of an arbitration provision limiting the parties did not allow the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to compel arbitration by nonparty), and Smith v. Mark Dodge, Inc., 934 So.2d 375, 380 (Ala.2006) (noting that there is an exception to the equitable estoppel rule requiring the arbitration provision to contain sufficiently broad language indicating that the nonsig-natory was contemplated as a party). | 1 | 2 |
Draughon v. General Fin. Credit Corp.green2 sentences2015Draughon v. General Finance Credit Corp., 362 So.2d 880, 884 (Ala.1978).’ “Pierce v. Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, 678 So.2d 765, 768 (Ala.1996). ■“In order for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply, a party must demonstrate: ‘““(1) That ‘[t]he person against, whom estoppel is asserted, who usually must have knowledge of the facts, communicates something in a misleading way, either by words, conduct, or silence, with the intention that the communication will be acted on’; “ ‘ “(2) That ‘the person seeking to assert estoppel, who lacks knowledge of the facts, relies upon [t 1983Draughon v. General Finance Credit Corporation , 362 So.2d 880 , 884 (Ala. 1978); Anders v. Sandlin , 191 Ala. 158 , 67 So. 684 (1914). | 1 | 2 |
First Nat. Bank of Opp v. Bolesgreen2 sentences2015First National Bank of Opp v. Boles, 231 Ala. 473, 479 , 165 So. 586, 592 (1936). 2015First National Bank of Opp v. Boles, 231 Ala. 473, 479 , 165 So. 586, 592 (1936). | 1 | 2 |
| Pace v. UTILITIES BD. OF CITY OF FOLEYgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jack Ingram Motors, Inc. v. Wardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cook's Pest Control, Inc. v. Boykingreen | 1 | 1 |
| McCormack v. AmSouth Bank, NAgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ex Parte City of Jacksonvillegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ex Parte Ballewgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Robinson v. Boohaker, Schillaci Co., P.C.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ledlow v. City of Pell Citygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thomson-Csf, S.A. v. American Arbitration Association, Evans & Sutherland Computer Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner
green
2 sentences2007City of Guntersville v. Alred , 495 So.2d 566 (Ala. 1986); Alford v. City of Gadsden , supra. However, "`"[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a bar to the correction . . . of a mistake of law."'" State Highway Dep't v. Headrick Outdoor Adver., Inc. , 594 So.2d at 1205 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Montgomery v. United States , 176 F.Supp. 768 , 772 (M.D.Ala. 1959) (quoting in turn Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner , 353 U.S. 180 , 182 , 77 S.Ct. 707 , 1 L.Ed.2d 746 (1957))) (emphasis omitted). 2007City of Guntersville v. Alred , 495 So.2d 566 (Ala. 1986); Alford v. City of Gadsden , supra. However, "`"[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a bar to the correction . . . of a mistake of law."'" State Highway Dep't v. Headrick Outdoor Adver., Inc. , 594 So.2d at 1205 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Montgomery v. United States , 176 F.Supp. 768 , 772 (M.D.Ala. 1959) (quoting in turn Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner , 353 U.S. 180 , 182 , 77 S.Ct. 707 , 1 L.Ed.2d 746 (1957))) (emphasis omitted). | 7 | 1992–2007 |
Mazer v. Jackson Ins. Agency
green
2 sentences2015In Mazer v. Jackson Insurance Agency, 340 So.2d 770 (Ala.1976), our supreme court discussed the doctrine of equitable estoppel, stating: “The purpose of [the doctrine of] equitable estoppel ... is to promote equity and justice in an individual case by preventing a party from asserting rights under a general technical rule of law when his own conduct renders the assertion of such rights contrary to equity and good conscience. 1999Agency , 340 So.2d 770 (Ala. 1976)." In Ex parte Four Seasons, Ltd. , 450 So.2d 110 , 111 (Ala. 1984), our supreme court stated: "Although the doctrine of equitable estoppel is, as a general rule, not applicable to the state, to municipal subdivisions, or to state-created agencies, the doctrine is applicable to the government where justice and fair play require it. | 4 | 1986–2015 |
Ex Parte Jones
green
2 sentences1999My views on when and under what circumstances the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied are stated in my special writings in Med Center Cars, Inc. *561 v. Smith, 727 So.2d 9 (Ala.1998) (Maddox, J., concurring in the result as to Parts I(B), II, and III; and dissenting as to Parts I(A) and I(C)); Ex parte Dickinson, 711 So.2d 984 (Ala.1998) (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ex parte Stripling, 694 So.2d 1281 (Ala.1997) (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); and Ex parte Jones, 686 So.2d 1166 (Ala.1996) (Maddox, J., dissenting). 1998My views on *Page 23 when and under what circumstances the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied are stated in my special writings in Ex parte Dickinson , 711 So.2d 984 (Ala. 1998) (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ex parte Stripling , 694 So.2d 1281 (Ala. 1997) (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); and Ex parte Jones , 686 So.2d 1166 (Ala. 1996) (Maddox, J., dissenting). | 3 | 1998–2000 |
First Family Financial Services, Inc. v. Rogers
green
2 sentences2009Servs., Inc. v. Rogers, 736 So.2d 553 (Ala.1999) (holding that the language of an arbitration provision limiting the parties did not allow the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to compel arbitration by nonparty), and Smith v. Mark Dodge, Inc., 934 So.2d 375, 380 (Ala.2006) (noting that there is an exception to the equitable estoppel rule requiring the arbitration provision to contain sufficiently broad language indicating that the nonsig-natory was contemplated as a party). 2000Servs, Inc. v. Rogers , 736 So.2d 553 (Ala. 1999); Med Center Cars, Inc. v. Smith , 727 So.2d 9 (Ala. 1998); Ex parte Isbell , 708 So.2d 571 (Ala. 1997); Ex parte Martin , 703 So.2d 883 (Ala. 1997); Ex parte Jones , 686 So.2d 1166 (Ala. 1996); Ex parte Stallings Sons, Inc. , 670 So.2d 861 (Ala. 1995); see also David F. Sawrie, Equitable Estoppel and the Outer Boundaries of Federal Arbitration Law: The Alabama Supreme Court's Retrenchment of an Expansive Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration , 51 Vand. | 2 | 2000–2009 |
Alford v. City of Gadsden
green
2 sentences2007City of Guntersville v. Alred , 495 So.2d 566 (Ala. 1986); Alford v. City of Gadsden , supra. However, "`"[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a bar to the correction . . . of a mistake of law."'" State Highway Dep't v. Headrick Outdoor Adver., Inc. , 594 So.2d at 1205 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Montgomery v. United States , 176 F.Supp. 768 , 772 (M.D.Ala. 1959) (quoting in turn Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner , 353 U.S. 180 , 182 , 77 S.Ct. 707 , 1 L.Ed.2d 746 (1957))) (emphasis omitted). 1992In Ex parte Fields , supra, at 1293 , this Court held that neither the state or its political subdivisions can be "estopped by doing that which they have no authority to do." Consequently, as this Court has held, the doctrine of estoppel may not authorize a city to do that which the city had no authority to do, Alford v. City of Gadsden , 349 So.2d 1132 (Ala. 1977); and a city may not adopt a zoning ordinance that contravenes a state law. | 2 | 1992–2007 |
Med Center Cars, Inc. v. Smith
green
2 sentences2000Servs, Inc. v. Rogers , 736 So.2d 553 (Ala. 1999); Med Center Cars, Inc. v. Smith , 727 So.2d 9 (Ala. 1998); Ex parte Isbell , 708 So.2d 571 (Ala. 1997); Ex parte Martin , 703 So.2d 883 (Ala. 1997); Ex parte Jones , 686 So.2d 1166 (Ala. 1996); Ex parte Stallings Sons, Inc. , 670 So.2d 861 (Ala. 1995); see also David F. Sawrie, Equitable Estoppel and the Outer Boundaries of Federal Arbitration Law: The Alabama Supreme Court's Retrenchment of an Expansive Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration , 51 Vand. 1999My views on when and under what circumstances the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied are stated in my special writings in Med Center Cars, Inc. *561 v. Smith, 727 So.2d 9 (Ala.1998) (Maddox, J., concurring in the result as to Parts I(B), II, and III; and dissenting as to Parts I(A) and I(C)); Ex parte Dickinson, 711 So.2d 984 (Ala.1998) (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ex parte Stripling, 694 So.2d 1281 (Ala.1997) (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); and Ex parte Jones, 686 So.2d 1166 (Ala.1996) (Maddox, J., dissenting). | 2 | 1999–2000 |
Ex Parte Stripling
green
2 sentences1999My views on when and under what circumstances the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied are stated in my special writings in Med Center Cars, Inc. *561 v. Smith, 727 So.2d 9 (Ala.1998) (Maddox, J., concurring in the result as to Parts I(B), II, and III; and dissenting as to Parts I(A) and I(C)); Ex parte Dickinson, 711 So.2d 984 (Ala.1998) (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ex parte Stripling, 694 So.2d 1281 (Ala.1997) (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); and Ex parte Jones, 686 So.2d 1166 (Ala.1996) (Maddox, J., dissenting). 1998My views on *Page 23 when and under what circumstances the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied are stated in my special writings in Ex parte Dickinson , 711 So.2d 984 (Ala. 1998) (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ex parte Stripling , 694 So.2d 1281 (Ala. 1997) (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); and Ex parte Jones , 686 So.2d 1166 (Ala. 1996) (Maddox, J., dissenting). | 2 | 1998–1999 |
Ex Parte Dickinson
green
2 sentences1999My views on when and under what circumstances the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied are stated in my special writings in Med Center Cars, Inc. *561 v. Smith, 727 So.2d 9 (Ala.1998) (Maddox, J., concurring in the result as to Parts I(B), II, and III; and dissenting as to Parts I(A) and I(C)); Ex parte Dickinson, 711 So.2d 984 (Ala.1998) (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ex parte Stripling, 694 So.2d 1281 (Ala.1997) (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); and Ex parte Jones, 686 So.2d 1166 (Ala.1996) (Maddox, J., dissenting). 1998My views on *Page 23 when and under what circumstances the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied are stated in my special writings in Ex parte Dickinson , 711 So.2d 984 (Ala. 1998) (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ex parte Stripling , 694 So.2d 1281 (Ala. 1997) (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); and Ex parte Jones , 686 So.2d 1166 (Ala. 1996) (Maddox, J., dissenting). | 2 | 1998–1999 |
Ex Parte Four Seasons, Ltd.
green
2 sentences1999Agency , 340 So.2d 770 (Ala. 1976)." In Ex parte Four Seasons, Ltd. , 450 So.2d 110 , 111 (Ala. 1984), our supreme court stated: "Although the doctrine of equitable estoppel is, as a general rule, not applicable to the state, to municipal subdivisions, or to state-created agencies, the doctrine is applicable to the government where justice and fair play require it. 1994Ex parte State Department of Human Resources; Ex parte Four Seasons, Ltd., 450 So.2d 110 (Ala.1984). | 2 | 1994–1999 |
United States v. Lazy Fc Ranch
green
2 sentences1989United States v. Lazy F C Ranch , 481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973). 1984United States v. Lazy F C Ranch , 481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973). | 2 | 1984–1989 |
Auto-Plaza, Inc. v. Central Bank of Alabama
green
2 sentences1989Although this Court pointed out in Auto-Plaza, Inc. v. Central Bank of Alabama, N.A. , 394 So.2d 6 (Ala. 1980), that the mere inclusion of a nonwaiver of acceleration clause does not, under all circumstances , preclude the operative effect of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, it should be noted that the agreement in Auto-Plaza did not require that any contract modifications be in writing. 1989As to the issue of equitable estoppel, our supreme court said in Auto-Plaza, Inc. v. Central Bank, 394 So.2d 6 (Ala.1980): “Ordinarily, then, the applicability vel non of the equitable estoppel doctrine is a fact issue. | 2 | 1989–1989 |
Weil v. Hill
neutral
2 sentences1947Warner v. Warner, 248 Ala. 556 , 28 So.2d 701 ; Weil v. Hill, 193 Ala. 407 , 69 So. 438 ; Alabama Great Southern R. 1947Warner v. Warner, 248 Ala. 556 , 28 So.2d 701 ; Weil v. Hill, 193 Ala. 407 , 69 So. 438 ; Alabama Great Southern R. | 2 | 1946–1947 |
Webb v. City of Demopolis
green
2 sentences1927Webb v. Demopolis, 95 Ala. 116 , 13 So. 289 , 21 L. 1913The doctrine is that the sovereign, in such cases, cannot be thus deprived of his rights; nor will he allow; any of his subjects, by wrongful conduct, to destroy this public right and use. —Webb v. Demopolis, 95 Ala. 116 , 13 South. 289 , 21 L. | 2 | 1913–1927 |
| Doe ex dem. McPherson v. Walters neutral | 2 | 1884–1907 |
Smith v. Mundy
neutral
2 sentences1907Dec. 200 ; Smith v. Mundy, 18 Ala. 182 , 52 Am. 1884It has been uniformly held by this court, that “ a court of law will not look to, or consider the equity of a party, in opposition of the legal title of the other,” and that a court of equity was the only proper forum in which the purchaser of an equitable title could protect himself by invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel. — McPherson v. Walters, 16 Ala. 714 ; Smith v. Mundy, 18 Ala. 182 ; Kelly v. Hendricks, 57 Ala. 193 ; Lehman v. Bryan, 67 Ala. 558 ; Tutwiler v. Munford, 73 Ala. 308 . | 2 | 1884–1907 |
| Boutwell v. State green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| MTA, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| City of Birmingham v. Cochrane Roofing & Metal Co. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Arkel Land Co. v. Cagle green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Mason v. County of Mobile green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Weaver v. Firestone green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Joseph v. Crossing II, L.L.C. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Sparks v. Alabama Power Co. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| City of Guntersville v. Alred green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| First National Bank of Montgomery, Estate of Georgia S. Gossler, Deceased v. United States green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Ex Parte Tony's Towing, Inc. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Ex Parte Lovejoy green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Ex Parte Isbell green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Ex Parte Martin green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Ex Parte Stallings & Sons, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Ex Parte Warren green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Maintenance, Inc. v. HOUSTON CTY. ALA. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Durham v. Harbin green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Galerie Des Monnaies of Geneva, Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., New York Branch (In Re Galerie Des Monnaies of Geneva, Ltd.) green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Galerie Des Monnaies of Geneva, Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank, A.G. (In Re Galerie Des Monnaies of Geneva, Ltd.) green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| TRANSAMERICA COM. FINANCE v. Union Bank green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Anders v. Sandlin neutral | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Mooradian v. Canal Insurance Company green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.