equitable estoppel doctrine in Florida

2025See e.g., Armas v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 842 So. 2d 210, 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“Equitable estoppel is warranted when the signatory to the contract containing the arbitration clause raises allegations of concerted conduct by both the non-signatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract.”); Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc. v. Pain Clinic of NW Fla., 158 So. 3d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (recognizing a non-signatory defendant can enforce an arbitration clause against a signatory plaintiff); Shetty v. Palm Beach Radiation Oncology Assoc. et al., 915 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)

2022Corp., 733 So. 2d 571, 575 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (“Signing a contract as an agent for a disclosed principal is not sufficient to bind the agent to arbitrate claims against him personally.”); Armas v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 842 So. 2d 210, 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“Non-signatories can also compel arbitration based on the equitable estoppel doctrine.” (emphasis added)).

2007The primary purpose of the doctrine of equitable estoppel is to "prevent a party from profiting from his or her wrongdoing." Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071, 1078 (Fla.2001).

2005The doctrine of equitable estoppel applies “in all cases where one, by word, act or conduct, willfully caused another to believe in the existence of a certain state of things, and thereby induces him to act on this belief injuriously to himself, or to alter his own previous condition to his injury.” Major League Baseball v. Morsani 790 So.2d 1071, 1076 (Fla.2001) (quoting State ex rel.

2002See Dep't of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397, 400 (Fla.1981); Mandarin Paint & Flooring, Inc. v. Potura Coatings of Jacksonville, Inc., 744 So.2d 482, 485 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

1998See State Dep’t of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397, 400 (Fla. 1981).

2015See Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. S.A.P, 835 So.2d 1091 , 1099 (Fla.2002) (stating a main purpose of the doctrine of equitable estoppel "is to prevent a party from profiting from his or her wrongdoing" and applies where the wrongdoer engaged in acts of concealment); see also Acoustic Innovations, Inc. v. Schafer, 976 So.2d 1139 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel so that the cause of action for breach of contract did not accrue until it became clear the employer did not intend to honor the oral employment agreement).

2015See Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. S.A.P, 835 So. 2d 1091, 1099 (Fla. 2002) (stating a main purpose of the doctrine of equitable estoppel “is to prevent a party from profiting from his or her wrongdoing” and applies where the wrongdoer engaged in acts of concealment); see also Acoustic Innovations, Inc. v. Schafer, 976 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel so that the cause of action for breach of contract did not accrue until it became clear the employer did not intend to honor the oral employment agreement). -6- We have considered the o

2025See e.g., Armas v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 842 So. 2d 210, 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“Equitable estoppel is warranted when the signatory to the contract containing the arbitration clause raises allegations of concerted conduct by both the non-signatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract.”); Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc. v. Pain Clinic of NW Fla., 158 So. 3d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (recognizing a non-signatory defendant can enforce an arbitration clause against a signatory plaintiff); Shetty v. Palm Beach Radiation Oncology Assoc. et al., 915 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)

2013A non-signatory such as Heller may compel arbitration under the doctrine of equitable estoppel “ ‘when the signatory to the contract containing the arbitration clause raises allegations of concerted conduct by both the non-signatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract.’ ” Shetty, 915 So.2d at 1235 (quoting Armas, 842 So.2d at 212 ).

2022Based on that finding, we concluded that “the doctrine of equitable estoppel bar[red] the application of the statute of limitations.” Id.

2022Based on that finding, we concluded that “the doctrine of equitable estoppel bar[red] the application of the statute of limitations.” Id.

2025See e.g., Armas v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 842 So. 2d 210, 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“Equitable estoppel is warranted when the signatory to the contract containing the arbitration clause raises allegations of concerted conduct by both the non-signatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract.”); Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc. v. Pain Clinic of NW Fla., 158 So. 3d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (recognizing a non-signatory defendant can enforce an arbitration clause against a signatory plaintiff); Shetty v. Palm Beach Radiation Oncology Assoc. et al., 915 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)

2014Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, for example, Florida courts have permitted a non-signatory defendant to enforce an arbitration clause against a signatory plaintiff either: (1) “when the signatory to a written agreement containing an arbitration clause must rely on the terms of the written agreement in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory,” Koechli v. BIP Int’l, Inc., 870 So.2d 940, 944 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (citation omitted); or (2) when “there are allegations of concerted action by both a nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract.” Roman v. Atl.

2009Owners Ass’n v. Murphy, 554 So.2d 1179, 1181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).

1995We note that the doctrine of estoppel "is an equitable doctrine which is applied only where to refuse its application would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of a fraud." Brickell Bay Club Condominium Ass'n v. Hernstadt, 512 So.2d 994, 996 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), review denied, 520 So.2d 584 (Fla. 1988); see also Pelican Island Property Owners Ass'n v. Murphy, 554 So.2d 1179, 1181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Capital Bank v. Schuler, 421 So.2d 633, 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); McAllister Enters. v. McAllister Hotel, Inc., 219 So.2d 114, 116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).

2002See, e.g., Pritchard v. State, 163 Ariz. 427 , 788 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1990); Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist., 64 Cal.App.4th 1023 , 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 777, 789 (1998); Woodard v. City of Lincoln, 256 Neb. 61 , 588 N.W.2d 831, 836 (1999) ("We find no reason to place the tort claims acts outside the reach of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.”); Brown v. City of New York, 264 A.D.2d 493 , 694 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (1999) (equitably estopping the City from asserting the limitations period due to misconduct); Mercer v. State, 48 Wash.App. 496 , 739 P.2d 703, 706 (1987). .

2002See, e.g., Pritchard v. State, 163 Ariz. 427 , 788 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1990); Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist., 64 Cal.App.4th 1023 , 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 777, 789 (1998); Woodard v. City of Lincoln, 256 Neb. 61 , 588 N.W.2d 831, 836 (1999) ("We find no reason to place the tort claims acts outside the reach of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.”); Brown v. City of New York, 264 A.D.2d 493 , 694 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (1999) (equitably estopping the City from asserting the limitations period due to misconduct); Mercer v. State, 48 Wash.App. 496 , 739 P.2d 703, 706 (1987). .

2002See, e.g., Pritchard v. State, 163 Ariz. 427 , 788 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1990); Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist., 64 Cal.App.4th 1023 , 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 777, 789 (1998); Woodard v. City of Lincoln, 256 Neb. 61 , 588 N.W.2d 831, 836 (1999) ("We find no reason to place the tort claims acts outside the reach of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.”); Brown v. City of New York, 264 A.D.2d 493 , 694 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (1999) (equitably estopping the City from asserting the limitations period due to misconduct); Mercer v. State, 48 Wash.App. 496 , 739 P.2d 703, 706 (1987). .

2002See, e.g., Pritchard v. State, 163 Ariz. 427 , 788 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1990); Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist., 64 Cal.App.4th 1023 , 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 777, 789 (1998); Woodard v. City of Lincoln, 256 Neb. 61 , 588 N.W.2d 831, 836 (1999) ("We find no reason to place the tort claims acts outside the reach of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.”); Brown v. City of New York, 264 A.D.2d 493 , 694 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (1999) (equitably estopping the City from asserting the limitations period due to misconduct); Mercer v. State, 48 Wash.App. 496 , 739 P.2d 703, 706 (1987). .

2002See, e.g., Pritchard v. State, 163 Ariz. 427 , 788 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1990); Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist., 64 Cal.App.4th 1023 , 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 777, 789 (1998); Woodard v. City of Lincoln, 256 Neb. 61 , 588 N.W.2d 831, 836 (1999) ("We find no reason to place the tort claims acts outside the reach of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.”); Brown v. City of New York, 264 A.D.2d 493 , 694 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (1999) (equitably estopping the City from asserting the limitations period due to misconduct); Mercer v. State, 48 Wash.App. 496 , 739 P.2d 703, 706 (1987). .

2002See, e.g., Pritchard v. State, 163 Ariz. 427 , 788 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1990); Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist., 64 Cal.App.4th 1023 , 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 777, 789 (1998); Woodard v. City of Lincoln, 256 Neb. 61 , 588 N.W.2d 831, 836 (1999) ("We find no reason to place the tort claims acts outside the reach of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.”); Brown v. City of New York, 264 A.D.2d 493 , 694 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (1999) (equitably estopping the City from asserting the limitations period due to misconduct); Mercer v. State, 48 Wash.App. 496 , 739 P.2d 703, 706 (1987). .

2002See, e.g., Pritchard v. State, 163 Ariz. 427 , 788 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1990); Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist., 64 Cal.App.4th 1023 , 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 777, 789 (1998); Woodard v. City of Lincoln, 256 Neb. 61 , 588 N.W.2d 831, 836 (1999) ("We find no reason to place the tort claims acts outside the reach of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.”); Brown v. City of New York, 264 A.D.2d 493 , 694 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (1999) (equitably estopping the City from asserting the limitations period due to misconduct); Mercer v. State, 48 Wash.App. 496 , 739 P.2d 703, 706 (1987). .

2002See, e.g., Pritchard v. State, 163 Ariz. 427 , 788 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1990); Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist., 64 Cal.App.4th 1023 , 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 777, 789 (1998); Woodard v. City of Lincoln, 256 Neb. 61 , 588 N.W.2d 831, 836 (1999) ("We find no reason to place the tort claims acts outside the reach of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.”); Brown v. City of New York, 264 A.D.2d 493 , 694 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (1999) (equitably estopping the City from asserting the limitations period due to misconduct); Mercer v. State, 48 Wash.App. 496 , 739 P.2d 703, 706 (1987). .

2002See, e.g., Pritchard v. State, 163 Ariz. 427 , 788 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1990); Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist., 64 Cal.App.4th 1023 , 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 777, 789 (1998); Woodard v. City of Lincoln, 256 Neb. 61 , 588 N.W.2d 831, 836 (1999) ("We find no reason to place the tort claims acts outside the reach of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.”); Brown v. City of New York, 264 A.D.2d 493 , 694 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (1999) (equitably estopping the City from asserting the limitations period due to misconduct); Mercer v. State, 48 Wash.App. 496 , 739 P.2d 703, 706 (1987). .

2002See, e.g., Pritchard v. State, 163 Ariz. 427 , 788 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1990); Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist., 64 Cal.App.4th 1023 , 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 777, 789 (1998); Woodard v. City of Lincoln, 256 Neb. 61 , 588 N.W.2d 831, 836 (1999) ("We find no reason to place the tort claims acts outside the reach of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.”); Brown v. City of New York, 264 A.D.2d 493 , 694 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (1999) (equitably estopping the City from asserting the limitations period due to misconduct); Mercer v. State, 48 Wash.App. 496 , 739 P.2d 703, 706 (1987). .

1965The chancellor also held in the decree that the plaintiff American Oil Company had entered into a contract of purchase with Bishop and by virtue thereof "stands in his shoes and is entitled to claim with him the benefit of the estoppel existing against the defendants." The three decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida cited by the chancellor in his decree as authority for invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel are Texas Co. v. Town of Miami Springs, 44 So.2d 808 (1950), Bregar v. Britton, 75 So.2d 753 (1954), and Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 151 So.2d 433 (1963).

1957"Under such circumstances, the doctrine of equitable estoppel will be applied." The Florida Supreme Court in the case of Texas Company v. Town of Miami Springs, Fla. 1950, 44 So.2d 808 , held that where an oil company, before purchasing two lots in town for a gasoline service station, submitted plans to the town for the proposed stations and received permits to construct them, and the company then purchased the two lots and thereafter permits were renewed by Miami Springs, but one month after the renewal an emergency ordinance was passed forbidding the erection of a service station within 850

2021Watson v. Gray, 48 So. 2d 84 , 87–88 (Fla.1950) (quoting 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 804 (5th ed.1941)).

2003Watson v. Gray, 48 So.2d 84 (Fla.1950)(applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel).

2017As the trial court explained, the doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes a municipality from exercising its zoning power where the “property owner (1) [relying] in good faith (2) upon some act or omission of the government (3) has made such a substantial change in position or has incurred such extensive obligations and expenses that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the. right he acquired.” Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So.2d 10, 15-16 (Fla. 1976) (quoting City of Hollywood v. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co., 283 So.2d 867, 869 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)).

1979(See, for instance, Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1976), Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 151 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1963), City of North Miami Beach v. Keller, 308 So.2d 558 (Fla. DCA 1975).) However, the City argues that Southern Gulf Utilities, Inc. v. City of North Miami Beach, 323 So.2d 669 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1975), [3] cited by the trial judge, precludes application of the doctrine of estoppel because, the City contends, a City has a right and duty, notwithstanding a contract to the contrary, to readjust its rates provided the readjustment is reasonable.

2025See Logan, 350 So. 3d at 410, 412 (first quoting Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 442 ; and then quoting Plastiquim S.A., 337 So. 3d at 1273); see also Kolsky v. Jackson Square, LLC, 28 So. 3d 965, 970 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (holding that nonsignatory defendants may compel arbitration given that conspiracy claim raised "allegations of . . . substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the non-signatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract" (quoting MS Dealer Serv.

2012Id. at 212 .

2021Id.; see also Noble v. Yorke, 490 So. 2d 29, 31 (Fla. 1986) (holding absent specific statutory provision, there is no rule of law which in general exempts statutory rights and defenses from the operation of the doctrine of equitable estoppel).

1986Recently, our supreme court in Noble v. Yorke, 490 So.2d 29 (Fla.1986), where the respondent was injured by a dog bite when she was told by the petitioner to disregard a “bad dog” sign displayed on the property, stated that: [Ajbsent specific statutory provision, there is no rule of law which in general exempts statutory rights and defenses from the operation of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

2009In Ryan v. Lobo De Gonzalez, 841 So.2d 510 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), the court held that section 95.051, did not abrogate the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

2005See Ryan v. Lobo de Gonzalez, 841 So.2d 510 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

1985These facts fully support the alternative conclusion of the trial court that the county's action was barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341 So.2d 977 (Fla. 1976); see Daniell v. Sherrill, 48 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1950); The Florida Companies v. Orange County, 411 So.2d 1008 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). [1] We have carefully examined the evidentiary points raised by the appellant and find either no error, no prejudice, see Bessman v. State, 259 So.2d 776 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Delano Hotel, Inc. v. Gold, 126 So.2d 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961), or both.

1962Recent cases such as Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Lobean, 127 So.2d 98 ; Daniell v. Sherill, 48 So.2d 736 ; and City of Tarpon Springs v. Koch, 142 So.2d 763 , have applied the doctrine of legal estoppel to a governmental body, indicating also that equitable estoppel might be applied, and the Evans defendants contend that such doctrine, or the doctrine of equitable estoppel, should be applied in this case.

1983As the court said in Jones v. First Virginia Mtg. & Real Estate Inv., 399 So.2d 1068, 1074 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981): It is true that sometimes the harsh consequences of an exercise of police power can be avoided by application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, but the conditions which will trigger such relief are tightly circumscribed, lest an "unwise restraint [be placed] upon the police power of the government." In the present case Leadership purchased several different tracts of land zoned "agricultural" from appellees for from $5,500 to $7,300 per acre and took back purchase money mortgages

1982Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 151 So.2d at 435 ; Jones v. First Virginia Mortgage and Real Estate Investment Trust, 399 So.2d at 1074 ; Andover Development Corp. v. City of New Smyrna Beach, 328 So.2d 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).

2025See Logan, 350 So. 3d at 410, 412 (first quoting Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 442 ; and then quoting Plastiquim S.A., 337 So. 3d at 1273); see also Kolsky v. Jackson Square, LLC, 28 So. 3d 965, 970 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (holding that nonsignatory defendants may compel arbitration given that conspiracy claim raised "allegations of . . . substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the non-signatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract" (quoting MS Dealer Serv.

2024“The theory behind the equitable estoppel doctrine is not to make legally valid a void divorce or to make an invalid marriage valid, but rather, to prevent one from disrupting family relations by allowing one to avoid obligations as a spouse.” Mayer v. Mayer, 311 S.E.2d 659, 668 (N.C.