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17 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1975–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Millergreen2 sentences1994K.A.T. contends that we can insure rejection of the doctrine in doubtful cases only by adopting the rule established in Miller, supra, that “[t]he stepparent must take positive action interfering with the natural parent’s support obligation to be bound” by equitable estop-pel. 478 A.2d at 359 (emphasis added). 1994K.A.T. contends that we can insure rejection of the doctrine in doubtful cases only by adopting the rule established in Miller, supra, that “[t]he stepparent must take positive action interfering with the natural parent’s support obligation to be bound” by equitable estop-pel. 478 A.2d at 359 (emphasis added). | 4 | 4 |
Leekley v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen2 sentences2012We need not decide here whether WASA is in the position of the sovereign for the purposes of an equitable estoppel analysis. "[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel, if applicable against the government at all, may be invoked only where there is a showing of some type of affirmative misconduct by a government agent.” Mamo v. District of Columbia, 934 A.2d 376, 386 (D.C.2007) (quoting Leekley v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp’t Servs., 726 A.2d 678, 680 (D.C.1999)). 2012We need not decide here whether WASA is in the position of the sovereign for the purposes of an equitable estoppel analysis. "[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel, if applicable against the government at all, may be invoked only where there is a showing of some type of affirmative misconduct by a government agent.” Mamo v. District of Columbia, 934 A.2d 376, 386 (D.C.2007) (quoting Leekley v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp’t Servs., 726 A.2d 678, 680 (D.C.1999)). | 3 | 3 |
Parker v. Sagergreen2 sentences1975In applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, “[t]he vital principle is that he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted.” Goodman v. Dicker, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 353, 354 , 169 F.2d 684, 685 (1948), quoting Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580 , 25 L.Ed. 618 (1880); see Parker v. Sager, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 4, 8 , 174 F.2d 657, 661 (1949). 1975In applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, “[t]he vital principle is that he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted.” Goodman v. Dicker, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 353, 354 , 169 F.2d 684, 685 (1948), quoting Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580 , 25 L.Ed. 618 (1880); see Parker v. Sager, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 4, 8 , 174 F.2d 657, 661 (1949). | 3 | 3 |
Mamo v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2012We need not decide here whether WASA is in the position of the sovereign for the purposes of an equitable estoppel analysis. "[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel, if applicable against the government at all, may be invoked only where there is a showing of some type of affirmative misconduct by a government agent.” Mamo v. District of Columbia, 934 A.2d 376, 386 (D.C.2007) (quoting Leekley v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp’t Servs., 726 A.2d 678, 680 (D.C.1999)). 2012We need not decide here whether WASA is in the position of the sovereign for the purposes of an equitable estoppel analysis. "[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel, if applicable against the government at all, may be invoked only where there is a showing of some type of affirmative misconduct by a government agent.” Mamo v. District of Columbia, 934 A.2d 376, 386 (D.C.2007) (quoting Leekley v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp’t Servs., 726 A.2d 678, 680 (D.C.1999)). | 2 | 2 |
Robinson v. Smithgreen2 sentences2007Nor has Mr. Mamo shown any misconduct on the part of Mr. Teasley or other District government official for the nonpayment of such damages; but, as we have stated, “‘the doctrine of equitable estoppel, if applicable against the government at all, may be invoked only where there is a showing of some type of affirmative misconduct by a government agent.’ ” Leekley v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 726 A.2d 678, 680 (D.C.1999) (quoting Robinson v. Smith, 683 A.2d 481, 492 (D.C.1996)). 1999In addition, “[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel, if applicable against the government at all, may be invoked only where there is a showing of some type of affirmative misconduct by a government agent .” Robinson v. Smith, 683 A.2d 481, 492 (D.C.1996) (citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Goodman v. Dickergreen2 sentences1975In applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, "[t]he vital principle is that he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted." Goodman v. Dicker, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 353, 354 , 169 F.2d 684, 685 (1948), quoting Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580 , 25 L.Ed. 618 (1880); see Parker v. Sager, 85 U.S.App. 1975In applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, "[t]he vital principle is that he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted." Goodman v. Dicker, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 353, 354 , 169 F.2d 684, 685 (1948), quoting Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580 , 25 L.Ed. 618 (1880); see Parker v. Sager, 85 U.S.App. | 2 | 2 |
District of Columbia v. Brookstowne Community Development Co.green1 sentence2012Co., 987 A.2d 442, 450 (D.C.2010) (quoting Hospitality Temps Corp. v. District of Columbia, 926 A.2d 131, 139 (D.C.2007)). | 1 | 1 |
Hospitality Temps Corp. v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence2012Co., 987 A.2d 442, 450 (D.C.2010) (quoting Hospitality Temps Corp. v. District of Columbia, 926 A.2d 131, 139 (D.C.2007)). | 1 | 1 |
Thoubboron v. Ford Motor Co.green2 sentences2007The equitable estoppel doctrine provides that “ ‘a party with full knowledge of the facts, which accepts the benefits of a transaction, contract, statute, regulation, or order may not subsequently take an inconsistent position to avoid the corresponding obligations or effects.’ ” Thoubboron v. Ford Motor Co., 809 A.2d 1204, 1212 (D.C.2002) (quoting First Am. 2007The equitable estoppel doctrine provides that "`a party with full knowledge of the facts, which accepts the benefits of a transaction, contract, statute, regulation, or order may not subsequently take an inconsistent position to avoid the corresponding obligations or effects.'" Thoubboron v. Ford Motor Co., 809 A.2d 1204, 1212 (D.C.2002) (quoting First Am. | 1 | 1 |
Knill v. Knillgreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767, 769 (D.C.1968) (declining to apply doctrine), petition for review denied, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 353 , 418 F.2d 1189 (1969); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 669 , 11 Cal.Rptr. 707, 714 (1961) (finding elements of estoppel absent); Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 117 , 429 A.2d 833, 836 (1980) (facts not sufficient to establish estoppel); V.L.P. v. J.S.S., 407 A.2d 244, 249 (Del.Fam.Ct.1978) (same); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. at 550 , 510 A.2d at 551 (declining to apply doctrine); Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 166-70 , 478 A.2d 351, 1993See, e.g., Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767, 769 (D.C.1968) (declining to apply doctrine), petition for review denied, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 353 , 418 F.2d 1189 (1969); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 669 , 11 Cal.Rptr. 707, 714 (1961) (finding elements of estoppel absent); Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 117 , 429 A.2d 833, 836 (1980) (facts not sufficient to establish estoppel); V.L.P. v. J.S.S., 407 A.2d 244, 249 (Del.Fam.Ct.1978) (same); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. at 550 , 510 A.2d at 551 (declining to apply doctrine); Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 166-70 , 478 A.2d 351, | 1 | 1 |
Cassidy v. Owengreen1 sentence1993See also Cassidy v. Owen, 533 A.2d 253, 255 (D.C.1987). | 1 | 1 |
Nolan v. Nolangreen1 sentence1993The proponent of an equitable estoppel claim must demonstrate that he or she "changed his [or her] position prejudicially in reasonable reliance on a false representation or concealment of material fact which the party to be estopped made with knowledge of the true facts and intent to induce the other to act." Nolan v. Nolan, 568 A.2d 479, 484 (D.C.1990). | 1 | 1 |
Vlp v. Jssgreen1 sentence1993See, e.g., Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767, 769 (D.C.1968) (declining to apply doctrine), petition for review denied, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 353 , 418 F.2d 1189 (1969); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 669 , 11 Cal.Rptr. 707, 714 (1961) (finding elements of estoppel absent); Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 117 , 429 A.2d 833, 836 (1980) (facts not sufficient to establish estoppel); V.L.P. v. J.S.S., 407 A.2d 244, 249 (Del.Fam.Ct.1978) (same); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. at 550 , 510 A.2d at 551 (declining to apply doctrine); Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 166-70 , 478 A.2d 351, | 1 | 1 |
Angela Fuller v. Gerald Fullergreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767, 769 (D.C.1968) (declining to apply doctrine), petition for review denied, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 353 , 418 F.2d 1189 (1969); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 669 , 11 Cal.Rptr. 707, 714 (1961) (finding elements of estoppel absent); Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 117 , 429 A.2d 833, 836 (1980) (facts not sufficient to establish estoppel); V.L.P. v. J.S.S., 407 A.2d 244, 249 (Del.Fam.Ct.1978) (same); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. at 550 , 510 A.2d at 551 (declining to apply doctrine); Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 166-70 , 478 A.2d 351, 1993See, e.g., Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767, 769 (D.C.1968) (declining to apply doctrine), petition for review denied, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 353 , 418 F.2d 1189 (1969); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 669 , 11 Cal.Rptr. 707, 714 (1961) (finding elements of estoppel absent); Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 117 , 429 A.2d 833, 836 (1980) (facts not sufficient to establish estoppel); V.L.P. v. J.S.S., 407 A.2d 244, 249 (Del.Fam.Ct.1978) (same); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. at 550 , 510 A.2d at 551 (declining to apply doctrine); Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 166-70 , 478 A.2d 351, | 1 | 1 |
Clevenger v. Clevengergreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767, 769 (D.C.1968) (declining to apply doctrine), petition for review denied, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 353 , 418 F.2d 1189 (1969); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 669 , 11 Cal.Rptr. 707, 714 (1961) (finding elements of estoppel absent); Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 117 , 429 A.2d 833, 836 (1980) (facts not sufficient to establish estoppel); V.L.P. v. J.S.S., 407 A.2d 244, 249 (Del.Fam.Ct.1978) (same); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. at 550 , 510 A.2d at 551 (declining to apply doctrine); Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 166-70 , 478 A.2d 351, 1993See, e.g., Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767, 769 (D.C.1968) (declining to apply doctrine), petition for review denied, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 353 , 418 F.2d 1189 (1969); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 669 , 11 Cal.Rptr. 707, 714 (1961) (finding elements of estoppel absent); Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 117 , 429 A.2d 833, 836 (1980) (facts not sufficient to establish estoppel); V.L.P. v. J.S.S., 407 A.2d 244, 249 (Del.Fam.Ct.1978) (same); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. at 550 , 510 A.2d at 551 (declining to apply doctrine); Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 166-70 , 478 A.2d 351, | 1 | 1 |
Fuller v. Fullergreen1 sentence1993See, e.g., Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767, 769 (D.C.1968) (declining to apply doctrine), petition for review denied, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 353 , 418 F.2d 1189 (1969); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 669 , 11 Cal.Rptr. 707, 714 (1961) (finding elements of estoppel absent); Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 117 , 429 A.2d 833, 836 (1980) (facts not sufficient to establish estoppel); V.L.P. v. J.S.S., 407 A.2d 244, 249 (Del.Fam.Ct.1978) (same); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. at 550 , 510 A.2d at 551 (declining to apply doctrine); Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 166-70 , 478 A.2d 351, | 1 | 1 |
Remkiewicz v. Remkiewiczgreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767, 769 (D.C.1968) (declining to apply doctrine), petition for review denied, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 353 , 418 F.2d 1189 (1969); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 669 , 11 Cal.Rptr. 707, 714 (1961) (finding elements of estoppel absent); Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 117 , 429 A.2d 833, 836 (1980) (facts not sufficient to establish estoppel); V.L.P. v. J.S.S., 407 A.2d 244, 249 (Del.Fam.Ct.1978) (same); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. at 550 , 510 A.2d at 551 (declining to apply doctrine); Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 166-70 , 478 A.2d 351, 1993See, e.g., Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767, 769 (D.C.1968) (declining to apply doctrine), petition for review denied, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 353 , 418 F.2d 1189 (1969); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 669 , 11 Cal.Rptr. 707, 714 (1961) (finding elements of estoppel absent); Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 117 , 429 A.2d 833, 836 (1980) (facts not sufficient to establish estoppel); V.L.P. v. J.S.S., 407 A.2d 244, 249 (Del.Fam.Ct.1978) (same); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. at 550 , 510 A.2d at 551 (declining to apply doctrine); Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 166-70 , 478 A.2d 351, | 1 | 1 |
People ex rel. Beardsley v. City of Rock Islandgreen2 sentences1990Quoting from People v. Rock Island, 215 Ill. 488, 495 , 74 N.E. 437, 440 (1905), the court stated that [wjhere a party acting in good faith under affirmative acts of a city has made such expensive and permanent improvement that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the rights acquired, the doctrine of equitable estoppel will be applied. 1990Quoting from People v. Rock Island, 215 Ill. 488, 495 , 74 N.E. 437, 440 (1905), the court stated that [wjhere a party acting in good faith under affirmative acts of a city has made such expensive and permanent improvement that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the rights acquired, the doctrine of equitable estoppel will be applied. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| City of Chicago v. Exchange National Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
Cuff v. Van Bogartgreen1 sentence1978But see Haba v. Cuff, Ohio App., 28 Ohio Op.2d 266 , 201 N.E.2d 343 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 , 85 S.Ct. 656 , 13 L.Ed.2d 558 , rehearing denied, 380 U.S. 927 , 85 S.Ct. 883 , 13 L.Ed.2d 815 (1965); City of Fort Worth v. Johnson, 388 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.1964). [1] Obviously, the zoning board cannot attend to every conceivable violation. | 1 | 1 |
| Henry v. Mississippigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burke v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
Chester Park Apartments, Inc. v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1978But see Haba v. Cuff, Ohio App., 28 Ohio Op.2d 266 , 201 N.E.2d 343 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 , 85 S.Ct. 656 , 13 L.Ed.2d 558 , rehearing denied, 380 U.S. 927 , 85 S.Ct. 883 , 13 L.Ed.2d 815 (1965); City of Fort Worth v. Johnson, 388 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.1964). [1] Obviously, the zoning board cannot attend to every conceivable violation. | 1 | 1 |
South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1978But see Haba v. Cuff, Ohio App., 28 Ohio Op.2d 266 , 201 N.E.2d 343 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 , 85 S.Ct. 656 , 13 L.Ed.2d 558 , rehearing denied, 380 U.S. 927 , 85 S.Ct. 883 , 13 L.Ed.2d 815 (1965); City of Fort Worth v. Johnson, 388 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.1964). [1] Obviously, the zoning board cannot attend to every conceivable violation. 1978But see Haba v. Cuff, Ohio App., 28 Ohio Op.2d 266 , 201 N.E.2d 343 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 , 85 S.Ct. 656 , 13 L.Ed.2d 558 , rehearing denied, 380 U.S. 927 , 85 S.Ct. 883 , 13 L.Ed.2d 815 (1965); City of Fort Worth v. Johnson, 388 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.1964). [1] Obviously, the zoning board cannot attend to every conceivable violation. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dews v. Dews
green
2 sentences1994Revisiting the subject in Dews, supra, this court canvassed the decisions and concluded that, while “[m]any appellate courts, including this one, have considered whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel might be applied to prevent a supposed father from denying paternity, ... none that we have found has affirmed a trial court decision to that effect.” 632 A.2d at 1167 (citing cases). 1994Revisiting the subject in Dews, supra, this court canvassed the decisions and concluded that, while “[m]any appellate courts, including this one, have considered whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel might be applied to prevent a supposed father from denying paternity, ... none that we have found has affirmed a trial court decision to that effect.” 632 A.2d at 1167 (citing cases). | 3 | 1994–1994 |
Pietros v. Pietros
green
2 sentences1994Although appellee is able to point to somewhat greater receptivity toward the doctrine recently, see, e.g., Pietros v. Pietros, 638 A.2d 545 (R.I.1994), nothing like a trend can be identified toward imposing the statutory obligations of parenthood on a nonparent by way of equitable considerations. 1994Although appellee is able to point to somewhat greater receptivity toward the doctrine recently, see, e.g., Pietros v. Pietros, 638 A.2d 545 (R.I.1994), nothing like a trend can be identified toward imposing the statutory obligations of parenthood on a nonparent by way of equitable considerations. | 3 | 1994–1994 |
Dickerson v. Colgrove
green
2 sentences1975In applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, "[t]he vital principle is that he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted." Goodman v. Dicker, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 353, 354 , 169 F.2d 684, 685 (1948), quoting Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580 , 25 L.Ed. 618 (1880); see Parker v. Sager, 85 U.S.App. 1975In applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, "[t]he vital principle is that he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted." Goodman v. Dicker, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 353, 354 , 169 F.2d 684, 685 (1948), quoting Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580 , 25 L.Ed. 618 (1880); see Parker v. Sager, 85 U.S.App. | 2 | 1975–1975 |
In Re ALDRIDGE
green
1 sentence2002A dismissal with prejudice would have had res judicata implications for both the Pennsylvania and Illinois suits, the avoidance of which had been appellants’ reason for requesting a voluntary dismissal without prejudice in the first place as appellants acknowledged in Thoubboron I, supra, 624 A.2d at 1215 . 14 Appellants argue that the trial court improperly carved out an equitable estoppel exception to the general rule that plaintiffs may decide against paying a defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs in favor of a dismissal with prejudice. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Schweiker v. Hansen
green
2 sentences1996The doctrine of equitable estoppel, if applicable against the government at all, see Gropp, supra note 24, 606 A.2d at 1016, may be invoked only “where there is a showing of some type of ‘affirmative misconduct’ by a government agent.” Id. (quoting Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788-90 , 101 S.Ct. 1468, 1470-72 , 67 L.Ed.2d 685 (1981); other citations omitted). “[M]ere delay does not constitute ‘affirmative misconduct.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). 1996The doctrine of equitable estoppel, if applicable against the government at all, see Gropp, supra note 24, 606 A.2d at 1016, may be invoked only “where there is a showing of some type of ‘affirmative misconduct’ by a government agent.” Id. (quoting Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788-90 , 101 S.Ct. 1468, 1470-72 , 67 L.Ed.2d 685 (1981); other citations omitted). “[M]ere delay does not constitute ‘affirmative misconduct.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
District of Columbia v. Cahill
green
1 sentence1990Cahill, 60 U.S.App.D.C. at 343, 54 F.2d at 454 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Amer. Cent. Mtg. Invest. v. Unionamerica Mtg. & Etc.
green
2 sentences1987American Century Mortgage Investors v. Unionamerica Mortgage and Equity Trust, 355 A.2d 563 , 565 (D.C. 1976); Parker v. Sager, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 4, 8 , 174 F.2d 657, 661 (1949) (citation omitted). 1987American Century Mortgage Investors v. Unionamerica Mortgage and Equity Trust, 355 A.2d 563 , 565 (D.C. 1976); Parker v. Sager, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 4, 8 , 174 F.2d 657, 661 (1949) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
City of Fort Worth v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1978But see Haba v. Cuff, Ohio App., 28 Ohio Op.2d 266 , 201 N.E.2d 343 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 , 85 S.Ct. 656 , 13 L.Ed.2d 558 , rehearing denied, 380 U.S. 927 , 85 S.Ct. 883 , 13 L.Ed.2d 815 (1965); City of Fort Worth v. Johnson, 388 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.1964). [1] Obviously, the zoning board cannot attend to every conceivable violation. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Westfield v. City of Chicago green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Town of Highland Park v. Marshall
green
1 sentence1978To find a lack of authority here would virtually abolish the doctrine of equitable estoppel as applied to the government, since any invalid official action could be characterized as unauthorized. [8] But see City of Chicago v. Exchange National Bank, 51 Ill.2d 543 , 283 N.E.2d 878 (1972), in which it was suggested that, if the city knew of the violation of the zoning ordinance by the vendor of a building, the vendee could rely on an estoppel defense. [9] In Cahill, supra, the estimated potential loss was at least $6,135. [10] Cf. Westfield v. City of Chicago, 26 Ill.2d 526 , 187 N.E.2d 208 (19 | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.