equitable estoppel doctrine in West Virginia

2020As with 11 The doctrine of equitable estoppel, as stated by Lord Denman, in Pickard v. Sears, 6 Adolph. & El. 469, has been generally adopted in both English and American courts, as follows: “Where one by his words or conduct willfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time.” Preston v. Mann, 25 Conn. 118, 128 .

1918The doctrine of equitable estoppel, as stated by Lord Denman, in Pickard v. Sears, 6 Adolph. & El. 469, has been generally adopted in both English and American courts, as follows: “Where one by his words or conduct wilfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to" alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time.” Preston v. Mann, 25 Conn. 118, 128 .

2014Mr. Jones then appealed to the Circuit Court of Raleigh County on the basis that the hearing examiner and the Retirement Board failed to consider the doctrine of equitable estoppel and this Court’s decision in Hudkins v. Public Retirement Board, 220 W.Va. 275 , 647 S.E.2d 711 (2007).

2014Mr. Jones then appealed to the Circuit Court of Raleigh County on the basis that the hearing examiner and the Retirement Board failed to consider the doctrine of equitable estoppel and this Court’s decision in Hudkins v. Public Retirement Board, 220 W.

2013However, the instant appeal only concerns amounts owed up through December 1, 2011, prior to the filing of Mr. Crisp’s request for modification. 2 S.E.2d 363 (1999), to urge us to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

2007In Syllabus Point 7 of Samsell v. State Line Development Company, 154 W.Va. 48 , 174 S.E.2d 318 (1970) this Court acknowledged that the doctrine of estoppel may be applied against the State, but held that: The doctrine of estoppel should be applied cautiously, only when equity clearly requires that it be done, and this principle is applied with especial force when one undertakes to assert the doctrine against the state.

2007In Syllabus Point 7 of Samsell v. State Line Development Company, 154 W.Va. 48 , 174 S.E.2d 318 (1970) this Court acknowledged that the doctrine of estoppel may be applied against the State, but held that: The doctrine of estoppel should be applied cautiously, only when equity clearly requires that it be done, and this principle is applied with especial force when one undertakes to assert the doctrine against the state.

2000In Syllabus Point 3 of Bradley v. Williams, 195 W.Va. 180 , 465 S.E.2d 180 (1995), this Court determined that “ ‘[e]stop-pel applies when a party is induced to act or to refrain from acting to her detriment because of her reasonable reliance on another party’s misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact.’ Syl.

2000In Syllabus Point 3 of Bradley v. Williams, 195 W.Va. 180 , 465 S.E.2d 180 (1995), this Court determined that “ ‘[e]stop-pel applies when a party is induced to act or to refrain from acting to her detriment because of her reasonable reliance on another party’s misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact.’ Syl.

1993In Lauderback v. Wadsworth, 187 W.Va. 104 , 416 S.E.2d 62 (1992), this Court declined to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

1993In Lauderback v. Wadsworth, 187 W.Va. 104 , 416 S.E.2d 62 (1992), this Court declined to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

1990This Court has previously rejected the argument that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied to prevent a lessee from discontinuing its supply of free gas to lessors, that In Kimble we explained in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel against defendant [lessee], it should be established that plaintiffs [lessors] were without information as to the matter to which the conduct of defendant relates, i.e., the furnishing of free gas; and must likewise be without convenient or available means of acquiring such information. 134 W.Va. at 769 , 61 S.E.2d at 733 .

1990This Court has previously rejected the argument that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied to prevent a lessee from discontinuing its supply of free gas to lessors, that In Kimble we explained in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel against defendant [lessee], it should be established that plaintiffs [lessors] were without information as to the matter to which the conduct of defendant relates, i.e., the furnishing of free gas; and must likewise be without convenient or available means of acquiring such information. 134 W.Va. at 769 , 61 S.E.2d at 733 .

1989Hall v. Hall, 215 Pa.Super. 24 , 257 A.2d 269 (1969) (doctrine of estoppel precluded husband from using blood-grouping tests to establish nonpater-nity where child was acknowledged as husband’s in separation agreement and paternity was not questioned until one year following separation); Annotation, 43 A.L.R. 4th at 610-15 (1986); but cf. NPA v. WBA, 8 Va.App. 246 , 380 S.E.2d 178 (1989) (doctrine of equitable estoppel could not be applied to require non-biological father to pay child support because he did not knowingly misrepresent to child that he was the natural father and child suffered n

1989Hall v. Hall, 215 Pa.Super. 24 , 257 A.2d 269 (1969) (doctrine of estoppel precluded husband from using blood-grouping tests to establish nonpater-nity where child was acknowledged as husband’s in separation agreement and paternity was not questioned until one year following separation); Annotation, 43 A.L.R. 4th at 610-15 (1986); but cf. NPA v. WBA, 8 Va.App. 246 , 380 S.E.2d 178 (1989) (doctrine of equitable estoppel could not be applied to require non-biological father to pay child support because he did not knowingly misrepresent to child that he was the natural father and child suffered n

1988Among other factors, the granting of equitable estoppel should be premised upon (1) ‘a showing of the plaintiff’s actual and reasonable reliance on the defendant’s conduct or representations’ and (2) ‘evidence of improper purpose on the part of the defendant or of the defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge of the deceptive nature of its conduct.’ Naton, 649 F.2d at 696 .” 784 F.2d at 292 . 6 A number of state courts have also held that the limitation period for filing a discrimination complaint is not jurisdictional and is subject to equitable tolling principles.

1988Donnelley & Sons Co., 745 F.2d 407 ] at 410-11 [(7th Cir.1984)] (quoting Reeb v. Eco *409 nomic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 931 (5th Cir.1975)).” It then discussed in some detail the doctrine of equitable estoppel: “Equitable estoppel is available only if the employee’s otherwise untimely filing was the result ‘either of a deliberate design by the employer or of actions that the employer should unmistakably have understood would cause the employee to delay filing his charge.’ Price v. Litton Business Systems, Inc., 694 F.2d 963, 965 (4th Cir.1982).

1988Among other factors, the granting of equitable estoppel should be premised upon (1) ‘a showing of the plaintiff’s actual and reasonable reliance on the defendant’s conduct or representations’ and (2) ‘evidence of improper purpose on the part of the defendant or of the defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge of the deceptive nature of its conduct.’ Naton, 649 F.2d at 696 .” 784 F.2d at 292 . 6 A number of state courts have also held that the limitation period for filing a discrimination complaint is not jurisdictional and is subject to equitable tolling principles.

1986Therefore, the court in Williams, 206 Neb. at 638-39 , 294 N.W.2d at 363 , reversed the trial court’s award of summary judgment for the husband, stating that a genuine issue of material fact remained with respect to whether the requisite elements necessary to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel were present.

1986Therefore, the court in Williams, 206 Neb. at 638-39 , 294 N.W.2d at 363 , reversed the trial court’s award of summary judgment for the husband, stating that a genuine issue of material fact remained with respect to whether the requisite elements necessary to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel were present.

1986As this Court stated in Syllabus Point 2 of Helmick v. Broll, 150 W.Va. 285 , 144 S.E.2d 779 (1965), “It is essential to the application of the principles of equitable estoppel that the one claiming the benefit thereof establish that he relied, to his disadvantage or detriment, on the acts, conduct or representation of the one alleged to be estopped.” See abo Mundy v. Arcuri, 165 W.Va. 128 , 267 S.E.2d 454, 456-57 (1980); Syl. pt. 3, Nisbet v. Watson, 162 W.Va. 522 , 251 S.E.2d 774 (1979); Syl. pt. 1, Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Lane, 152 W.Va. 578 , 165 S.E.2d 379 (1969); Syl. pt. 6, Wallace

1986As this Court stated in Syllabus Point 2 of Helmick v. Broll, 150 W.Va. 285 , 144 S.E.2d 779 (1965), “It is essential to the application of the principles of equitable estoppel that the one claiming the benefit thereof establish that he relied, to his disadvantage or detriment, on the acts, conduct or representation of the one alleged to be estopped.” See abo Mundy v. Arcuri, 165 W.Va. 128 , 267 S.E.2d 454, 456-57 (1980); Syl. pt. 3, Nisbet v. Watson, 162 W.Va. 522 , 251 S.E.2d 774 (1979); Syl. pt. 1, Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Lane, 152 W.Va. 578 , 165 S.E.2d 379 (1969); Syl. pt. 6, Wallace

1986As this Court stated in Syllabus Point 2 of Helmick v. Broll, 150 W.Va. 285 , 144 S.E.2d 779 (1965), “It is essential to the application of the principles of equitable estoppel that the one claiming the benefit thereof establish that he relied, to his disadvantage or detriment, on the acts, conduct or representation of the one alleged to be estopped.” See abo Mundy v. Arcuri, 165 W.Va. 128 , 267 S.E.2d 454, 456-57 (1980); Syl. pt. 3, Nisbet v. Watson, 162 W.Va. 522 , 251 S.E.2d 774 (1979); Syl. pt. 1, Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Lane, 152 W.Va. 578 , 165 S.E.2d 379 (1969); Syl. pt. 6, Wallace

1986As this Court stated in Syllabus Point 2 of Helmick v. Broll, 150 W.Va. 285 , 144 S.E.2d 779 (1965), “It is essential to the application of the principles of equitable estoppel that the one claiming the benefit thereof establish that he relied, to his disadvantage or detriment, on the acts, conduct or representation of the one alleged to be estopped.” See abo Mundy v. Arcuri, 165 W.Va. 128 , 267 S.E.2d 454, 456-57 (1980); Syl. pt. 3, Nisbet v. Watson, 162 W.Va. 522 , 251 S.E.2d 774 (1979); Syl. pt. 1, Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Lane, 152 W.Va. 578 , 165 S.E.2d 379 (1969); Syl. pt. 6, Wallace

1986As this Court stated in Syllabus Point 2 of Helmick v. Broll, 150 W.Va. 285 , 144 S.E.2d 779 (1965), “It is essential to the application of the principles of equitable estoppel that the one claiming the benefit thereof establish that he relied, to his disadvantage or detriment, on the acts, conduct or representation of the one alleged to be estopped.” See abo Mundy v. Arcuri, 165 W.Va. 128 , 267 S.E.2d 454, 456-57 (1980); Syl. pt. 3, Nisbet v. Watson, 162 W.Va. 522 , 251 S.E.2d 774 (1979); Syl. pt. 1, Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Lane, 152 W.Va. 578 , 165 S.E.2d 379 (1969); Syl. pt. 6, Wallace

1986As this Court stated in Syllabus Point 2 of Helmick v. Broll, 150 W.Va. 285 , 144 S.E.2d 779 (1965), “It is essential to the application of the principles of equitable estoppel that the one claiming the benefit thereof establish that he relied, to his disadvantage or detriment, on the acts, conduct or representation of the one alleged to be estopped.” See abo Mundy v. Arcuri, 165 W.Va. 128 , 267 S.E.2d 454, 456-57 (1980); Syl. pt. 3, Nisbet v. Watson, 162 W.Va. 522 , 251 S.E.2d 774 (1979); Syl. pt. 1, Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Lane, 152 W.Va. 578 , 165 S.E.2d 379 (1969); Syl. pt. 6, Wallace

1975Va. 253 , pt. 8 syl., 57 S.E. 729 , that: “Discretionary power to refuse the writ of mandamus will not be exercised in a case in which the legal right is clear, substantial and fruitful in benefits, and the plaintiff has done nothing out of which an equitable estoppel or defense in the nature of one can arise.” See also, State v. Davis, 74 W.

1975Va. 253 , pt. 8 syl., 57 S.E. 729 , that: “Discretionary power to refuse the writ of mandamus will not be exercised in a case in which the legal right is clear, substantial and fruitful in benefits, and the plaintiff has done nothing out of which an equitable estoppel or defense in the nature of one can arise.” See also, State v. Davis, 74 W.

1975Va. 261 , 82 S.E. 207 .